l  -r- 

A,  I 


DIVERSITY  OF 

■iSSS^&N 

“  STACKS 


NOTICE:  Return  or  renew  all  Library  Materialsl  The  Minimum  Fee  for 
each  Lost  Book  is  $50.00. 


The  person  charging  this  material  is  responsible  for 
its  return  to  the  library  from  which  it  was  withdrawn 
on  or  before  the  Latest  Date  stamped  below. 


THE 


VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65 


CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.— XII. 


THE 

VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 

AND 

THE  ARMY  OF  THE  JAMES 


BY 

ANDREW  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  CHIEF  OF  ENGINEERS,  AND  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL 
U.  S.  A.  J  CHIEF  OF  STAFF,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  J  COMMANDING 
SECOND  CORPS,  ETC.,  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 

1883 


Copyright,  1883,  by 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 


Trow's 

Printing  and  Bookbinding  Company 
201-213  East  Twelfth  Street 

NEW  YORK 


/  1 


4 

5  3 

crp 

REMOTE  STOEAGs. 

oo 

« 

CQ 

LuJ 

bcokstacks  office 

ac 

UJ 
— i 

PREFACE. 

$ 

a 

O 

o 

M 

N 

0 

01 


«JI 


o 


CQ 


T> 


In  preparing  this  narrative  I  have  met  with  great  and  un¬ 
expected  difficulties  from  the  incomplete  condition  of  the 
files  of  the  War  Department  in  the  matter  of  the  official 
reports  of  Corps,  Division,  and  Brigade  commanders.  So 
many  officers  of  high  command  were  killed  and  wounded 
during  the  campaign,  the  movements  by  day  and  night, 
the  battles,  actions,  and  close  contact  with  the  enemy  were 
so  unceasing,  that  there  was  but  little  time  for  the  prepara¬ 
tion  of  reports,  and  to  this  day  many  of  them,  if  prepared, 
have  not  been  received  at  the  War  Department.  The  de¬ 
spatches  become  therefore  the  more  important,  but  the  files 
of  these  are  not  complete. 

All  the  Reports,  Returns,  orders,  despatches,  and  papers 
of  every  kind  in  the  War  Department,  including  the  Con¬ 
federate  Archives,  have  been  placed  at  my  disposal  by 
authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  I  am  under  many 
obligations  to  General  Drum,  Adjutant-General,  and  Col¬ 
onel  R.  N.  Scott,  in  charge  of  the  preparation  of  the  “  Offi¬ 
cial  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies  ”  for 
publication. 

Major-General  Hancock  has  furnished  me  with  a  complete 
printed  set  of  the  reports  made  by  him  during  the  war. 

I  am  indebted  to  Colonel  George  Meade  for  placing  in  my 
hands  the  retained  copies  of  all  General  Meade’s  despatches 


S 1 68 ! 89 


VI 


PREFACE. 


sent  and  received  during  the  campaign.  I  have  also  had 
my  own  papers  covering  the  same  period. 

I  am  also  indebted  to  Major-General  de  Peyster  for  the 
valuable  information  contained  in  his  elaborate  work,  “  La 
Royale,”  published  at  his  own  expense  for  private  circula¬ 
tion,  and  for  the  aid  .1  have  derived  from  his  correspondence 
with  Confederate  officers. 

I  am  also  under  obligations  to  General  Fitz  Lee  and  Gen¬ 
eral  E.  P.  Alexander  for  valuable  information,  and  to  the 
Rev.  J.  William  Jones,  D.D.,  Secretary  of  the  Southern 
Historical  Society,  for  a  full  set  of  the  publications  of  that 
Society  from  January,  1876,  to  the  present  day,  and  for 
other  information. 

The  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts  placed 
all  its  papers  in  my  hands. 

Colonel  John  P.  Nicholson,  of  Philadelphia,  offered  the 
volumes  of  his  valuable  Military  Library  for  my  use. 

From  the  gentlemen  having  charge  of  the  several  sub¬ 
offices  of  the  Adjutant-General’s  Department — Messrs. 
Joseph  W.  Kirkley,  Henry  Ellerbrook,  Thomas  C.  Bourne, 
A.  P.  Tasker,  F.  Jones,  and  Hemy  E.  Scott — I  have  had 
constant  aid.  , 

Mr.  Fitz  Gerald,  Librarian  of  the  War  Department,  has 
sent  me  all  the  volumes  of  the  Library  treating  of  the  War. 
Indeed,  wherever  I  have  asked  for  assistance  in  any  shape  it 
has  been  given  me  in  the  most  obliging  manner. 

To  Mr.  William  J.  Warren,  Chief  Clerk  of  the  Engineer 
Department,  I  am  under  very  great  obligations  for  untiring 
assistance  throughout  the  whole  time  of  the  preparation  of 
this  narrative.  Through  him,  also,  I  have  had  the  use  of 
the  Journal  of  Colonel  Roebling,  of  General  Warren’s  staff. 


A.  A.  Humphreys. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

List  of  Maps, . xi 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Position  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  the  Spring 
of  1864  —  The  Reorganization  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac— General  Plan  of  Operations  for 
the  Campaign — The  Movement  by  the  Left  Flank 
Decided  on  —  The  Composition  and  Numbers  of 
the  Two  Armies, . 1 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Passage  of  the  Rapid  an  —  The  Battle  of  the 
Wilderness, . 18 


CHAPTER  III. 

Spottsylvania  Court  House, . 57 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Movement  to  the  North  Anna  River — The  Cavalry 
Corps  sent  against  the  Confederate  Cavalry, 

AND  TO  HAXALL’S  LANDING  ON  JAMES  RlVER,  .  .119 


vm 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  V. 

PAGE 

Tiie  Co-operative  Movement  op  tee  Army  of  the 
James — The  Battle  of  Druky’s  Bluff,  .  .  .  137 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Passage  of  the  Pamunkey  River — Totopotomoy  and 
Cold  Harbor, . 160 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Passage  of  James  River  —  Assaults  upon  the  In- 

TRENCIIMENTS  OF  PETERSBURG, . 194 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Movement  against  the  Weldon  and  SouTn  Side 
Railroads  —  The  Cavalry  Engagements  in  the 
Vicinity  of  Trevylian  Station  on  the  Virginia 
Central  Railroad,  and  Reams’s  Station  on  the 
Weldon  Railroad — The  Casualties  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  from  the  Commencement  of  the 
Campaign  until  June  30rrn  —  The  Demonstration 
against  Washington, . 226 

CHAPTER  IX. 

The  Operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  against 

THE  INTRENCHMENTS  OF  PETERSBURG  TO  BE  BY  REG¬ 
ULAR  Approaches — Movement  to  the  North  Bank 
of  the  James — The  Petersburg  Mine,  .  .  .  246 

CHAPTER  X. 

Movement  to  the  North  Bank  of  the  James  to 
Threaten  Richmond  —  Capture  of  the  Weldon 
Railroad  at  the  Globe  Tavern — The  Battle  of 
Reams’s  Station, . 267 


CONTENTS. 


IX 


CHAPTER  XI. 

PAGE 

Movement  against  Richmond  on  the  North  Bank  of 
the  James — Capture  of  Fort  Harrison— Co-oper¬ 
ative  Movement  on  the  Left,  by  which  that 
Flank  is  Extended  to  Peebles’s  Farm  —  Move¬ 
ments  against  our  Right  on  the  North  Bank  of 
TnE  James  —  Movement  to  Turn  Lee’s  Right 
Flank  and  Occupy  the  South  Side  Railroad — 

Co  -  operative  Movement  against  Lee’s  Left 
Flank, . 284 


CHAPTER  XII. 

The  Winter  of  1864-65 — Movement  to  Break  up  the 
Wagon-train  Route  of  Supply  from  Hicksford, 
on  the  Weldon  Railroad,  to  Petersburg,  and 
Extension  of  our  Retrenchments  to  Hatcher’s 
Run — The  Capture  and  Recapture  of  Fort  Sted- 
man — Preparations  to  Move  against  Lee’s  Right 
Flank  and  the  Danville  and  South  Side  Rail¬ 
roads,  . 308 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Movement  to  Turn  Lee’s  Right  —  Actions  of  White 
Oak  Ridge  and  Dinwiddie  Court  House — The  Bat¬ 
tle  of  Five  Forks— Lee’s  Intrenchments  West 
of  Petersburg  Carried — He  Abandons  the  Rich¬ 
mond  and  Petersburg  Lines,  and  Retreats  to¬ 
ward  Danville, . 322 

CHAPTER  XIY. 

Lee’s  Army  Assembled  at  Amelia  Court  House — 
Night  March  Past  Meade’s  and  Sheridan’s  Left 
Flank — Attacked  while  Retreating — Battles  of 


X 


CONTENTS. 


1 


PAGE 

Sailor’s  Creek— Retreat  Continued  During  the 
Night — Halts  near  Farmville — Correspondence 
Between  Grant  and  Lee — Surrender  of  Lee  at 
Appomattox — Surrender  of  All  Other  Confeder¬ 
ate  Armies— Army  of  the  Potomac  Disbanded,  .  373 

APPENDIX  A. 

Organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Com¬ 
manded  by  Major-General  George  G.  Meade,  on 
May  4,  1864, .  401 


APPENDIX  B. 

Extract  from  Consolidated  Morning  Report  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  April  30,  1864— Corre¬ 
spondence  with  the  Adjutant-General,  .  .  408 

APPENDIX  C. 

Organization  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
Commanded  by  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  January 


31,  1864 

,  and  August,  1864, 

.  411 

APPENDIX 

D,  • 

•  •  • 

.  421 

u 

E,  . 

•  •  • 

.  423 

u 

E,  . 

•  •  • 

.  424 

u 

G,  . 

•  •  • 

.  425 

(< 

H,  . 

•  •  • 

.  426 

u 

I,  • 

•  •  * 

.  428 

(< 

J,  . 

•  •  • 

.  428 

u 

K,  . 

•  •  • 

.  429 

i( 

E,  . 

•  •  • 

.  432 

it 

M,  . 

i  »  • 

* 

.  439 

LIST  OF  MAPS. 


The  maps  are  placed  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 

Virginia  Between  Washington  and  Richmond. 
The  Wilderness. 

Spottsylvania  Court  House. 

Totopotomoy. 

Cold  Harbor. 

North  Anna. 

Bermuda  Hundred. 

Richmond. 

Petersburg. 


General  Map  of  the  Field  of  Operations. 


THE 


VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  POSITION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  AND 
OF  THE  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA  IN  THE 
SPRING  OF  1864— THE  REORGANIZATION  OF  THE 
ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC— GENERAL  PLAN  OF  OP¬ 
ERATIONS  FOR  THE  CAMPAIGN— THE  MOVEMENT 
BY  THE  LEFT  FLANK  DECIDED  ON— THE  COMPO¬ 
SITION  AND  NUMBERS  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES. 

In  the  Spring  of  1864  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  lay  be¬ 
tween  the  Rapidan  and  the  Rappahannock.  The  infantry 
was  posted  chiefly  in  the  vicinity  of  Culpeper  Court  House 
covering  the  roads  leading  from  Lee’s  position,  the  First  and 
Third  Corps  about  two  miles  in  advance  of  the  Court  House, 
the  Second  Corps  near  Stevensburg,  the  Sixth  Corps  near 
"Welford’s  Ford,  on  Hazel  River,  and  the  Fifth  Corps  guard¬ 
ing  the  railroad  from  the  Rappahannock  River  back  to  Bris- 
toe  Station,  near  Manassas  Junction.  The  Ninth  Corps,  under 
General  Burnside,  began  to  relieve  the  Fifth  Corps  from 
this  duty  on  April  25th,  and  between  the  1st  and  3d  of  May 
encamped  along  the  railroad  from  Manassas  Junction  to 
Rappahannock  Station. 

The  main  body  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac  was  about  two  miles  in  front  of  the  First  Corps,  the 
other  part  of  it  near  Stevensburg.  A  chain  of  infantry 
XII.— 1 


2 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


pickets,  well  in  advance,  encircled  the  whole  army  ;  cavalry 
pickets  extended  outside  of  these  to  give  early  notice  of  any 
serious  movement  of  the  enemy.  The  Rapidan  was  care¬ 
fully  watched,  especially  at  the  fords  and  at  the  railroad 
bridge. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  lay  along  its  intrench- 
ments  on  the  Rapidan,  from  Barnett’s  Ford,  about  five  miles 
above  the  railroad  crossing  of  that  river,  down  to  the  vicin¬ 
ity  of  Morton’s  Ford,  a  distance  of  eighteen  or  twenty  miles. 
Ewell’s  corps  held  the  lower  half  of  these  intrenchments, 
Hill’s  the  upper  half.  A  few  brigades  guarded  ^ie  river, 
the  main  force  being  concentrated  in  the  rear  ready  to  ad¬ 
vance  to  the  river  or  to  either  flank.  The  fords  below  and 
above  the  intrenchments  were  watched  by  small  detach¬ 
ments  of  cavalry,  the  main  force  of  which  lay  along  the 
Rappahannock  below  Fredericksburg,  where,  in  a  country 
scarcely  touched  by  the  war,  forage  was  comparatively 
abundant.  Having  an  intrenched  front  on  the  banks  of  a 
river,  his  left  partly  withdrawn,  and  the  Wilderness  on  his 
right  flank  not  far  from  his  return  intrenchment  on  Mine 
Run,  Lee  could  not  use  cavalry  on  his  front,  and  did  not 
need  them  on  his  right  except  in  small  parties  to  watch  the 
crossings  of  the  river  and  the  main  roads. 

The  return  intrenchment  on  Lee’s  right,  beginning  near 
Morton’s  Ford,  extended  up  Mine  Run  to  its  source  near 
Antioch  Meeting  House,  south  of  the  plank  road  running 
from  Orange  Court  House  to  Fredericksburg.  General 
Lee’s  headquarters  were  at  Orange  Court  House,  about 
seventy  miles  from  Richmond. 

General  Longstreet  with  two  of  the  divisions  of  his  Corps 
returned  to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  the  last  part 
of  April,  and  was  held  in  the  vicinity  of  Gordonsville,  a  po¬ 
sition  from  which  he  could  better  meet  an  advance  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  by  its  right  flank  than  by  its  left.  It 


THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  SPRING  OF  ’64. 


3 


■was  known  to  General  Meade  that  General  Longstreet  had 
returned,  but  it  was  reported  and  believed  that  his  three  di¬ 
visions  were  with  him,  Pickett’s,  Field’s,  and  Kershaw’s. 

On  March  4tli  General  Meade  recommended  to  the  Secre¬ 
tary  of  War  to  consolidate  the  five  infantry  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  form  three  corps  of  them.  This 
consolidation  was  effected  by  orders  from  the  War  Depart¬ 
ment  dated  March  23d,  the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Corps 
being  retained,  and  the  divisions  of  the  First  and  Third 
Corps  transferred  to  the  three  retained  corps,  though  pre¬ 
serving  their  corps  and  division  badges  and  distinctive 
marks.  This  re-organization  required  brigades  and  divi¬ 
sions  in  all  the  five  corps  to  be  consolidated.1 

The  reason  given  for  this  reorganization  was  the  reduced 
strength  of  nearly  all  the  infantry  regiments  composing  the 
army ;  but  it  caused  some  dissatisfaction  with  both  officers 
and  enlisted  men,  owing  to  the  spirit  of  rivalry  between  the 
several  corps,  the  divisions  of  a  corps,  and  the  brigades  of  a 
division.  The  history  and  associations  of  these  organiza¬ 
tions  were  different,  and  when  they  were  merged  in  other 
organizations  their  identity  was  lost  and  their  pride  and 
esprit  de  coips  wounded. 

At  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of  1864,  in  the  first  week 
of  May,  the  three  infantry  corps  amounted  to  73,390  officers 
and  enlisted  men,  giving  an  average  strength  of  nearly  25,000 
to  each.  In  a  country  so  heavily  wooded  as  that  in  which 
the  operations  were  to  be  conducted,  five  infantry  corps 
of  about  15,000  each  would  have  been  a  more  judicious 
organization,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  communication  be¬ 
tween  the  corps  commander  and  the  subordinate  command- 

1  The  new  Second  Corps  consisted  of  the  old  Second,  formed  in  two  divisions, 
and  the  old  Third  Corps,  consisting  of  two  divisions.  The  new  Fifth  Corps  con¬ 
sisted  of  the  old  Fifth,  formed  in  two  divisions,  and  the  old  First  Corps,  formed  in 
two  divisions.  A  division  that  had  been  united  with  the  Third  Corps  on  J uly  9, 
1863,  was  transferred  to  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  was  the  third  division  of  that  corps, 


4 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


ers  in  a  battle  in  such  a  country,  and  the  consequent  diffi¬ 
culty  of  prompt  and  efficient  control  of  extensive  lines  of 
battle,  especially  at  critical  moments,  or  when  unforeseen 
exigencies  occurred.  The  nature  of  the  appointment  of  a 
corps  commander,  emanating  as  it  did  from  the  President, 
conferred  a  much  wider  discretion  on  him  than  that  author¬ 
ized  in  a  division  commander,  and  that  discretion  wras  some¬ 
times  needed  in  the  division  commanders  of  corps  25,000 
strong. 

A  marked  case  exemplifying  this  difficulty  will  be  found 
in  the  second  day’s  fighting  on  the  left  in  the  Wilderness. 
General  Hancock’s  lines  were  so  extended,  and  his  troops  on 
the  right  were  so  separated  from  those  on  the  left,  owing  to 
the  difference  in  the  character  of  the  tasks  allotted  to  each, 
that  on  the  second  day  he  assigned  General  Birney  to  the 
command  of  his  right  wing,  and  General  Gibbon  to  the  com¬ 
mand  of  his  left  wing,  in  which  commands  these  officers 
needed  the  authority  and  discretion  of  corps  commanders. 
The  difficulties  were  greatly  increased  when,  further  on  in 
the  day,  General  Hancock  had,  besides  his  own  corps  and 
Getty’s  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  two  divisions  of  the 
Fifth  Corps  and  one  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps — divisions 
to  which  General  Birney  was  a  stranger,  and  the  character 
of  whose  officers  he  was  unacquainted  with.  It  is  well  known 
that  the  personal  character  of  a  general  officer  in  moments  of 
difficulty  has  a  powerful  influence  upon  the  result. 

These  criticisms  are  made  in  order  to  a  full  understanding 
of  the  difficulties  of  the  campaign. 

By  an  act  approved  on  the  29th  of  February,  1864,  Congress 
revived  the  grade  of  Lieutenant-General  in  the  army,  and 
authorized  the  President,  during  his  pleasure,  to  assign  the 
officer  of  that  grade  to  the  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
United  States. 

On  the  9th  of  March  following,  General  Grant  received 


THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  SPRING  OF  ’64. 


5 


his  commission  as  Lieutenant-General,  and  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  armies. 

On  the  10th,  he  visited  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
headquarters  of  which  was  near  Brandy  Station,  on  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Bailroad,  about  seventy  miles  from 
Washington,  and  announced  to  General  Meade  his  intention 
of  making  his  headquarters  with  that  army.  The  reasons 
for  this  determination  mentioned  by  Badeau  in  his  “  Military 
History  of  General  Grant  ”  (which  are  supposed  to  be  those 
of  General  Grant  himself),  were,  “the  transcendent  import¬ 
ance  of  the  issues  in  Virginia  upon  which  the  fate  of  both 
the  national  and  the  rebel  capital  depended,”  and  the 
fact  that  the  force  opposed  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
(the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia)  “was  the  strongest,  the 
best  led,  and  the  best  appointed  ”  army  in  the  Confederate 
service. 

Another  consideration  was,  that  “the  political  and  per¬ 
sonal  influences  of  various  sorts  and  of  various  individuals 
which  centred  at  Washington  had  thwarted  some  generals, 
and  interfered  with  all  who  had  commanded  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  It  was  General 
Grant’s  duty  himself  to  encounter  these  difficulties,  and  to 
withstand,  if  he  could  not  prevent,  political  interference  ;  to 
remain  where  he  could  control  all  the  movements  of  all  the 
armies,  absolutely  and  independently.  .  .  .  If  he  re¬ 

mained  at  the  East  this  was  secured,  but  with  the  General- 
in-Chief  a  thousand  miles  away,  the  Government  might  be 
unable  to  resist  entreaties  or  threats  of  interested  or  anxious 
outsiders,  and  the  best  concerted  schemes  might  come  to 
naught.  .  .  .  Unless  he  was  near  the  capital,  he  could 

not  control  all  the  operations  of  all  the  armies  without  in¬ 
terruption,  and  could  not  carry  out  the  plan  that  he  believed 
the  only  one  by  which  the  rebellion  could  be  overthrown. 
In  Washington  General  Grant  would  not  stay  in  time  of 


6 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


war ;  lie  must  then  direct,  in  person,  the  campaigns  of  that 
renowned  Army  of  the  Potomac.” 

But  General  Grant  says,  in  his  report  of  July  22,  1865, 
upon  the  operations  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  from 
the  date  of  his  appointment  as  Lieutenant-General  to  the 
close  of  the  war,  “  I  may  here  state  that  commanding  all  the 
armies  as  I  did,  I  tried,  as  far  as  possible,  to  leave  General 
Meade  in  independent  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac.  My  instructions  for  that  army  were  all  through  him, 
and  were  general  in  their  nature,  leaving  all  the  details  and 
the  execution  to  him.” 

On  the  9th  of  April,  General  Meade  was  instructed  that 
Lee’s  army  would  be  his  objective ;  that  General  Butler 
with  the  Army  of  the  James  would  move  against  Richmond 
by  the  south  bank  of  James  River,  on  the  same  day  that  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  moved  against  Lee,  and  that  if  Lee 
fell  back  upon  Richmond,  the  two  armies  would  form  a 
junction  on  James  River,  preferably  above  the  city.  In  the 
event  of  Lee’s  falling  back  toward  Richmond  all  the  lines 
of  supply  to  that  city  were  to  be  destroyed  as  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  advanced,  and  if  the  junction  of  the  two  ar¬ 
mies  took  place  below  the  city,  the  destruction  of  the  lines 
of  supply  south  of  the  James  would  be  effected  by  them. 

In  co-operation  with  the  movement  upon  Lee  and  upon 
Richmond,  General  Sigel  (succeeded  by  General  Hunter) 
was  directed  to  move  the  force  under  his  command  in  two 
columns,  one  under  General  Crook  from  the  Great  Kanawha 
through  Lewisburg  to  the  East  Tennessee  and  Virginia 
Railroad,  and  down  that  railroad  (“doing  all  the  damage 
possible  ”)  and  unite  with  the  other  column,  which  was  to 
move  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  Staunton,  and,  if  practi¬ 
cable,  to  Lynchburg,  by  way  of  Lexington  or  Charlottes¬ 
ville,  and  then  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  byway  of  Gor- 
donsville,  destroying,  as  far  as  practicable,  railroads  that 


THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  SPRING  OF  ’64. 


7 


could  be  used  as  lines  of  supply  to  the  enemy,  and  also  the 
James  River  and  Kanawha  Canal. 

Apart  from  being  the  Confederate  capital,  Richmond  was 
one  of  the  most  important  military  positions  in  the  Southern 
States.  It  is  at  the  head  of  tide-water  of  James  River  and 
of  navigation  for  sea-going  steamers  of  the  smaller  class, 
but  for  over  thirty  miles  below  the  city  the  river  is  so  nar¬ 
row  as  to  be  readily  defended.  It  is  connected  by  railroads 
and  by  the  James  River  and  Kanawha  Canal  with  the  most 
fertile  and  productive  parts  of  Virginia  north  of  the  James, 
and  with  East  Tennessee.  South  of  the  James  it  is  con¬ 
nected  by  railroads  with  all  the  seaports  of  the  South 
Atlantic  and  Gulf  States  as  far  west  as  the  State  of  Mis¬ 
sissippi,  and  with  all  the  interior  towns  and  productive 
districts  of  those  states.  Those  seaports  our  blockading 
squadrons  did  not  succeed  in  closing  against  enterprising 
blockade-runners.  It  had  iron  works,  workshops,  and  manu¬ 
factories  in  which  the  materiel  of  war  was  prepared. 

Its  proximity  to  Washington  and  the  Middle  States  added 
to  its  importance,  and  being  the  Confederate  capital  still 
further  increased  it,  though  this  last  consideration  was  not 
so  important  as  it  had  been  earlier  in  the  war,  when  it  was 
still  doubtful  what  encouragement  or  assistance  Great  Brit¬ 
ain  and  France  might  afford  the  Confederate  States.  The 
attitude  of  Great  Britain  toward  Mexico,  late  in  the  Spring 
of  1862,  made  it  evident  that  she  would  not  take  any  active 
part  with  them,  but  the  invasion  of  Mexico  by  French  troops 
rendered  it  quite  probable  that  the  Emperor  Louis  Napo¬ 
leon  might  do  so. 

The  question  has  been  asked  why  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac  was  not  withdrawn  from  the  Rapidan  in  the  Spring  of 
1864,  and  moved  by  water  to  the  near  vicinity  of  Richmond, 
where,  by  taking  possession  of  the  lines  of  supply  of  that 
great  military  depot,  the  force  defending  it  would  be  obliged 


8 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


to  assume  the  offensive  and  attack  the  enveloping  army  in 
its  intrenchments.  But  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  Lee 
would  have  withdrawn  to  and  remained  within  the  care¬ 
fully  prepared  fortifications  enclosing  Richmond  while  this 
transfer  was  being  made,  but  that,  judging  from  his  'opera¬ 
tions  after  Gettysburg,  and  up  to  the  Winter,  of  1863-64,  he 
would  have  advanced  beyond  the  city  so  far  that  a  com¬ 
pletely  enveloping  line  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  that 
distance  from  the  city  would  not  have  been  practicable 
and  that  by  his  intrenching  and  continuing  to  extend  and 
intrench,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  have  been  forced 
to  attack  constantly  in  order  to  gain  possession  of  those 
lines  of  supply  at  a  suitable  distance  from  Richmond,  and 
while  extending  its  enveloping  lines  would  have  been  sub¬ 
ject  to  attack  on  the  extending  flank  under  unfavorable  cir¬ 
cumstances. 

But  suppose  the  city  captured  while  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  remained  strong  enough  to  keep  the  field  and  con¬ 
tinue  the  contest  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac ;  it  would 
then  probably  have  moved  westward  toward  Lynchburg,  or 
south  of  west  to  some  similar  point,  as,  for  instance,  Dan¬ 
ville,  covering  railroads  that  would  have  formed  its  lines  of 
supply.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  must  then  have  followed, 
rebuilding  railroads  and  guarding  them  afterward  (which  in 
moving  from  the  Rapidan  to  Richmond  it  did  not  do),  and 
have  fought  battles  corresponding  to  those  it  fought  on  the 
route  to  Richmond,  but  under  less  favorable  circumstances 
as  to  the  maintenance  of  its  supplies.  The  face  of  the 
country  west  of  Richmond  is,  however,  better  adapted  to 
the  handling  of  troops  than  that  of  the  region  near  tidal 
waters,  though  that  would  not  have  rendered  the  conflicts 
less  bloody. 

A  direct  movement  against  Lee  in  the  field  so  distant 
from  Richmond  as  the  Rapidan,  would  give  opportunities  of 


1 

j 

THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  SPRING  OF  ’64.  9 

flanking  operations  by  the  whole  army,  and  a  freer  handling 
of  it  than  the  one  just  referred  to,  and  therefore  with  more 
opportunities  of  success  in  destroying  the  power  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia.  Until  the  James  River  was  crossed 
this  movement  would  cover  Washington  better  than  the 
other. 

But  move  as  we  might,  long-continued,  hard  fighting 
under  great  difficulties  was  before  us,  and  whatever  might 
be  the  line  of  operations  adopted,  the  successful  execution 
of  the  task  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could  only  be  ac¬ 
complished  by  the  vigorous  and  untiring  efforts  of  all  be¬ 
longing  to  that  army,  and  by  suffering  heavy  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded,  and  that  the  whole  army  well  understood. 

On  the  15th  of  April,  General  Benham,  of  the  Engineers, 
was  instructed  confidentially  to  have  prepared  by  the  end  of 
April,  in  such  manner  as  not  to  attract  attention,  water 
transportation  for  the  pontoon  bridge  materiel  for  crossing 
James  River,  and  General  Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery,  was 
ordered  to  have  siege  guns  and  siege  materiel  ready  at 
Washington  for  transportation  at  that  time. 

Lee’s  army  being  the  objective,  the  first  question  was,  by 
which  flank  should  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  move. 

To  move  by  our  right  flank  would  take  us  through  a  more 
open  and  cultivated  country  than  that  we  should  find  in 
moving  by  our  left ;  but  then  we  would  be  obliged  to  detach 
a  strong  force  to  protect  the  Alexandria  Railroad,  and  our 
depot  on  it,  and  when  the  fifteen  days’  supplies  of  the  wagon 
train  were  exhausted,  the  protecting  force  must  be  in¬ 
creased,  for  the  wagon  train  and  for  the  additional  length 
of  railroad  we  had  acquired  ;  or,  if  the  railroad  were  aban¬ 
doned,  a  strong  covering  force  would  be  required  for  the 
wagon  train  moving  to  and  from  navigable  waters.  The 
proper  care  of  the  wounded,  of  which  we  expected  to  have 
a  large  number  on  hand  in  a  few  days,  would  be  greatly 
1* 


10  THE  VIRGINIA.  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


facilitated  by  the  easy  access  to  water  transportation  that  a 
movement  by  the  left  would  afford.  To  clear  the  left  of  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments  on  the  Rapidan  at  Barnett’s  Ford,  we 
must  cross  that  river  above  that  point,  and  advance  by  the 
roads  from  Madison  Court  House  and  from  Stannardsville 
to  Orange  Court  House  and  to  Gordonsville,  passing  over 
Southwest  Mountain,  near  to  which  are  Orange  Court  House 
and  Gordonsville.  The  distance  we  should  be  obliged  to 
traverse  before  reaching  Southwest  Mountain,  more  than 
forty  miles,  fully  exposed  to  the  view  of  the  enemy,  would 
give  him  ample  time  to  take  up  and  intrench  a  position 
covering  the  roads  through  Southwest  Mountain  by  which 
we  must  advance ;  and  equal  difficulties  would  be  encoun¬ 
tered  should  we  move  still  further  to  his  left. 

In  moving  by  our  left  flank  we  should  abandon  our  line  of 
supply  by  the  Alexandria  Railroad,  and  at  once  open  short 
routes  of  communication  from  our  protected  flank,  the  left, 
to  navigable  waters  connected  with  Washington  and  other 
depots  of  supply.  No  protecting  force  would  be  necessary 
to  cover  these  short  land  routes. 

The  objection  to  moving  by  our  left  consisted  in  the  char¬ 
acter  of  the  country  south  of  the  Rapidan,  through  which 
we  must  pass  for  the  distance  of  ten  or  fifteen  miles  after 
crossing  the  river,  and  in  which  we  might  be  obliged  to 
fight  the  first  battle.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  well 
acquainted  with  the  chief  roads  passing  through  that  region, 
known  as  the  Wilderness,  but  there  were  besides  these  chief 
roads  numerous  wood-roads,  connecting  the  farms,  mines, 
etc.,  and  intersecting  the  main  roads.  The  farms  were  few 
in  number,  the  greater  part  of  the  country  being  covered 
with  a  forest,  usually  of  dense  growth,  and  over  a  large  part 
of  its  extent  there  was,  besides,  an  almost  impenetrable 
undergrowth,  which  it  was  very  difficult  for  even  small 
bodies  of  men  to  move  in.  To  handle  large  bodies  of  troops 


THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  SPRING  OF  ’64. 


11 


in  battle  in  such  a  field  was  exceedingly  difficult.  Except 
along  the  main  roads  and  in  the  open  ground  of  the  farms, 
artillery  would  be  of  little  use.  But  that  was  not  the  only 
disadvantage  ;  for  an  enemy  remaining  on  the  defensive 
awaiting  attack  where  this  undergrowth  existed,  would  be 
unseen,  while  the  troops  advancing  to  attack  would  make 
their  presence  known,  and  thus  the  tangled  growth  would 
serve  in  some  measure  as  an  intrenchment,  at  least  for  the 
first  and  most  destructive  fire.  In  the  region  about  Chan- 
cellorsville  the  country  was  more  open  and  the  woods  less 
dense.  There  was  some  reason  to  believe,  however,  from 
our  experience  in  the  movement  against  Lee  in  the  preced¬ 
ing  November,  that  by  setting  the  whole  army  in  motion  at 
midnight,  with  its  reserve  artillery  and  great  trains  of  over 
four  thousand  wagons,  it  might  move  so  far  beyond  the  Rap- 
idan  the  first  day  that  it  would  be  able  to  pass  out  of  the 
Wilderness  and  turn,  or  partly  turn,  the  right  flank  of  Lee 
before  a  general  engagement  took  place.  There  was  no 
question  of  the  practicability  of  the  troops,  with  their  fight¬ 
ing  trains,  accomplishing  this,  as  they  were  quite  equal  to, 
and  ready  for,  a  continuous  march  of  thirty  miles  or  more 
in  twenty-four  hours,  by  which  they  would  have  got  sub¬ 
stantially  clear  of  the  Wilderness  ;  they  had  often  before 
made  such  marches  when  called  on  to  do  so  ;  but  the  ques¬ 
tion  was  as  to  the  practicability  of  moving  the  great  trains 
of  the  army  that  distance  simultaneously  with  the  troops, 
so  as  to  keep  them  under  cover  of  the  army. 

It  was  well  known  that  daylight  would  divulge  our  move¬ 
ment  to  Lee’s  signal  officers  on  Clark’s  Mountain,  and  at 
other  points  along  his  lines,  and  it  was  believed  that  he 
would  at  once  move  by  the  Orange  and  Fredericksburg  pike 
and  plank  roads  to  oppose  us. 

Superiority  in  numbers  on  such  a  field  would  be  of  less 
value  than  on  any  other.  Besides,  with  such  intelligent 


12 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’G5. 


material  as  the  larger  part  of  both  armies  was  composed  of, 
the  greater  familiarity  of  the  Southern  men  with  the  dense 
forests  and  wooded  swamps  of  the  South  would  give  them 
an  advantage  in  an  encounter  in  the  Wilderness  tending  to 
neutralize  the  disparity  of  numbers.  When  lines  of  battle 
are  broken  on  such  a  field,  and  the  troops  fall  back  in  dis¬ 
order,  the  successful  side  is  thrown  into  almost  equal  dis¬ 
order  in  attempting  to  advance  quickly,  and  both  sides  are 
obliged  to  re-form. 

In  the  previous  November  our  movement,  begun  in  the 
morning,  had  been  observed  as  soon  as  the  fog  rose,  but 
Ewell’s  corps  only  succeeded  in  reaching  Locust  Grove 
(Robertson’s  tavern)  on  the  pike  by  half  past  ten  o’clock  on 
the  morning  of  the  second  day,  and  Hill’s  corps  the  corre¬ 
sponding  point  on  the  plank  road,  New  Hope  Church,  at  four 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  second  day.  Robertson’s 
tavern  is  about  five  miles  west  of  the  old  Wilderness  tavern, 
New  Hope  Church  six  miles  west  of  the  intersection  of  the 
Brock  road  with  the  plank  road,  and  three  miles  west  of 
Parker’s  store. 

The  movement  by  the  left  flank  was  adopted,  and  I  was  re¬ 
quested  by  General  Meade  to  prepare  a  project  for  it.  Two 
were  sketched  out  by  me,  the  one  turning  Lee’s  right  by  the 
Catharpin  and  Pamunkey  roads  in  comparatively  open  coun¬ 
try,  the  other  by  roads  having  about  the  same  general  direc¬ 
tion  as  the  Pamunkey,  but  from  five  to  eight  miles  eastward 
of  it,  passing  two  to  four  miles  west  of  Spottsylvania  Court 
House.  The  two  projects  were  coincident  for  the  first  day 
and  for  a  part  of  the  second,  and  both  were  subject  to 
material  modification  or  entire  abandonment  on  the  second 
day,  dependent  upon  the  movements  of  Lee. 

The  first  project  was  adopted,  and  the  order  of  move¬ 
ment  was  prepared  by  me  in  conformity  to  it.  The  order 
for  continuing  the  movement  on  the  5th  of  May,  issued  on 


THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  SPRING  OF  ’64. 


13 


the  evening  of  the  4th,  also  conformed  to  it,  but  owing  to 
indications  of  the  enemy’s  movement  on  the  4th,  the  order 
of  march  was  partial  only,  and  held  in  view  the  probability 
of  a  general  engagement  on  that  day. 

Upon  the  reorganization  of  the  army,  Major-General  Han¬ 
cock,  who  had  been  absent,  owing  to  wounds  received  at 
Gettysburg,  resumed  command  of  the  Second  Corps  ;  Major- 
General  Warren  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Fifth 
Corps  ;  Major-General  Sedgwick  retained  command  of  the 
Sixth  Corps,  and  Major-General  Sheridan  was  appointed  to 
the  command  of  the  Cavalry  Corps.1 

The  Ninth  Corps,  Major-General  A.  E.  Burnside  com¬ 
manding,  united  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  6n  the 
morning  of  the  6th  of  May,  though  it  was  not  incorporated 


1  On  the  30th  April  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  organized  as  follows,  viz. : 

Major-General  Geo.  G.  Meade  Commanding  the  Army ;  Major-General  A.  A. 
Humphreys,  Chief  of  Staff ;  Brigadier-General  Henry  J.  Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery ; 
Major  James  C.  Duane,  Chief  Engineer. 

Second  Corps ,  Major-General  Winfield  S.  Hancock  commanding :  First  Divi¬ 
sion  (old  Second  Corps),  composed  of  four  brigades,  Brigadier-General  F.  C.  Bar- 
low  commanding ;  Second  Division  (old  Second  Corps),  composed  of  three  bri¬ 
gades,  Brigadier-General  John  Gibbon  commanding ;  Third  Division  (old  Third 
Corps),  composed  of  two  brigades,  Major-General  D.  B.  Birney  commanding ; 
Fourth  Division  (old  Third  Corps),  composed  of  two  brigades,  Brigadier-General 
G.  Mott  commanding. 

Fifth  Corps,  Major-General  G.  K.  Warren  commanding :  First  Division  (old 
Fifth  Corps),  three  brigades,  Brigadier-General  Charles  Griffin  commanding ; 
Second  Division  (old  First  Corps),  three  brigades,  Brigadier-General  J.  C.  Eobin- 
son  commanding ;  Third  Division  (old  Fifth  Corps),  two  brigades,  Brigadier- 
General  S.  W.  Crawford  commanding ;  Fourth  Division  (old  First  Corps),  three 
brigades,  Brigadier-General  J.  S.  Wadsworth  commanding. 

Sixth  Corps ,  Major-General  John  Sedgwick  commanding:  First  Division, 
four  brigades,  Brigadier-General  H.  G.  Wright  commanding ;  Second  Division, 
four  brigades,  Brigadier-General  G.  W.  Getty  commanding;  Third  Division, 
two  brigades,  Brigadier- General  James  B.  Eicketts  commanding. 

Cavalry  Corps ,  Major-General  P.  H.  Sheridan  commanding :  First  Division, 
three  brigades,  Brigadier- General  A.  T.  A.  Torbert  commanding ;  Second  Divi¬ 
sion,  two  brigades,  Brigadier-General  D.  McM.  Gregg  commanding ;  Third  Divi¬ 
sion,  two  brigades,  Brigadier-General  J.  H.  Wilson  commanding. 

For  further  details  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  see 
Appendix  A. 


14 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


with  it  until  the  24th  of  May,  when  it  became  a  part  of 
Major-General  Meade’s  command.1 2 

The  consolidated  Morning  Report  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  of  the  30th  April,  1864,  gives  for  its  numerical 
strength  on  that  day  •  “  present  for  duty  equipped 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men.  Guns, 

Provost  Guard . 

70 

1,048 

Engineers . 

50 

2,226 

The  three  Infantry  Corps . 

3,506 

69,884 

Artillery  of  the  Infantry  and  Cavalry 

• 

Corps,  and  the  Reserve  Artillery 

with  its  Guard . 

285 

9,945  274 

The  Cavalry  Corps . 

585 

11,839 

The  total  number  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  of  all  arms  and  branches  of  the  service,  in¬ 
cluding  Provost  Guard,  Engineers,  Reserve  Artillery  with 
its  guard,  the  Infantry  Corps  and  their  Artillery,  and  the 
Cavalry  Corps  and  its  Artillery,  “present  for  duty  equipped ,” 
on  the  30th  of  April  amounted  to  99,438. 

According  to  the  return  of  the  Ninth  Corps  for  the  month 
of  April,  1864,  the  number  present  for  duty  was  923  officers 
and  18,408  enlisted  men,  with  forty-two  guns.  These  num¬ 
bers  include  73  officers  and  1,199  enlisted  men  of  cavalry 
and  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  artillery. 

The  Morning  Report  of  this  Corps  for  the  10th  of  May, 
1864,  gives  for  its  strength — 


Officers.  Enlisted  Men.  Guns. 

Infantry . * .  851  18,995 

Artillery .  33  1,017  80 9 

Cavalry .  84  1,728 


1  It  consisted  of  four  divisions,  the  First  commanded  by  Brigadier-General 
Thos.  G.  Stevenson,  the  Second  by  Brigadier-General  R.  B.  Potter,  the  Third  by 
Brigadier-General  O.  B.  Willcox,  and  the  Fourth,  a  colored  division,  by  Brigadier- 
General  E.  Ferrero.  The  Third  and  Fourth  Divisions  were  newly  raised,  and 
had  not  been  in  the  field,  and  in  fact  all  but  6,000  of  the  enlisted  men  of  the  Corps 
had  just  entered  the  service. 

2  See  Appendix  B. 


3  Probably  a  mistake — 42  guns. 


THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  SPRING  OF  ’64. 


15 


On  the  1st  of  May,  1864,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
commanded  by  General  R.  E.  Lee,  was  composed  of  three 
Infantry  Corps,  the  First  Corps  commanded  by  Lieutenant- 
General  James  Longstreet,  the  Second  by  Lieutenant-Gen¬ 
eral  Richard  S.  Ewell,  the  Third  by  Lieutenant-General  A. 
P.  Hill.  The  Cavalry  Corps  was  commanded  by  Major-Gen¬ 
eral  J.  E.  B.  Stewart.1 

The  consolidated  Morning  Report  of  the  Army  of  North¬ 
ern  Virginia,  of  April  20,  1864  (the  Morning  Report  for 
April  30,  1864,  is  not  in  the  possession  of  the  War  Depart¬ 
ment,  nor  is  there  any  information  in  that  Department 
concerning  it)  shows  that  there  were  that  day  present  for 
duty : 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Second  Corps  2 3 . 

.  1,379 

15,705 

Third  Corps . 

.  1,551 

20,648 

Total  Infantry . 

. 2,930 

36,353 

Cavalry  Corps . 

.  467 

7,932 

Artillery . 

.  237 

4,617 

The  last  return  previous  to  May  1,  1864,  of  Longstreet’s 
two  divisions  that  were  with  him  in  the  Department  of  East 


1  The  Chief  of  Artillery  was  Brigadier- General  William  N.  Pendleton  ;  the 
Adjutant-General,  Colonel  Walter  H.  Taylor;  the  Chief  Engineer,  Major-General 
M.  L.  Smith  ;  the  Chief  Quartermaster,  Lieutenant- Colonel  James  L.  Corley  ;  the 
Chief  Medical  Director,  Surgeon  Lafayette  Guild. 

The  First  Corps  had  present  with  it  only  two  of  its  divisions,  commanded 
by  Major-Generals  Field  and  Kershaw,  Pickett’s  division  being  absent  on  the 
south  side  of  James  River.  The  Second  Corps  had  present  its  three  divisions, 
commanded  by  Major-Generals  Early,  Johnson,  and  Rodes,  and  the  Third 
Corps  its  three  divisions,  commanded  by  Major-Generals  Anderson,  Heth,  and 
Wilcox. 

The  Cavalry  Corps  consisted  of  two  divisions  commanded  by  Major-Generals 
Hampton  and  Fitzhugh  Lee. 

For  the  details  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  See  Appendix  C. 

3  Hoke’s  brigade  and  two  regiments  of  Rodes's  division  absent,  not  counted. 


16  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

Tennessee  (known  to  the  War  Department)  is  that  of  March 
31,  1864,  which  gives  present  for  duty : 1 


Officers.  Enlisted  Men. 

Field’s  Division .  3,875 

McLaw’s  Division  (Kershaw’s  before 

May  1st) .  4,542 

Total .  8,417 


There  were  probably  1,000  officers  with  the  two  divisions. 
Colonel  Taylor,  in  his  “Four  Years  with  General  Lee,” 
estimates  the  effective  force  of  those  two  divisions  when 
they  rejoined  the  army  at  10,000  enlisted  men  present  for 
duty.2. 

There  were,  according  to  our  information,  four  bat- 


1  Department  of  East  Tennessee,  Lieutenant-General  Longstreet  commanding, 


March  31,  1864. 

Officers. 

Field’s  Division . 

McLaw’s  “  . 

Buckner’s  “  . 

Wharton’s  Brigade . 

Jackson’s  “  . . . 

Cavalry  two  brigades,  Generals  Jones  and  Vaughn 
commanding . 


Enlisted  Men. 
3,875 
4.542 
3,401 
'  838 

366 

4,264 


Buckner’s  division,  commanded  by  Brigadier- General  B.  R.  Johnson,  consisted 
of  Johnson’s  brigade  of  Tennessee  regiments  and  Gracie’s  and  Law’s  Alabama 
brigades. 

2  So  far  as  I  can  make  out  from  the  very  defective  returns  in  our  possession  of 
Pickett’s  division,  its  effective  force  (enlisted  men  present  for  duty)  at  this 
period,  the  latter  part  of  April,  was  about  5,000. 

The  first  return,  or  Morning  Report,  in  the  Confederate  archives  in  the  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  War  Department,  in  which  the  numbers  of  Longstreet’s  Corps  are 
given  after  that  of  March  31,  1864,  is  the  Morning  Report  of  the  Army  of  North¬ 
ern  Virginia  of  June  30,  1864,  in  which  that  corps  is  reported  as  having  present 
for  duty  1,098  officers  and  13,060  enlisted  men.  That  this  Corps  should  have 
gone  into  the  campaign  of  1864  with  about  the  same  numbers  that  it  had  on  the 
31st  of  August,  1863,  while  the  Third  Corps  (Hill’s)  increased  in  that  time  from 
13,601  enlisted  men  present  for  duty  to  20,648,  and  the  Second  Corps  (Ewell’s) 
from  15,428  to  near  18,000  (including  Hoke’s  brigade,  and  two  regiments  of  Rodes’s, 
absent),  was  quite  unexpected.  Neither  General  Longstreet  nor  his  division 
commanders  state  the  strength  of  their  commands  in  their  reports  of  the  opening 
operations  of  the  campaign. 


THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  SPRING  OF  ’64. 


17 


teries  of  four  guns  in  each  infantry  division,  which,  for 
the  eight  divisions,  is  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  guns, 
seventy-two  guns  in  the  reserve  artillery,  and  twenty-four 
with  the  Cavalry — a  total  of  two  hundred  and  twenty-four 
guns. 

Using  the  figures  of  the  extracts  from  the  Morning  Re¬ 
ports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  we  have  for  its  num¬ 
bers  “  present  for  duty,”  May  1,  1864,  not  less  than — 

Officers.  Enlisted  Men, 


Infantry .  3,930  44,770 

Artillery .  237  4,617 

Cavalry .  467  7,932 


making  a  grand  aggregate  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  of 
infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry  of  61,953,  with  probably  two 
hundred  and  twenty-four  guns. 


CHAPTER  H. 


THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  RAPID  AN— THE  BATTLE  OF  THE 

WILDERNESS. 

On  the  2d  of  May  the  order  for  the  movement  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  issued.1 

The  movement  began  promptly  at  midnight  of  the  3d, 
Major-General  Sheridan,  with  two  of  his  cavalry  divisions, 
leading  the  two  infantry  columns,  one  of  his  divisions,  Tor- 
bert’s,  being  left  to  cover  the  rear  of  the  army.  A  canvas 
and  a  wooden  ponton  bridge  were  laid  at  Germanna  Ford, 
the  same  at  Ely’s  Ford,  and  a  wooden  ponton  bridge  at 
Culpeper  Mine  Ford,  five  bridges  in  all,  the  river  being 
about  two  hundred  feet  wide. 

The  Second  Corps,  preceded  by  Gregg’s  cavalry  division, 
crossed  at  Ely’s  Ford,  and  moved  to  Chancellorville,  fol¬ 
lowed  by  the  reserve  artillery.  The  Fifth  Corps,  preceded 
by  Wilson’s  cavalry  division,  and  followed  by  the  Sixth 
Corps,  crossed  at  Germanna  Ford,  and  moved  to  Wilderness 
Tavern,  at  the  intersection  of  the  Germanna  plank  road,2  by 
the  Orange  Court  House  and  Fredericksburg  pike.  The 
head  of  the  Sixth  Corps  halted  three  miles  from  Germanna 
Ford,  the  rear  at  the  ford. 

The  trains,  except  those  known  as  the  fighting  trains, 
which  accompanied  the  troops  (see  the  order  of  movement). 


1  See  order  of  May  2,  1864 — Appendix  D. 

2  This  road  ran  from  Germanna  FonJ  to  Fredericksburg. 


THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  RAPID  AN. 


19 


crossed  at  Culpeper  Mine  Ford  and  Ely’s  Ford.  They  were 
covered  by  the  cavalry,  and  had  an  infantry  guard  of  1,200 
men  from  each  infantry  corps. 

Gregg’s  cavalry  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  Piney  Branch 
Church,  throwing  out  reconnoissances  on  the  Pamunkey  road 
and  toward  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  Fredericksburg,  and 
Hamilton’s  crossing.  Wilson’s  cavalry  moved  to  Parker’s 
store,  on  the  Fredericksburg  and  Orange  Court  House  plank 
road,  throwing  out  reconnoissances  to  the  right  on  the 
Orange  pike  and  plank  roads,  and  on  the  Catharpin  and 
Pamunkey  roads. 

The  head  of  the  Second  Corps  arrived  at  Chancellorville 
at  10  a.m.  of  the  4th,  and  the  whole  corps,  with  the  trains 
moving  with  the  troops,  were  at  the  halting-place  designated 
about  1  o’clock.  The  whole  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  up  to 
its  position  by  2  o’clock.  Each  of  these  corps  had  marched 
more  than  twenty  miles,  and  both  had  assisted  in  laying  the 
wooden  ponton  bridges  at  their  crossings  of  the  Rapidan, 
and  had  improved  the  roads  leading  up  the  steep  river-banks. 
The  Sixth  Corps  had  marched  more  than  sixteen  miles,  but 
following  the  Fifth  Corps  was  later  in  getting  to  its  halting- 
ground  for  the  night. 

The  canvas  bridges  were  taken  up  on  the  4th,  and  joined 
the  corps  to  which  they  belonged.  The  wooden  bridges 
were  left  for  the  trains  and  the  Ninth  Corps. 

Respecting  this  operation  General  Grant  says,  “  This  I  re¬ 
garded  as  a  great  success,  and  it  removed  from  my  mind  the 
most  serious  apprehensions  I  had  entertained,  that  of  cross¬ 
ing  the  river  in  the  face  of  an  active,  large,  well-appointed, 
and  ably-commanded  army,  and  how  so  large  a  train  was  to 
be  carried  through  a  hostile  country  and  protected.”  And 
he  might  well  be  gratified  at  the  result,  for  it  was  a  good 
day’s  work  in  such  a  country  for  so  large  an  army  with  its 
artillery  and  fighting  trains  to  march  twenty  miles,  crossing 


20 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


a  river  on  five  bridges  of  its  own  building,  without  a  single 
mishap,  interruption,  or  delay. 

It  was  not  practicable,  however,  to  get  over  all  the  great 
trains  on  the  4th,  nor  was  it  expected,  as  the  order  of  move¬ 
ment  shows.  In  fact  it  was  two  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
5th  of  May  before  they  had  ceased  crossing  at  Ely’s  Ford, 
when  the  wooden  bridge  there  was  taken  up  and  moved  to 
.  Chancellorville ;  and  it  was  five  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  5th  of  May  before  they  had  ceased  crossing  at  Culpeper 
Mine  Ford,  when  the  bridge  there  was  taken  up  and  the  pon¬ 
ton  train  moved  one  and  a  half  miles  from  the  river.  It  was 
in  consideration  of  the  fact  that  it  was  not  practicable  in  this 
region  to  move  the  great  trains  along  the  protected  flank 
of  the  army  simultaneously  with  the  troops,  that  led  to  fix¬ 
ing  the  halting-places  of  the  heads  of  the  infantry  columns 
at  Chancellorville  and  Wilderness  tavern,  points  which  they 
reached  early  in  the  day.  The  troops  might  have  easily  con¬ 
tinued  their  march  five  miles  further,  the  Second  Corps  to 
Todd’s  tavern,  the  head  of  the  Fifth  Corps  to  Parker’s  store, 
and  the  head  of  the  Sixth  Corps  to  Wilderness  tavern ;  but 
even  that  would  have  left  the  right  too  open  during  the  fore¬ 
noon  of  the  5th,  and  it  was  more  judicious  to  let  the  troops 
remain  for  the  night  where  they  had  halted,  as  it  made  the 
passage  of  the  trains  secure,  and  the  troops  would  be  fresher 
when  meeting  the  enemy  next  day,  of  which  there  was  much 
probability. 

At  1.15  p.m.  of  the  4th,  General  Grant  telegraphed  from 
Germanna  Ford  to  General  Burnside  to  make  a  forced  march 
until  he  reached  there.  His  First  Division,  General  Steven¬ 
son,  had  then  arrived  at  Brandy  Station,  and  his  Fourth, 
the  colored  division,  had  marched  that  morning  from  Ma¬ 
nassas  Junction,  more  than  forty  miles  distant  from  Ger¬ 
manna  Ford.  General  Stevenson’s  division  crossed  the 
Bapidan  at  Germanna  Ford  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  and 


THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  RAPIDAN. 


21 


by  the  night  of  the  5th  Potter’s  and  Willcox’s  divisions, 
coming  from  Bealeton  and  from  Rappahannock  Station, 
had  likewise  crossed  there  and  advanced  some  three  miles. 
General  Ferrero’s  division  (Fourth)  crossed  on  the  morning 
of  the  6th. 

Indications  concerning  the  movements  of  the  enemy  were 
noted  before  one  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  ;  some 
few  shots  were  fired  toward  Robertson’s  tavern,  and  they 
were  observed  moving  in  some  force  from  Orange  Court 
House  on  the  plank  road  toward  New  Yerdiersville. 

Major-General  Sheridan  having  received  some  informa¬ 
tion  during  the  day  to  the  effect  that  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy’s  cavalry  was  near  Hamilton’s  crossing,  and  suggest¬ 
ing  that  he  should  proceed  against  them,  the  order  for 
movement  on  the  5tli  directed  him  to  do  so  with  Gregg’s 
and  Torbert’s  divisions.  The  army  was  to  move  at  five 
o’clock  in  the  morning,  General  Wilson  to  proceed  to  Craig’s 
Meeting  House  on  the  Catharpin  road,  and  to  keep  out 
parties  on  the  Orange  Court  House  pike  and  plank  road,  the 
Catharpin  and  Pamunkey  roads,  and  in  the  direction  of 
Twyman’s  store  and  Andrew’s  tavern  or  Good  Hope  Church ; 
General  Hancock  to  move  to  Shady  Grove  Church,  on  the 
Catharpin  road,  and  extend  his  right  toward  the  Fifth  Corps 
at  Parker’s  store  ;  General  Warren  to  move  to  Parker’s  store 
and  extend  his  right  toward  the  Sixth  Corps  at  Old  Wilderness 
.tavern  ;  General  Sedgwick  to  move  to  Old  Wilderness  tavern, 
leaving  a  division  to  cover  the  bridge  at  Germanna  Ford, 
until  General  Burnside’s  command  arrived.  After  reaching 
the  points  designated  the  army  was  to  be  held  ready  to 
move  forward.  The  movement  began  promptly  as  ordered.1 

Let  us  see  what  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  doing 
to  meet  this  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


1  See  order  of  May  4tli — Appendix  E. 


22 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


General  Ewell  states  that  the  corps  and  division  com¬ 
manders  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  met  General  Lee 
on  the  2d  of  May  at  the  signal  station  on  Clark’s  Mountain, 
when  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac  would  cross  by  some  of  the  fords  below  them  ;  that  the 
movement  of  that  army  being  observed  on  the  morning  of 
the  4th,  he,  General  Ewell,  moved,  under  orders,  toward 
Locust  Grove  (Robertson’s  tavern)  on  the  Orange  pike, 
where  the  head  of  his  corps,  Early’s  division,  halted  for  the 
night  about  five  miles  from  Old  Wilderness  tavern,  Rodes’s 
and  Johnson’s  divisions  closing  up  on  him.1 

(general  Hill  with  Heth’s  and  Wilcox’s  divisions  of  his 
corps  moved  about  midday  of  the  4tli  along  the  Orange 
Court  House  plank  road,  halting  for  the  night,  Heth  at  Mine 
Run  and  Wilcox  at  Verdiersville,  the  former  about  seven 
miles  from  Parker’s  store  and  about  ten  from  the  intersec¬ 
tion  of  the  Brock  road  writh  the  Orange  Court  House  plank 
road.  Anderson’s  division  remained  on  the  Rapidan  and 
did  not  unite  with  the  corps  until  the  morning  of  the  6th. 

It  will  be  observed  that  General  Lee  moved  more 
promptly  toward  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  than  he  had 
done  in  the  preceding  November  when  that  army  crossed 
the  Rapidan,  though  the  reports  from  General  Wilson’s  par¬ 
ties  indicated  that  these  corps  were  no  further  advanced 
than  they  had  been  on  that  occasion. 

General  Longstreet  moved  from  the  vicinity  of  Gordons- 
ville  at  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  halting  for 
the  night  at  Brock’s  bridge,  and  on  the  night  of  the  5th  at 
Richards’s  shop  on  the  Catliarpin  road,  not  far  from  Craig’s 
Meeting  House.  He  was  probably  retained  on  the  Catliar- 
pin  road  until  it  was  ascertained  what  disposition  was  made 
of  Hancock.  Stewart’s  cavalry,  which  had  been  drawn  in, 


1  R.  D.  Johnson’s  brigade  of  Rodes’s  division  joined  it  on  the  morning  of  the  6th. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


23 


was  to  operate  on  the  Confederate  right  flank,  on  the  Catliar- 
pin  and  other  roads. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  General  Ewell  moved  down 
the  pike,  Johnson’s  division  leading,  followed  by  Eodes's 
and  Early’s.  He  was  instructed  by  General  Lee  to  regulate 
his  march  by  that  of  General  Hill  on  the  plank  road,  and 
was  informed  that  it  was  preferred  not  to  bring  on  a  general 
engagement  before  General  Longstreet  came  up.  General 
Ewell,  being  three  or  four  miles  further  advanced  than  Hill, 
halted  his  command  when  the  head  of  it  was  two  miles  dis¬ 
tant  from  the  Wilderness  tavern  or  Germanna  road.  Just 
before  halting  he  sent  Walker’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  divi¬ 
sion  down  the  road  leading,  on  his  left,  from  the  pike  to 
Spottswood  on  the  Germanna  plank  road. 

General  Crawford’s  division  led  the  column  of  the  Fifth 
Corps,  General  Wadsworth’s  followed,  then  General  Robin¬ 
son’s  ;  General  Griffin’s  forming  the  rear — his  division  hav¬ 
ing  lain  during  the  night  across  the  pike,  about  a  mile  out 
from  the  Germanna  road. 

At  a  quarter  past  seven  General  Meade,  while  on  his  way 
to  General  Warren’s  headquarters  near  the  Old  Wilderness 
tavern,  received  a  despatch  from  that  officer  informing  him 
that  the  enemy’s  infantry  was  on  the  pike  in  some  force 
about  two  miles  from  the  Wilderness  tavern.  A  few  minutes 
later  General  Meade  was  with  General  Warren,  and  at  once 
directed  him  to  halt  his  column  and  attack  the  enemy  with 
his  whole  force.  This  would  soon  develop  what  part  of 
Lee’s  army  was  there.  At  the  same  time,  7.30  a.m.,  a  des¬ 
patch  was  sent  to  General  Hancock  informing  him  that  the 
enemy  was  on  the  pike  in  some  force,  and  directing  him  to 
halt  at  Todd’s  tavern  until  further  developments  were  made. 
This  despatch  was  received  by  him  at  9  o’clock,  at  which 
time  his  advance  was  two  miles  beyond  Todd’s  tavern. 

General  Sedgwick  was  directed  to  move  out  on  the  road 


24 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 


that  leaves  the  Germanna  plank  road  at  Spottswood  and  en¬ 
ters  the  pike  some  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Wilderness 
tavern,  attack  the  enemy  and  connect  with  the  Fifth  Corps 
on  the  pike.  His  force  was  Wright’s  division  and  Neill’s 
brigade  of  Getty’s  division,  to  which  the  second  brigade  of 
Ricketts’s  division,  General  Seymour  commanding,  was 
added  in  the  afternoon.  General  Ricketts’s  division  covered 
the  Germanna  bridge  until  General  Burnside’s  troops  re¬ 
lieved  him  toward  noon. 

General  Grant  had  been  at  once  informed  by  General 
Meade  of  what  was  transpiring  and  soon  joined  him.  After 
brief  conference  the  two  rode  forward  a  short  distance,  and 
took  position  on  a  knoll  in  the  open  ground  around  Wilder¬ 
ness  tavern  and  the  Lacy  farm,  and  on  this  knoll  General 
Grant  and  General  Meade  remained  during  the  battle,  with 
only  an  occasional  brief  absence  to  the  nearest  troops. 

When  the  head  of  Crawford’s  column  reached  the  high 
open  ground  of  Chewning’s  farm,  about  a  mile  from  Parker’s 
store  (and  three  miles  from  Wilderness  tavern),  he  found 
Colonel  Hammond,  commanding  the  cavalry  detachment  left 
there  by  General  Wilson  until  the  infantry  should  arrive, 
skirmishing  with  what  General  Crawford,  at  8  a.m.,  re¬ 
ported  to  be  the  enemy’s  cavalry. 

At  5  a.m.  General  Wilson  had  reported  his  command  mov¬ 
ing  toward  the  Catharpin  road,  and  that  his  pickets  re¬ 
ported  nothing  new  from  the  enemy  that  morning. 

At  8  a.m.  General  Crawford  had  received  the  order  to  halt, 
and  had  taken  up  a  good  position  in  high  open  ground  at 
Chewning’s,  from  which  a  good  road  ran  to  Parker’s  store, 
and  another  to  Tapp’s  farm  on  the  plank  road,  about  two 
miles  east  of  Parker’s  store.  Finding  that  our  cavalry  at 
Parker’s  store  needed  assistance,  General  Crawford  threw 
forward  a  skirmish  line  that  became  engaged  with  the 
flankers  of  an  infantry  force  moving  on  the  plank  road,  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


25 


advance  guard  of  Hill,  Kirkland’s  brigade,  but  by  that  time 
the  cavalry  had  been  forced  back,  retiring  slowly  on  the 
plank  road  before  the  skirmishers  of  Hill’s  advance. 

Some  time  after  eight  o’clock  General  Crawford  was  in¬ 
formed  by  General  Warren  that  Griffin  and  Wadsworth 
would  attack  Ewell  on  the  pike,  and  he  was  ordered  to  join 
in  it  with  one  of  his  brigades. 

Between  nine  and  ten  o’clock,  the  development  of  the  en¬ 
emy’s  force  was  such  that  a  despatch  was  sent  to  General 
Hancock,  directing  him  to  move  up  the  Brock  road  to  the 
Orange  Court  House  plank  road,  and  be  prepared  to  move 
out  that  road  toward  Parker’s  store. 

When  Sedgwick  was  ordered  out  against  Ewell’s  left, 
Getty’s  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  except  Neill’s  brigade, 
was  brought  to  the  Wilderness  tavern,  and  as  soon  as  it  was 
ascertained  that  the  enemy’s  infantry  were  on  the  plank 
road  at  Parker’s  store  in  force,  between  nine  and  ten  o’clock, 
Getty  was  sent  on  the  Brock  road  to  its  intersection  with 
the  Orange  plank  road,  about  two  miles  from  the  Wilder¬ 
ness  tavern,  and  directed  to  move  out  the  latter  road  and 
attack  the  enemy,  and,  if  he  could,  drive  them  back  beyond 
Parker’s  store.  The  order  to  General  Getty  was  sent  at  the 
same  time  as  that  to  General  Hancock  to  come  up. 

The  Brock  road  begins  on  the  Orange  pike  about  a  mile 
east  of  the  Old  Wilderness  tavern,  and  runs  in  a  southeast 
direction  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  intersecting  the 
Germanna  plank,  the  Orange  plank,  the  Furnace,  the  Cathar- 
pin  and  other  roads  running  in  a  southwest  and  south  direc¬ 
tion. 

General  Ewell,  seeing  our  force  on  the  pike,  supported 
Jones’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division  (which  had  led  the 
advance  prepared  for  action)  with  Battle’s  and  Doles’s  bri¬ 
gades  of  Rodes’s  division.  The  other  brigades  of  Johnson’s 
division  (Steuart’s,  Stafford’s,  and  Walker’s)  were  formed  on 
XII.— 2 


26 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


their  left  of  the  pike  in  the  order  stated,  or  were  forming, 
when,  about  noon,  General  Griffin,  advancing  with  great 
difficulty  through  the  woods — Ayres’s  brigade  on  the  right 
of  the  pike,  Bartlett’s  and  Barnes’s  on  the  left — suddenly 
struck  Jones’s  brigade,  broke  it  and  drove  it  back  through 
the  supporting  line,  disordering  Battle’s  brigade,  which, 
with  Doles’s,  was  then  hard  pressed.  General  Jones,  a  gal¬ 
lant  officer,  was  killed  in  a  desperate  effort  to  rally  his  bri¬ 
gade.1  Ayres’s  brigade  at  the  same  time  attacked  the  part 
of  Johnson’s  division  in  his  front.  Daniel’s  brigade  of 
Rodes’s  division  was  at  once  sent  forward  to  the  assistance  of 
Doles  and  Battle.  Early’s  division  was  brought  up  and 
formed  across  the  pike,  Gordon’s  brigade  being  ordered  for¬ 
ward  to  the  right  of  Rodes’s  line  (the  contest  still  going  on), 
where  it  took  an  active  and  important  part  in  repelling  the 
attack. 

Wright’s  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  to  have  attacked 
in  connection  with  the  Fifth  Corps,  but  met  with  such  delay 
and  difficulty  in  forcing  its  way  through  the  dense  scrubby 
pine  and  tangled  undergrowth,  that  it  could  not  connect 
with  the  Fifth,  and  did  not  get  in  contact  with  the  enemy 
until  much  later  in  the  day.  General  Griffin  stated  that, 
not  being  supported  on  his  right,  Ayres’s  brigade  was  forced 
back  across  the  pike,  and  that  entailed  the  falling  back  of 
the  other  brigades  of  his  division,  the  enemy  following  and 
forming  on  the  line  first  occupied  by  them,  where  they  at 
once  intrenched.  Two  of  Griffin’s  guns  on  the  pike  were 
lost.  They  remained  between  the  two  lines  until  night, 
when  they  were  taken  away  by  the  enemy. 

In  the  meantime  Wadsworth’s  division,  followed  and  sup¬ 
ported  on  the  left  by  Dennison’s  Maryland  brigade  of  Rob¬ 
inson’s  division,  had  advanced  through  thick  woods  and 

1  General  Early,  in  his  Memoir,  says  these  two  brigades,  Jones's  and  Battle’s, 
“  were  driven  back  in  some  confusion.” 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


27 


dense  thicket,  passing  through  which  had  probably  changed 
the  direction  of  his  movement,  so  as  to  bring  him,  about  the 
time  that  Daniel’s  and  Gordon’s  brigades  got  on  the  ground, 
in  front  of  the  enemy’s  right,  with  his  left  flank  toward 
them,  of  which  they  took  instant  advantage  to  attack,  and 
his  front  line  being  so  entangled  in  the  wood  as  not  to  ad¬ 
mit  of  ready  handling,  its  left  fell  back  quickly,  and  in  some 
confusion,  and  the  enemy,  passing  through  the  opening  thus 
made,  took  Dennison’s  brigade  in  flank,  as  well  as  the  two 
brigades  of  the  right,  and,  after  a  short,  sharp  engagement, 
forced  them  also  to  retire. 

Wadsworth’s  division  had  moved  before  McCandless’s 
brigade  of  Crawford’s  division  could  unite  with  it,  and  this 
brigade  had  to  take  such  direction  as,  it  was  thought,  would 
bring  it  to  Wadsworth’s  left,  but  it  did  not.  Passing 
through  the  same  kind  of  entangled  wood  found  everywhere, 
it  came  in  contact  with  Ewell’s  right,  a  part  of  ifc  became 
enveloped  by  Gordon’s  brigade,  had  many  killed  and 
wounded,  lost  several  hundred  prisoners,  and  fell  back. 
Crawford’s  division,  being  now  somewhat  isolated,  was, 
toward  two  o’clock,  drawn  in,  and  posted  about  a  mile  south¬ 
west  from  the  Lacy  house,  facing  toward  Chewning’s. 

The  line  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  established  with  its  right 
on  the  pike,  about  three  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy’s 
line,  thence  gradually  diverging  further  from  it  to  Crawford. 
The  enemy  had  reformed  his  line  on  the  ground  occupied 
when  attacked,  Rodes’s  division  (Daniel’s,  Doles’s,  and  Bat¬ 
tle’s  brigades)  on  the  right  (their  right)  of  the  pike,  John¬ 
son’s  division  on  the  left  of  it  (Steuart’s,  Walker’s,  and 
Stafford’s  brigades),  then  Hays’s  and  Pegram’s  brigades  of 
Early’s  division,  Gordon’s  brigade  remaining  on  the  right  of 
Rodes  until  night,  when  it  was  placed  on  Pegram’s  left. 
The  whole  line  was  intrenched  as  soon  as  occupied. 

It  was  between  two  and  three  o’clock,  perhaps  even  later, 


28 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


when  Wright’s  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  got  up  to  the 
enemy’s  front  north  of  the  pike  and  formed  about  three 
hundred  yards  from  Johnson’s  and  Early’s  line.  Upton’s 
brigade  resting  its  left  on  the  pike,  connected  with  the  Fifth 
Corps ;  the  brigades  of  Penrose  and  Russell  came  next, 
Neill’s  brigade  of  Getty’s  division  being  on  the  right.  The 
ground  between  Upton  and  the  enemy  had  been  fought  over, 
and  many  killed  and  wounded  of  both  sides  lay  on  it.  The 
woods  were  on  fire  on  his  entire  front.  Soon  after  arriving 
on  the  ground  Russell’s  and  Neill’s  brigades  were  attacked 
by  Stafford’s  and  Walker’s  brigades,  which,  after  a  sharp 
encounter,  were  repulsed,  Neill  capturing  some  prisoners. 
General  Stafford  was  mortally  wounded.  The  enemy  had 
artillery  on  their  left  in  the  open  ground  of  a  farm,  which 
partly  enfiladed  Neill’s  line,  and  the  ground  on  his  right  and 
left.  Shortly  after  this  attack,  while  the  firing  was  still 
heavy,  Seymour’s  brigade  of  Ricketts’s  division  arrived  and 
was  posted  on  the  right  of  Neill. 

Turning  now  to  our  left  we  find  that  General  Getty  arrived 
at  the  crossing  of  the  Brock  and  Orange  plank  roads  not 
long  after  eleven  o’clock,  and  threw  out  his  skirmish  line 
across  the  Orange  plank  road.  Half  a  mile  out  it  encoun¬ 
tered  the  skirmishers  of  the  enemy’s  advance,  forcing  back 
Colonel  Hammond’s  cavalry.  These  skirmishers  fell  back 
before  Getty’s.  Learning,  about  noon,  from  the  prisoners 
takeh,  that  Hill’s  corps  was  on  the  road,  Hetli’s  division 
leading,  General  Getty  disposed  his  troops  for  attack,  ex¬ 
tending  his  right  toward  the  left  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  but 
finding  the  enemy  in  force,  deemed  it  best  to  await  the 
arrival  of  part  of  the  Second  Corps  before  attacking,  and 
while  thus  waiting  intrenched  slightly. 

General  Hill  had  undoubtedly  received  the  same  instruc¬ 
tions  as  General  Ewell,  that  “General  Lee  preferred  not  to 
bring  on  a  general  engagement  before  Longstreet  came  up.” 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


29 


Heth’s  division  of  Hill’s  corps  led  on  the  morning  of  the 
5th  on  the  Orange  plank  road,  and  a  little  after  midday, 
when  near  the  Brock  road,  the  head  of  his  column  was  met 
by  Getty’s  division,  as  already  stated,  in  front  of  which  Heth 
took  up  a  position  crossing  the  plank  road  on  some  compar¬ 
atively  elevated  ground,  having  in  its  front  and  on  its  right 
and  left  the  swampy  heads  of  affluents  of  the  Ny  on  the 
right  and  of  Wilderness  Run  on  the  left. 

General  Davis’s  (Colonel  Stone  commanding),  General 
Cook’s,  and  General  Walker’s  brigades  were  on  the  right  of 
the  road,  General  Kirkland’s  on  the  left.  Heth’s  artillery 
was  posted  in  the  rear  on  an  eminence  in  the  open  ground 
of  Tapp’s  farm  on  the  Confederate  left  of  the  road,  and  was 
covered  by  epaulments.  The  same  close  underbrush  was 
found  in  this  part  of  the  Wilderness,  as  in  almost  every  other 
portion  of  it  occupied  by  our  troops,  aggravated  in  the 
swampy  parts.  General  Lee  and  General  Hill  accompanied 
Heth’s  division  and  remained  near  the  artillery  on  this  and 
the  following  day. 

Wilcox’s  division  followed  Heth’s,  and  at  about  two 
o’clock,  when  at  Tapp’s  farm,  turned  to  the  left  in  order  to 
connect  with  Ewell,  and  moved  beyond  Chewning’s ;  it  then 
formed  line  of  battle  (its  skirmishers  engaged)  looking 
toward  Ewell’s  right,  which  was  in  sight,  in  the  open  ground 
of  Hagerson’s  farm ;  toward  five  o’clock  however,  Wilcox 
was  called  back  to  Heth’s  support,  a  movement  that  was 
observed  by  General  Warren. 

Hill  had  moved  with  caution,  and  wThen  Heth  came  in 
front  of  Getty  showed  no  disposition  to  attack,  for  instead 
of  forming  Wilcox  to  support  Heth,  he  sent  him  to  the  left 
to  unite  with  Ewell. 

As  already  stated,  when  it  became  apparent  that  the 
enemy  in  full  force  were  moving  against  us  on  the  Orange 
plank  and  pike  roads,  General  Hancock  was  directed  to 


30 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


move  up  the  Brock  road  to  the  intersection  of  the  Orange 
plank  road  and  be  prepared  to  move  out  toward  Parker’s 
store.  Toward  noon  he  was  advised  that  Hill’s  corps,  or 
part  of  it,  had  driven  our  cavalry  from  Parker’s  store,  and 
were  moving  down  the  plank  road  ;  that  Getty  had  been 
sent  to  drive  them  back,  but  might  not  be  able  to  do  so, 
and  he  was  directed  to  support  Getty,  and  drive  the  enemy 
beyond  Parker’s  store,  occupy  that  place  and  unite  with 
Warren’s  left,  then  about  a  mile  from  the  store.  At  half 
past  one  p.m.  he  was  advised  that  the  enemy  had  the  plank 
road  near  to  the  Brock  road;  that  Getty  was  not  strong 
enough  to  attack,  but  would  aid  him ;  that  Griffin  had  been 
pushed  back  somewhat ;  that  Warren’s  left  was  within  a 
mile  of  Parker’s  store,  but  might  be  drawn  in  or  driven  in  ; 
that  he  must  push  out  the  plank  road  and  connect  with 
Warren.  An  hour  later  he  was  informed  of  the  result  of 
Warren’s  attack,  and  that  Crawford  had  been  drawn  in  a 
mile.  At  quarter  past  three  p.m.  General  Getty  was  ordered 
to  attack  at  once,  General  Hancock  informed  of  it  and  di¬ 
rected  to  support  him  with  his  whole  corps,  that  the  attack 
up  the  plank  road  must  be  made  at  once,  for  it  was  believed 
that  Longstreet  could  not  be  up  before  the  next  morning. 
General  Sedgwick  and  General  Warren  were  advised  of  this 
and  ordered  to  be  prepared  to  renew  the  attack  as  soon  as 
they  were  informed  that  Hancock  and  Getty  had  begun  it. 
General  Ricketts’s  First  Brigade,  General  Morris  command¬ 
ing,  was  placed  to  support  the  left  of  the  Sixth  Corps  or  the 
right  of  the  Fifth  as  might  be  needed;  the  part  of  the 
Ninth  Corps  that  had  got  up  covered  the  Germanna  bridge 
and  the  road  which  led  from  the  enemy’s  left  to  the  Ger¬ 
manna  road  near  the  bridge.  As  soon  as  General  Hancock 
received  the  despatch  directing  him  to  move  his  command 
up  the  Brock  road  to  its  intersection  with  the  plank  road 
(about  11  a.m.),  he  at  once  set  his  corps  in  motion  toward 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


31 


that  point,  and,  riding  in  advance  of  the  corps,  met  General 
Getty  there,  whose  division  he  found  in  line  of  battle  along 
the  Brock  road,  the  Second  Brigade,  General  Grant’s,  on  the 
left  of  the  plank  road,  the  First  and  Fourth  Brigades,  Gen¬ 
eral  Wheaton’s  and  General  Eustis’s,  on  the  right  of  the 
road.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Morgan,  General  Hancock’s  Chief 
of  Staff,  was  sent  to  inform  General  Meade  of  General  Han¬ 
cock’s  arrival,  and  of  the  condition  of  affairs.  At  2  p.m.  the 
head  of  his  command,  General  Birney’s  division,  arrived  and 
was  formed  on  Getty’s  left  in  two  lines  of  battle  along  the 
Brock  road.  It  will  be  noted  that  at  the  same  hour  General 
Wilcox’s  division  came  up  to  General  Heth’s,  but  moved  off 
toward  Ewell.  Mott’s  and  Gibbon’s  divisions  coming  up 
rapidly,  took  their  position  on  Birney’s  left  in  the  same 
formation.  Barlow’s  division,  except  Frank’s  brigade,  held 
the  left  of  the  line,  and  was  thrown  forward  on  high  clear 
ground  in  front  of  the  Brock  road,  which  commanded  the 
country  for  some  distance  to  the  right  and  left,  and  covered 
the  bed  of  the  Fredericksburg  and  Orange  Court  House  un¬ 
finished  railroad  in  front.  As  this  was  the  only  point  on 
the  line  where  artillery  could  have  an  effective  range,  the 
artillery  of  the  corps,  except  one  battery  and  a  section,  was 
put  in  position  here.  It  was  supported  by  Barlow’s  division. 
Dow’s  battery  was  placed  in  the  second  line  near  Mott’s 
left ;  the  section  of  Ricketts’s  battery  was  placed  on  the 
Orange  plank  road.  Frank’s  brigade  covered  the  junction 
of  the  Brock  road  with  a  road  leading  northerly  to  the  Ca- 
tliarpin  furnaces,  and  thence  to  Chancellorville  and  to  the 
Catharpin  and  other  roads.  At  this  point  (where  Frank’s 
brigade  was  posted)  a  road  came  in  also  from  the  south, 
leaving  the  Catharpin  road  about  a  mile  west  of  Shady 
Grove  Church,  and  near  the  junction  of  the  road  from 
Parker’s  store  with  the  Catharpin  road. 

The  division  commanders  were  directed  to  throw  up 


32 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


breastworks  (of  logs  and  earth)  upon  going  into  position,  a 
work  which  was  accomplished  without  delay,  the  line  begin¬ 
ning  at  Getty’s  left  and  extending  along  the  whole  position 
occupied  by  the  corps,  being  refused  on  the  left  so  as  to  in¬ 
clude  the  junction  of  the  road  leading  to  the  Furnaces 
where  Frank’s  brigade  was  posted.  The  second  line  also 
threw  up  breastworks,  and  a  third  line  was  subsequently 
constructed  in  rear  of  the  Third  and  Fourth  Divisions. 

General  Hancock  states  that  when  the  despatches  hereto¬ 
fore  mentioned  (except  that  of  3.15  p.m.)  reached  him,  the 
greater  portion  of  his  troops  were  coming  up  to  join  Gen¬ 
eral  Getty.  Birney’s  division  had  already  taken  position  on 
Getty’s  left.  The  remaining  divisions  were  forming  as  they 
arrived  on  the  ground.  The  Brock  road  was  very  narrow 
and  heavily  wooded  on  both  sides,  and  hence  the  formation 
of  the  infantry  in  line  of  battle  was  impeded ;  their  march 
had  been  greatly  retarded  by  the  artillery  occupying  the 
road.  General  Getty  had  informed  General  Hancock  when 
he  came  up  that  there  were  two  divisions  of  Hill  in  his  front 
and  that  he  momentarily  expected  an  attack.  For  that  rea¬ 
son  General  Hancock  directed  the  breastworks  to  be  com¬ 
pleted  in  order  to  receive  the  attack. 

At  quarter  past  four,  General  Getty,  in  compliance  with 
his  orders  from  General  Meade,  advanced  to  the  attack 
through  thick  undergrowth,  and  some  four  hundred  yards 
from  the  Brock  road  became  hotly  engaged  with  Heth’s 
division,  part  of  which  was  lying  down  behind  the  crest  of  a 
small  elevation.1 

Finding  that  General  Getty  had  met  the  enemy  in  force, 
General  Hancock  ordered  General  Birney  to  advance  his 
command  (his  own  division  and  Mott’s)  to  the  support  of 
Getty,  although  the  formation  he,  General  Hancock,  had 

1  See  the  report  of  General  Grant,  commanding  the  Vermont  brigade.  He 
states  his  loss  to  have  been  1,000,  about  one-half  of  his  brigade. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


33 


directed  to  be  made  before  carrying  out  his  instructions  to 
advance  was  not  yet  completed.  General  Birney  at  once 
moved  forward  liis  own  division  on  the  right  and  Mott’s  on 
the  left  of  Getty,  with  a  section  of  artillery  on  the  plank 
road,  which  did  good  service  in  the  course  of  the  action. 
General  Hancock  says  the  fight  became  “very  fierce  at  once, 
the  lines  of  battle  were  exceedingly  close,  the  musketry 
continuous  and  deadly  along  the  entire  line.”  General 
Alexander  Hays,  commanding  the  Second  Brigade  of  Bir- 
ney’s  division,  an  officer  of  distinguished  gallantry,  was 
killed  at  the  head  of  his  brigade.  Carroll’s  brigade  of  Gib¬ 
bon’s  division  was  sent  to  the  support  of  Getty’s  right,  and 
Owen’s  brigade  of  the  same  division  to  the  support  of  Getty 
on  the  plank  road.  Colonel  Carroll  was  wounded,  but  re¬ 
mained  on  the  field.  The  battle  continued  with  great  se¬ 
verity  until  near  eight  o’clock,  when  darkness  and  the  dense 
forest  put  an  end  to  it,  fortunately  for  Hill,  whose  troops 
were  shattered  and  his  lines  disjointed ;  an  hour  more  of 
daylight,  and  he  would  have  been  driven  from  the  field,  for 
Longstreet  and  Anderson  were  many  miles  distant.1 

Before  the  close  of  the  action  Colonel  Smyth’s  Irish  bri- 


1  General  McAllister,  commanding  First  Brigade,  Mott’s  division,  states  that 
soon  after  they  went  into  action,  the  brigade  on  his  left,  Mott’s  second,  sud¬ 
denly  gave  way  from  the  left,  without  any  apparent  cause,  rolling  away  to  the 
rear,  and  carrying  his  own  brigade  in  the  same  way  after  it.  He  imputes  it  to 
the  fact  that  the  time  of  many  of  the  regiments  would  soon  be  out  ;  but  I  find 
that  Colonel  Burns  of  the  Seventy-third  New  York,  belonging  to  the  Second 
Brigade,  an  intrepid  soldier,  attributes  it  to  the  falling  back  of  troops  in  their 
front,  followed  quickly  by  the  outflanking  of  their  brigade  by  the  enemy.  There 
is  no  report  from  the  commander  of  the  Second  Brigade,  nor  do  I  find  General 
Mott’s  report  on  the  files  of  the  War  Department. 

These  two  brigades,  forming  Mott’s  Fourth  Division  of  the  Second  Corps,  were 
the  remnant  of  the  old  Second  Division,  Third  Corps.  They  were  good  troops,  with 
three  years’  experience  in  fighting,  and  I  think  the  explanation  of  Colonel  Burns 
is  the  right  one,  viz.  :  that  they  were  struck  in  flank  and,  as  they  were  sometimes 
apt  to  do,  acted  on  their  own  judgment  without  waiting  for  that  of  their  com¬ 
mander.  I  commanded  the  division  at  Gettysburg,  having  been  assigned  to  it 
about  the  middle  of  May,  and  I  knew  the  troops  well. 

2* 


34 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


gade,  and  Colonel  Brooke’s  brigade,  both  of  Barlow’s  divi¬ 
sion,  attacked  the  enemy’s  right  and  forced  it  back. 

General  Wadsworth,  with  his  division,  and  Baxter’s  bri¬ 
gade  of  the  Second  Division,  was  ordered  to  move  between 
four  and  five  o’clock  in  a  southeast  direction  so  as  to  strike 
the  force  engaged  with  Hancock  and  Getty  on  its  left  flank 
and  rear. 

Moving  in  the  direction  stated,  General  Wadsworth  found 
his  progress  greatly  impeded  by  the  thick  woods  and  under¬ 
brush.  He  met  only  the  skirmish  line  of  the  enemy,  which 
he  drove  before  him  until  it  was  too  dark  to  see,  when  the 
troops  halted  for  the  night  in  line  of  battle,  facing  south¬ 
east,  his  left  about  half  a  mile  from  the  Brock  road. 

Soon  after  the  attack  on  Heth  began,  Wilcox’s  division  was 
recalled  to  his  support,  McGowan’s  brigade  forming  across 
the  road,  Thomas’s  on  the  left,  parallel  with  the  road,  Scales’s 
and  lastly  Lane’s  on  the  right.  The  brigades  on  the  right 
passed  through  Heth’s  lines  and  advanced  at  different  times 
as  far  as  the  swamps,  in  and  near  which  they  encountered 
Hancock’s  and  Getty’s  men  with  varying  success,  but  were 
finally  forced  back  to  Heth’s  position,  their  right  and  left 
flanks  pressed  back.  Hill’s  lines  were  very  irregular  and 
much  broken,  and  his  troops  in  some  disorder. 

In  one  of  the  narratives  of  the  battle  it  is  stated,  in  order 
to  show  how  close  the  lines  were,  and  how  bewildering  the 
dense  forest  growth  was,  that  many  men  from  both  armies, 
in  looking  for  water  during  the  night,  found  themselves 
within  the  opposing  lines,  and  were  made  prisoners.  This 
probably  refers  to  the  left  of  Hill,  opposite  to  which  Wads¬ 
worth’s  troops  had  halted. 

At  midnight  of  the  5tli,  General  Longstreet  received  a 
message  from  General  Lee,  informing  him  of  the  results  of 
the  day,  and  directing  him  to  come  up  to  Parker’s  store. 
Marching  at  once,  he  arrived  there  at  dawn  of  the  6tli,  and 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


35 


was  directed  to  move  liis  column  down  the  plank  road,  and 
relieve  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Wilcox.  Anderson’s  divi¬ 
sion,  of  Hill’s  corps,  which  had  reached  Verdiersville  in  the 
night  of  the  5th,  was  also  ordered  up,  and  arrived  the  next 
morning  soon  after  Longstreet’s  divisions. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  heavy  skirmishing  went 
on  on  our  right,  and  at  about  five  o’clock,  under  orders  from 
General  Meade  for  the  right  to  attack,  General  Seymour’s 
brigade,  Colonel  Keifer  commanding  the  first  line,  and 
Neill’s  brigade,  with  part  of  Penrose’s,  attacked  Pegram’s 
and  Hays’s  brigades,  both  intrenched  ;  Pegram’s  was 
strongly  posted  on  rising  ground,  and  had  artillery  in  the 
open  ground  on  his  left,  which  enfiladed  our  lines.  General 
Neill,  finding  that  he  could  not  carry  the  enemy’s  intrenched 
line,  and  that  his  loss  was  severe,  withdrew,  but  Seymour’s 
troops  maintained  the  contest  until  dark,  losing  heavily  in 
killed  and  wounded,  Colonel  Keifer  among  the  latter.  On 
the  other  side  General  Pegram  was  severely  wounded. 

Artillery  was  placed  in  the  lines  of  the  Fifth  Corps  wher¬ 
ever  it  could  be  used  to  aid  in  carrying  the  enemy’s  in¬ 
trenched  line,  but  the  attempts  were  unsuccessful. 

Turn  now  to  the  cavalry.  At  daylight  of  the  5tli,  General 
Wilson,  leaving  Colonel  Hammond  with  500  men  at  Parker’s 
store  to  remain  until  the  infantry  came  up,  moved  toward 
Craig’s  Meeting  House,  posting  his  First  Brigade  at  the  junc¬ 
tion  of  the  Parker’s  store  road  with  the  Catharpin  road,  and 
sending  the  Second  Brigade,  Colonel  Chapman  commanding, 
to  Craig’s  Meeting  House,  where,  at  8  a.m.,  it  encountered 
Rosser’s  brigade  of  Hampton’s  division,  and,  General  Wilson 
states,  drove  him  back  two  miles.  Here  Rosser  was,  it  is 
stated,  strongly  reinforced  in  the  afternoon,  and,  it  was  be¬ 
lieved,  by  Longstreet’s  infantry — in  part,  at  least.  The  en¬ 
emy  now  assumed  the  offensive,  and  drove  Chapman  back 
upon  the  First  Brigade,  and  General  Wilson,  having  in  the 


36 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


meantime  found  that  the  enemy’s  infantry  had  possession  of 
the  Parker’s  store  road,  fell  back  rapidly  to  Todd’s  tavern, 
pressed  by  the  enemy.  Here  he  found  Gregg’s  division, 
sent  by  General  Sheridan  to  his  support,  which  in  its  turn 
drove  the  enemy’s  cavalry  beyond  Corbin’s  Bridge. 

A  reconnoissance  on  the  morning  of  the  5tli  by  a  part  of 
Gregg’s  division,  from  Piney  Branch  Church  to  Fredericks¬ 
burg,  found  no  enemy  there,  and  one  sent  toward  Hamil¬ 
ton’s  crossing  came  upon  the  rear  of  two  brigades  of  cavalry 
moving  from  that  place  toward  Lee’s  right.  The  enemy’s 
cavalry  had  been  drawn  in. 

General  Torbert,  delayed  by  the  trains,  reached  Clian- 
cellorville  at  midday,  and  was  held  in  front  of  that  place 
to  cover  the  trains  and  support  Gregg.  General  Sheridan 
found  the  defensive  enforced  on  him  by  the  necesssity  of 
protecting  the  trains  and  their  immense  amount  of  materiel. 

As  soon  as  the  fighting  ceased  in  the  evening  of  the  5th, 

> 

General  Hancock,  General  Warren,  and  General  Sedgwick 
were  ordered  to  attack  punctually  at  five  o’clock  the  next 
morning. 

General  Burnside  was  ordered  to  start  at  two  o’clock  in 
the  morning  of  the  6th,  with  General  Willcox’s,  General 
Potter's,  and  General  Stevenson’s  divisions,  and  be  in 
position  with  the  first  two  between  General  Warren  and 
General  Hancock,  so  as  to  advance  against  the  enemy  with 
the  rest  of  the  army  at  five  o’clock.  His  movement  was  to 
be  so  directed  as  to  get  possession  of  the  high*  open  ground 
at  Chewning’s  and  then  attack  Hill’s  left  and  rear  ;  for  so  far 
as  could  be  ascertained  the  gap  between  Hill  and  Ewell  was 
not  yet  closed ;  neither  was  that  between  Hancock  and 
Warren.  Stevenson’s  division  was  to  be  retained  at  Old 
Wilderness  tavern  as  a  reserve. 

Each  corps  commander  was  advised  of  the  instructions 
given  to  the  others..  Ewell’s  corps  strengthened  their  in- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


37 


trenchments  during  the  night,  and  put  artillery  in  position. 
Ramseur’s  brigade  came  up,  and  early  in  the  morning  of  the 
6th  was  sent  to  the  extreme  right  in  the  vicinity  of  Chewn- 
ing’s.  Hill’s  corps  also  intrenched  at  some  time,  for  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th  Hancock’s  troops  found  an  earth  in- 
trenchment  three  or  four  hundred  yards  back  of  the  Con¬ 
federate  log  intrenchment.1 

The  first  shots  on  the  morning  of  the  6tli  were  fired  by 
the  enemy  on  the  right  and  left  a  few  minutes  before  five 
o’clock.  Punctually  at  five  our  attack  began.  Two  vigor¬ 
ous  assaults  were  made  by  Wright  from  the  right  of  his 
division  against  the  intrenched  lines  of  the  enemy,  but 
they  were  repelled  with  severe  loss.  General  Warren’s 
attacks  on  Ewell’s  right  were  also  unsuccessful ;  for  Ewell’s 
lines  were  much  stronger  than  on  the  day  before,  and 
were  still  further  strengthened  by  artillery.  The  attacks 
of  both  corps  were  frequent  and  persistent  throughout  the- 
morning. 

An  examination  of  prisoners  during  the  night  of  the  5th, 
drew  from  them  the  statement  that  Longstreet  was  expected 
to  be  up  in  the  morning  to  attack  our  left,  and  that  his  force 
was  about  12,000.  General  Hancock  was  notified  of  this  and 
advised  to  look  out  for  his  left.  Preparations  were  at  once 
made  by  him  to  meet  the  enemy  at  this  point.  Barlow’s 
division  was  posted  for  that  purpose,  and  artillery  was  placed, 
to  cover  the  road  by  which  Longstreet  was  expected  to  ad¬ 
vance,  the  road  heretofore  mentioned  leading  from  the 
Catharpin  road  to  the  Brock  road  at  Trigg’s.  A  strong 
skirmish  line  was  thrown  out  to  cover  the  Brock  road. 
General  Gibbon  was  placed  in  command  of  the  left,  com¬ 
posed  of  his  own  and.  Barlow’s  divisions  and  the  artillery. 
General  Birney  was  put  in  command  of  the  right,  composed 

1  It  is  evident  from  the  reports  of  some  of  Longstreet's  subordinate  command¬ 
ers  that  they  supposed  these  intrenchments  had  been  thrown  up  by  our  troops. 


38 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


of  his  own,  Mott’s,  and  Getty’s  divisions.  At  five  o’clock 
General  Birney’s  command  advanced  along  the  Orange 
plank  road,  his  own  and  Mott’s  divisions  in  the  first  line, 
Getty’s  in  the  second,  supported  by  Carroll’s  and  Owen’s 
brigades  of  Gibbon’s  division.  Wadsworth’s  command  ad¬ 
vanced  at  the  same  time  on  the  right  of  Birney.  All  at¬ 
tacked  the  enemy  with  great  vigor,  and  after  a  desperate 
contest  the  enemy’s  line  was  broken  at  all  points,  and  he 
was  driven  in  confusion  through  the  forest,  suffering  severe 
loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  Just  before  Hill’s 
troops  gave  way,  the  head  of  Longstreet’s  corps  arrived  on 
the  ground,  Kershaw  leading,  and  had  begun  to  form  on  his 
right  of  the  road  ;  Birney’s  left  was  farther  forward  than  his 
centre  on  the  plank  road,  and  probably  farther  forward  than 
his  right,  opposite  which  the  Confederate  artillery  in  the 
open  ground  of  Tapp’s  farm  with  some  of  Heth’s  division 
still  held.  Indeed,  some  of  the  musketry  fire  of  Birney’s 

left  is  stated  to  have  come  in  on  the  rear  of  the  batteries. 

% 

The  advance  through  the  forest,  undergrowth,  and  swamps 
for  more  than  a  mile,  in  a  hot  contest,  had  separated  and 
disordered  Hancock’s  troops,  and  Birney’s  left,  met  in  this 
condition  by  Kershaw’s  division,  was  not  only  brought  to  a 
standstill,  but  at  some  points  swayed  back  and  forward, 
until  at  length  Kershaw,  himself  leading  his  division,  forced 
Birney’s  left  back  as  far  as  his  centre.  Wadsworth’s  advance 
had  crowded  many  of  Birney’s  troops  to  the  south  side  of 
the  plank  road,  so  that  the  greater  part  of  his,  Birney’s, 
command  was  on  his  left  of  that  road.  Field’s  division  of 
Longstreet’s  corps,  following  close  on  Kershaw’s  division, 
some  of  it  coming  on  the  ground  at  double-quick,  was  formed 
on  the  Confederate  left  of  the  plank  road,  and,  advancing,  at 
once  became  hotly  engaged  with  Birney’s  right  and  Wads¬ 
worth’s  troops,  Gregg’s  Texans  and  Benning’s  Georgians,  in 
the  lead,  bearing  the  brunt  of  the  fight  and  losing  heavily 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


39 


in  killed  and  wounded,  General  Benning  among  the  latter.1 
Anderson’s  division  of  Hill’s  corps,  following  Field’s  divi¬ 
sion,  formed  on  the  same  part  of  the  line,  one  portion  unit¬ 
ing  with  Field’s  troops  in  the  attack,  the  other  portion 
supporting.  It  was  when  Hancock’s  troops  were  partially 
checked  by  the  fresh  troops  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  that  the 
necessity  of  readjusting  his  formation  became  imperative. 
Regiments  were  separated  from  their  brigades  and  mixed 
with  others,  and  the  line  of  battle  was  very  irregular,  and 
commanders  were  in  this  way  losing  the  control  of  their 
troops.  This  was  about  half-past  six  o’clock. 

General  Hancock  informed  General  Meade  of  the  arrival 
of  some  of  Longstreet’s  command,  and  was  notified  in  reply 
(7  a.m.)  that  Stevenson’s  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps  was 
held  at  Wilderness  tavern  in  reserve,  and  wTould  be  sent  him 
if  absolutely  required.  Generals  Sedgwick  and  Warren 
were  ordered  to  press  their  attacks.  General  Sheridan  was 
directed  to  attack  with  a  division  of  cavalry  on  Longstreet’s 
flank  and  rear  by  the  Brock  road,  and  Hancock  was  subse¬ 
quently  informed  that  Sheridan  had  received  the  order  at 
eight  o’clock  at  Cliancellorville.  General  Sheridan  had  been 
previously  (on  the  5th)  advised  that  it  was  left  to  his  discre¬ 
tion  to  take  the  offensive  against  the  enemy’s  cavalry  so  far  as 
he  could  do  so  without  endangering  the  safety  of  the  trains. 

General  Webb’s  brigade  of  Gibbon’s  division  was  now  or¬ 
dered  to  Birney,  and  Getty’s  division,  which  had  suffered 
severely  again  to-day,  General  Getty  himself  severely 
wounded,  was  withdrawn  to  the  Brock  road. 


1  As  Gregg's  brigade  were  hastening  forward  in  double-quick  they  passed  Gen¬ 
eral  Lee  in  Tapp’s  field,  and  as  they  had  not  seen  him  in  several  months,  greeted 
him  with  cheers.  Under  the  impulse  of  the  moment,  knowing  the  urgent  need 
of  Hill’s  troops  for  help,  Lee  dashed  forward  to  the  head  of  the  brigade  to  lead  it 
into  the  fight,  when  with  one  voice  they  cried  out  to  him  to  go  back,  and  at  this 
moment  Longsyeet  (whom  Lee  wished  to  confer  with)  coming  upon  the  ground, 
he  was  constrained  to  yield  to  their  demand  and  turn  to  other  duties. 


40 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


At  half-past  six  o’clock,  General  Hancock,  not  hearing  any 
fire  from  the  direction  of  Burnside’s  intended  attack,  sent  a 
request  to  General  Meade  that  he,  Burnside,  should  attack  as 
soon  as  possible,  as  many  of  the  regiments  of  Birney’s  com¬ 
mand  were  tired  and  shattered,  and  just  held  their  own 
against  Longstreet ;  but  reiterated  orders  to  General  Burn¬ 
side  to  push  forward  and  attack  did  not  bring  about  his  ex¬ 
pected  co-operation.  As  late  as  11.45  a.m.  General  Bawlins 
wrote  him,  “Push  in  and  drive  the  enemy  from  Hancock’s 
front  and  get  on  the  Orange  plank  road.  Hancock  has  ex¬ 
pected  you  for  the  last  three  hours,  and  has  been  making  his 
attack  and  dispositions  with  a  view  to  your  assistance.” 

At  7  a.m.,  General  Hancock  sent  a  staff  officer  to  General 
Gibbon,  commanding  the  left  wing,  informing  him  of  the  suc¬ 
cess  of  his  right  wing  and  directing  him  to  attack  the  en¬ 
emy’s  right  with  Barlow’s  division,  and  to  press  to  the 
right,  toward  the  Orange  plank  road.  This  order,  General 
Hancock  says,  was  only  partially  carried  out,  Frank’s  bri¬ 
gade  of  Barlow’s  division  being  the  only  one  sent  to  feel  the 
enemy’s  right,  which  after  an  obstinate  contest  connected 
with  Mott’s  left ;  but  had  Barlow’s  division  advanced,  as  di¬ 
rected  by  him  in  several  orders,  he  felt  confident  that  the 
enemy’s  force  he  was  in  contact  with  would  have  been  de¬ 
feated  ;  at  all  events  an  attack  on  the  enemy’s  right  by  Bar¬ 
low’s  division  would  have  prevented  the  turning  of  the  left 
of  Mott’s  division  which  occurred  later  in  the  day.  The 
cause  of  the  failure  to  carry  out  his  orders  more  fully  Gen¬ 
eral  Hancock  states  that  he  does  not  know,  but  that  it  was 
probably  owing  to  the  expected  approach  of  Longstreet  on 
his  left  about  that  time.  The  report  of  General  Gibbon 
throws  no  further  light  upon  the  subject.  General  Han¬ 
cock’s  Chief  of  Staff,  Colonel  Morgan,  who  was  then,  be¬ 
tween  7  and  8  a.m.,  on  the  extreme  left  with  General  Gibbon, 
sent  word  that  infantry,  supposed  to  be  Longstreet’s,  was 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


41 


moving  toward  the  left  on  the  Brock  road  from  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  Todd’s  tavern,  and  again  preparations  were  made  to 
meet  him  by  sending  out  Brooke’s  brigade  and  constructing 
an  intrenchment  across  the  road.  After  these  preparations 
were  made,  it  turned  out  that  the  troops  advancing  were  a 
body  of  several  hundred  convalescents  returning  to  the 
army,  and  mistakenly  following  the  route  of  march  of  the 
Second  Corps. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  according  to  our  information 
Pickett’s  division  was  with  Longstreet,  and  only  Field’s  and 
Kershaw’s  divisions  had  as  yet  been  encountered ;  and  that 
Anderson’s  division  of  Hill’s  corps  had  not  then  been  felt 
by  our  troops,  nor  its  presence  become  known  to  them. 
These  two  divisions,  with  perhaps  some  of  the  brigades  of 
the  other  divisions  of  Longstreet,  might  well  be  the  force 
which,  later,  about  9  o  clock,  threatened  Hancock’s  left 
flank  at  Trigg’s,  though,  in  point  of  fact,  it  turned  out  to  be 
Confederate  cavalry  dismounted,  with  some  artillery. 

About  8  a.m.  General  Stevenson’s  division  of  the  Ninth 
Corps  reported  to  General  Hancock  at  the  intersection  of 
the  Brock  and  plank  roads,  and  about  the  same  hour  Gen¬ 
eral  Wadsworth  was  formally  placed  under  his  command, 
and  he  was  informed  by  General  Meade  that  Burnside  had 
pushed  lorward  nearly  to  Parker’s  store,  and  would  attack 
across  his  front,  information  that  turned  out  to  be  erroneous. 
Subsequently,  at  nine  o’clock,  a  despatch  was  sent  to  General 
Hancock,  informing  him  that  Colonel  Comstock,  aide-de- 
camp  of  General  Grant,  had  been  sent  to  point  out  to  Gen¬ 
eral  Burnside  where  to  attack  the  enemy  on  the  plank  road ; 
but  this  attack  did  not  take  place  until  two  o’clock. 

At  8.50  a.m.  the  divisions  of  Birney,  Mott,  and  Wads¬ 
worth  and  part  of  Stevenson’s  division  resumed  their  attack 
along  the  plank  road,  with  Webb’s,  Carroll’s,  and  Owen’s 
brigades  of  Gibbon’s  division — all  his  division,  indeed — and 


42 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


became  furiously  engaged  with  the  enemy.1  The  firing  had 
hardly  commenced  when  Hancock  was  informed  that  his  left 
flank  at  Trigg’s  was  so  seriously  threatened  as  to  fully  oc¬ 
cupy  Barlow’s  division,  and  Eustis’s  brigade  of  Getty’s  divi¬ 
sion  and  Leasure’s  brigade  of  Stevenson’s  division  were  sent 
to  support  him.  The  enemy’s  dismounted  cavalry  opened 
upon  him  with  artillery,  and  pressed  forward  their  skirmish 
line.  The  rapid  firing  of  Sheridan’s  attack  on  Stewart’s  cav¬ 
alry  near  Todd’s  tavern  helped  to  confirm  the  impression 
that  this  was  a  serious  flank  attack  by  the  enemy.  These 
repeated  reports  of  an  advance  by  Longstreet  on  his  left 
prevented  General  Hancock  from  throwing  his  full  strength 
into  the  attack  along  the  plank  road. 

About  half-past  nine  Cutler’s  brigade  of  Wadsworth’s  divi¬ 
sion  was  driven  back  into  the  open  ground  around  the  Lacy 
house  in  some  disorder,  and  with  heavy  loss.  Under  Han¬ 
cock’s  order  General  Birney  with  two  brigades  re-established 
the  line.  The  contest  continued  without  material  change  of 
position  on  either  side.  At  about  half-past  ten,  Generals 
Sedgwick  and  Warren  were  directed  to  suspend  further  at¬ 
tack,  to  strengthen  their  intrenchments  and  to  throw  up  new 
works,  in  order  that  a  part  of  their  troops  might  be  available 
for  an  attacking  force  to  move  from  the  vicinity  of  Hancock’s 
right.  Engineer  troops  to  the  number  of  about  1^200  had 
been  sent  to  General  Warren  the  night  of  the  5th,  and  had 
been  placed  in  his  second  line.  They  were  now  used  for 
constructing  intrenchments  and  bridges,  and  were  not  at  any 
time  afterward  used  as  infantry,  for  it  was  difficult  to  replace 


1  General  Webb  says  that  upon  reporting  to  General  Birney  he  was  ordered  by 
him  to  move  out  along  the  plank  road  and  relieve  Getty  ;  that  in  doing  so  he  saw 
nothing  of  Getty’s  troops,  but  when  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  out,  he  sud¬ 
denly  found  himself  in  close  contact  with  the  enemy,  who  opened  a  destructive  fire 
upon  him,  and  his  brigade  at  once  entered  into  a  hot  contest,  in  the  course  of 
which  it  became  mixed  with  regiments  of  Stevenson’s  and  Wadsworth’s  divisions. 
He  lost  23  officers  and  957  enlisted  men  killed  and  wounded. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


43 


such  well-instructed,  experienced  engineer  troops.  Kitch- 
ing’s  brigade,  guard  of  the  reserve  artillery,  had  also  been 
i  ordered  to  General  Warren  at  the  same  time,  and  was  now 
'sent  to  the  support  of  General  Wadsworth. 

Toward  eleven  o’clock  the  firing  on  Hancock’s  front  died 
away.  As  yet  Burnside  had  not  engaged  the  enemy. 

General  Longstreet  says  that  about  ten  o’clock  Major- 
General  M.  L.  Smith  and  others,  who  had  been  sent  out  to 
examine  the  position  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  returned  and 
reported  that  their  left  extended  but  a  short  distance  from 
the  plank  road,  and  that  upon  this  report  Wofford’s  brigade 
of  Kershaw’s  division,  which  brigade  had  just  come  up, 
Anderson’s  brigade  of  Field’s  division,  and  Mahone’s  of 
Anderson’s  division,  Hill’s  corps  (to  which  Davis’s  brigade 
of  Hetli’s  division,  Colonel  Stone  commanding,  was  after¬ 
ward  added),  were  sent  to  attack  the  enemy’s  left  and  rear, 
the  flank  movement  to  be  followed  by  a  general  advance  of 
all  his,  Longstreet’s,  troops.  The  brigades  mentioned  moved 
by  the  right  flank  until  they  reached  the  bed  of  the  unfin¬ 
ished  Fredericksburg  Railroad.  There  they  formed,  facing 
north,  and  at  about  eleven  o’clock  advanced  until  they  en¬ 
countered  the  flank  and  rear  of  Birney’s  command,  which 
with  Wadsworth’s  was  engaged  with  Kershaw’s,  Field’s,  and 
Anderson’s  divisions.  This  movement,  concealed  from  view 
by  the  dense  wood,  was  completely  successful.  Frank’s 
brigade,  on  the  left  of  Mott,  was  the  first  encountered.  It 
had  been  heavily  engaged,  and  had  nearly  exhausted  its 
ammunition,  and  was  at  once  driven  before  the  enemy’s 
vehement  attack.  Passing  over  Frank’s  brigade,  they  struck 
McAllister’s,  which,  at  the  firing  of  the  first  shots  against 
Frank’s,  had  changed  front  to  meet  the  attack,  for  General 
McAllister  had  in  person  ascertained  the  position  of  the 
flanking  force  a  short  time  before,  but  not  in  time  to  com¬ 
municate  with  General  Mott.  He  soon  found  himself  with 


44 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


a  fire  on  liis  front,  flank,  and  rear,  under  which  his  line 
broke  and  fell  back  in  confusion  to  the  intrenchments  on 
the  Brock  road.  The  confusion  extended  to  the  adjoining 
troops.  General  Hancock,  whose  bearing  on  the  field  had 
so  powerful  an  influence  on  his  command,  endeavored  to 
restore  order  and  reform  his  line  of  battle  along  the  Orange 
plank  road,  retaining  his  right,  as  it  was  then,  in  front  of 
Field  and  Anderson,  but  was  unable  to  do  so,  owing  to  the 
great  difficulty  of  adjusting  lines  under  fire  in  such  a  dense 
forest,  and  to  the  partial  disorganization  of  the  troops,  the 
most  of  whom  had  been  engaged  since  five  o’clock  in  the 
morning  under  heavy  musketry  fire.  Consulting  with  Gen¬ 
eral  Birney,  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  withdraw  to  the 
breastworks  on  the  Brock  road,  which  was  accomplished, 
and  the  troops  reformed  in  two  lines  of  battle  on  the  ground 
from  which  they  had  advanced  to  the  attack  in  the  morning.- 
The  enemy  pushed  forward  to  within  a  few  hundred  yards 
of  the  breastworks,  but  did  not  attempt  to  assault  them. 

General  Wadsworth,  an  officer  of  distinguished  intrepidity, 
was  mortally  wounded  in  front  of  his  command  during  this 
attack  and  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  General  Bax¬ 
ter  w'as  wounded.1 

As  soon  as  the  success  of  the  flank  attack  was  established, 
General  Longstreet  made  arrangements  to  follow  it  up,  and 
ordered  an  advance  of  all  his  troops  for  that  purpose.  While 
riding  at  the  head  of  his  column,  moving  by  the  flank  down 


1  General  Hancock  says  of  the  field  of  battle  in  the  Wilderness : 

“  It  was  covered  by  a  dense  forest,  almost  impenetrable  by  troops  in  line  of 
battle,  where  manoeuvring  was  an  operation  of  extreme  difficulty  and  uncer¬ 
tainty.  The  undergrowth  was  so  heavy  that  it  was  scarcely  possible  to  see  more 
than  one  hundred  paces  in  any  direction.  The  movements  of  the  enemy  could 
not  be  observed  until  the  lines  were  almost  in  collision.  Only  the  roar  of  the 
musketry  disclosed  the  position  of  the  combatants  to  those  who  were  at  any  dis¬ 
tance,  and  my  knowledge  of  what  was  transpiring  on  the  field,  except  in  my 
immediate  presence,  was  limited,  and  was  necessarily  derived  from  reports  of 
subordinate  commanders.” 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


45 


the  plank  road,  when  opposite  the  brigades  that  had  made 
the  flank  movement,  which  were  drawn  np  parallel  with  the 
road,  about  sixty  yards  from  it,  a  portion  of  them  fired  a 
volley,  which  killed,  among  others,  General  Jenkins,  com¬ 
manding  the  leading  brigade  of  Field’s  division,  and  severely 
wounded  General  Longstreet.  General  Kershaw  was  riding 
with  General  Jenkins,  arranging  the  details  of  the  attack  to 
be  made,  when  the  firing  took  place,  and  he  says  that  General 
Lee  soon  came  upon  the  ground,  postponed  the  attack  to  a 
later  hour,  and  ordered  him  to  take  position  with  his  right 
resting  on  the  unfinished  Orange  Railroad. 

Colonel  Leasure’s  brigade  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  which  had 
been  posted  on  the  left  under  Gibbon,  was  now  ordered  by 
General  Hancock  to  sweep  along  his  whole  front  from  left  to 
right,  holding  his  own  right  about  one  hundred  yards  from 
the  breastworks  and  attack  any  enemy  he  should  find.  This 
order  was  promptly  and  thoroughly  executed  ;  some  of  the 
enemy  were  encountered,  who  fell  back  without  engaging  him. 

About  2  p.m.  General  Robinson  with  his  First  Brigade, 
Colonel  Lyle  commanding,  and  two  regiments  of  heavy  ar¬ 
tillery,  reported  to  General  Hancock.  They  were  massed 
near  the  plank  road  in  reserve.1 

To  return  to  an  earlier  hour  of  the  day.  As  soon  as  Hetli’s 

1  A  description  of  the  route  of  the  Fredericksburg  and  Orange  Court  House  un¬ 
finished  railroad,  where  it  runs  through  the  battlefield,  will  serve  to  explain  the 
manner  in  which  Longstreet's  flank  attack  was  made.  The  road  runs  from 
Trigg’s,  Hancock’s  extreme  left,  in  a  northwest  direction  about  parallel  with  the 
Brock  road,  and  at  a  distance  of  about  half  a  mile  from  it.  At  the  end  of  a  mile 
it  turns,  and  runs  a  little  south  of  west,  until,  at  Parker's  store,  it  is  about  three 
hundred  yards  from  the  plank  road.  The  part  of  it  parallel  with  the  Brock  road 
was  opposite  the  position  of  Barlow’s  division  and  the  artillery  of  the  Second 
Corps.  Longstreet’s  troops  formed  for  the  flank  attack  on  this  railroad  bed  near 
the  bend.  It  was  a  good  enough  road  for  troops  to  move  on.  Had  Barlow’s  divi¬ 
sion  gone  forward  at  the  time  mentioned  by  General  Hancock,  when  Frank's  bri¬ 
gade  was  sent  to  feel  the  enemy’s  right,  whether  by  the  unfinished  railroad,  which 
was  much  the  best  route,  or  by  any  other  route,  its  line  would  have  extended 
across  the  railroad-bed  west  of  the  bend,  and  none  of  the  enemy’s  troops  could 
have  entered  or  crossed  that  bed  without  its  being  known  to  our  troops,  and 


46 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


and  Wilcox’s  divisions  were  reformed,  after  Longstreet  and 
Anderson  came  upon  the  field,  they  were  placed  on  the  left 
of  Anderson’s  division,  reaching  Ewell’s  right,  and  at  once 
intrenched.  Willcox’s  left  extended  beyond  the  open  ground 
of  Chewning’s  farm. 

General  Burnside’s  two  divisions  had  moved  out  in  the 
morning  toward  Chewning’s,  near  which  place  it  was  found 
that  the  enemy  had  put  some  artillery  in  position  supported 
by  infantry.  Receiving  the  fire  of  this  force,  dispositions 
were  made  for  its  attack,  but  in  accordance  with  more  recent 
orders  the  command  moved  toward  Tapp’s,  where  the  firing 
still  continued  heavy.  The  advance  in  this  direction  was 
through  woods  with  matted  undergrowth,  and  the  progress 
was  very  slow.  Willcox’s  division  was  composed  entirely  of 
raw  troops,  inexperienced  in  every  way.  Finally,  about  two 
o’clock,  Potter’s  division  came  upon  the  enemy  intrenched 
on  the  opposite  side  of  a  swampy  ravine,  and,  attacking, 
gained  some  advantage.  This  appears  to  have  been  the  line 
held  by  Perry’s  brigade  of  Anderson’s  division,  and  Law’s 
brigade  of  Field’s  division,  commanded  by  General  W.  F. 
Perry.  Willcox’s  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps  was  now 
brought  up,  and,  to  relieve  the  attack  on  Hancock,  about  half¬ 
past  five  a  further  attack  was  made,  which  broke  Law’s  and 
Perry’s  brigades,  and  drove  them  back  in  disorder.  General 
Perry  was  severely  wounded.  But  General  Wofford  came  to 
their  assistance,  and  attacked  successfully  the  somewhat 
disordered  troops  of  Willcox.  General  Heth  arriving  with  a 
part  of  his  division,  the  Confederate  brigades  that  had  been 
forced  back  advanced  with  it,  passing  over  the  ground  on 

Longstreet’s  flanking  attack  could  not  have  been  made  without  due  preparation 
to  meet  it.  Its  success  depended  upon  its  being  concealed.  Frank’s  advance 
should  have  been  made  along  this  road,  and  the  road  should  have  been  watched 
as  far  as  the  bend.  But  these  considerations  as  to  the  action  of  others  did  not  re¬ 
lieve  General  Birney  from  the  necessity  of  taking  precautions  to  guard  the  left 
flank  of  his  command  from  surprise.  Its  right  flank  was  not  exposed  to  it. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


47 


which  the  contest  had  taken  place.  Apparently  those  contend¬ 
ing  forces  recovered  the  position  they  had  held  before  their 
fighting  began,  for  General  Burnside  says  that  he  formed  his 
command  for  the  night  immediately  in  front  of  the  enemy’s 
intrencliments  and  connected  with  Hancock  on  his  left. 

The  chief  object  of  General  Burnside’s  movement  was  not 
accomplished.  His  presence  near  the  left  of  Longstreet’s 
corps  and  Anderson’s  division  in  the  afternoon  probably 
kept  some  of  those  troops  from  joining  in  the  attack  on 
Hancock  at  4.15  p.m.  Could  his  attack  have  been  made 
early  in  the  day,  and  followed  up  with  vigor,  it  would  have 
had  important  consequences.  Hancock,  expecting  his  co¬ 
operation,  made  his  dispositions  with  a  view  to  it. 

About  three  o’clock  General  Hancock  was  directed  to  at¬ 
tack  at  six,  and  General  Burnside  advised  of  it  and  ordered 
to  attack  at  the  same  hour,  aiding  Hancock.  Hearing  the 
firing  on  General  Hancock’s  front  at  a  quarter  past  four, 
General  Burnside  attacked  as  soon  as  Willcox  was  in  posi¬ 
tion,  with  the  result  already  stated. 

At  a  quarter  past  four  o’clock  the  enemy  advanced  in  force 

against  Hancock’s  line  until  they  came  within  a  hundred 

paces  of  it,  when  they  opened  a  heavy  musketry  fire,  which 

was  not,  however,  very  destructive.  The  attack  was  heaviest 

on  Hancock’s  left  of  the  plank  road.  At  the  end  of  half  an 

hour  a  portion  of  Mott’s  division  and  of  Ward’s  brigade  of 

Birney’s  division  gave  way,  retiring  in  disorder ;  but  through 

the  exertion  of  General  Hancock,  his  staff,  and  other  officers, 

manv  of  them  returned  to  the  line  of  battle.  The  moment 
%/ 

the  break  began  the  enemy  pushed  forward,  and  Anderson’s 
brigade  of  Field’s  division 1  took  possession  of  that  part  of 
the  first  line  of  intrencliments  and  planted  their  colors  there. 

1  General  Hancock  says  Anderson’s  brigade,  but  in  the  Lee  Memorial  volume  it 
is  stated  to  have  been  Jenkins’s  brigade  led  by  Bratton.  See  also  the  report  of 
Colonel  James  R.  Hagood,  commanding  First  South  Carolina  Regiment,  Jenkins’s 
brigade,  whose  regiment  formed  part  of  the  force  that  got  possession  of  our  in- 


48 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Colonel  Carroll  of  Gibbon’s  division  had  his  brigade  near  at 
hand,  and  was  ordered  by  General  Birney  to  drive  them  out, 
which  he  did,  moving  forward  at  double-quick.  General 
Hancock’s  despatch  referring  to  this  says  both  the  attack 
and  counter-attack  were  of  the  handsomest  kind.  By  five 
o’clock  the  enemy  was  completely  repulsed,  and  fell  back 
with  heavy  loss  in  killed  and  wounded. 

During  this  attack  Dow’s  battery,  Sixth  Maine,  rendered 
effective  service,  one  section  on  the  plank  road,  the  other 
near  Mott’s  left,  in  the  second  line.  It  wTas  served  with 
great  steadiness  and  gallantry. 

As  Hancock’s  troops  were  nearly  out  of  ammunition,  and 
the  ammunition  wagons  were  at  some  distance  in  the  rear, 
and  there  was  not  time  to  replenish  and  organize  a  formida¬ 
ble  attack  by  six  o’clock,  that  attack  was  given  up.* 1 

It  should  be  mentioned  that  just  before  the  attack  the 
front  line  of  breastworks  near  the  point  where  the  line  was 
broken  through,  which  was  entirely  of  logs,  took  fire  from 
the  forest  in  front  (the  battleground  of  the  morning),  which 
had  been  burning  for  some  hours.  The  heat  and  smoke 
were  driven  into  the  faces  of  the  men,  preventing  them  on 
portions  of  the  line  from  firing  over  the  parapet,  and  at 
some  points  obliged  them  to  abandon  it.2 

trenchment,  in  which  he  says  they  received  a  terrific  musketry  and  artillery  fire 
from  our  second  line,  and  that  the  troops  on  his  left  giving  way  he  abandoned 
the  intrenchments ;  he  lost  something  more  than  one-third  of  his  command, 
killed  and  wounded,  in  this  attack. 

1  Colonel  Theodore  Lyman,  an  accomplished  gentleman  from  Boston,  a  volun¬ 
teer  aide  on  the  staff  of  General  Meade  from  the  Summer  of  1863  to  the  close  of 
the  war,  serving  without  pay  or  allowances,  passed  the  5th  and  6th  of  May  with 
General  Hancock,  sending  constantly  brief  notes  with  small  diagrams  to  General 
Meade,  showing  the  progress  of  the  operations  and  giving  the  latest  information. 
It  was  General  Meade’s  habit  to  intrust  this  service  to  Colonel  Lyman,  sending 
him  to  the  different  corps  commanders.  These  little  despatches  are  on  file  in  the 
War  Department  and  furnish  valuable  information. 

2  General  McAllister,  who  was  in  the  second  line,  says  that  he  opened  upon  the 
enemy  when  they  got  into  the  first  1  ne,  and  that  a  part  of  his  brigade  advanced 
upon  them  also.  He  was  wounded  and  obliged  to  leave  the  field. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


49 


The  attacking  force,  so  far  as  I  can  make  out,  was  Field’s 
and  Anderson’s  divisions,  excepting  Law’s  and  Perry’s  bri¬ 
gades,  with  probably  some  part  of  Heth’s  division. 

To  return  to  the  Sixth  Corps.  Shaler’s  brigade  reported 
back  to  it  from  the  trains  some  time  in  the  day  and  was 
placed  on  the  right  of  Seymour.  Owing  to  the  close  prox¬ 
imity  of  the  enemy,  intrenching  here  was  difficult,  but  the 
brigade  engaged  in  it. 

General  Johnston’s  brigade  of  Rodes’s  division  having  ar¬ 
rived  from  Hanover  Junction,  was  sent  to  General  Early, 
who  posted  it  to  watch  his  left.  General  Gordon  having  as¬ 
certained  where  the  right  flank  of  the  Sixth  Corps  rested  in 
the  woods,  and  that  it  was  without  support,  proposed  attack¬ 
ing  it  in  flank  with  his  brigade,  which  was  to  be  formed  in 
open  ground  four  or  five  hundred  yards  distant.  But  at  that 
time  it  was  deemed  best  not  to  do  so,  as  there  were,  in 
General  Early’s  opinion,  indications  of  an  attempt  to  turn 
their  left  by  Burnside’s  corps  or  part  of  it.  Later  in  the 
day  this  objection  no  longer  existed,  and  preparations  were 
made  in  the  afternoon  for  the  attack,  with  Gordon’s  brigade, 
supported  by  Johnston’s,  to  be  followed  up  by  a  front  attack 
with  the  rest  of  Early’s  division.  Gordon’s  brigade  was 
formed  in  some  open  ground  near  the  edge  of  the  woods, 
and  Johnston’s  in  rear  of  it.  The  advance  was  then  made  a 
short  time  before  sunset.  Shaler’s  brigade  was  partly  en¬ 
gaged  building  breastworks  when  the  attack  came,  and  was 
struck  in  flank,  rolled  up  and  thrown  into  confusion,  and 
several  hundred  prisoners  captured  from  it,  including  Gen¬ 
eral  Shaler.  Seymour’s  brigade  was  also  disordered,  and 
toward  the  end  of  the  attack  he  was  captured,  though  not 
many  prisoners  were  taken  from  his  brigade.  But  the  ad¬ 
vance  of  Gordon’s  brigade  through  the  dense  thicket  disor¬ 
dered  his  troops,  and  his  right,  striking  that  part  of  Shaler’s 
line  that  was  refused,  gave  way.  The  disorder  of  his  troops 
XII.— 3 


50 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


and  the  darkness  in  the  forest  of  approaching  night  put  a 
stop  to  Gordon’s  further  progress.  Johnston’s  brigade 
passed  Gordon’s  left,  and  got  in  rear  of  Wright’s  line,  en¬ 
countered  some  part  of  it,  and  took  some  prisoners.  Pe- 
gram’s  brigade  attacked  in  front  very  soon  after  Gordon 
struck  Shaler.  Darkness  coming  on  found  the  opposing 
troops  in  some  disorder,  and  in  very  close  proximity,  but 
General  Wright  promptly  restored  order  among  his  troops. 
General  Early  drew  back  his  brigades  and  formed  a  new 
line  in  front  of  his  old.1  During  the  night  an  entirely  new 
line  was  taken  up  by  the  Sixth  Corps,  its  front  and  right 
thrown  back,  a  change  which  the  right  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
conformed  to. 

I  have  recently  learnt  that  the  facilities  which  the  open 
ground  on  which  Gordon  formed  offered  for  making  a  flank 
attack  on  Sedgwick’s  right,  and  also  on  Early’s  left,  had 
been  noted  during  the  day  by  General  Wright,  and  only  the 
want  of  troops  prevented  him  from  making  the  flank  attack 
on  Early.  Morris’s  and  Upton’s  brigades,  the  only  dispos¬ 
able  troops  the  Sixth  Corps  had,  were  held  available,  under 
orders  from  General  Meade,  for  Warren’s  left,  or  Hancock’s 
right.  Had  General  Sedgwick  suggested  this  flank  attack 
for  those  brigades  or  the  support  of  his  own  flank  by  them 
it  would  have  been  acceded  to.  There  must  have  been  some 
neglect  in  the  vedettes  or  skirmish  line  in  keeping  a  look¬ 
out  on  that  ground,  otherwise  timely  notice  would  have 
been  given  of  the  presence  of  Gordon  there.2 

1  General  Early,  in  his  Memoir,  after  describing  this  affair,  says  of  it :  “  It  was 
fortunate,  however,  that  darkness  came  to  close  this  affair,  as  the  enemy,  if  he 
had  been  able  to  discover  the  disorder  on  our  side,  might  have  brought  up  fresh 
troops  and  availed  himself  of  our  condition.  As  it  was,  doubtless  the  lateness  of 
the  hour  caused  him  to  be  surprised  and  the  approaching  darkness  increased  the 
confusion  in  his  ranks,  as  he  could  not  see  the  strength  of  the  attacking  force, 
and  probably  imagined  it  to  be  much  more  formidable  than  it  really  was.” 

2  Soon  after  this  flank  attack  began,  staff  officers  of  the  Sixth  Corps  rode  in  to 
General  Meade’s  headquarters  and  informed  me  (General  Meade  was  at  General 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


51 


Tlie  operations  of  tlie  cavalry  on  the  6th  must  now  be 
stated.  On  the  morning  of  that  day  General  Sheridan  di¬ 
rected  General  Custer  with  his  own  brigade  and  Devin’s  to 
move  down  the  Furnace  road  to  the  Brock  road,  connect 
with  Hancock’s  left,  and  attack  the  enemy  there.  At  the 
intersection  of  the  Furnace  and  Brock  roads  Custer  encoun¬ 
tered  Hampton’s  division,  while  Gregg  met  Fitzhugh  Lee’s 
division  at  Todd’s  tavern,  both  repulsing  the  enemy’s  at¬ 
tacks  handsomely.  General  Sheridan  was  restrained  from 
following  up  any  advantage  gained,  as  the  cavalry  was  very 
far  out  from  the  trains,  the  care  of  which  he  was  especially 
entrusted  with. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  General  Sheridan’s  despatch  informing 
him  of  these  encounters,  General  Meade  at  1  p.m.  replied, 
that  as  Hancock’s  line  had  been  heavily  pressed,  and  his  left 
turned,  he,  General  Meade,  thought  it  best  to  draw  in  the 
cavalry  so  as  to  secure  the  protection  of  the  trains.  Exactly 
what  had  taken  place  on  Hancock’s  left  flank  was  not  then 
thoroughly  known  at  headquarters.  Before  this  direction 
was  executed  the  enemy’s  cavalry  again  attacked  and  were 
repulsed,  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field.  In 
reporting  this  at  2.35  p.m.,  General  Sheridan  stated  that  they, 

Grant’s  headquarters  near  by)  that  in  endeavoring  to  carry  a  despatch  to  the 
right  of  their  line  they  found  that  it  had  just  been  broken  and  rolled  up  ;  that 
the  enemy  occupied  the  position,  and  that  part  of  them  were  advancing  down  the 
Germanna  plank  road  on  our  right  and  rear,  following  the  fugitives  from  Shaler’s 
and  Seymour’s  brigades ;  and  they  added  that  probably  both  Sedgwick  and 
Wright  were  captured.  I  at  once  made  dispositions  to  meet  this  with  the  Provost 
Guard  and  some  troops  that  General  Warren  sent  me,  and  the  reserve  artillery 
near  by,  and  then  sent  notice  of  the  affair  to  General  Meade,  who  at  once  came 
over  with  General  Grant.  Soon  the  staff  officers  whom  I  had  sent  up  the  Ger¬ 
manna  road  to  rally  the  fugitives  returned,  reporting  there  was  no  enemy  on  it ; 
reports  from  a  brigade  of  Warren’s  corps  sent  in  the  same  direction  confirmed 
their  report,  and  then  information  was  received  from  General  Sedgwick  and  Gen¬ 
eral  Wright  showing  the  actual  condition  of  the  corps. 

I  have  mentioned  these  details  because  exaggerated  statements  concerning  this 
affair,  which  quickly  spread  through  the  army,  gave  rise,  I  think,  to  unfounded 


rumors. 


52 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


the  enemy’s  cavalry,  were  then  working  to  his  left,  and  that 
he  had  made  new  dispositions  in  accordance  with  the  orders 
received.  The  cavalry  were  accordingly  drawn  in  from 
Todd’s  tavern  and  the  Brock  road  in  front  of  the  Furnaces, 
and  the  enemy’s  cavalry  followed  them.  In  the  morning  of 
the  7th,  Custer  drove  such  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  force  as 
were  at  the  Furnaces  to  Todd’s  tavern,  where  General  Sheri¬ 
dan  with  Gregg’s  and  Merritt’s  divisions  attacked  Stewart’s 
whole  cavalry  force,  Hampton’s  and  Fitzhugh  Lee’s  divisions, 

5> 

and  drove  them  along  the  Spottsvlvania  road  and  also  back 
upon  the  Shady  Grove  Church  road  (Catharpin  road),  Fitz¬ 
hugh  Lee’s  division  along  the  Brock  road,  and  Hampton’s 
along  the  Catharpin.  They  had  constructed  barricades  and 
rifle-pits,  which  were  charged  and  captured.  The  drawing 
in  of  the  cavalry  the  day  before  did  not  oblige  them  to  fight 
on  disadvantageous  ground  on  the  7th,  nor  under  any  other 
adverse  condition. 

To  return  to  the  infantry  corps  of  the  army.  On  the 
morning  of  the  7th,  reconnoissances  were  made  of  the 
enemy’s  position,  which  was  found  to  be  well  intrenched  : 
part  of  it  ran  along  the  open  ground  of  the  Hagerson,  Chew- 
ning,  and  Tapp  farms ;  artillery  was  placed  not  only  where 
the  ground  was  open,  but  at  other  portions  of  the  line.  The 
average  distance  apart  of  the  lines  of  the  two  armies  was 
about  three-quarters  of  a  mile.  To  attack  a  position  of  such 
character,  situated  as  this  was,  covered  by  a  tangled  forest 
that  inevitably  disordered  the  attacking  forces  as  they  ad¬ 
vanced,  was  not  judicious  ;  it  promised  no  success.  General 
Grant  therefore  decided  to  continue  the  movement  by  the 
left  flank,  with  a  view  to  a  general  engagement  in  the  more 
open  country. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  7th,  the  bridge  at  Germanna 
Ford  was  taken  up,  and  relaid  at  Ely’s  Ford,  for  the  passage 
of  the  ambulance  train  containing  the  wounded,  who  were  to 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


53 


be  sent  to  Washington  by  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Rail¬ 
road.  In  the  course  of  the  day  their  destination  was  changed, 
and  they  were  subsequently  sent  to  Washington  by  way  of 
Fredericksburg. 

According  to  the  reports  of  the  Medical  Director  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  Surgeon  Thomas  A.  McParlin,  from 
May  4  to  December  31,  1864  (see  pages  148-178,  Appendix 
to  First  Part  of  the  “  Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the 
War,”  and  also  the  tables  of  killed,  wounded,  and  missing 
in  Part  First,  Surgical  Volume),  the  number  of  wounded  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness 
was  9,102,  not  including  the  Ninth  Corps  (see  pages  151  and 
152,  Appendix) .  This  I  believe  to  be  more  correct  than  any 
other  statement  we  have  of  the  number  of  wounded  in  that 
battle.  In  the  same  report  it  is  stated  that  the  number  of 
wounded  according  to  the  regimental  reports  was  10,805, 
but  that  subsequent  reports  rendered  it  probable  that  that 
number  was  erroneous.  The  number  of  killed,  according  to 
the  regimental  reports,  was  2,009,  which  number  is  undoubt¬ 
edly  very  nearly  accurate.  The  number  of  missing  according 
to  the  regimental  records  was  2,902.  This  is  the  number 
furnished  by  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  army  to  General 
Badeau,  and  includes  the  missing  of  the  Ninth  Corps. 

The  casualties  in  General  Burnside’s  Ninth  Corps  were, 
according  to  his  report,  256  killed  and  1,118  wounded. 
These  added  to  the  regimental  reports  of  killed  and  the 
medical  reports  of  wounded,  we  have  for  the  casualties  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Ninth  Corps  in  the  battle  of 
the  Wilderness  2,265  killed,  10,220  wounded,  and  2,902  miss¬ 
ing.  Total,  15,387.  Killed  and  wounded,  12,485.  General 
Burnside’s  missing  numbered  145. 1 


1  For  a  notice  of  the  errors  in  Badeau’s  tabular  statement  ot  the  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  James,  from  May  5,  1864, 
to  April  9,  1865,  found  on  page  713,  vol.  iii. ,  of  his  Military  Life  of  General  Grant, 


54 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


The  woods  took  fire  in  many  places,  and  it  is  estimated 
that  200  of  our  wounded  perished  in  the  flames  and  smoke. 

According  to  the  tabular  statement,  Part  First,  “  Medical 
and  Surgical  History  of  the  War,”  the  casualties  in  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  were  2,000  killed,  6,000  wounded,  and 
3,400  missing.  The  authority  for  this  statement  is  not  given, 
and  I  do  not  find  anywhere  records  of  the  loss  of  that  army 
in  the  Wilderness.* 1 

Concerning  the  difference  of  loss  between  the  two  armies, 
it  must  be  recollected  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  the 
attacking  party  on  the  right  and  left,  and  that  these  attacks 
were  continued  and  repeatedly  renewed  after  Ewell  and  Hill 
had  intrenched.  It  is  true  that  some  counter-attacks  were 
made  by  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  or  parts  of  it,  upon 
Sedgwick,  Warren,  and  Hancock,  but  it  was  when  the  posi¬ 
tions  of  those  corps  in  the  woods  were  well  defined,  though, 
with  two  exceptions,  not  intrenched,  and  when  there  was  no 


see  Appendix  P.  See,  also,  the  same  Appendix  for  the  correction  of  the  errors  of 
a  statement  of  the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  battle  of  the  Wilder¬ 
ness,  by  Major-General  C.  M.  Wilcox,  which  errors  arose  from  his  misapprehension 
of  the  tabular  statement  in  the  Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the  War. 

1  General  Ewell,  in  his  report  of  March  20,  1865,  states  that  his  killed  and 
wounded  in  the  Wilderness  numbered  1,250.  General  McGowan  in  his  report 
states  that  the  casualties  of  his  brigade  (Wilcox’s  division)  amounted  to  438  killed 
and  wounded,  and  43  missing.  General  Lane  states  the  loss  of  his  brigade  (Wil¬ 
cox’s  division)  at  272  killed  and  wounded  and  143  missing.  In  General  Kershaw’s 
brigade  (see  General  Kershaw’s  report  of  his  division)  the  loss  was  296  killed  and 
wounded  and  26  missing.  In  General  Goode  Bryan’s  brigade  (Kershaw’s  division) 
the  killed  and  wounded  were  133.  In  Mahone’s  brigade  the  number  was  146.  It 
is  stated  that  the  losses  in  Gregg’s  and  Benning’s  brigades  of  Field’s  division  were 
very  heavy.  The  heaviest  losses  were  probably  in  Hill’s  corps  and  part  of  Long- 
street’s.  But  I  can  find  no  sufficient  data  to  serve  as  a  test  of  the  correctness  of 
the  numbers  of  the  table  of  the  Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the  War. 

General  Early,  who  took  command  of  Hill’s  corps  on  the  morning  of  May  8th, 
says  that  when  he  took  command  of  it  “the  infantry  numbered  about  13,000 
muskets  for  duty.”  By  the  return  of  April  20th,  the  number  of  enlisted  men  of 
infantry  of  Hill's  corps  present  for  duty  was  20,648.  This  contrast  of  numbers 
may  afford  some  indication  of  the  loss  of  that  corps  by  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing  in  the  Wilderness.  It  is  true  there  are  other  sources  of  reduction  of 
numbers  than  the  casualties  of  battle,  such  as  expiration  of  terms  of  service. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 


55 


uncertainty  as  to  where  and  liow  they  were  posted.  The 
chief  exceptional  attack  made  against  our  troops  intrenched 
was  that  against  Hancock  in  the  afternoon  of  May  6th,  when 
his  loss  was  small,  that  of  the  enemy  severe.  The  other  was 
the  front  attack  of  Early,  late  in  the  atternoon,  and  in  the 
evening,  when  Gordon’s  flank  attack  was  made. 

Besides  the  general  officers  named,  both  sides  lost  many 
valuable  officers  in  this  battle,  and  of  those  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  none  were  held  in  higher  esteem  for  soldierly 
qualities  than  Major  H.  L.  Abbott,  of  the  Twentieth  Massa¬ 
chusetts,  a  brilliant  young  officer.1 2 

I  have  gone  into  more  detail  in  the  account  of  this  battle 
than  I  shall  undertake  to  give  of  those  that  are  to  follow, 
chiefly  because  it  may  serve  to  show  what  difficulties  were 
encountered  by  the  forces  engaged  in  it,  owing  to  the  char¬ 
acter  of  the  field  on  which  it  took  place.  Some  of  its  fea¬ 
tures  were  found  in  other  of  the  battle-grounds  of  the  two 
armies ;  but,  so  far  as  I  know,  no  great  battle  ever  took 
place  before  on  such  ground.3  But  little  of  the  combatants 
could  be  seen,  and  its  progress  was  known  to  the  senses 
chiefly  by  the  rising  and  falling  sounds  of  a  vast  musketry 
fire  that  continually  swept  along  the  lines  of  battle,  many 


1  Colonel  Theodore  Lyman  informs  me  that  on  a  visit  he  made  to  the  battle¬ 
field  of  the  Wilderness  after  the  war,  in  going  over  the  ground  where  the  Twen¬ 
tieth  Massachusetts,  one  of  the  very  best  regiments  in  the  service,  lost  a  third  of 
its  number  in  killed  and  wounded,  he  found  the  line  occupied  by  the  enemy  to  be 
just  behind  the  crest  of  a  slight  elevation,  where  they  had  placed  a  row  of  logs, 
and,  lying  down  behind  it,  were  effectually  screened  from  the  bullets  and  sight  of 
our  troops,  for  in  front  of  and  around  them  was  a  dense  thicket  of  saplings;  and 
in  that  thicket,  not  more  than  twenty  or  thirty  yards  distant,  was  the  Twentieth 
Massachusetts  and  other  of  our  troops,  whose  presence  was  made  known  by  their 
thrusting  through  the  brush,  and  whose  return  fire,  aimed,  as  they  supposed,  at 
the  Confederate  troops,  had  cut  off  the  saplings  three,  four,  and  five  feet  above 
the  ground  as  regularly  as  if  they  had  been  cut  by  a  machine.  Many  of  the  par¬ 
tially  cut  off  tops  were  still  hanging  when  Colonel  Lyman  visited  the  ground. 

2  The  ground  occupied  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  vicinity  of  Chancel- 
lorville  in  the  Spring  of  1863  was  either  open  or  in  woods  chiefly  of  ordinary 

character  with  but  little  undergrowth. 


56 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


miles  in  length,  sounds  which  at  times  approached  to  the 

* 

sublime. 

General  Badeau,  in  his  “Military  Life  of  General  Grant,” 
appears  to  intimate  that  General  Grant  intended  to  bring  on 
a  general  engagement  on  the  5th  of  May,  in  the  preliminary 
position  directed  to  be  taken  up  in  the  order  of  march  issued 
on  the  4th.  But  that  view  is  not  consistent  with  the  orders 
issued  nor  with  what  was  best  to  do. .  Had  he  really  wished 
to  fight  a  battle  on  the  5th,  the  Second  Corps,  after  cross¬ 
ing  at  Ely’s  Ford  on  the  4th,  should  have  moved  out  the 
Orange  plank  road  to  New  Hope  Church ;  the  Fifth  Corps 
out  the  pike  to  Bobertson’s  tavern ;  the  Sixth  Corps  to  Old 
Wilderness  tavern  ;  and,  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  to  posi¬ 
tion  between  the  Second  and  Fifth  Corps  ;  Wilson’s  cavalry 
out  the  Orange  plank  road  in  advance  of  the  Second  Corps, 
and  moving  to  the  left  at  New  Hope  Church.  That  would 
have  brought  on  a  battle  in  more  open  and  better  ground 
for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  than  that  of  the  Wilderness. 
Had  Lee  gone  into  the  strong,  intrenched  position  of  Mine 
Bun,  or  had  he  withdrawn  to  it  after  the  battle,  we  could 
have  moved  to  turn  his  right  as  soon  as  the  trains  were  suf¬ 
ficiently  advanced  to  admit  of  it,  and  in  doing  so  should 
have  found  still  more  open  country.  I  do  not  perceive  that 
there  is  anything  to  induce  the  belief  that  General  Grant 
intended  or  wished  to  fight  a  battle  in  the  Wilderness.  His 
doing  so  was,  under  the  circumstances,  unavoidable,  not  a 
matter  of  choice.  Further,  it  would  have  been  strange  if 
the  Chief-of- Staff  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  whose  special 

occupation  concerned  the  operations  of  that  army,  its  move- 

% 

ments  and  battles  and  their  object,  should  not  have  known 
of  this  intention  if  it  had  any  existence. 


CHAPTER  III. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 

As  before  stated,  General  Grant  had  determined  to  con¬ 
tinue  the  movement  by  the  left,  and  in  that  view  directed 
General  Meade  to  take  position,  by  a  night  march,  at  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House  with  one  corps,  at  Todd’s  tavern  with 
another,  and  with  a  third  at  the  intersection  of  the  road  from 
Piney  Branch  Church  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  with 
the  road  from  Alsop’s  to  the  Old  Court  House  ;  Burnside  to 
move  to  Piney  Branch  Church.  These  positions  were  merely 
preliminary  to  further  movement  in  a  more  southerly  direc¬ 
tion,  dependent  partly  upon  the  course  that  General  Lee 
should  take. 

This  movement  required  the  trains  to  be  set  in  motion 
about  three  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  7th,  so  as  to 
clear  the  road  for  the  troops,  though  it  was  apprehended 
that  the  people  of  the  country  would  inform  General  Lee  of 
it,  and  that  he  would  readily  surmise  its  object. 

In  accordance  with  the  project  of  General  Grant,  the  army 
began  to  move  at  half-past  eight  in  the  evening ;  General 
Warren  by  the  Brock  road  toward  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  General  Sedgwick  by  the  pike  and  plank  roads  to 
Chancellorville,  and  thence  by  way  of  Aldrich’s  and  Piney 
Branch  Church  toward  the  point  designated  in  the  order  of 
march,  the  intersection  of  the  two  roads  named  ;  but  early 
in  the  morning  of  the  8th  he  was  directed  to  hold  one  divi¬ 
sion  at  that  point,  another  at  Piney  Branch  Church,  and  the 
3*  12 


58 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  65. 


third  midway  between  the  two.  Burnside  followed  Sedg¬ 
wick,  but  early  on  the  8th  he  was  directed  to  halt  at  Ald¬ 
rich’s,  where  the  Piney  Branch  Church  road  leaves  the 
Fredericksburg  plank  road  (about  two  miles  from  the 
church),  in  order  to  cover  the  trains.  Ferrero’s  division  went 
to  the  trains,  with  which  it  remained  several  weeks.  Han¬ 
cock  followed  Warren  as  far  as  Todd’s  tavern.  The  reserve 
artillery  wTent  to  Piney  Branch  Church,  the  trains  to  that 
vicinity.  General  Sheridan  was  directed  to  have  a  sufficient 
force  on  the  approaches  from  the  right  to  keep  the  corps 
commanders  advised  in  time  of  the  appearance  of  the 
enemy.1 

After  overlooking,  for  a  time,  the  commencement  of  the 
movement,  General  Meade,  with  General  Grant,  rode  to 
General  Hancock’s  headquarters  on  the  Brock  road,  near 
the  left  of  his  line,  to  await  there  the  arrival  of  the  head  of 
Warren’s  column,  and  about  eleven  o’clock  set  out  for  Todd’s 
tavern,  in  advance  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  reaching  there  about 
midnight.2 

Arrived  at  Todd’s  tavern  General  Meade  found  Gregg’s 
cavalry  division  there,  Merritt’s  being  further  forward  on  the 

1  See  Appendix  G  for  the  orders  of  General  Grant  and  General  Meade. 

2  While  at  General  Hancock’s  headquarters  it  was  learnt,  about  eleven 
o’clock,  that  the  head  of  Warren’s  column  was  near  by,  halted  and  seriously  de¬ 
layed  by  the  mounted  troops  of  the  Provost-Marshal-Genera],  which,  following  the 
headquarters,  had  occupied  the  road  instead  of  drawing  out  of  it.  General  War¬ 
ren  had  remained  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Lacy  house  to  oversee  the  withdrawal  of 
his  troops,  the  most  important  part  of  his  duty.  Had  he  been  at  the  head  of  his 
column  the  delay  would  not  have  occurred,  since  he  would  at  once  have  notified 
General  Meade  of  the  obstruction,  and  it  would  have  been  removed  immediately. 
The  headquarters  at  once  set  out  as  the  speediest  way  of  removing  the  obstacle, 
and  rode  rapidly  to  Todd’s  tavern,  reaching  there  about  midnight.  The  narrow 
road  lay  through  woods  all  the  way,  and  made  the  night  appear  very  dark ;  for 
some  distance  after  passing  the  Second  Corps  the  woods  were  still  on  fire,  and  at 
one  time  obliged  us  to  turn  off  to  the  right,  and  there  was  a  little  uncertainty 
afterward  whether  we  had  returned  to  the  right  road,  a  matter  of  some  concern, 
as  the  enemy  were  probably  within  a  mile  of  us  on  the  right.  As  we  shall  see 
further  on,  Longstreet’s  corps  was  at  that  time  moving  toward  Spottsylvania 
Court  House,  along  a  road  parallel  with  the  Brock  road,  and  about  a  mile  from  it. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


59 


road  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House.  They  had  not  yet  re¬ 
ceived  their  orders,  and  General  Meade  at  one  a.m.  directed 
Merritt  to  move  his  command  at  once  beyond  Spottsyl¬ 
vania  Court  House,  placing  one  brigade  at  the  Block  House, 
which  is  at  the  intersection  of  the  Shady  Grove  Church 
road  with  the  old  Court  House  road,  a  mile  and  a  half 
west  of  the  Court  House,  and  a  mile  east  of  the  Shady  Grove 
road  bridge  over  the  Po  River.  He  was  to  picket  the  roads 
ajrproaching  the  Court  House,  and  to  dispose  of  the  other 
two  brigades  to  cover  the  trains.  He  was  to  open  the  Brock 
road  beyond  the  Court  House  for  the  infantry  corps,  closely 
following  him  on  its  -way  to  occupy  that  place.  Gregg  he 
directed  to  move  immediately  to  the  vicinity  of  Corbin’s 
bridge  and  watch  the  roads  approaching  from  Parker’s 
store,  and  when  the  Second  Corps  reached  Todd’s  tavern,  to 
send  a  force  on  the  Brock  road  to  watch  it  in  the  direction 
of  the  Wilderness.  General  Sheridan  was  notified  at  the 
same  hour  of  these  orders. 

At  five  a.m.  General  Warren  informed  General  Meade  that 
the  head  of  his  column  reached  General  Merritt’s  head¬ 
quarters  (about  a  mile  east  of  Todd’s  tavern)  at  half-past 
three  a.m.,  that  Merritt’s  troops  had  then  already  moved  to 
clear  the  road,  and  that  he,  General  Warren,  had  massed  his 
troops  there  as  they  came  up  to  rest,  for  the  march  on  a 
dark  night  by  a  narrow  road  running  through  woods  had 
much  fatigued  them  ;  that  at  the  hour  of  his  writing  Gen¬ 
eral  Merritt  had  been  engaged  some  time. 

General  Pitzhugh  Lee’s  cavalry  division  was  on  the  road, 
which  they  had  barricaded  by  felling  trees  across  it,  and 
disputed  every  foot  of  ground,  and  in  the  darkness  of  night 
General  Merritt  found  it  exceedingly  difficult  to  make  any 
progress.  At  six  a.m.  General  Warren,  upon  an  intimation 
from  General  Merritt  that  his  infantry  could  push  the 
enemy  faster  than  he  could,  ordered  an  advance  of  his  corps, 


60  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  '64  AND  ’65. 

General  Robinson’s  division  now  leading.  In  reporting  this 
General  Warren  added,  “It  is  difficult  to  do  much  with  troops 
in  an  expeditious  manner  in  these  dense  woods.”  The  same 
obstacles  continued  until  about  half -past  eight  o’clock,  when 
Robinson’s  division  emerged  from  the  woods  into  the  open 
ground  of  Alsop’s,  about  two  and  a  half  miles  from  the 
Court  House.  Here  the  Brock  road  forks,  uniting  again  at 
the  end  of  a  mile.  Robinson  advanced  along  the  left  hand 
fork  to  the  junction  of  the  two,  Lyle’s  brigade  on  the  left, 
Dennison’s  on  the  right,  Coulter’s,  formerly  Baxter’s,  brigade 
on  the  left  rear.  At  the  junction  of  the  forks  the  line  was 
reformed  in  column  of  regiments,  and  advanced  along  the 
road  in  open  ground,  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers  in  front, 
to  within  two  or  three  hundred  yards  of  the  wood  which  the 
road  entered,  when  suddenly  a  severe  musketry  and  artillery 
fire  was  opened  upon  their  front  and  right  from  an  intrench- 
ment  just  inside  the  edge  of  the  wood.  This  staggered 
them,  and  in  a  short  time  they  fell  back  to  the  shelter  of  the 
woods  in  their  rear.  The  Maryland  brigade  took  up  a 
position  in  the  edge  of  tlie  wood  and  checked  the  further 
advance  of  the  enemy,  who  followed  them  after  turning  the 
left  of  Lyle’s  brigade,  which  had  held  on  close  to  the  enemy’s 
intrenchment  under  the  shelter  of  a  steep  crest.  General 
Robinson  was  severely  wounded  at  the  first  fire,  while  lead¬ 
ing  his  men.  Prisoners  taken  showed  this  force  of  the 
enemy  to  be  Kershaw’s  and  Humphreys’s  brigades  of  Ker¬ 
shaw’s  division.  Their  intrenchments  were  slight,  but  gave 
sufficient  cover  to  the  men.  They  were  at  the  intersection 
of  the  Brock  road  by  the  old  Court  House  road,  and  about 
a  mile  and  a  half  from  Spottsylvania  Court  House  and  the 
same  distance  from  the  Shady  Grove  Church  road  bridge 
over  the  Po. 

In  the  meantime  Griffin  took  the  right  fork,  Bartlett  in 
line  of  battle  in  advance,  Ayres  and  Sweitzer  marching  on 


SPOTTSYLV ANI A  COURT  HOUSE. 


61 


the  road.  When  Bartlett  got  half  way  across  the  open 
ground  of  Alsop,  he  also  came  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s 
infantry  and  artillery  soon  after  Robinson,  and  with  nearly 
similar  results,  but  by  the  personal  exertions  of  General 
Griffin,  who  led  his  division  in  person,  and  of  Generals 
Bartlett  and  Ayres,  the  men  reformed  quickly  under  cover 
of  Ayres’s  brigade,  who  were  in  a  sunken  part  of  the  road  ; 
and  Griffin  again  advanced,  taking  uj)  the  line  afterward 
held  for  several  days.  Crawford  came  up  on  his  left,  driv¬ 
ing  the  enemy  out  of  the  woods  there.  Field’s  division  of 
Longstreet’s  corps  had  been  coming  up  all  this  time,  and 
taking  part  in  the  fight ;  they  began  now  to  push  through 
the  pines  on  Griffin’s  right,  threatening  that  flank.  But 
Cutler  came  up  :  his  division  had  had  several  hours’  rest  and 
were  in  good  condition.  Forming  in  a  ravine,  they  advanced 
in  fine  style,  drove  the  enemy  out  of  the  woods  on  Griffin’s 
right,  and  established  their  line  so  as  to  connect  with  his. 
The  position  now  held  by  the  corps  was  intrenched.  It  was 
from  two  to  four  hundred  yards  distant  from  that  of  the 
enemy.  At  half-past  twelve  p.m.  General  Warren  reported 
that  he  had  pushed  back  the  enemy,  but  had  not  quite 
gained  the  junction  of  the  Brock  and  Catharpin  roads 
(Shady  Grove  Church  road  he  meant,  not  the  Catharpin) ; 
that  General  Wright  had,  at  his  request,  come  up  to  his 
support ;  that  the  straggling  had  been  heavy,  the  men, 
wounded  and  tired,  falling  out  of  the  ranks  into  the  woods  ; 
that  he  had  encountered  a  division  of  cavalry  (Fitzhugh 
Lee’s)  and  two  divisions  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  from  whom 
he  had  taken  prisoners ;  that  Longstreet’s  men  stated  that 
they  had  left  their  trenches  the  night  before  at  eleven 
o’clock. 

Turning  now  to  the  Second  Corps,  we  find  that  the  troops 
in  front  of  Hancock  occupied  the  road  all  night,  and  for 
that  reason  the  head  of  his  column  did  not  march  until  after 


62 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


daylight,  reaching  Todd’s  tavern  about  nine  o’clock  in  the 
morning,  and  relieving  Gregg’s  division  of  cavalry,  which  was 
holding  that  point,  his  skirmishers  engaged  with  the  enemy's 
cavalry  in  front  of  the  tavern.  The  Second  Corps  was  placed 
in  position  and  intrenched  here. 

About  11  a.m.  Colonel  Miles  was  sent  to  make  a  recon- 
noissance  on  the  Catharpin  road  toward  Corbin’s  bridge 
(about  two  miles  distant)  with  his  own  brigade  and  one  of 
Gregg’s  cavalry  brigades  and  a  battery.  Upon  his  occupy¬ 
ing  a  wooded  crest  facing  the  river  and  half  a  mile  from  it, 
the  enemy,  Hampton’s  cavalry  division,  on  the  high  ground 
on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  opened  upon  him  with  ar¬ 
tillery.  He  remained  here  until  ordered  to  return  later  in 
the  day. 

We  have  now  to  trace  the  movement  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  during  the  night  of  the  7th  and  on  the 
8th. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  7th,  General  Lee,  informed  of 
the  movement  of  our  trains,  and  partly  surmising  its  object, 
directed  General  R.  H.  Anderson,  now  in  command  of  Long- 
street’s  corps,  to  move  to  Spottsyl vania  Court  House,  and  in 
the  official  diary  of  the  First  Corps  it  is  stated  that  the  corps 
took  up  the  line  of  march  for  the  Court  House  at  eleven 
o’clock  that  night.  General  Bratton,  commanding  a  brigade 
in  Field’s  division,  says  in  his  report  that  orders  to  move 
were  received  at  nine  o’clock  in  the  evening.  The  right  of 
the  corps  rested  opposite  Hancock’s  left,  and  from  that 
point  a  road  running  south,  at  the  end  of  two  miles  entered 
the  Catharpin  road  between  Todd’s  tavern  and  Corbin’s 
bridge.  This  road  the  corps  followed,  and  after  crossing 
Corbin’s  bridge,  took  the  Shady  Grove  Church  road  to 
Spottsylvania  Court  House,  crossing  the  Po  a  second  time 
on  the  bridge  a  mile  west  of  the  Block  House  and  two  and  a 
half  miles  west  of  the  Court  House.  This  bridge  the  head 


SPOTTSYL VANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


63 


of  the  column  reached  about  daylight  of  the  8th.1  Their 
route  was  about  three  miles  shorter  than  General  Warren’s, 
who,  when  he  arrived  at  General  Merritt’s  headquarters,  at 
half-past  three  in  the  morning,  had  marched  as  far  as  they 
had  when  arriving  at  the  point  where  their  leading  troops 
met  those  of  General  Warren  between  nine  and  ten  o’clock 
in  the  morning.  They  had  the  additional  advantage  of  not 
encountering  on  their  route  an  enemy’s  barricades  and  other 
obstructions  in  a  thick  wood,  and  of  resting  an  hour  at  day¬ 
light  where  they  could  find  water  and  fuel,  and  get  some¬ 
thing  to  eat  and  drink ;  small  matters,  those  not  familiar 
with  campaigning  may  perhaps  think,  but  nevertheless  im¬ 
portant,  as  every  soldier  knows.2 

Kershaw  was  in  advance  after  the  rest,  and  finding  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee  engaged,  turned  off  rapidly  to  the  left  with  his 
leading  brigades,  Kershaw’s  and  Humphreys’s,  after  they  had 
crossed  the  Block  House  bridge,  and  occupied  some  cover 
made  by  the  cavalry.  They  were  followed  quickly  by  Field’s 
division,  and  with  the  result  already  told.  The  other  two 
brigades  of  Kershaw’s  division,  Wofford’s  and  Bryan’s,  were 
sent  to  the  Court  House,  and  with  some  of  Fitzhugh  Lee’s 
cavalry  drove  off  General  Wilson’s  cavalry  division.  This 
division  leaving  Aldrich’s  on  the  Fredericksburg  road  at  5 
a.m.  had,  at  an  early  hour,  encountered  Wickham’s  brigade  of 
Fitzhugh  Lee’s  division  in  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and 
driving  it  from  the  town  had  held  the  place  two  hours  when 
General  Wilson  was  recalled  by  General  Sheridan.  The  force 
already  mentioned  was  moving  against  him  at  the  same  time. 


1  See  authorities  already  mentioned,  and  a  Paper  of  Colonel  William  Wallace, 
Second  South  Carolina,  Kershaw’s  brigade  (Southern  Historical  Society  Papers, 
March,  1879). 

2  Medical  officers  have  noted  that  the  amount  of  shock  and  depression  of  vital 
power  with  the  wounded  who  have  gone  into  action  early  in  the  morning  without 
the  usual  meal  is  much  greater  than  with  those  who  have  had  the  meal  (see 
Report  of  the  Medical  Director  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Surgeon  McParlin). 


64 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


On  the  night  of  the  7th  General  Ewell  was  ordered  to  ex¬ 
tend  his  right,  and  if  at  daylight  he  found  no  large  force  in 
his  front  to  follow  General  Anderson  to  Spottsylvania  Court 
House.  This  was  done,  the  corps  moving  past  Parker’s 
store,  and  on  the  longest  route  taken  by  Lee’s  troops.  On 
the  march  General  Early  was  assigned  to  the  command  of 
Hill’s  corps,  Gordon  to  the  command  of  Early’s  division,  and 
some  transfers  of  brigades  were  made  among  Ewell’s  divisions. 
Mahone  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Anderson’s  divi¬ 
sion  of  Hill’s  corps.  General  Ewell  says  the  march  was  dis¬ 
tressing  from  the  intense  heat,  the  thick  dust,  and  the  smoke 
from  burning  woods ;  and  that  his  troops  reached  Spottsyl¬ 
vania  Court  House  about  5  p.m.,  just  in  time  for  Rodes’s  divi¬ 
sion  to  repel  (he  says)  an  attempt  to  turn  Anderson’s  right, 
which  rested  on  the - road  :  the  Brock  road  is  meant. 

General  Early  states  that  General  Lee’s  orders  to  him  were 
to  move  by  Todd’s  tavern  along  the  Brock  road  to  Spottsyl¬ 
vania  Court  House  as  soon  as  his  front  was  clear  of  the 
enemy  :  that  in  order  to  get  into  that  road  he  was  obliged  to 
reopen  an  old  one  leading  from  Hill’s  right,  by  which  he 
was  enabled  to  take  a  cross-road  leading  into  the  road  from 
Todd’s  tavern  to  Shady  Grove  Church  (the  Catharpin  road),1 
his  trains  and  artillery,  except  one  battalion,  going  around 
by  Shady  Grove  ;  that  when  about  a  mile  from  the  Catharpin 
road  the  enemy’s  cavalry  vedettes  were  encountered  by  him, 
and  Mahone’s  division  was  thrown  forward  to  develop  the 
enemy’s  force  and  position  ;  that  Mahone  encountered  a  body 
of  infantry  on  that  road,  about  a  mile  from  Todd’s  tavern, 
and  had  a  brisk  engagement  with  it,  causing  it  to  fall  back 
rapidly  toward  Todd’s  tavern,  and  at  the  same  time  General 
Hampton  moved  with  his  cavalry  on  his,  Early’s,  right,  and 
struck  the  enemy  on  the  flank  and  rear,  but  on  account  of 

1 1  suppose  from  this  description  that  General  Early  took  a  route  lying  between 
those  followed  by  Longstreet’s  and  Ewell’s  corps. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


65 


their  (the  Confederates’)  want  of  knowledge  of  the  country, 
and  the  approach  of  darkness,  the  enemy  was  enabled  to 
make  his  escape.  This  affair  showed  him  that  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  held  Todd’s  tavern  and  the  Brock  road,  and 
that  his  march  as  ordered  could  not  be  continued.  He 
halted  for  the  night  on  the  Catharpin  road  a  mile  from  the 
tavern. 

Let  us  see  what  General  Hancock  says  of  this.  He  states 
that  at  half-past  one  o’clock  he  sent  Gibbon  half  way  to 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  to  support  Warren  and  Sedg¬ 
wick  ;  that  when  General  Miles  was  returning  from  his  re- 
connoissance  at  5.30  p.  m.,  he  was  attacked  by  Mahone’s 
brigade  (division),  which  was  marching  toward  Spottsylvania 
Court  House.  A  brigade  from  Barlow’s  division  was  sent  to 
his  support,  and  the  corps  held  ready  to  move.  At  this 
time  he  was  informed  that  the  enemy’s  infantry  was  also  ad¬ 
vancing  along  the  Brock  road  against  his  right,  information 
which  he  afterward  ascertained  by  reconnoissance  to  be  er¬ 
roneous,  and  he  directed  General  Miles  to  retire  slowly  to  the 
main  line  of  battle  at  Todd’s  tavern.  This  movement,  he 
says,  was  executed  with  great  skill  and  success  by  that  officer, 
who,  while  accomplishing  it,  repelled  two  spirited  attacks  of 
the  enemy,  inflicting  severe  loss  upon  him.  After  the  second 
repulse  of  the  enemy,  he  withdrew  Miles  to  Todd’s  tavern. 

To  resume  the  general  narrative.  At  one  o’clock  General 
Meade  ordered  General  Sedgwick  to  move  to  Spottsylvania 
Court  House  and  unite  with  General  Warren  in  an  immediate 
and  vigorous  attack  upon  the  enemy.  Of  this  General  Han¬ 
cock  was  notified.  The  arrangements  for  the  attack  of  the 
Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  were  not  conrpleted  until  late  in  the 
afternoon,  and  it  was  then  only  partial,  and  not  determined 
and  vigorous.  The  ground  was  new  to  everyone,  and  the 
troops  were  tired.  It  was  also  made  too  late  in  the  day  to  be 
followed  up  advantageously  if  successful.  Some  advance 


66 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


was  made  by  a  part  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  Penrose’s  New 
Jersey  brigade  of  Wright’s  division,  leading  the  advance  in 
open  ground,  was  repulsed  by  a  sharp  fire  from  the  wood  in 
their  front.  A  little  later,  toward  dusk,  General  Crawford 
passed  over  the  open  ground  into  the  woods  beyond — he  had, 
it  appears,  passed  the  right  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  and  had 
come  upon  Rodes’s  division  of  Ewell’s  corps  unexpectedly  to 
them,  while  they  were  moving  by  a  flank,  and  forced  them 
back  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  it  is  stated,  taking  some  pris¬ 
oners.  After  nightfall  Crawford  fell  back  to  the  line  of  the 
corps.  Ewell,  after  stating  that  his  troops  reached  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court  House  just  in  time  for  Rodes  to  repel  an  attempt 
to  turn  Anderson’s  right,  adds  that  Rodes  advanced  nearly 
half  a  mile,  when  his  left  coming  upon  strong  works  was 
checked,  and  he  was  forced  to  halt ;  that  Johnson’s  division 
formed  on  his  right  and  Gordon  remained  in  reserve.  Both 
sides  now  continued  to  intrench. 

At  1  p.m.,  by  order  of  General  Grant,  General  Sheridan 
was  directed  to  concentrate  his  available  mounted  force  and 
move  against  the  enemy’s  cavalry,  and  when  his  supplies 
were  exhausted  to  proceed  to  James  River,  communicate 
with  General  Butler,  procure  supplies,  and  return  to  the 
army. 

At  the  same  hour  an  order  of  movement  southward  was 
prepared  by  direction  of  General  Grant,  the  Second  and 
Fifth  Corps  to  move  via  Block  House,  Peany’s  tavern,  Mount 
Pleasant,  Three  Cornered  Handkerchief,  and  Waller’s  Church 
to  Dabney’s  mills  on  the  North  Anna ;  the  Sixth  Corps 
and  reserve  artillery  to  move  via  Spottswood  Court  House, 
Mattapony  Church,  Green  Branch,  and  New  Market  to  Dav¬ 
enport’s  Ford  on  the  North  Anna,  near  Dabney’s  mills ;  the 
main  trains,  followed  by  the  Ninth  Corps,  to  move  via  Al- 
sop’s,  Gates’s,  Anderson’s,  Smith’s  mill,  Stannard’s  mill, 
Mud  tavern,  and  Round  Oak  Church  to  Childsburg — the 


SPOTTSYLYANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


67 


time  of  movement  to  be  determined  afterward.  This  order 
I  was  not  issued,  as,  later  in  the  day,  it  was  found  that  Lee 
!was  concentrating  his  whole  army  at  Spottsylvania  Court 
House. 

General  Badeau,  in  describing  the  movement  to  Spottsyl¬ 
vania  Court  House,  in  his  “  Military  Life  of  General  Grant,” 
dwells  somewhat  upon  what  he  calls  Meade’s  blunders,  by 
which,  according  to  him,  Spottsylvania  Court  House  was 
lost  to  us.  Describing  the  three  bridges  across  the  Po  con¬ 
nected  with  this  movement,  Corbin’s  bridge,  the  bridge  a 
mile  west  of  the  Block  House  (and  two  and  a  half  miles 
west  of  the  Court  House),  and  Snell’s  bridge  (two  and  a  half 
miles  south  of  the  Court  House),  he  says  : 

“  These  bridges  were  of  the  first  importance,  for  they  commanded 
Lee’s  only  approaches  to  Spottsylvania,  and  Sheridan,  who  had  been 
ordered  to  keep  a  good  lookout  toward  the  enemy,  disposed  his  force  so 
as  to  secure  all  three  positions.  Wilson  was  ordered  to  advance  on  the 
left,  by  the  Fredericksburg  road,  to  take  possession  of  the  Court  House, 
and  then  move  into  position  at  Snell’s  bridge  ;  while  Gregg  and  Merritt 
on  the  right  were  directed  to  proceed  to  the  same  point,  crossing  the  Po 
at  Corbyn’s  bridge  and  then  advance  by  Shady  Grove  and  the  Block 
House  road. 

“  Had  these  orders  been  carried  out,”  he  goes  on,  “every  avenue  to 
Spottsylvania  would  have  been  closed  to  the  rebel  army.”  He  con¬ 
tinues  :  “  But  Meade  arrived  at  Todd’s  tavern  at  midnight,  where 
Gregg  and  Merritt  were  bivouacked.  Sheridan’s  orders  had  not  yet  ar¬ 
rived,  and  Meade  at  once  issued  new  and  different  ones,  Gregg  being 
simply  instructed  to  move  to  the  vicinity  of  Corbyn’s  bridge  and  watch 
the  roads  from  Parker’s  store,  wjjile  Merritt  was  ordered  to  open  the 
Brock  road  to  Spottsylvania;  Snell’s  bridge  and  that  on  the  Block 
House,  the  most  important  points  of  all,  being  utterly  ignored.  Meade, 
indeed,  directed  Merritt  to  place  a  brigade  at  the  Block  House,  and  to 
picket  the  roads  leading  to  the  Court  House  ;  but  the  Block  House 
was  a  mile  from  the  bridge,  which  was  not  mentioned  in  the  order,  and 
one  brigade  could  hardly  withstand  the  rebel  army.  Sheridan  had  or¬ 
dered  two  divisions  to  hold  these  points.” 


68 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Let  us  see  what  the  orders  of  General  Sheridan  say 
(Badeau  does  not  give  a  copy  of  them),  the  time  when 
they  were  issued,  the  hour  at  which  the  three  cavalry 
divisions  were  to  move,  and  whether  the  roads  they  were  di¬ 
rected  to  take  were  open  to  them  at  that  time,  or  at  the  time 
when  General  Sheridan’s  orders  were  received  by  them,  or, 
indeed,  written.  As  to  Snell’s  bridge,  it  was  rather  too  far 
out  of  the  way  to  be  used  by  Lee  in  approaching  the  vicin¬ 
ity  of  the  Court  House  and  he  did  not  use  it.  There  was 
another  bridge  nearer,  close  to  the  Old  Court  House,  which 
Lee  did  use  for  his  trains,  but  which  General  Badeau  does 
not  mention  and  apparently  knows  nothing  about. 

The  instructions  of  General  Sheridan,  issued  at  1  a.m.  of 
the  8th,  are  comprised  in  those  to  Gregg,  which  are  as  fol¬ 
lows  : 

“May  8th,  1  a.m. 

“Move  with  your  command  at  5  a.m.,  on  the  Catharpin  road,  cross¬ 
ing  at  Corbin’s  bridge,  and  taking  position  at  Shady  Grove  Church. 
General  Merritt  will  follow  you,  and  at  Shady  Grove  Church  will  take 
the  left  hand,  or  Block  House  road,  moving  forward  and  taking  up 
position  at  that  point  [viz.,  Block  House].  Immediately  after  he  has 
passed,  you  will  move  forward  with  your  division,  on  the  same  road,  to 
the  crossing  of  Po  River,  where  you  will  take  up  position  supporting 
General  Merritt.  General  Wilson  with  his  division  will  march  from 
Alsop’s  by  way  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House  and  the  Gate  to  Snell’s 
bridge,  where  he  will  take  up  position.  .  .  .  The  infantry  march 

to  Spottsylvania  to-night.” 

Tlie  first  point  to  note  in  this  order  in  connection  with 
Badeau’s  criticisms  is  that  Merritt  is  directed  to  take  posi¬ 
tion  at  the  Block  House ,  not  at  the  bridge,  and  that  Gregg  is 
to  take  up  position  at  the  bridge  and  support  Merritt — that 
is,  he  was  to  look  east,  not  west. 

The  next  point  to  note  in  the  same  connection  is  that  the 
cavalry  were  to  move  at  daylight,  5  a.m.,  of  the  8th.  But 
the  Fifth  Corps  was  expected  to  be  in  its  position  at  Spott- 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


69 


sylvania  Court  House  by  daylight  of  the  8th,  and  would 
have  been  but  for  the  presence  of  Fitzhugh  Lee  on  the 
Brock  road.  Next,  had  Gregg  and  Merritt  moved  from 
Todd’s  tavern  on  the  road  to  Corbin’s  bridge  at  any  time  on 
the  night  of  the  7tli,  or  on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  they 
would  have  found  themselves  opposed  by  Hampton’s  cavalry 
division  (just  as  Merritt  was  opposed  by  Fitzhugh  Lee’s  on 
the  Brock  road),  for  Hampton  fell  back  on  that  road  after 
the  engagement  at  Todd’s  tavern  on  the  7th,  and  held  it. 
Moreover,  by  one  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  8tli  Long- 
street’s  corps  also  occupied  the  roads  on  which  Gregg  and 
Merritt  were  ordered  to  move  to  the  Block  House,  and  to 
the  Shady  Grove  road  bridge  over  the  Po.  Had  they  at¬ 
tempted  to  carry  out  their  orders  to  move  that  way,  and  had 
they  succeeded  in  getting  rid  of  Hampton,  they  would  have 
found  Longstreet’s  corps  between  them  and  the  points  they 
were  ordered  to  occupy.  “Had  these  orders  been  carried 
out,’  Badeau  says,  meaning  that  Meade  prevented  them  from 
being  carried  out  by  issuing  others,  “every  avenue  to  Spott- 
sylvania  would  have  been  closed  to  the  rebel  army,”  while, 
in  fact,  before  the  orders  were  issued  the  Confederate  troops 
held  every  avenue  to  Spottsylvania  that  they  desired  to  close 
against  us  and  to  occupy  themselves.1 

It  has  been  already  stated  that  there  was  reason  to  appre¬ 
hend  that  Lee  would  surmise  the  object  of  the  movement  of 
our  trains  in  the  afternoon  of  the  7th,  and  the  two  armies 
were  so  close  to  each  other  that  the  fact  of  our  being  in  mo¬ 
tion  early  in  the  night  could  scarcely  be  concealed  from 
him.  That  Lee  would  use  the  Shady  Grove  road  to  make 
corresponding  movements  was  anticipated. 

The  orders  of  General  Meade  to  General  Merritt  directed 
him,  while  retaining  one  brigade  at  the  Block  House,  to 


1  I  am  not  criticising  General  Sheridan’s  orders,  but  Badeau's  statements. 


70 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


open  tlie  road  beyoyid  the  Court  House  with  two  of  his  bri¬ 
gades  ;  the  brigade  at  the  Block  House  was  expected  to 
have  some  force  at  the  Block  House  bridge  on  the  watch ; 
it  was  with  that  view  that  it  was  ordered  there.  All  these 
roads  were  to  be  picketed  so  as  to  give  early  intelligence  to 
the  Fifth  Corps  of  the  approach  of  Lee’s  troops.  As  to 
Meade’s  not  having  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the  Block 
House  (Shady  Grove  road)  bridge  and  of  Snell’s  bridge, 
those  and  other  bridges  were  marked  on  our  maps,  the 
name  of  Snell’s  bridge  being  written  in  red  ink  on  some  of 
the  earlier  editions  which  General  Meade  and  myself  used, 
and  printed  on  the  later  editions.  He  could  not  have  failed 
to  know  of  them,  and  as  to  the  Block  House  bridge,  I  have 
a  distinct  recollection  of  my  referring,  when  he  had  written 
Merritt’s  order,  to  the  necessity  of  having  some  force  at  that 
bridge ;  and  of  his  replying  that  the  object  of  the  order  was 
so  plain  that  Merritt  would  certainly  have  such  force  there. 
General  Meade  himself  wrote  and  signed  the  orders  to  Mer¬ 
ritt  and  Gregg  and  the  notification  to  General  Sheridan. 

Fitzliugh  Lee’s  presence  on  the  Brock  road  prevented  our 
gaining  Spottsylvania  Court  House.  So  long  as  it  was  dark 
General  Warren’s  infantry  could  have  made  but  little  more 
progress  against  Fitzliugh  Lee  than  Merritt’s  cavalry  did, 
and  the  final  result  would  have  been  the  same  whether  he 
or  Merritt  had  the  advance.  The  presence  of  Fitzhugli 
Lee’s  cavalry  on  the  Brock  road,  and  Hampton’s  cavalry 
and  Longstreet’s  corps  on  the  Shady  Grove  road,  settled  the 
question  as  to  who  should  first  hold  the  Court  House  with 
infantry,  whatever  might  have  been  the  disposition  of  our 
cavalry.  The  distance  from  the  Wilderness  to  Spottsylvania 
Court  House  was  about  the  same,  by  the  routes  followed, 
for  both  armies,  though  Hancock’s  left  was  nearer  to  it  by 
two  or  three  miles  than  Longstreet’s  right,  measured  by  the 
shortest  route  the  latter  could  follow. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


71 


There  was  nothing  in  the  site  of  Spottsylvania  Court 
House  that  gave  it  special  military  strength.  Its  military 
importance  was  derived  from  its  proximity  to  the  Richmond 
and  Fredericksburg  Railroad  and  the  stage  and  telegraph 
roads  between  these  towns.  Roads  also  radiated  from  it  in 
all  directions,  including  a  good  wagon-road  to  Richmond. 
But  sufficiently  good  roads  southward  lay  open  to  us  on 
either  side  of  it,  by  which,  if  we  did  not  attack  in  front,  we 
could  have  moved  to  turn  either  flank. 

Very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  9th  General  Early  was 
ordered  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House  by  way  of  the  Shady 
Grove  road,  and  took  position  in  the  afternoon  close  to  and 
east  of  the  Court  House,  covering  the  road  to  Fredericks¬ 
burg,  where  he  intrenched.  During  the  day  Lee  rectified 
his  lines,  intrenched  carefully,  and  put  artillery  in  position. 

General  Hancock  was  directed  to  move  up  to  the  right  of 
the  Fifth  Corps,  where  he  took  position  and  intrenched  on 
high  ground  overlooking  the  Po  and  the  Shady  Grove  road 
south  of  it.  In  the  afternoon  Mott’s  division  was  sent  to 
the  left  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 

No  active  operations  were  undertaken  against  the  enemy 
on  the  9th ;  the  army  was  allowed  to  rest.  The  Fifth  and 
Sixth  Corps  readjusted  their  lines,  threw  up  intrencliments, 
strengthened  those  already  made,  and  put  artillery  in  posi¬ 
tion.  The  skirmishers  and  sharpshooters  were  very  active 
on  both  sides,  and  in  the  morning  General  Sedgwick  was 
killed  close  to  the  intrencliments  at  the  right  of  his  corps, 
but  not  under  cover,  at  the  point  where  the  forks  of  the 
road  in  Alsop’s  field  unite.  He  was  highly  esteemed,  being 
a  modest,  courageous,  honest-hearted  man.  General  Wright 
succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  corps. 

The  skirmishers  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  were  pushed 
forward  so  as  to  develop  the  position  and  character  of  the 
enemy’s  works,  and  ascertain  where  they  were  probably  vul- 


72 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


nerable.  This  work  was  continued  by  both  those  corps  on 
the  10th.1 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  9th,  General  Burnside  moved 
with  the  Ninth  Corps  from  Aldrich’s,  on  the  Orange  and 
Fredericksburg  plank  road,  to  Gate’s  house,  on  the  road  from 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  to  Fredericksburg,  and  then 
toward  the  Court  House,  crossing  the  Ny  at  Gate’s  house  (a 
mile  and  a  half  from  the  Court  House)  with  Willcox’s  divi¬ 
sion,  and  encountering  a  force  of  dismounted  cavalry  and  a 
brigade  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  according  to  General  Burn¬ 
side’s  report.  About  midday  Stevenson’s  division  arrived,  a 
portion  of  which  was  also  thrown  across  the  river,  while 
Potter’s  division  following  was  held  near  Alsop’s,  about  a 
mile  back  from  the  Ny. 

Some  description  of  Lee’s  intrenched  position  may  be 
necessary  to  the  comprehension  of  the  operations  that  fol¬ 
lowed.  The  principal  roads  leading  to  the  Court  House 
have  been  already  noted,  as  well  as  the  general  position  of 
Longstreet’s,  Ewell’s,  and  Hill’s  corps. 

Longstreet’s  corps  occupied  a  line  running  from  the  river 
Po  in  a  general  direction,  a  little  north  of  east,  and  about  a 
mile  and  a  quarter  long  in  a  straight  line,  not  following  the 


1  From  an  examination  of  the  Report  of  the  Medical  Director  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  Surgeon  McParlin,  pp.  153-178,  Appendix  to  Part  First,  Medical  and 
Surgical  History  of  the  War,  I  find  that  the  number  of  wounded  of  the  cavalry 
on  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  May  was  250  ;  the  number  of  the  wounded  of  the 
Fifth  Corps  on  the  8th  and  9th  of  May,  nearly  all  on  the  8th,  was  1,419.  The 
wounded  of  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps  on  those  days  was  about  150  each,  mak¬ 
ing  a  total  of  1,909  wounded.  Taking  the  mean  between  one-fourth  and  one- 
fifth  of  this  number,  for  the  number  of  killed,  a  proportion  which  I  have  found 
to  be  very  nearly  correct,  we  have  about  443  killed,  and  a  total  loss  of  killed  and 
wounded  on  those  days  of  about  2,412.  The  number  of  missing  was  small. 

Of  the  General  officers,  General  Robinson,  Fifth  Corps,  was  severely  wounded 
on  the  8th ;  General  Sedgwick  killed,  and  General  Morris,  Sixth  Corps,  wounded 
on  the  9th.  On  the  Confederate  side,  Brigadier-General  Hays,  Johnson’s  division, 
was  wounded  on  the  9th. 

I  have  not  found  a  statement  of  the  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  of  the  Con¬ 
federate  force. 


SPOTTSYL VANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


73 


varying  directions  and  sinuosities  of  the  intrencliments.  Its 
left  rested  on  the  Po,  opposite  the  right  of  the  Fifth  Corps, 
in  high,  open  ground,  about  one-tliird  of  a  mile,  in  a  straight 
line,  above  the  Shady  Grove  road  bridge,  which  its  artillery 
covered.  The  intrenchments  here  lay  for  one-third  of  a  mile 
on  the  elevated,  open  ground  of  Perry’s  farm,  having  in 
front  of  them,  at  varying  distances,  in  no  place  exceeding 
two  hundred  yards,  a  belt  of  wood,  chiefly  on  the  descend¬ 
ing  slope  of  the  plateau,  which  wood  intervened  between 
them  and  the  intrenchments  of  the  right  of  the  Fifth  Corps, 
though  not  extending  to  those  intrenchments.  The  line 
then  ran  through  this  belt  of  wood  and  along  its  outer  edge 
on  the  Spindler  farm  to  the  junction  of  the  Brock  and  Block 
House  roads,  around  which  was  the  open  ground  of  Spin- 
dler’s  farm.  This  part  of  the  line,  from  the  Po  to  the  Brock 
road,  was  occupied  by  Field’s  division  of  Longstreet’s  corps. 
On  the  right  of  the  Brock  road  the  intrencliment  ran  through 
woods  (which  were  slashed  in  part)  in  a  northeast  direction 
for  the  space  of  half  a  mile,  entering  then  the  open  ground 
of  Harrison’s  farm.  This  part  was  occupied  by  Kershaw’s 
division,  whose  right  extended  beyond  the  left  of  the  Fifth 
Corps.  The  line  now  ran  nearly  north  for  half  a  mile,  chiefly 
through  wood,  which  was  slashed,  some  part  being  in  open 
ground,  where  there  were  abatis.  Bodes’s  division  of 
Ewell’s  corps  occupied  this  part  of  the  line,  his  right 
(Doles’s  brigade)  resting  at  what  was  afterward  known  as 
the  bloody  angle.  From  this  angle  the  line  ran  along  the 
outer  edge  of  a  wood  in  a  nearly  east  direction  (a  little  north 
of  east)  for  about  four  hundred  yards,  having  in  front  of 
it  for  a  long  distance  the  open  ground  of  Landron’s  and 
Brown’s  farms ;  it  terminated  at  a  high,  open  point,  which, 
General  Ewell  says,  if  held  by  the  enemy,  would  have  en¬ 
abled  their  artillery  to  command  our  line.  Six  or  eight 
guns  were  in  position  at  this  angle.  This  east  and  west  liue 
XII.— 4 


74 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


is  usually  termed  the  salient,  but  should  be  called  its  apex. 
The  intrenchments  turned  here  at  this  high,  open  point, 
making  a  second  angle  which  has  been  sometimes  con¬ 
founded  with  the  west  angle,  and  ran  nearly  south  six 
or  seven  hundred  yards,  having  fairly  open  ground  in 
front  and  the  wood  about  the  McCool  house  in  rear.  Gen¬ 
eral  Johnson’s  division  of  Ewell’s  corps  held  the  intrench¬ 
ments  from  Rodes’s  right  along  the  apex  of  the  salient,  and 
along  a  part  of  its  east  face  for  the  distance  of  six  or 
seven  hundred  yards.  Walker’s  (Stonewall)  brigade  was 
on  the  left  of  Johnson’s  division,  then  York’s  (formerly  Staf¬ 
ford’s),  then  Terry’s  (formerly  Jones’s),  whose  right  was  at 
the  east  angle,  the  high  open  point  which  he  held.  Stew¬ 
art’s  brigade  held  from  the  east  angle  south  toward  Hill. 
Gordon’s  division  was  held  in  reserve. 

Hill’s  corps,  on  Ewell’s  right,  occupied  a  line  running 
nearly  south,  and  terminating  south  of  the  road  from  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House  to  Fredericksburg.  The  interval  be¬ 
tween  Ewell  and  Hill  was  occupied  by  skirmishers.  The 
ground  in  front  of  Hill  was  broken  and  wooded  over  the 
third  of  its  length  adjoining  Ewell’s  line  ;  for  the  remaining 
distance  the  ground  Was  open.  In  a  straight  line  the  dis¬ 
tance  from  the  left  to  the  right  of  Hill’s  corps  was,  at  this 
time,  about  a  mile  and  a  half — by  the  line  of  intrenchments 
more.  From  Rodes’s  left  centre  to  Hill’s  left  an  intrench- 
ment  cutting  off  the  northerly  part  of  the  salient  (or  the 
“  two  angles,”  as  General  Ewell  terms  it)  was  built  and  occu¬ 
pied  by  Gordon’s  division,  but  some  batteries  of  the  Sixth 
Corps  enfilading  this  line,  his  division  was  placed  near  the 
junction  of  Kershaw’s  and  Rodes’s  divisions  in  order  to  sup¬ 
port  either.  Artillery,  giving  flank  as  well  as  direct  fire, 
was  placed  in  position  throughout  these  intrenchments,  and 
wherever  they  were  subject  to  the  enfilade  fire  of  our  artil- 
erly  they  were  well  traversed.  Where  there  was  wood  in 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


75 


front  of  them  it  was  slashed,  where  the  ground  was  open 
there  was  abatis. 

On  the  10th  the  intrenchments  on  the  enemy’s  left  were 
extended  a  mile  west  of  the  Po,  on  the  high,  open  ground 
of  Graves’s  farm,  in  order  to  cover  the  Shady  Grove  road, 
and  an  additional  intrenchment  was  thrown  up  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  10th  in  similar  ground  on  the  east  bank  of 
the  Po,  to  hold  the  Shady  Grove  crossing  of  that  stream. 
Later  on,  the  intrenchments  east  of  the  Court  House  were 
extended  about  two  miles  south  of  it,  the  extreme  right  rest¬ 
ing  on  the  Po  at  Snell’s  bridge. 

It  will  be  perceived  from  this  brief  sketch  of  Lee’s  in¬ 
trenchments,  that,  from  the  vicinity  of  the  intersection  of 
the  Brock  and  Block  House  roads,  where  the  advanced  in¬ 
fantry  troops  of  the  armies  first  came  in  contact,  his  line 
formed  a  salient  projecting  a  mile  to  the  north,  with  a  width 
of  half  a  mile  from  the  west  to  the  east  face.  The  eastern  half 
or  more  of  the  salient  was  covered  by  wood  ;  in  the  western 
part  was  the  open  ground  of  Harrison’s  and  McCool’s  farms. 
West  of  the  salient  these  intrenchments  extended  in  a  direc¬ 
tion  a  little  south  of  west  about  two  miles,  as  already  de¬ 
scribed,  covering  the  chief  road  leading  west  from  the  Court 
House  and  the  crossing  of  the  Po  by  that  road,  while  on  the 
right  of  the  salient  its  easterly  face  was  extended  a  mile 
south,  and  subsequently  two  miles  further,  to  Snell’s  bridge 
over  the  Po. 

With  such  intrenchments  as  these,  having  artillery 
throughout,  with  flank  fire  along  their  lines  wherever  prac¬ 
ticable,  and  with  the  rifled  muskets  then  in  use,  which  were 
as  effective  at  three  hundred  yards  as  the  smooth-bore  mus¬ 
kets  at  sixty  yards,1  the  strength  of  an  army  sustaining  at¬ 
tack  was  more  than  quadrupled,  provided  they  had  force 


1  Accuracy  of  fire  is  meant,  not  range. 


76 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  '65. 


enough  to  man  the  intrenchments  well.  In  fact  there  is 
scarcely  any  measure  by  which  to  gauge  the  increased 
strength  thereby  gained.  Much  the  greater  part  of  this  in- 
trencliment  was  concealed  by  wood,  which  in  some  places 
was  scrubby  and  dense.  The  enemy’s  skirmish  lines  and 
sharpshooters  were  very  active  in  trying  to  keep  off  all  our 
attempts  to  examine  them  closely.  Our  own  skirmishers 
were  pressed  against  them,  and  in  many  places  forcing  them 
back  into,  or  close  to  their  works,  gave  the  opportunity  for 
quick  examination,  and  furnished  the  information  upon 
which  our  assaults  were  made. 

The  report  of  General  Burnside  to  General  Grant  on  the 
9th,  of  the  force  he  had  encountered  on  the  Fredericksburg 
road,  seeming  to  indicate  that  Lee  was  moving  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  Fredericksburg,  General  Hancock  was  directed  to 
examine  the  Po  with  a  view  to  crossing  it.  From  Corbin’s 
bridge  to  the  left  of  Hancock’s  corps  the  course  of  the  Po  is 
about  east ;  it  then  turns  and  runs  south  about  two  and  a 
half  miles,  when  it  again  runs  easterly.  In  front  of  Hancock 
its  course  was  east,  having  the  Shady  Grove  road  running 
parallel  to  it  at  the  distance  of  a  mile.  It  was  determined 
that  Hancock  should  cross  the  river  in  his  front  and  make  a 
reconnoissance  in  force  along  the  Shady  Grove  road  on  the 
enemy’s  left,  crossing  the  river  again  by  the  Shady  Grove 
road  bridge  or  below  it,  with  a  view  to  turning  and  attacking 
the  enemy’s  left. 

Hancock  says  that  at  six  o’clock  in  the  morning,  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  instructions  from  the  Commanding  General,  he 
directed  Birney,  Barlow,  and  Gibbon  to  cross  the  stream, 
which  they  did  at  three  different  points,  Gibbon  being  the 
furthest  down  and  opposite  the  left  of  the  position  of  the 
Second  Corps.  The  passage  was  difficult,  owing  to  the  depth 
of  the  water  and  the  thick  undergrowth  of  the  banks.  The 
resistance  to  Birney  was  stubborn,  but  not  so  to  Barlow, 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


77 


and  to  Gibbon  there  was  none.  After  the  crossing,  three 
pontoon  bridges  were  laid  by  General  Hancock,  one  at  Bar¬ 
low’s  crossing  and  two  near  Gibbon’s.  The  river  was  fifty 
feet  wide  and  not  fordable.  The  troops  were  pushed  for¬ 
ward  toward  the  Block  House  bridge,  but  night  coming  on,  it 
was  impracticable  to  keep  the  skirmish  line  moving  through 
the  dense  woods  in  the  darkness,  though  a  portion  of  it 
reached  the  stream  and  ascertained  that  it  was  too  deep  to 
ford.  General  Hancock  was  compelled  to  wait  until  morn¬ 
ing,  though  anxious  to  secure  the  Block  House  bridge  and 
cross  before  halting. 

Late  in  the  night  orders  were  issued  from  the  headquarters 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  for  the  operations  of  the  next 
day.  General  Hancock  was  to  endeavor  to  ascertain  the  po¬ 
sition  and  force  of  the  enemy  in  his  front  and  the  location  of 
his  left  flank,  and  hold  his  corps  ready  to  advance  against 
the  enemy ;  the  Sixth  Corps  to  feel  in  like  manner  for  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments  in  his  front,  General  Mott  to  hold 
his  division  ready  to  move  to  General  Burnside  upon  hearing 
heavy  firing  in  that  direction. 

At  early  dawn  on  the  10th,  a  close  examination  was  made 
by  Hancock  of  the  Block  House  bridge,  with  the  design  of 
forcing  a  passage  over  it,  but  the  enemy  was  found  in  strong 
force  on  the  opposite  bank  in  intrenchments  which  com¬ 
manded  the  bridge  and  its  approaches,  and  General  Hancock 
concluded  not  to  attempt  to  carry  the  bridge,  but  sent 
Brooke’s  brigade  of  Barlow’s  division  down  the  river  to  as¬ 
certain  what  could  be  effected  there.1  General  Birney  was 
directed  to  send  a  small  force  out  on  the  Andrews’s  tavern 
road  to  cover  Brooke’s  movement.  Brooke  crossed  the  Po 
about  half  a  mile  below  the  bridge,  and  pushing  forward  a 


1  It  is  stated  in  the  Official  Diary  of  Longstreet’s  Corps,  May  9th,  “  At  night 
Mahone’s  division  is  sent  to  the  left  of  Field  to  hold  the  Shady  Grove  road.”  The 
intrenchments  mentioned  were  thrown  up  by  Mahone. 


78 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


detachment  a  short  distance,  discovered  the  enemy’s  line  of 
strong  earthworks  occupied  by  artillery  and  infantry. 

At  this  time  General  Hancock  received  a  despatch  from 
General  Meade,  dated  10  a.m.,  directing  him  to  transfer  two 
divisions  to  General  Warren’s  position,  and  arrange  with 
General  Warren  to  make  a  vigorous  attack  on  the  enemy’s 
line  at  five  o  clock,  the  remaining  division  to  be  so  disposed 
as  to  keep  up  his  threatening  attitude  on  the  enemy’s  left,  but 
in  such  manner  that  it  could  be  promptly  withdrawn  to  him 
if  needed.  General  Wright  and  General  Mott  were  ordered 
to  attack  at  the  same  hour.  General  Warren  was  corre¬ 
spondingly  instructed,  and  informed  that  General  Hancock, 
in  virtue  of  seniority,  would  command  the  combined  opera¬ 
tions  of  the  two  corps.  . 

Accordingly  Gibbon’s  division  recrossed  at  once  and 
formed  on  Warren’s  right ;  Birney’s  division  followed,  and 
was  massed  in  rear  of  Warren,  leaving  Barlow  to  hold  the 
ground  on  the  south  side  of  the  Po  ;  General  Hancock  pro¬ 
ceeded  at  once  to  examine  the  ground  where  the  assault 
was  to  be  made.  When  General  Birney  began  to  withdraw, 
the  regiments  he  had  ordered  toward  Andrews’s  tavern 
were  attacked  near  Glady  Run  and  driven  in,  and  it  soon 
became  evident  that  the  enemy  were  advancing  in  force 
on  Barlow’s  position.  When  General  Meade  was  informed 
of  this,  he  directed  Barlow’s  division  to  be  withdrawn  to 
the  north  side  of  the  Po,  as  he  did  not  wish  to  bring  on  a 
battle  at  that  time  on  the  south  side.  General  Hancock 
accordingly  joined  General  Barlow  and  directed  him 
to  recross  the  river.  This  withdrawal  commenced  about 
two  o’clock.  Brooke’s  and  Brown’s  brigades  were  in 
front  (south)  of  the  Shady  Grove  road  ;  Miles’s  and  Smyth’s 
brigades  along  the  road,  the  left  resting  on  a  crest  a  few 
hundred  paces  from  the  Block  House  bridge.  In  rear 
of  this  line  a  broad  open  plain  extended  to  the  ponton 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


79 


bridges  ;  it  was  swept  by  the  artillery  of  Field’s  left  and  of 
the  intrenchments  at  the  Block  House  bridge.  Brooke’s 
and  Brown’s  brigades  were  withdrawn  to  the  right  and  rear 
of  Miles’s  and  Smyth’s  brigades  to  a  wooded  crest,  and  Miles 
and  Smyth  retired  to  a  crest  in  front  of  the  ponton  bridges. 
The  enemy,  Heth’s  division  of  Hill’s  corps,  now  advanced  and 
attacked  Brooke  and  Brown  with  great  vigor,  but  were  met 
by  a  destructive  fire  that  forced  them  to  fall  back  at  once 
with  severe  loss.  They  reformed  and  again  attacked,  press¬ 
ing  forward  close  up  to  our  line,  but  were  again  met  by  so 
deadly  a  fire  that  they  again  fell  back  with  heavy  loss.  Dur¬ 
ing  this  contest  the  woods  took  fire  on  the  right  and  rear  of 
these  two  brigades,  and  approached  so  close  that  upon  the 
second  repulse  of  the  enemy,  Brooke  and  Brown  were  or¬ 
dered  to  retire  across  the  river,  which  they  did  in  admirable 
order,  under  the  artillery  fire  of  the  enemy  already  referred 

to,  which  swept  the  plain.  The  enemy  seeing  these  troops 
• 

retiring,  again  advanced,  but  were  checked  by  their  fire. 
The  horses  of  one  of  Captain  Arnold’s  guns  became  terrified 
and  unmanageable  by  the  fire  of  the  woods,  and  wedged  the 
gun  so  firmly  between  two  trees  that  it  could  not  be  extri¬ 
cated,  and  was  lost — the  first  gun,  General  Hancock  says,  lost 
by  the  Second  Corps.  The  loss  of  these  two  brigades  in 
killed  and  wounded  was  heavy.  Some  of  the  wounded  per¬ 
ished  in  the  fire  of  the  woods.  A  heavy  artillery  fire  between 
the  guns  of  the  Second  Corps  and  of  the  enemy  closed  the 
operation. 

General  Early  says  of  this  operation  of  the  Second  Corps, 
that  “  early  on  the  morning  of  the  10th  he  was  ordered  to 
move  one  of  his  divisions  back  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the 
Po  on  the  Shady  Grove  road  ;  and  to  move  with  another  to 
the  rear  and  left  by  the  way  of  Spottsylvania  Old  Court 
House,  and  drive  back  a  column  of  the  enemy  which  had 
crossed  the  Po  and  taken  possession  of  the  Shady  Grove 


80 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


road,”  thus  threatening  their  rear  and  endangering  their 
trains,  which  were  on  the  road  leading  from  Louisa  Court 
House  past  the  Old  Court  House.  Mahone’s  division,  he 
says,  was  sent  to  occupy  the  banks  of  the  Po  on  Field’s  left, 
while  with  Heth’s  division  and  a  battalion  of  artillery  he 
moved  to  the  rear,  crossing  the  Po  on  the  Louisa  Court 
House  road,  and  then  following  that  road  until  he  reached 
one  coming  in  from  Waite’s  shop  on  the  Shady  Grove  road. 
After  moving  about  a  mile  on  Waite’s  shop  road,  he  con¬ 
tinues,  he  met  Hampton  gradually  falling  back  before  the 
enemy,  who  had  pushed  out  a  column  of  infantry  consider¬ 
ably  to  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  line.  (This  column  was 
the  regiments  sent  by  Birney  to  cover  Brooke’s  right.) 
“  This  column  was,  in  turn,”  he  says,  “forced  back  to  the 
position  of  the  Shady  Grove  road,  which  was  occupied  by 
what  was  reported  to  be  Hancock’s  corps.  Following  up 
and  crossing  a  small  stream  (Glady  Run)  just  below  a  mill¬ 
pond,  we  succeeded  in  reaching  Waite’s  shop  (on  the  Shady 
Grove  road),  from  whence  an  attack  was  made  on  the  enemy, 
and  the  entire  force  which  had  crossed  the  Po  was  driven 
back  with  the  loss  of  one  piece  of  artillery,  which  fell  into 
our  hands,  and  a  considerable  number  in  killed  and 
wounded.”  “This,”  he  says,  “relieved  us  from  a  very 
threatening  danger,  as  the  position  the  enemy  had  attained 
would  have  enabled  him  to  completely  enfilade  Field’s  posi¬ 
tion,  and  get  possession  of  the  line  of  our  communications 
to  the  rear,  within  a  very  short  distance  of  which  he  was, 
when  met  by  the  force  which  drove  him  back.  In  this  af¬ 
fair  Heth’s  division  behaved  very  handsomely,  all  of  the  bri¬ 
gades  (Cook’s,  Davis’s,  and  Walker’s)  being  engaged  in  the 
attack.  General  H.  H.  Walker  had  the  misfortune  to  re¬ 
ceive  a  severe  wound  in  the  foot,  which  rendered  amputation 
necessary,  but  otherwise  our  loss  was  slight.” 

Intrenchments  were  thrown  up  from  Field’s  left  on  the 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


81 


Po,  covering  the  Shady  Grove  road  for  the  space  of  a  mile, 
in  addition  to  those  on  the  east  bank,  covering  the  Block 
House  bridge.  General  Hancock  says,  “  The  enemy  re¬ 
garded  this  as  a  considerable  victory,  and  General  Heth 
published  a  congratulatory  order  to  his  troops,  etc.  Had 
not  Barlow’s  fine  division,  then  in  full  strength,  received 
imperative  orders  to  withdraw,  Heth’s  division  would  have 
had  no  cause  for  congratulation.” 

Throughout  the  morning  of  the  10th  there  was  sharp  skir¬ 
mish  and  artillery  fire  going  on,  part  of  it  preliminary  to  the 
attacks  directed  for  the  afternoon.  At  3.30  p.m.  General 
Hancock  was  informed  by  General  Meade  that  General 
Warren  reported  the  opportunity  for  immediate  attack  to 
be  so  favorable  that  he  was  ordered  to  attack  at  once,  and 
Gibbon  directed  to  co-operate  with  him ;  that  Wright  was  or¬ 
dered  to  be  ready  to  attack  at  once.  At  a  quarter  before 
four  o’clock  General  Wright  with  Mott  was  ordered  to  at¬ 
tack  immediately. 

General  Warren,  wearing  his  full  uniform,  proceeded  to  as¬ 
sault  the  enemy’s  position  at  once  with  Crawford’s  and 
Cutler’s  divisions,  and  Webb’s  and  Carroll’s  brigades  of 
Gibbon’s  division  under  Gibbon’s  orders.1  Opposite  the 
right  of  this  attacking  force  the  wood  in  front  of  the  enemy’s 
retrenchments  was  dense,  and  filled  with  a  low  growth  of 
dead  cedar  trees,  whose  hard,  sharp-pointed  branches,  inter¬ 
laced  and  pointed  in  all  directions,  made  it  very  difficult  for 
the  troops  to  advance  under  the  heavy  artillery  and  mus¬ 
ketry  fire  they  met  at  the  outset.  They  emerged  into  the 
open  ground  near  the  intrenchments  with  disordered  ranks 
and  under  a  heavy  artillery  and  musketry  fire,  part  direct, 
part  flanking,  that  swept  the  whole  ground,  but  went  for- 


1  Robinson’s  division  had  been  broken  up  and  its  troops  distributed  to  the  other 
divisions,  excepting  Dennison’s  Maryland  brigade,  the  terra  of  whose  service  ex¬ 
pired  before  the  close  of  May. 

4* 


82  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


ward,  some  to  the  abatis,  others  to  the  crest  of  the  parapet, 
but  were  all  driven  back  with  heavy  loss.  General  Carroll 
says  that  the  right  of  his  line  gained  the  enemy’s  breast¬ 
works,  and  his  whole  line  reached  the  abatis.  It  is  claimed 
that  some  of  Crawford’s  men  did  the  same,  or  it  may  be 
Cutler’s.  The  Official  Diary  of  Longstreet’s  Corps  says, 
“  Some  of  the  enemy  succeed  in  gaining  the  works  but  are 
killed  in  them.”  Brigadier-General  Rice,  commanding  a 
brigade  in  Cutler’s  division,  a  very  gallant  officer,  was 
mortally  wounded  in  this  assault. 

General  Hancock  returned  to  the  ground  at  about  half¬ 
past  five  p.m.,  just  before  the  close  of  the  assault.  He  was 
ordered  to  renew  it  at  half -past  six  p.m.,  but,  under  orders, 
deferred  it  until  seven  p.m.,  when  he  attacked  with  Birney’s 
and  Gibbon’s  divisions,  part  of  the  Fifth  Corps  uniting  with 
him,  but  with  no  more  success  than  the  preceding  attempt. 
In  this  second  attack  the  wood  was  on  fire  in  some  places. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Hancock  had  not  been  directed 
to  cross  the  Po  at  daylight  of  the  10th,  instead  of  being 
ordered  to  cross  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  9tli.  Had  he 
been,  there  appears  to  be  every  reason  to  conclude  that  the 
Confederate  left  would  have  been  turned  and  taken  in  rear, 
while  the  Fifth  Corps  attacked  it  in  front. 

As  it  was,  Hancock’s  crossing  in  the  evening  of  the  9th  put 
Lee  on  his  guard,  and  enabled  him  to  bring  troops  to  the 
threatened  flank  by  daylight  of  the  lOtli  and  throw  up  in- 
trenchments.1  It  was  a  mistake,  too,  as  Hancock  had  crossed, 
to  abandon  the  turning  movement  on  the  morning  of  the 


1  Hancock  says  that  at  early  dawn  of  the  10 th  the  enemy  was  in  strong  force  at 
the  bridge,  in  intrenchments  which  commanded  the  bridge  and  its  approaches. 

The  Official  Diary  of  Longstreet’s  Corps,  May  9th,  says :  “  At  night  Mahone’s 
division  is  sent  to  the  left  of  Field  to  hold  the  Shady  Grove  road.”  General 
Early,  however,  says:  “  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  10th,  I  was  ordered  to  move 
one  of  my  divisions  back  to  cover  tho  crossing  of  the  Po,  on  the  Shady  Grove 
road.” 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


83 


10th,  and  make,  instead  of  it,  a  front  attack  on  the  strong 
intrenchments  of  Longstreet’s  left.  It  would  have  been 
better  to  have  continued  the  turning  movement,  the  Fifth 
Corps  aiding  by  sending  one  of  its  divisions  to  Hancock  and 
making  a  front  attack  with  the  other  two  at  the  critical 
moment.1 

The  examination  of  the  enemy’s  works  under  cover  of  the 
skirmishers  of  the  Sixth  Corps  developed  a  part  of  them 
which  General  Wright  deemed  to  be  vulnerable  to  a  sys¬ 
tematic,  resolute  attack.  The  other  portions  in  his  front 
were  covered  by  a  wide  slashing  and  had  a  flanking  artillery 
fire.  The  vulnerable  part  was  the  right  of  Rodes's  front 
held  by  Doles’s  brigade,  whose  right  rested  at  the  west  angle 
of  what  I  have  called  the  apex  of  the  salient,  and  the  part 
of  the  apex  itself  held  by  the  left  of  Johnson’s  division. 
The  intrenchment  held  by  Doles  was  in  open  ground,  two 
hundred  yards  from  a  pine  wood  with  abatis  in  front  and 
traverses  at  intervals.  In  the  re-entrant  of  the  line  there 
was  a  battery  with  traverses.  One  hundred  yards  in  rear 
was  a  second  line  partly  finished,  occupied  by  a  line  of  bat¬ 
tle.  A  wood-road  led  from  the  open  ground  of  the  Scott  or 
Shelton  house,  where  the  column  of  attack  was  formed,  di¬ 
rectly  to  the  point  of  attack.  Colonel  Upton,  commanding 
Second  Brigade,  First  Division,  Sixth  Corps,  was  designated 
to  make  the  attack  on  Doles.  General  Russell  now  com¬ 
manded  the  First  Division.  Colonel  Upton’s  command  was 
composed  of  his  own  brigade,  the  Third  Brigade,  formerly 
Russell’s,  and  four  regiments  of  Neill’s  brigade  of  the  Sec- 


1  There  were  two  officers  commanding  the  same  army.  Such  a  mixed  com¬ 
mand  was  not  calculated  to  produce  the  best  results  that  either  singly  was  capa¬ 
ble  of  bringing  about.  It  naturally  caused  some  vagueness  and  uncertainty  as  to 
the  exact  sphere  of  each,  and  sometimes  took  away  from  the  positiveness,  fulness, 
and  earnestness  of  the  consideration  of  an  intended  operation  or  tactical  move¬ 
ment  that,  had  there  been  but  one  commander,  would  have  had  the  most  earnest 
attention  and  corresponding  action. 


84 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


ond  Division.  General  Russell,  Colonel  Upton,  and  all  the 
regimental  commanders  examined  the  ground. 

In  conjunction  with  Upton’s  attack,  Mott  early  in  the  day 
moved  to  the  open  ground  of  the  Brown  house,  which  is 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  north  of  what  I  have  called  the  apex 
of  the  salient ;  open  ground  connected  Brown’s  farm  with 
Landron’s,  on  the  south  end  of  which  lay  the  apex;  but 
there  was  wood  on  each  side  of  that  open  connecting  space 
that  came  up  to  within  four  or  five  hundred*  yards  of  the 
apex.  At  2  p.m.  General  Mott  was  instructed  by  General 
Wright,  under  whose  orders  he  had  been  placed,  to  be  ready 
to  assault  the  works  in  his  front  at  five  o’clock.  These 
works,  like  those  of  Doles’s,  had  abatis  and  were  well  trav¬ 
ersed  and  well  supplied  with  artillery. 

Upton’s  column  was  formed  in  four  lines.  They  were  led 
quietly  to  near  the  edge  of  the  wood,  two  hundred  yards 
from  the  enemy.  A  heavy  battery  of  the  Sixth  Corps  had 
been  put  in  position  to  give  a  direct  fire  on  Doles’s  front 
and  to  enfilade  the  apex  line  of  the  salient,  which,  as  before 
said,  adjoined  Doles’s  brigade.  This  battery  kept  up  a  con¬ 
stant  fire  until  the  moment  of  Upton’s  charge  arrived.  Its 
cessation  was  the  signal  to  charge.  The  column  had  been 
led  up  silently  to  the  edge  of  the  wood,  and  upon  the  signal 
being  given,  rushed  forward  with  a  hurrah  under  a  terrible 
front  and  flank  fire,  gained  the  parapet,  had  a  hand-to-hand 
desperate  struggle,  which  lasted  but  a  few  seconds,  and  the 
column  poured  over  the  works,  capturing  a  large  number  of 
prisoners.  Pressing  forward  and  extending  right  and  left, 
the  second  line  of  intrenchments  with  its  battery  fell  into 
Upton’s  hands.  The  enemy’s  line  was  completely  broken 
and,  Colonel  Upton  says,  an  opening  made  for  the  division, 
Mott’s,  which  was  to  have  supported  the  left,  but  it  did  not 
arrive.  Colonel  Upton  says  further,  that  reinforcements  to 
the  enemy  arrived  and  assailed  him  in  front  and  on  both 


SPOTTS YLV ANI A  COURT  HOUSE. 


85 


flanks,  the  impulse  of  the  charge  was  over  and  it  remained 
for  them  to  hold  the  intrenchments  won,  which  they  did 
until  General  Russell  ordered  them  to  withdraw,  which  they 
effected  under  the  cover  of  darkness.  Their  loss  in  the  as¬ 
sault  Colonel  Upton  states  to  have  been  about  1,000  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  The  enemy,  he  says,  lost  at 
least  100  killed  at  the  first  intrenchment,  and  met  with  a 
much  heavier  loss  in  trying  to  regain  their  works ;  that  he 
captured  between  1,000  and  1,200  prisoners,  and  several 
stand  of  colors.  He  mentions  that  Captain  Burham,  of  the 
Forty-third  New  York,  had  two  colors  in  his  hands  when  he 
was  killed  in  coming  back  from  the  second  line. 

It  appears  from  General  Ewell’s  report,  made  in  Rich¬ 
mond  on  March  20,  1865,  that  the  right  of  Daniel’s  brigade 
was  involved  in  the  breaking  of  Doles’s  works,  and  fell  back 
to  the  second  line.  Gordon  at  once  brought  up  his  division, 
and  with  it  Battle’s  brigade,  the  remnant  of  Doles’s  bri¬ 
gade,  and  the  right  of  Daniel’s,  and  at  once  attacked  Upton 
in  front  and  on  his  right  flank,  while  Walker’s  brigade  of 
Johnson’s  division  attacked  his  left  flank.1  In  a  short  time 
he  (General  Ewell)  says,  the  enemy  was  driven  from  our 
works,  leaving  100  dead  within  them,  and  a  large  number  in 
front.  Our  loss,  as  near  as  I  can  tell,  was  650,  of  whom  350 
were  prisoners. 

Upton’s  report  was  prepared  soon  after  the  affair  occurred, 
while  everything  was  fresh  in  his  memory.  He  was,  besides, 
an  active  participant  in  everything  that  took  place,  and  saw 
and  knew  exactly  all  that  occurred.  General  Ewell’s  report 
was  not  made  until  long  after,  and  is  not  accompanied  by 
detailed  reports  of  subordinates.  He  says  the  attack  took 


1  In  a  paper  prepared  by  Captain  McHenry  Howard,  on  the  staff  of  General 
Steuart,  Steuart’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division,  or  part  of  it,  promptly  took  part 
in  the  attack  on  Upton.  This  paper  is  on  the  files  of  the  Military  Historical  Soci¬ 
ety  of  Massachusetts. 


8G  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 

place  at  four  o’clock,  whereas  Colonel  Upton  states  that  it 
took  place  at  ten  minutes  past  six  o’clock,  which  is  undoubt¬ 
edly  accurate.  The  report  of  Colonel  Upton  is  an  admirable 
paper  upon  the  manner  of  conducting  such  attacks.  He  was, 
immediately  after  this,  promoted  to  the  rank  of  Brigadier- 
General.  Colonel  Carroll  of  the  Second  Corps  was  also  pro¬ 
moted  to  the  same  rank  at  the  same  time. 

There  is  no  report  on  the  files  of  the  War  Department  from 
General  Mott  of  his  attack,  nor  is  there  any  from  General 
Wright  of  that  or  any  other  operation  of  that  part  of  the 
campaign.  The  only  report  upon  it  that  I  found  in  the  War 
Department  is  that  of  Colonel  McAllister  who  commanded 
the  First  Brigade  of  Mott’s  division ;  Colonel  William  B. 
Brewster,  commanded  the  Second  Brigade.  The  division 
consisted  of  two  brigades.  Colonel  McAllister  says  that  his 
brigade  formed  the  first  line,  Colonel  Campbell,  with  two 
regiments  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  being  on  his  right ;  that  the 
Second  Brigade  formed  the  second  line,  and  that  the  com¬ 
mand  moved  forward  to  the  attack  punctually  at  five  o’clock  ; 
but  he  must  be  mistaken  in  the  hour,  since  it  is  evident  that 
the  attack  of  Mott  was  intended  to  be  simultaneous  with  that 
of  Upton,  and  must  have  been  set  in  motion  by  the  same  sig¬ 
nal,  the  cessation  of  our  artillery  fire  in  that  quarter.  On 
entering  the  fields,  McAllister  says,  the  enemy  opened  his 
batteries  upon  them,  enfilading  their  lines,  and  the  men  fell 
back  in  confusion,  except  a  small  part  of  the  front  line,  and 
that,  after  consulting  with  his  Colonels,  he  fell  back  to  the 
foot  of  the  hill,  where  he  massed  his  command.  He  says 
nothing  of  General  Mott,  who  was  well  known  as  a  gallant 
officer.  Colonel  McAllister  was  also  well  known  to  myself 
and  many  others  as  a  man  of  courage  and  coolness. 

Mott  formed  his  division  for  attack  in  view  of  the  enemy, 
who  made  every  preparation  to  meet  it.  Upton’s  attack  was 
concealed  from  their  view  and  was  a  surprise,  and  the  plan 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


87 


of  assault  being  well  arranged  and  carried  out,  was  a  success. 
The  plan  and  manner  of  Mott’s  assault,  on  the  contrary,  did 
not  admit  of  its  being  a  surprise.  The  formation  of  his 
troops  probably  kept  the  attention  of  the  enemy  upon  him, 
and  in  that  way  helped  more  effectually  to  conceal  Upton’s 
preparations. 

The  failure  of  Mott’s  division  did  more  than  neutralize 
the  success  of  Upton.  Had  Mott  joined  him,  the  two  press¬ 
ing  forward,  taking  the  enemy  on  the  right  and  left  in  flank 
and  rear,  and  receiving  further  reinforcements  from  the 
Sixth  Corps  as  they  progressed,  the  probabilities  were  that 
we  should  have  gained  possession  of  Lee’s  retrenchments. 
One  difficulty  in  the  way  of  entire  success  was,  however,  the 
lateness  of  the  hour  at  which  the  attack  was  made,  but  the 
arrangement  of  the  attacking  columns  could  not  be  com¬ 
pleted  before.  It  is  disheartening  to  troops  to  be  obliged 
to  abandon  intrenchments  won  so  gallantly  and  with  such 
severe  loss. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th,  General  Burnside  was  ordered 
to  make  a  reconnoissance  upon  the  Court  House,  in  the 
course  of  which  General  Stevenson  was  killed,  an  officer, 
General  Burnside  says,  who  commenced  his  services  in  the 
war  with  him  in  the  expedition  to  North  Carolina,  and  on  all 
occasions  proved  himself  a  brave  and  efficient  soldier. 1 

The  reconnoissance  was  pushed  close  to  the  enemy  on  the 
Fredericksburg  road,  and  a  position  taken  up  there  and  in¬ 
trenched.2 

On  the  11th  the  Ninth  Corps  was  ordered  to  withdraw  to 
the  north  side  of  the  Ny,  take  up  a  position  with  its  left  on 
the  main  road  (to  Fredericksburg)  near  the  Harris  house,  its 

1  The  following  day  Major-General  Crittenden  arrived  and  took  command  of 
the  First  Division. 

8  It  was  in  a  despatch  to  General  Halleck  on  the  11th  of  May  that  General 
Grant,  referring  to  the  fighting  up  to  that  time,  made  use  of  the  noted  phrase, 
“  I  .  .  .  propose  to  fight  it  out  on  this  line  if  it  takes  all  summer.” 


88 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


right  connecting  with  Mott’s  division  near  the  Brown  honse, 
hut  before  this  order  could  be  carried  out,  General  Burnside 
was  ordered  to  recross  the  N y,  and  reoccupy  his  position  near 
the  Court  House,  which  was  done  without  any  serious  oppo¬ 
sition.  Corps  commanders  were  directed  to  ascertain  the 
least  force  sufficient  to  hold  their  positions  securely,  and  the 
number  of  troops  that  would  be  available  for  offensive  move¬ 
ments,  and  what  additional  works,  if  any,  were  necessary  to 
reduce  the  holding-force  to  a  minimum.  They  were  also 
directed  to  keep  their  skirmishers  pressed  well  up  against 
the  enemy,  and  ascertain  what  changes,  if  any,  had  been 
made  by  them  in  their  works  or  troops.  The  object  of  these 
instructions  was  to  ascertain  where  a  concentrated  attack 
could  best  be  made. 

At  11.30  a.m.  General  Hancock  was  directed  tosendBirney 
to  unite  with  Mott,  and  to  form  connection  between  Wright 
and  Burnside,  but  this  was  subsequently  recalled. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  Heth  was  moved  back  to  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House  on  the  morning  of  the  11th  and  con¬ 
nected  his  left  with  Wilcox,  who  was  on  the  left  of  Hill’s 
corps.  Mahone  remained  to  cover  the  Shady  Grove  road. 
“On  the  afternoon  of  the  11th,”  Early  says,  “the  enemy 
was  demonstrating  to  our  left,  up  the  Po  [Miles’s  brigade 
sent  to  Todd’s  tavern],  as  if  to  get  possession  of  Shady  Grove 
and  the  road  thence  to  Louisa  Court  House,”  and  he  “was 
ordered  by  General  Lee  to  take  possession  of  Shady  Grove 
by  light  the  next  morning  and  hold  it.  To  aid  in  that  pur¬ 
pose  two  brigades  of  Wilcox’s  division  (Thomas’s  and  Scales’s) 
were  moved  from  the  right,  and  Mahone  was  ordered  to 
move  before  light  to  Shady  Grove ;  but  during  the  night 
it  was  discovered  that  the  movement  to  our  left  was  a  feint 
[it  was  not]  and  that  there  was  a  real  movement  of  the 
enemy  toward  our  right.  Before  daybreak  on  the  morning 
of  the  12th,  Wilcox’s  brigades  were  returned  to  him  and  at 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


89 


dawn  Mahone’s  division  was  moved  to  the  right,  leaving 
Wright’s  brigade  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  Po  on  Field’s 
left.” 

On  the  10th  of  May,  the  wounded,  according  to  Surgeon 
McParlin,  including  the  700  brought  to  the  hospitals  on  the 
11th  were,  of  the 

Second  Corps .  1,680 

Fifth  Corps . 767 

Sixth  Corps .  900 

Making  a  total  of .  3,347  wounded. 

Taking  the  same  proportion  as  that  used  for  the  8th  and 
9  th  for  the  killed,  we  have  753,  and  a  total  of  killed  and 
wounded  of  4, 100.  The  missing  were  not  many.  Brigadier- 
General  Rice,  Fifth  Corps,  was  mortally  wounded  on  the 
10th.  Brigadier-General  Stevenson,  Ninth  Corps,  was  killed. 
On  the  Confederate  side  Brigadier-General  W.  W.  Walker, 
Heth’s  division,  was  severely  wounded. 

The  Confederate  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  must  have 
been  severe  in  Heth’s  division,  and  also  in  the  troops  of 
Ewell’s  corps  that  were  engaged,  particularly  in  Rodes’s 
division.  The  loss  in  Longstreet’s  corps  was  probably 
small.  The  total  Confederate  loss  in  killed  and  wounded 
may  have  been  2,000. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  11th  General  Meade  received  the 

* 

following  despatch  from  General  Grant,  dated  3  p.m. 

“  Move  three  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  by  the  rear  of  the  Fifth 
and  Sixth  Corps  under  cover  of  night,  so  as  to  join  the  Ninth  Corps  in 
a  vigorous  assault  on  the  enemy  at  four  o’clock  a.m.  to-morrow.  I  will 
send  one  or  two  staff  officers  over  to-night  to  stay  with  Burnside,  and 
impress  him  with  the  importance  of  a  prompt  and  vigorous  attack. 
Warren  and  Wright  should  hold  their  corps  as  close  to  the  enemy  as 
possible  to  take  advantage  of  any  diversion  caused  by  this  attack  and 
to  break  in  if  the  opportunity  presents  itself.  There  is  but  little  doubt 


90 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


in  my  mind  that  the  assault  last  evening  would  have  proved  entirely 
successful  if  it  had  commenced  an  hour  earlier,  and  had  been  heartily 
entered  into  by  Mott’s  division  and  the  Ninth  Corps.” 

Personal  conferences  with  the  three  corps  commanders 
were  had  by  General  Meade  concerning  this  attack,  and  Gen¬ 
eral  Hancock  sent  two  staff  officers  with  Colonel  Comstock  of 
General  Grant’s  staff  to  examine  the  ground  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  intended  point  of  attack.  It  was  intended  that  General 
Hancock  should  form  his  command  in  the  open  ground  of 
Brown’s  farm,  and  assault  the  apex  of  the  salient.  It  was  a 
repetition  of  Mott’s  attack  on  the  10th,  on  a  much  larger 
scale  in  every  way.  Mott’s  division  had  been  on  the  Brown 
farm  and  in  that  vicinity  for  two  days.  The  details  of  the 
enemy’s  works  were  not  known,  but  it  was  known  that  open 
ground,  four  hundred  yards  wide  in  its  narrowest  part,  led 
from  Brown’s  fields  nearly  due  south  to  the  apex  of  the  sa¬ 
lient,  and  that  a  line  from  Brown’s  house  to  McCool’s  house, 
which  was  just  inside  the  enemy’s  intrenchment,  ran  along 
the  middle  of  this  open  ground.  This  open  ground,  four 
hundred  yards  wide,  connected  Brown’s  fields  with  the  wide 
fields  of  Landron,  in  the  southwest  corner  of  which  was  the 
apex  of  the  salient. 

During  the  day  General  Wright,  commanding  the  Sixth 
Corps,  had  been  examining  carefully  the  ground  on  his  left, 
including  as  much  of  the  ground  just  mentioned  as  eould  be 
got  at,  and  all  roads  and  ways  leading  to  them.  Meeting 
afterward  General  Hancock  at  General  Meade’s  headquarters, 
and  learning  what  was  going  on,  he  mentioned  having  found 
a  much  shorter  road  than  that  which  it  was  intended  Gen¬ 
eral  Hancock’s  column  should  take,  and  having  had  Captain 
Mendell  of  the  U.  S.  Engineers  with  him,  suggested  that  he 
should  accompany  General  Hancock’s  leading  troops,  a  sug¬ 
gestion  that  was  adopted,  and  Captain  Mendell  accompanied 
them. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


91 


General  Hancock  was  directed  to  move  his  three  divisions 
at  dark  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Brown  house,  near  Mott’s  divi¬ 
sion,  and  assault  the  enemy’s  line  at  four  o’clock  in  the 
morning. 

General  Warren  was  directed  to  hold  the  position  vacated 
by  the  Second  Corps,  in  addition  to  the  position  held  by 
him,  and  Colonel  Kitching’s  heavy  artillery  brigade  was  as¬ 
signed  to  him  for  this  purpose  ;  he  was  further  directed,  in 
this  connection,  to  shorten  his  lines  wherever,  in  his  judg¬ 
ment,  it  was  advisable.  It  was  not  designed  to  change  the 
concentrated  formation  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  General  Warren 
and  General  Wright  already  held  their  corps  as  close  to  the 
enemy  as  was  judicious,  whether  with  a  view  to  assaulting  in 
their  fronts,  or  to  withdrawing  to  attack  elsewhere.  General 
Wright  was  directed  to  hold  two  of  his  divisions,  General 
Bussell’s  and  General  Wheaton’s  (Getty’s),  ready  in  rear  of 
his  intrenchments  to  move  wherever  required,  holding  his 
intrenchments  with  his  remaining  division,  Ricketts’s.  Both 
these  corps  commanders  were  directed  to  have  their  troops 
in  readiness  at  the  hour  named  for  the  combined  attack  of 
Burtiside  and  Hancock,  when,  it  was  understood,  they  might 
be  required,  according  to  the  developments  of  the  day, 
either  to  attack  in  their  fronts,  or  move  elsewhere  and  attack. 1 


1  From  the  hour  of  our  arrival  before  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  the  greater 
part  of  my  time  was  passed  with  the  troops ;  the  ground  occupied  by  them,  and 
between  them  and  the  enemy,  was  therefore  well  known  to  me. 

Badeau,  not  acquainted  with  it  or  the  enemy’s  works,  and  because  the  direction 
of  General  Grant  that  Warren  and  Wright  should  hold  their  corps  as  close  as  pos¬ 
sible  to  the  enemy  was  not  repeated  by  Meade  in  his  order  (their  corps  being  al¬ 
ready  as  close  to  the  enemy  as  was  judicious),  descants  upon  the  loss  of  Grant’s 
spirit  and  force  by  his  orders  percolating  through  three  brains  before  they 
reached  a  corps  commander.  But  he  does  not  attempt  to  point  out  in  what  man¬ 
ner  the  dispositions  ordered  by  Meade  were  inapplicable,  nor  how,  with  any  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  ground  and  the  enemy’s  works,  they  could  have  been  bettered,  nor 
where,  nor  how  they  caused  any  failure  in  promptitude  or  efficiency  to  meet  the 
necessities  of  the  day.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  very  evident  from  what  took  place 
that  they  met  in  the  best  possible  manner  the  requirements  of  the  day.  Badeau 


92 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Hancock’s  troops  moved  after  it  became  dark,  under  tlie 
guidance  of  Captain  Mendell,  over  a  narrow,  difficult  road 
and  in  a  heavy  rain.  Tlie  head  of  the  column  arrived  at  the 
Brown  house  about  half  an  hour  after  midnight,  the  night 
still  dark  and  rainy,  and  as  soon  as  practicable  were  formed 
for  attack,  about  twelve  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy’s  in- 
trenchments.  The  direction  by  which  the  troops  were  to  ad¬ 
vance  was  ascertained  by  the  compass  bearing  of  the  McCool 
house  (inside  the  Confederate  intrenchments)  from  the  Brown 
house.  This  line,  as  before  mentioned,  ran  midway  of  the 
open  ground  four  hundred  yards  wide  connecting  the  Brown 
and  Landron  farms.  Barlow’s  division  was  formed  opposite 
this  opening  in  two  lines  of  masses,  each  regiment  in  close 
column  of  attack,  Brooke’s  and  Miles’s  brigades  in  the  first 
line,  Smyth’s  and  Brown’s  in  the  second,  Birney’s  division 
formed  in  two  deployed  lines  on  Barlow’s  right,  Mott’s  in 
Birney’s  rear  in  one  line.  In  Birney’s  front  there  was  a 
marsh,  and  then  a  thick  wood  of  low  pines.  Half  way  up 
to  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  Birney’s  left  came  upon  the 
open  ground  of  Landron’ s  farm ;  his  right  continued  in 
wood  until  very  near  the  enemy. 

General  Gibbon  was  held  in  reserve  in  rear  of  Barlow 
and  Bimey. 

Owing  to  a  heavy  fog,  General  Hancock  postponed  the 
hour  of  attack  until  there  should  be  sufficient  light  to  see 
dimly,  and  at  4.35  a.m.  gave  the  order  to  advance.  The 
ground  sloped  up  to  the  Confederate  intrenchments.  The 

does  not  seem  to  have  known,  even  when  he  wrote  his  account  of  the  operations 
of  the  12th  of  May,  that  Longs  treet’s  troops  remained  that  day  in  their  intrench¬ 
ments  as  strong  as  they  were  on  the  10th  of  May,  when  the  repeated  assaults  on 
their  position  proved  it  to  be  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  assault,  if  well  manned. 
It  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  enemy  to  maintain  that  part  of  their 
works,  for  if  it  had  been  carried  the  troops  in  the  salient  would  have  been  taken  in 
rear  and  flank.  It  was  their  point  of  support  and  the  hinge  upon  which  Lee  was 
to  swing  back  from  the  salient,  and  its  giving  way  would  have  proved  disastrous 
to  him. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


93 


troops  in  column  and  in  line  kept  even  pace,  and  when 
about  half  way  np,  and  in  the  open  ground  of  Landron, 
burst  into  a  cheer,  and  ran  forward,  disregarding  the  sharp 
musketry  fire  they  received,  passed  through  the  abatis  and 
over  the  intrenchments,  capturing,  General  Hancock  says, 
nearly  4,000  prisoners  of  Ewell’s  corps,  twenty  pieces  of  ar¬ 
tillery,  with  their  caissons,  horses,  etc.,  several  thousand 
stands  of  small  arms,  and  upward  of  thirty  colors.  Major- 
General  Edward  Johnson,  and  Brigadier-General  George  H. 
Sfceuart  were  among  the  prisoners.  General  Hancock  says 
the  loss  of  the  enemy  in  killed  and  wounded  was  unusually 
great,  the  most  of  the  dead  having  been  killed  with  the  bay¬ 
onet.  Our  troops,  he  continues,  after  the  capture  of  the  in¬ 
trenchments  pursued  the  enemy  through  the  forest  in  the 
direction  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House  until  they  encoun¬ 
tered  a  second  formidable  line  of  earth  works  (the  works  built 
by  Gordon  and  heretofore  mentioned). 

General  Barlow  says  in  a  paper  upon  the  capture  of  the 
salient,  prepared  for  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Mas¬ 
sachusetts,  that  soon  after  his  division  began  to  move  to  the 
attack,  the  intervals  between  the  lines  and  the  brigades  were 
lost,  and  the  division  became  a  solid  mass  ;  that  when  the 
works  came  in  sight,  the  troops,  seeing  the  east  angle  to 
their  left,  instinctively  swayed  toward  it.  This  division  ap¬ 
pears  to  have  entered  the  east  angle  held  by  York’s  brigade 
and  the  intrenchments  running  south  from  it  six  or  seven 
hundred  yards,  held  by  Steuart’s  brigade.  General  Owen’s 
and  Colonel  Carroll’s  brigades  of  Gibbon’s  division  ran  for¬ 
ward  and  entered  the  works  with  them,  on  their  left,  captur¬ 
ing  the  two  guns  on  Steuart’s  centre,  and  turning  them 
on  the  enemy.  General  Birney’s  and  General  Mott’s  troops 
appear  to  have  entered  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  just  west 
of  the  east  angle,  extending  from  that  point  to  the  west 
angle  and  down  the  west  face  of  the  salient  some  four  liun- 


94  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


dred  yards,  encountering  Terry’s  and  Walker’s  (Stonewall) 
brigades  on  tlie  apex  of  the  salient  and,  I  think,  Battle’s 
brigade  of  Bodes’s  division  on  the  west  face.  The  two 
commands  and  McAllister’s  brigade  of  Mott’s  division  ap¬ 
pear  to  have  entered  the  works  at  about  the  same  time. 
In  the  capture  of  the  intrenchments  the  troops  became  dis¬ 
ordered  and  mixed,  and  it  was  exceedingly  difficult  to  restore 
order.  It  was  particularly  difficult  in  Barlow’s  division, 
where  the  men  must  have  been  twenty  deep  and  had 
mingled  in  one  common  mass.1  Immediate  efforts  were 
made,  however,  by  the  commanders  to  re-form  the  troops, 
and  General  Hancock  ordered  his  reserves  to  move  up  at 
once  and  occupy  the  captured  works.  Of  these  mention  has 
been  already  made  of  Owen’s  and  Carroll’s  brigades  of  Gib¬ 
bon’s  division.  Webb’s  brigade  soon  followed  them  on  their 
right,  he  severely  wounded  in  the  head  when  close  up. 
General  Gibbon  says  his  division  held  the  line  they  had 
gained.  The  prompt  movement  of  McAllister’s  brigade  has 
been  already  noted  ;  the  other,  Colonel  Brewster’s,  soon  fol¬ 
lowed.  The  condition  of  the  command  does  not  appear  to 
have  admitted  of  a  sufficient  force  sweeping  down  the  inte¬ 
rior  of  the  salient  along  its  east  and  west  faces,  taking  the 
troops  of  Hill’s  corps  and  of  Kodes’s  division  in  flank. 

According  to  the  statements  of  several  Confederate  officers 
the  withdrawal  of  General  Burnside  to  the  north  side  of  the 
Ny  on  the  11th,  together  with  the  throwing  back  of  Mott’s 
division  and  the  reconnoissance  of  Miles’s  brigade  to  Todd’s 
tavern  on  that  day,  had  satisfied  General  Lee  that  we  were 
about  to  turn  his  left,  and  he  therefore,  about  sunset,  or¬ 
dered  the  withdrawal  of  General  Ewell’s  artillery,  which  was 

1  It  is  apparent  from  this  experience  of  Barlow’s  division,  and  from  that  of  Up¬ 
ton’s  command  of  the  10th  of  May,  that  the  first  line  in  columns  of  attack  would 
have  been  sufficiently  massive  to  have  carried  the  intrenchments,  and  that  it 
would  have  been  better  to  have  had  the  second  line  in  more  open  formation,  fol¬ 
lowing  the  first  carefully  at  a  distance  of  several  hundred  yards. 


SPOTTSYL  VANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


95 


done  along  Johnson’s  front ;  bnt  during  the  night  General 
Johnson  learnt  from  scouts,  his  pickets,  and  brigade  com¬ 
manders  that  we  were  massing  in  his  front,  evidently  to  as¬ 
sault  in  the  morning.  This  he  reported,  and  asked  that  his 
artillery  might  be  sent  back  at  once.  When  this  report 
reached  General  Lee  he  is  said  to  have  remarked  that  Gen¬ 
eral  Johnson’s  despatch  informed  him  the  enemy  were  mass¬ 
ing  in  his  front,  at  the  same  time  General  Early  informed 
him  that  they  were  moving  around  his  left.  The  order  was, 
however,  given  for  the  artillery  “to  be  back  at  daylight .”  1 

Johnson’s  division  was  put  on  the  alert,  the  whole  of 
Ewell’s  corps,  indeed,  and  General  Gordon  was  ordered  to 
be  ready  to  support  Johnson.  Johnson’s  division  was  in  the 
trenches,  ready  an  hour  before  day.  Daylight,  Captain  Mc¬ 
Henry  Howard  says,  was  late  in  coming,  and  there  was  no 
indication  of  the  assault.  Presently  a  distant  cheer  was 
heard  just  off  the  salient  (east  angle)  followed  by  silence. 
Then  a  few  shots  from  the  picket  line  off  the  (east)  angle, 
and  presently  a  blue  line  appeared,  and  at  the  same  moment 
the  returning  artillery  was  coming  up  at  a  gallop,  but  Han¬ 
cock’s  assaulting  column  and  lines  swarmed  over  the  works 
.and  captured  it  before  a  shot  could  be  fired,  excepting  only 
from  two  guns  on  the  centre  of  Steuart’s  line,  which  fired 
two  rounds.  Johnson’s  infantry,  however,  delivered  a  brief, 
heavy  musketry  fire  upon  the  assaulting  forces,  but  with  no 
apparent  effect.  General  Johnson  states  emphatically  that 
he  was  not  surprised,  that  his  division  was  ready  in  the 
trenches  before  the  assaulting  force  made  its  appearance,  and 
Captain  Howard  says  that  the  cheering  of  that  force  would 
have  given  ample  time  to  be  ready  for  it  if  their  troops  had 
not  been  ready  at  that  time  ;  he  further  says  that  their  own 
line,  that  of  Steuart’s  brigade,  was  first  broken  on  the  left, 

1  Paper  of  Captain  McHenry  Howard,  Staff  of  General  George  H.  Steuart, 
Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts. 


96 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


at  tlie  angle,  and  tliat  Steuart’s  brigade  was  taken  in  flank 
and  rear  as  well  as  in  front. 

General  Gordon,  whose  instructions  were  to  support  both 
Johnson  and  Rodes,  had  placed  Evans’s  brigade  in  front  of 
the  McCool  house,  in  rear  of  Rodes’s  right  and  Johnson’s 
left ;  his  other  two  brigades,  Pegram’s  and  R.  D.  Johnston’s, 
he  had  posted  about  six  hundred  yards  in  rear,  near  the  Har¬ 
ris  house  ;  but  during  the  night,  being  informed  by  General 
Johnson  that  the  enemy  were  massing  in  front  of  his  divi¬ 
sion,  he  sent  Pegram’s  brigade  to  him,  which  was  placed  in 
the  trenches  near  Johnson’s  left.  At  daylight,  hearing  the 
musketry  firing  in  the  direction  of  the  east  angle,  held  by 
Terry,  he  ordered  Johnston  forward,  who,  moving  up,  was 
met  in  the  woods  between  the  McCool  house  and  the  east 
angle  by  Hancock’s  troops,  Barlow’s  right,  Birney’s  left  (both 
in  the  disorder  consequent  on  the  assault),  who  broke  his 
brigade  and  drove  it  back,  he  wounded.  Withdrawing  Pe¬ 
gram’s  and  Evans’s  brigades  at  double-quick  to  the  vicinity  of 
the  Harris  house,  in  rear  of  the  intrenchment  constructed  by 
himself  across  the  salient,  Gordon  formed  them  there  and 
then  advanced  against  the  troops  of  Hancock’s  left,  driving 
them,  he  says,  with  heavy  loss  from  the  captured  works  from 
the  left  of  Wilcox’s  division  (the  right  of  Johnson’s  division) 
to  the  salient  (east  angle)  and  a  quarter  of  a  mile  further, 
retaking  some  of  the  captured  guns,  which,  by  some  blunder, 
he  says,  were  lost  in  the  night  again.  The  loss  in  these  two 
brigades,  he  says,  was  not  heavy.  The  loss  of  Johnston’s 
brigade  he  does  not  mention.  With  this  account  we  shall 
presently  contrast  what  General  Barlow  says,  since  it  was  his 
troops  chiefly,  and  those  of  Birney’s  left,  that  Gordon’s 
troops  met.  The  right  of  Birney’s  and  Mott’s  troops,  al¬ 
though  disordered  from  the  capture  of  the  works,  also  entered 
the  salient,  moving  down  it  some  distance.  General  Rodes 
met  this  by  sending  Daniel’s  and  Ramseur’s  brigades  from 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


97 


their  works  to  the  attack,  which,  Ramseur  says,  was  made  in 
the  most  gallant  manner,  driving  the  troops  (of  Birney  and 
Mott)  that  had  entered  the  salient,  out  of  it  and  from  a  part 
of  that  portion  of  its  west  face  which  they  had  captured. 
The  outer  face  of  the  west  angle,  however,  remained  in  the 
possession  of  its  captors,  as  well  as  the  outer  face  of  the  apex 
of  the  salient.  General  Daniel  was  killed ;  General  Ram¬ 
seur  was  severely  wounded,  but  refused  to  leave  the  field. 

The  success  of  Hancock’s  assault  had  been  at  once  commu¬ 
nicated  to  General  Meade,  and  at  6  a.m.  such  intelligence 
was  received  by  him  from  General  Hancock  of  the  attempts 
of  the  enemy  to  assume  the  offensive,  that  General  Wright 
was  ordered  to  move  toward  Hancock  and  attack  at  once  on 
his,  Hancock’s,  right.  Taking  Russell’s  and  Wheaton’s  divi¬ 
sions,  which  were  held  ready  to  move,  he  marched  with  them 
quickly  to  the  west  angle  of  the  salient,  and  relieved  the 
troops  of  the  Second  Corps  in  that  vicinity.  He  was  wounded 
soon  after  coming  up,  but  retained  the  command  of  his 
corps.  At  the  time  the  Sixth  Corps  had  begun  to  arrive,  the 
enemy  had  compelled  such  of  the  Second  Corps  as  had  ad¬ 
vanced  into  the  interior  of  the  salient  in  this  part  of  the  field 
to  retire  to  the  outer  face  of  the  captured  intrenchments. 
In  fact,  it  appears  that  by  this  time  all  the  troops  of  the 
Second  Corps  were  on  the  outer  face  of  these  intrenchments, 
except  a  skirmish  or  picket  line  of  Barlow’s  division. 

General  Barlow  says  that  his  division  remained  during  the 
day  in  about  the  same  position  that  it  was  in  an  hour  after 
the  assault,  except  that  it  was  extended  considerably  to  the 
left  in  order  to  guard  against  any  attack  on  our  flank  (Owen’s 
and  Carroll’s  brigades  of  Gibbon’s  division,  both  of  which 
had  taken  part  in  the  assault  of  the  intrenchments,  were  on 
his  left,  Webb’s  brigade  also),  that  the  enemy  gradually 
pushed  forward  (on  his  front)  until  in  some  places  they  actu¬ 
ally  reached  their  first  line,  on  the  outer  side  of  which  our 
XII.— 5 


98 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


men  were  lying.  Brigadier-General  Grant,  commanding  the 
Vermont  brigade  of  the  Second  Division  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
as  soon  as  he  arrived  on  the  ground  was  ordered  to  relieve 
General  Barlow’s  division,  and  states  that  at  the  time  he 
reached  there,  about  eight  o’clock,  there  was  some  skirmish¬ 
ing  going  on  in  the  woods  beyond  the  captured  intrencli- 
ments,  and  that  there  was  an  evident  attempt  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy  to  recover  lost  ground,  and  that  our  skirmishers 
were  being  pressed  back.  These  skirmishers  he  relieved, 
but  soon  returned  with  his  brigade  to  the  Sixth  Corps,  on 
the  right.  It  is  apparent  from  these  statements  that  the 
outer  face  of  the  captured  intrenchments  in  this  part  of  the 
field  were  held  by  our  troops,  as  they  were  from  there 
around  to  the  apex  of  the  west  angle  and  some  distance  on 
the  west  face  of  the  salient. 

As  soon  as  he  came  upon  the  ground  General  "Wright  be¬ 
gan  a  heavy  attack  from  the  apex  of  the  west  angle  and  the 
thick  pine  wood  and  morass  west  of  the  angle  but  close  up  to 
the  west  face  of  the  salient.  It  was  in  this  vicinity  that  the 
close  deadly  fighting  of  11  the  Angle”  took  place,  continuing 
with  undiminished  fury  until  near  dark,  when  it  began  to 
abate,  but  lasting  until  three  o’clock  the«next  morning,  when 
the  enemy  were  withdrawn  to  a  new  line  of  intrencliment 
across  the  base  of  the  salient,  which  had  been  built  during 
the  night. 

But  I  am  anticipating.  When  Ramseur  got  into  the 
trenches  on  the  right  of  Daniel,  the  west  angle  and  some 
pari  of  the  intrencliment  south  of  it  were  still  held  wholly  by 
us,  and  a  deadly  fire  was  poured  on  Ramseur’s  right  flank. 
Perrin’s  and  Harris’s  brigades  of  Mahone’s  division,  Hill’s 
corps,  now  came  up  to  Ewell’s  assistance,  and  under  a  heavy 
artillery  and  musketry  fire  regained  some  further  part  of  th6 
inner  face  of  the  intrenchments  on  Ramseur’s  right,  where 
they  captured,  General  Harris,  says,  between  200  and  300 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


99 


prisoners.  McGowan’s  brigade  of  Wilcox’s  division  followed, 

U 

passing  through  a  heavy  fire  in  getting  to  the  trenches.  The 
right  of  his  brigade  extended  some  distance  up  the  left  or 
west  side  of  the  angle,  and  was  enfiladed  from  the  point  of 
the  angle  and  the  apex  of  the  salient.  We  held  the  apex  of 
the  salient  and  the  west  angle  in  strong  force,  as  well  as  the 
woods  and  ravine  on  the  right,  from  all  of  which  an  inces¬ 
sant,  powerful  fire  was  kept  up.  General  Perrin  was  killed, 
General  McGowan  severely  wounded. 

General  Hancock  had  directed  a  portion  of  his  artillery  to 
be  posted  on  some  high  ground  about  three  hundred  yards 
from  the  apex  of  the  salient,  which  maintained  an  incessant 
fire  over  our  line  on  the  enemy.  Some  guns  were  run  up 
close  against  the  breastworks  of  the  west  angle,  and  kept  up 
an  enfilade  fire  of  canister  along  the  west  face  of  the  salient, 
but  lost  heavily  in  men  and  horses.  Other  guns  also  were 
brought  close  to  the  intrenchments  nearer  the  east  angle.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  all  these  parts  of  the  enemy’s  in¬ 
trenchments  were  thickly  traversed.  The  contest  continued 
incessantly  throughout  the  day  along  the  whole  line,  from 
the  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps  to  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps  : 
occasionally  changes  in  troops  were  made  where  it  was  prac¬ 
ticable,  in  order  to  replenish  ammunition.  At  the  west  angle 
the  fighting  was  literally  murderous.  One  of  the  partici¬ 
pants,  Brigadier-General  Grant,  commanding  the  Vermont 
brigade  of  the  Second  Division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  says  of  it : 

“  It  was  not  only  a  desperate  struggle  but  it  was  literally  a  hand-to- 
hand  fight.  Nothing  but  the  piled  up  logs  or  breastworks  separated  the 
combatants.  Our  men  would  reach  over  the  logs  and  fire  into  the  faces 
of  the  enemy,  would  stab  over  with  their  bayonets ;  many  where  shot 
and  stabbed  through  the  crevices  and  holes  between  the  logs ;  men 
mounted  the  works,  and  with  muskets  rapidly  handed  them,  kept  up  a 
continuous  fire  until  they  were  shot  down,  when  others  would  take 
their  place  and  continue  the  deadly  work.  .  .  .  Several  times 

during  the  day  the  rebels  would  show  a  white  flag  about  the  works, 


100  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


and  when  our  fire  slackened  jump  over  and  surrender,  and  others  were 
crowded  down  to  fill  their  places.  ...  It  was  there  that  the  some¬ 
what  celebrated  tree  was  cut  off  by  bullets,  there  that  the  brush  and 
logs  were  cut  to  pieces  and  whipped  into  basket-stuff ;  .  .  .  there 

that  the  rebel  ditches  and  cross-sections  were  filled  with  dead  men  sev¬ 
eral  deep.  ...  I  was  at  the  angle  the  next  day.  The  sight  was  ter¬ 
rible  and  sickening,  much  worse  than  at  Bloody  Lane  (Antietam). 
There  a  great  many  dead  men  were  lying  in  the  road  and  across  the 
rails  of  the  torn  down  fences,  and  out  in  the  cornfield  ;  but  they  were 
not  piled  up  several  deep  and  their  flesh  was  not  so  torn  and  mangled 
as  at  the  ‘angle.’  ” 

As  an  indication  of  the  sanguinary  character  of  the  con¬ 
flict  of  the  10th  and  12th,  Colonel  Upton  remarks  that  Cap¬ 
tain  Lamont  of  the  Fifth  Maine,  the  only  one  of  seven  cap¬ 
tains  who  escaped  in  the  assault  of  the  10th,  was  among 
the  killed  on  the  12th. 

General  Me  Gowan,  of  Wilcox’s  division,  Hill’s  corps,  says  : 
“  Our  men  lay  on  one  side  of  the  breastwork,  the  enemy  on 
the  other,  and  in  many  instances  men  were  pulled  over.” 
He  believed  that  he  captured  as  many  prisoners  as  he  lost. 
“  The  trenches,”  he  says,  “  on  the  right  in  the  bloody  angle 
had  to  be  cleared  of  the  dead  more  than  once.  An  oak  tree, 
twenty-two  inches  in  diameter,  in  rear  of  the  brigade  was  cut 
down  by  musket-balls  and  fell  about  twelve  o’clock  Thurs¬ 
day  night,  injuring  several  men  in  the  First  South  Carolina 
regiment.” 

Many  others  give  the  same  account  of  the  character  of 
the  contest  at  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the  west  angle.  All  the 
brigades  engaged  in  it  lost  heavily.  Rain  fell  during  the 
day  and  heavily  toward  night. 

What  occurred  on  our  right  has  not  yet  been  mentioned. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  12th,  General  Warren  opened 
with  all  his  artillery,  and  pressed  forward  his  skirmish  line. 
The  intrenchments  of  the  enemy  gave  no  sign  of  having 
been  stripped  of  any  of  their  troops  to  meet  Hancock’s  and 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


101 


Wright’s  attacks  on  the  salient,  but  the  manner  in  which  the 
contest  there  was  carried  on  and  the  reinforcements  the 
enemy  received,  together  with  the  fact  that  Burnside  was  at¬ 
tacking  on  the  east  face  of  the  salient,  led  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  enemy  could  not  be  very  strong  in  Warren’s  front, 
and  at  9.15  a.m.  he  was  ordered  to  attack  at  once  at  all  haz¬ 
ards,  with  his  whole  force  if  necessary.1  He  accordingly 
prepared  to  do  so,  and  assaulted,  but  wTas  repulsed,  for  Long- 

v 

street’s  corps  was  holding  its  intrenchments  in  force,  the 
only  change  made  in  his  line  being  the  extension  of  his 
right  to  fill  the  place  from  which  Ramseur’s  brigade  had 
been  taken.2  Ricketts’s  division  had  followed  Wright  as 
soon  as  he  could  be  withdrawn,  and  at  11.30  a.m.  was  form¬ 
ing  in  rear  of  Wright’s  other  divisions.  Immediately  upon 
the  failure  of  Warren’s  attack  he  was  directed  to  send  Gen¬ 
eral  Cutler’s  division  to  General  Wright  and  be  prepared  to 
follow  with  his  whole  corps.3  Cutler’s  division  went  into 
action  as  soon  as  it  reached  the  ground.  It  appearing  prob¬ 
able  that  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
west  angle  could  be  carried  if  assaulted  by  the  whole  Fifth 


1  At  9.20  a.m.  General  Warren  reported  :  “  My  left  cannot  advance  without  a 
most  destructive  enfilade  until  the  Sixth  Corps  has  cleared  its  front.”  [By  at¬ 
tack  at  the  west  angle  of  the  salient  is  meant. — A.  A.  H.]  “My  right  is  close  up 
to  the  enemy’s  works  and  ordered  to  assault.  The  enemy’s  line  appears  to  be 
strongly  held.  It  is  his  point  d'appui  if  he  throws  back  his  right.” 

Immediately  after  this  despatch  he  reports  :  “I  cannot  advance  my  men  far¬ 
ther  at  present.” 

2  In  the  Official  Diary  of  Longstreet’s  Corps  this  attack  of  Warren  is  desig¬ 
nated  as  “two  violent  assaults”  between  nine  and  ten  o’clock  on  a  part  of  Gen¬ 
eral  Field’s  line.  That  part  of  the  attack  against  the  intrenchments  held  by 
Bratton’s  brigade,  where  the  works  crossed  the  Brock  road,  was  made  over  open 
ground  which  extended  from  one  intrenchment  to  the  other.  General  Bratton 
says  of  Warren’s  troops  that  they  advanced  beautifully  in  two  lines  of  battle  to 
within  fifty  yards  of  the  intrenchments,  when  the  musketry  and  artillery  fire 
was  opened  that  broke  them. 

3  I  was  overlooking  the  right  of  the  army,  and  gave  the  order  for  the  assaults 
there  to  cease,  as  soon  as  I  was  satisfied  they  could  not  succeed  ;  and  directed  the 
transfer  of  the  troops  to  the  centre  for  attack  there.— A.  A.  H. 


102  THE  VEEtGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Corps,  General  Warren  was  directed  to  withdraw  from  his 
front  and  move  with  his  whole  corps  to  the  designated 
point  and  attack.  Griffin’s  division  followed  Cutler’s  closely. 
The  other  troops  of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  following,  except 
Crawford’s  division,  when  the  project  of  further  assault  was 
given  up,  as  it  did  not  appear  to  promise  a  complete  success. 
Our  line  on  the  right  was  very  much  shortened,  Crawford 
remaining  in  the  old  intrenchments  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  in  part. 

Turn  now  to  our  left ;  at  four  o’clock  in  the  morning  of 
the  12th,  General  Potter’s  division  of  Burnside’s  corps  ad¬ 
vanced  against  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  held  by  Lane’s 
brigade,  the  left  of  Hill’s  corps.  These  he  carried  about  five 
o’clock,  capturing  some  prisoners  and  two  guns.  But  Gen¬ 
eral  Lane,  reforming  his  brigade  in  some  old  intrenchments 
that  enfiladed  those  he  had  been  dispossessed  of,  forced 
General  Potter  out  of  the  intrenchments  he  had  taken,  and, 
reinforced  by  Scales’s  and  Thomas’s  brigades,  sent  by  Gen¬ 
eral  Wilcox  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  firing,  they  followed  up 
Potter  for  a  short  distance,  but  were  recalled.  The  captured 
guns  were  retaken.  General  Lane  mentions  General  Doles’s 
brigade  of  Ewell’s  corps  coming  to  him  at  about  the  same 
time  as  the  others,  and  joining  in  the  advance. 

Urgent  orders,  General  Burnside  says,  were  received  from 
the  Lieutenant-General  to  establish  connection  with  the 
Second  Corps  at  all  hazards,  and  “  General  Crittenden’s  and 
General  Potter’s  divisions  were  ordered  forward  to  repeated 
attacks,  which  resulted  in  severe  loss,  but  did  not  succeed  in 
driving  the  enemy  from  his  main  line.”  General  Potter  es¬ 
tablished  connection  with  General  .Hancock  at  9.15  am. 
General  Willcox  was  now  ordered  to  attack  with  his  whole 
force  on  the  left  of  General  Crittenden.  Considerable  delay 
occurred  in  arranging  his  artillery  to  cover  his  left  against 
attack  in  the  event  of  his  being  repulsed.  He  was  on  the 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


103 


left  of  the  whole  army.  His  attack  was  made  against  a  sali¬ 
ent  held  bv  Walker’s  brigade  (Colonel  Mayo  commanding) 
of  Heth’s  division.  There  was  a  pine  thicket  in  front  of  the 
salient,  under  cover  of  which  General  Willcox  got  close  up 
to  the  works,  but  was  met  with  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  from 
Mayo’s  brigade,  and  Thomas’s  on  Mayo’s  left,  and  the  fire  of 
Heth’s  artillery  on  the  right  of  the  salient.  At  the  same 
time  Lane’s  brigade,  supported  by  Mahone’s  (under  Colonel 
Weisiger),  attacked  him  on  the  left  flank,  Lane  charging 
close  up  to  his  artillery,  but,  according  to  General  Willcox, 
his  charge  was  splendidly  repulsed,  the  Second  Michigan 
Infantry,  commanded  by  Colonel  William  Humphrey,  which 
supported  the  artillery,  manning  the  guns  when  the  artiller¬ 
ists  were  killed.  Lieutenant  Benjamin,  Chief  of  Artillery  of 
the  corps,  who  was  severely  wounded,  was  highly  commended 
for  the  manner  in  which  he  handled  his  artillery. 

The  assault  of  Willcox’s  first  line  was  repulsed  with  severe 
loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  the  latter,  he  says, 
swept  off  by  Lane’s  brigade  when  retreating.  His  second 
line,  he  says,  was  brought  forward,  and  held  its  ground  un¬ 
til  ordered  to  withdraw  to  the  edge  of  the  wood,  where  they 
threw  up  breastworks.  General  Lane  says  he  captured  a 
battery  of  six  guns,  but  was  unable  to  bring  them  off ;  that 
he  then  directed  his  attack  against  the  assaulting  troops,  and 
that  some  part  of  his  brigade  became  mixed  with  the  enemy 
and  had  fighting  at  close  quarters,  and  that  he  finally  fell 
back  upon  the  close  approach  of  two  lines  of  the  enemy. 

Lane’s  and  Weisiger’s  brigades,  General  Early  says,  had 
been  thrown  to  the  front  for  the  purpose  of  moving  to  the 
left  and  attacking  the  flank  of  the  column  which  had  broken 
Ewell’s  line,  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  him  and,  if  possible, 
recover  the  part  of  the  line  which  had  been  lost. 

Another  attempt  was  made  in  the  afternoon,  he  says,  to 
carry  out  the  flank  movement  with  Weisiger’s  brigade  and 


104  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Cook’s  brigade  of  Hetli’s  division,  but  it  was  discovered  that 
the  flanking  column  would  have  been  exposed  to  the  fire  of 
one  or  more  intrenched  lines,  and  the  attempt  was  not  made. 
Skirmishing  and  heavy  artillery  firing  wTere  kept  up  by  Gen¬ 
eral  Burnside  until  late  in  the  day.  Late  in  the  afternoon 
Humphreys’s  and  Bratton’s  brigades  of  Longstreet’s  corps 
were  sent  to  General  Ewell. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  it  wTas  found  that  the 
enemy  had  withdrawn  from  the  salient,  and  the  several  corps 
were  ordered  to  press  up  as  close  to  them  as  possible,  to  as¬ 
certain  their  position.  Colonel  Carroll,  of  Gibbon’s  division, 
advancing  through  the  woods,  driving  back  the  enemy’s  skir¬ 
mishers,  found  them  three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  rear  of  the 
apex  of  the  salient  in  a  strongly-intrenched  line  occupied  by 
infantry  and  artillery.  Pushing  forward  in  his  usual  intrepid 
manner,  Colonel  Carroll  was  severely  wounded  and  compelled 
to  quit  the  field. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  continuance  of  this  desperate  con¬ 
test  at  the  apex  of  the  salient  on  the  part  of  General  Lee  was 
an  unnecessary  sacrifice  of  troops  he  could  ill  afford  to  spare ; 
but  in  fact  he  could  not  withdraw  them  during  daylight 
without  the  risk  of  serious  disaster,  and  Meade  continued  to 
press  against  him  there  with  the  hope  of  bringing  about  that 
withdrawal  and  disaster. 

For  the  losses  of  the  day,  the  same  authority  as  that  here¬ 
tofore  used  gives  for  the  wounded  on  the  12th  : 


The  Second  Corps .  2,043 

The  Fifth  Corps .  970 

The  Sixth  Corps .  840 


Making  a  total  of .  3,853 


For  the  killed  we  have  880,  and  for  the  killed  and  wounded 
4,733.  The  prisoners  lost  did  not  probably  exceed  500. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


105 


General  Burnside  states  liis  losses  in  his  three  divisions, 
from  the  8th  to  the  ‘20th  of  May,  to  have  been  2,454  killed 
and  wounded  and  590  missing,  one-half  of  which  loss  he 
assigns  to  the  12th  of  May.  The  number  of  killed  and 
wounded  he  gives  is  probably  in  excess  of  the  actual  number, 
but  I  have  no  means  of  correcting  it.  The  Ninth  Corps  did 
not  at  that  time  form  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  I 
have  not  been  able  to  find  the  report  of  its  Medical  Director 
for  that  period.  The  killed  and  wounded  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
between  the  8th  and  12th  was  very  small. 

The  total  killed  and  wounded  on  the  12th,  including  the 
Ninth  Corps,  is,  therefore,  6,020.  The  total  missing,  800. 
The  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  6,820. 

I  have  not  found  any  exact  statement  of  the  Confederate 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded.  At  the  salient  it  must  have 
been  equal  to  that  of  our  troops  engaged  there  ;  in  Burn¬ 
side’s  and  Warren’s  attacks  much  less  than  ours.  Altogether 
their  killed  and  wounded  must  have  been  between  4,000  and 
5,000. 

Respecting  the  number  of  prisoners  lost  by  the  Confeder¬ 
ates,  General  Ewell  says  of  his  corps,  that  after  the  loss  of 
Johnson’s  division  (before  sunrise)  his  force  barely  num¬ 
bered  8,000.  This  was  before  the  losses  by  fighting,  after 
the  capture  of  the  salient,  occurred.  He  says  previously 
that  when  Hancock  broke  through  the  lines  he  captured 
about  2,000  men.  His  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners  on 
the  10th  he  states  to  have  been  650  ;  his  killed  and  wounded 
in  the  Wilderness,  1,250.  The  sum  of  these  figures  is  11,900, 
or  say  12,000.  But  the  number  of  enlisted  men  of  Ewell’s 
corps  present  for  duty  on  the  20th  of  April,  1864  (Hoke’s 
brigade  and  two  regiments  of  Rodes’s  division  absent  and  not 
counted),  was  15,705,  leaving  about  3,700  men  not  accounted 
for  by  General  Ewell’s  figures.  His  report,  as  before  stated, 
was  made  in  March,  1865,  from  Richmond,  where  the  exact 
5* 


106  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


data  may  not  have  been  accessible  to  him.  If  General 
Ewell’s  estimate,  that  after  the  loss  of  Johnson’s  division  be¬ 
fore  sunrise  of  the  12th  his  force  barely  numbered  8,000,  be 
correct,  then  the  greater  part  of  the  3,700  men  not  accounted 
for  may  be  attributed  to  an  underestimate  of  his  losses  on  the 
10th,  and  an  underestimate  of  Hancock’s  captures  at  daylight 
on  the  12th. 

The  Confederate  loss  on  the  12th  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners,  appears  from  the  preceding  discussion  to  have 
been  between  9,000  and  10,000,  officers  and  enlisted  men. 

In  General  officers  the  Confederates  suffered  severely, 
Brigadier-Generals  Daniel  and  Perrin  being  killed,  and 
Brigadier-Generals  Walker  (commanding  the  Stonewall  Bri¬ 
gade,  Johnson’s  division),  Bamseur,  R.  D.  Johnston,  and 
McGowan  being  severely  wounded,  and  Major-General  Ed¬ 
ward  Johnson  and  Brigadier-General  Geo.  H.  Steuart  cap¬ 
tured. 

On  the  part  of  the  United  States,  Major-General  Wright 
vas  wounded,  and  Brigadier-Generals  Webb  and  Carroll  were 
severely  wounded. 

A  movement  by  our  right  flank  would  probably  have  re¬ 
sulted  in  Lee’s  abandoning  his  intrenchments  at  once  and 
taking  position  behind  the  North  Anna.  That  was  not  de¬ 
sired,  and  as  a  movement  by  the  left  promised  an  oppor¬ 
tunity  of  attacking  Lee’s  right  before  it  could  be  reinforced 
from  his  left  or  his  intrenchments  extended,  and  as  at  the 
same  time  it  would  cover  our  hospitals  and  communication 
with  our  depots  in  Washington,  the  movement  by  the  left 
was  adopted. 

General  Warren  was  directed  to  move  his  corps  imme¬ 
diately  after  dark  on  the  13th,  by  way  of  Scott’s  (Shelton’s), 
Landron’s,  and  thence  by  a  farm-road  to  a  ford  of  the  Ny, 
half  a  mile  distant,  then  crossing  the  Ny,  to  move  across  the 
country,  chiefly  through  fields,  to  the  Fredericksburg  and 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


107 


Spottsylvania  Court  House  road,  and,  advancing  along  that 
road,  recross  the  Ny,  form  on  the  left  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and 
attack  on  the  Fredericksburg  road  at  four  a.m.  of  the  14th 
The  artillery  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  directed  to  move  by 
roads  further  to  the  rear  and  join  the  corps  on  the  Freder¬ 
icksburg  road.  The  Sixth  Corps  was  directed  to  follow  the 
Fifth  and  attack  on  its  left  on  the  Massaponax  Church  road. 
Guides  were  sent  to  the  two  corps. 

General  Hancock  was  directed  to  be  prepared  to  attack  at 
four  a.m.  on  his  front,  but  not  to  attack  until  ordered.  Gen¬ 
eral  Burnside  was  instructed  similarly  to  General  Hancock. 

The  night  set  in  dark  and  rainy.  Every  precaution  was 
taken  by  General  Warren  to  mark  out  the  line  of  his  march  ; 
men  were  posted  at  short  intervals,  and  fires  built  along  the 
line  ;  but  the  rain  and  heavy  mist  obscured  and  extinguished 
them.  The  mud  was  deep  over  a  large  part  of  the  route ; 
the  darkness  intense,  so  that  literally  you  could  not  see  your 
hand  held  before  your  face. 

The  march  was  necessarily  very  slow.  The  fatigue  of 
floundering  along  in  such  a  sea  of  mud  but  few  can  appre¬ 
hend.  In  spite  of  all  the  care  taken  to  prevent  it,  men  lost 
■their  way  and  lay  down  exhausted,  until  daylight  enabled 
them  to  go  on. 

At  six  o’clock  in  the  morning  the  head  of  General  Warren’s 
column  arrived  at  the  point  where  they  were  to  form  for  at¬ 
tack,  but  the  column  was  broken  and  scattered,  and  it  was 
not  practicable  to  get  the  command  in  condition  for  offensive 
operations  that  day.  The  attack  was  therefore  abandoned. 

The  Sixth  Corps  followed  the  Fifth,  the  head  of  the  column 
starting  at  three  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  14th,  and  was 
massed  out  of  sight  on  the  Massaponax  Church  road,  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Ny.  A  high  point  on  this  road  at  Gayle’s, 
on  the  south  side  of  the  river  and  about  half  a  mile  from  it, 
commanded  the  country  around  it  (which  was  open)  and  the 


108  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Fredericksburg  road  also.  It  was  therefore  occupied  by 
Upton’s  brigade,  now  only  800  strong.  But  shortly  after  he 
took  possession  he  was  attacked  by  Chambliss’s  cavalry  bri¬ 
gade  and  Mahone’s  infantry,  and  forced  to  abandon  the  posi¬ 
tion.  Under  orders  from  General  Meade,  General  Warren 
sent  General  Ayres  to  recover  it,  which  was  done,  the  enemy 
drawing  off.  General  Wright  at  the  same  time  sent  two  bri¬ 
gades,  who  relieved  Ayres,  and  followed  with  his  corps. 

General  Wright’s  brigade  of  Mahone’s  division,  which  had 
been  holding  the  intrenchments  on  the  Confederate  left 
covering  the  Shady  Grave  road  bridge,  was  brought  over  to 
Early’s  position  at  the  Court  House  on  the  14th,  and  the  re- 
coniioissance  made  by  it  and  by  Mahone  disclosed  our  move¬ 
ment  and  presence  on  their  right. 

It  was  not  until  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  that  our  with¬ 
drawal  from  the  right  was  discovered  by  Longstreet’s  skir¬ 
mishers,  who  then  entered  the  breastworks  abandoned  by 
the  Fifth  Corps  ;  nor  was  it  until  the  night  of  the  14th  that 
Field’s  division  was  brought  over  to  the  Court  House  and 
posted  on  the  right  of  Hill’s  corps.  Kershaw  remained  on 
the  left  until  midnight  of  the  15th,  and  then  moved  to  the 
Confederate  right,  where  he  was  held  in  reserve. 

Fortune  evidently  did  not  favor  us  on  the  night  of  the 
13th,  for  the  intrenchments  on  the  Confederate  right  did  not 
extend  much  south  of  the  Court  House,  and  only  Hill’s  corps 
was  on  that  front.  With  ordinary  weather  the  Fifth  and 
Sixth  Corps  would  have  been  able  to  attack  there  early  in  the 
morning,  before  reinforcements  could  have  been  brought 
from  the  Confederate  left. 

At  four  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  General  Han¬ 
cock,  by  direction  of  General  Meade,  moved  Barlow’s  and 
Gibbon’s  divisions  to  the  Spottsylvania  and  Fredericksburg 
road  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Ny  River,  leaving  Birney’s  divi¬ 
sion  to  cover  Burnside’s  right  flank. 


SPOTTSYL VANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


109 


During  the  15th,  16th,  and  17th,  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
Corps  advanced  their  intrenched  lines,  established  batteries, 
opened  roads,  examined  the  country  and  roads  leading  south¬ 
ward,  and  on  the  17th  the  Fifth  Corps  prepared  an  intrench- 
ment  to  be  held  in  connection  with  an  operation  to  be  under¬ 
taken  on  the  morning  of  the  18th.  Communication  was 
being  opened  with  Aquia  Creek  by  railroad,  which  was  com¬ 
pleted  the  22d  of  May,  and  the  wounded  sent  to  the  general 
hospitals  at  Washington.  Supplies  for  the  army  and  some 
additional  troops  were  received  during  this  time. 

Brigadier-General  Grant,  commanding  Vermont  brigade, 
Second  Division,  Sixth  Corps,  reports  that  Colonel  Warner’s 
regiment,  1,500  strong,  joined  his  brigade  on  the  15th  of  May. 

On  the  17th  of  May  Brigadier-General  B.  O.  Tyler,  with  a 
temporary  division  of  heavy  artillery  regiments  serving  as 
infantry,  and  the  Corcoran  Legion,  joined  the  Second  Corps, 
making  an  addition  to  it,  General  Hancock  says,  of  8,000 
men.  The  Corcoran  Legion  was  assigned  to  General  Gib¬ 
bon’s  division.  These  troops  were  distributed  to  the  army 
soon  after  their  arrival,  and  General  Tyler  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  one  of  Gibbon’s  brigades. 

Owing  to  the  losses  in  action  and  the  expiration  of  the 
terms  of  service  of  many  regiments  of  Mott’s  division  (the 
4th),  it  had  become  so  reduced  in  numbers  that  it  was  con¬ 
solidated  into  a  brigade  on  the  13th  of  May,  and  assigned  to 
Birney’s  division.1 

1  According  to  Badeau  (foot-note,  page  198,  Vol.  II.),  some  1,800  drafted  men, 
recruits,  and  convalescents  were  also  received  at  this  time,  in  addition  to  the  re¬ 
inforcements  already  mentioned,  making  a  total  of  11,300.  I  have  not  been  able 
to  obtain  any  detailed  statement  from  the  War  Department  of  additional  troops 
sent  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  during  this  campaign.  The  statement  of  the 
Department  gives  the  whole  number  sent  from  May  4,  1804,  to  June  12,  1864,  and 
from  June  12,  1864,  to  April  of  1865 ;  and  when  the  reinforcement  was  by  organ¬ 
ization — that  is,  by  regiments — the  numbers  of  the  statement  comprise  the  absent 
as  well  as  the  present,  the  extra  duty  men,  etc. 

The  statement  of  the  War  Department  is  that  the  reinforcements  sent  to  the 


110  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


On  the  19th  of  May  the  organization  of  the  Reserve  Artil¬ 
lery  was  broken  up.  Its  guns,  ninety-two  in  number,  were 
sent  to  the  Washington  d6pot.  Its  caissons  were  retained, 
and  took  the  place  of  the  army  wagons  carrying  the  reserve 
ammunition.  The  artillerymen  were  transferred  to  the 
Corps  Artillery.  Upon  arriving  before  Petersburg,  the  guns 
were  returned  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  They  had  ac¬ 
companied  the  army  chiefly  with  a  view  to  their  use  before 
Richmond.  The  brigade  guard  of  Colonel  Kitching  re¬ 
mained  with  the  Fifth  Corps,  with  which  it  had  been  serving 
from  an  early  day  after  the  campaign  began. 

It  had  been  suggested  by  Major-General  Wright,  and  also 
by  myself,  that  after  the  lapse  of  a  few  days  a  return  by 
night  to  the  enemy’s  left,  which  would  probably  be  aban¬ 
doned,  or  very  much  weakened  by  our  concentration  on  his 
right,  might  afford  a  good  opportunity  to  attack  there.  Gen¬ 
eral  Wright’s  suggestion  was  for  his  corps  only  to  under¬ 
take  it ;  but  it  was  concluded  to  send  both  the  Second  and 
Sixth  Corps,  and  on  the  17th,  Generals  Hancock  and  Wright 
were  ordered  to  move  their  troops  in  the  night  to  the  works 
captured  on  the  12th,  and  attack  the  enemy’s  new  intrench- 
ments  there  at  daylight  on  the  18th,  the  Sixth  Corps  on  the 
right  of  the  Second.  General  Burnside  was  directed  to  at¬ 
tack  in  conjunction  with  them,  and  General  Warren  to  crien 
his  artillery  at  the  same  time  and  be  prepared  for  the  offen¬ 
sive.  The  Second  Corps,  being  nearest  to  the  point  of  at¬ 
tack,  led,  the  Sixth  Corps  following.  The  troops  were  in  the 

Army  of  the  Potomac  (including  Burnside’s  corps)  from  May  4  to  June  12,  1864, 
was  by  organizations  1,031  officers  and  26,780  enlisted  men,  making  a  total  of 
27,811.  But  these  numbers,  as  already  remarked,  included  the  absent  as  well  as 
the  present,  and  of  the  present,  those  on  extra  duty,  etc.  During  the  same 
period  it,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  received,  by  recruits  to  regiments,  2,453 
enlisted  men.  The  effective  force  sent  between  May  4  and  June  12  was  probably 
about  12,000.  But  during  this  same  period  the  term  of  service  of  many  regiments 
expired,  and  they  were  mustered  out  of  service.  From  May  2d  to  July  4th, 
thirty-six  regiments  were  in  this  way  discharged  from  the  service. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


Ill 


position  designated  before  daylight,  and  at  four  a.m.  Gibbon 
and  Barlow  moved  forward  to  assault,  their  troops  in  lines 
of  brigades.  Birney  and  Tyler  were  held  in  reserve.  The 
artillery  was  posted  in  the  first  line  of  works  at  the  apex  of 
the  salient,  firing  over  the  troops.  The  Sixth  Corps  advanced 
on  the  right  of  the  Second.  But  the  enemy  was  on  the  alert, 
and  the  new  intrenchments  across  the  base  of  the  salient 
were  of  the  most  formidable  character,  being  concealed  on 
their  right  by  woods  and  having  on  that  part  of  their  front  a 
heavy  slashing,  and  on  their  left  front,  which  was  in  the  open 

ground  of  the  Harrison  farm,  lines  of  abatis.  As  the  troops 

• 

approached  they  were  met  with  a  heavy  musketry  and  artil¬ 
lery  fire  which  completely  swept  the  ground  in  front ;  but, 
notwithstanding,  they  pressed  forward  to  the  slashing  and 
abatis,  and  made  several  gallant  attempts  to  cany  the 
enemy’s  lines,  but  without  success. 

Upon  its  being  reported  to  General  Meade  that  there  was 
but  little  probability  of  the  enemy’s  lines  being  carried,  he 
directed  the  attack  to  be  discontinued,  and  the  troops  were 
accordingly  withdrawn.  The  Sixth  Corps  returned  at  once 
to  the  left  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  resuming  its  position  there. 

During  the  night  of  the  18th,  Barlow’s,  Gibbon’s,  and 
Birney’s  divisions  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  Anderson’s  mill, 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Ny  River,  below  the  left  of  the  Sixth 
Corps.  Tyler’s  division  was  posted  on  the  Court  House  and 
Fredericksburg  road  near  the  Harris  house,  in  the  vicinity  of 
which  Colonel  Kitching’s  brigade,  now  of  the  Fifth  Corps, 
was  also  posted,  on  the  left  of  Tyler. 

General  Burnside  made  the  attack  directed  on  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  18th  with  the  divisions  of  Crittenden  and  Potter, 
and  all  his  artillery,  uniting  on  the  right  with  Hancock,  but 
could  not  carry  the  enemy’s  intrenchments.  The  artillery  of 
the  Fifth  Corps  also  opened  and  continued  its  fire  for  several 
hours. 


112  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


During  the  night  of  the  18th  the  Ninth  Corps  was  moved 
to  the  left  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  its  left  resting  near  the  Po  at 
Quesenberry’s.  The  enemy’s  right  at  this  time  rested  on  the 
Po,  covering  the  road  crossing  that  stream  at  Snell’s  bridge. 
The  Sixth  and  Ninth  Corps  were  pressed  up  as  close  to  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments  as  practicable  without  assaulting,  and 
intrenched.  During  the  20th  the  Ninth  Corps  made  recon- 
noissances  in  the  direction  of  Smith’s  and  Stannard’s  mills, 
on  the  Ny  and  Po  crossings  of  the  Telegraph  road. 

The  Fifth  Corps  now  formed  the  right  of  the  army,  and 
had  an  intrenchment  running  across  the  Ny  above  the  Fred¬ 
ericksburg  road  crossing,  with  Kitching’s  brigade  and  Tyler’s 
division,  as  before  stated,  near  the  Harris  house  on  the  east 
side  of  the  Ny,  covering  the  right  of  the  army  and  the  road 
to  Fredericksburg,  now  in  full  use  by  our  trains  of  all  kinds. 
The  Second  Corps  was  held  ready  to  move  southward,  recon- 
noissances  in  that  direction  going  on.  In  the  afternoon  of  the 
19th  instructions  were  sent  to  General  Hancock  to  move  that 
night,  but  an  encounter  with  the  enemy  late  in  the  afternoon 
on  our  right  flank,  held  by  Tyler’s  division  and  Kitching’s 
brigade,  led  to  its  being  deferred  until  the  night  of  the  20th. 

General  Ewell  was  directed  by  General  Lee  on  the  19th  to 
demonstrate  in  his  front  to  ascertain  whether  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  moving  to  his,  Lee’s,  right,  as  he  believed  it 
to  be.  General  Ewell  says  that  to  accomplish  this  he  moved 
with  his  corps  around  on  our  right  by  a  detour  of  several 
miles,  on  roads  impassable  for  artillery,  when  he  came  upon 
us  prepared  to  receive  him — his  force  6,000.  Our  position 
being  developed,  and  his  object  attained,  he  was  about  to  re¬ 
tire,  he  says,  when  he  was  attacked.  Part  of  his  line,  he 
continues,  was  shaken,  but  Pegram’s  and  Ramseur’s  brigades 
held  their  ground  so  firmly  that  he  maintained  his  position 
till  nightfall,  when  he  withdrew  unmolested ;  that  his  loss 
was  about  900  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


113 


Ramseur  (whose  account  is  the  only  one  I  find  besides  that 
of  General  Ewell)  says  that  his  brigade  was  in  front,  that 
their  movement  was  discovered,  and  that  he  then  attacked 
with  his  brigade  and  drove  the  enemy  rapidly,  and  with 
severe  loss,  until  his  flanks  were  enveloped,  when  he  retired 
two  hundred  yards  and  formed,  Grimes’s  brigade  on  his  left, 
Battle’s  on  his  right ;  but  that  Gordon’s  division  on  their 
left  being  flanked,  retreated,  and  the  whole  line  was  com¬ 
pelled  to  fall  back,  when  it  was  repeatedly  attacked  by  a 
heavy  force  until  night,  when  it  quietly  and  safely  withdrew. 

Kershaw’s  division  held  Ewell’s  intrenchments  while  he 
was  absent. 

The  force  encountered  by  Ewell  was  Kitching’s  brigade 
and  General  Tyler’s  division,  posted  on  the  Fredericksburg 
road  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Harris  house.  Colonel  Kitching, 
on  the  left  of  Tyler,  perceived  indications  of  the  movement 
in  the  course  of  the  afternoon,  and  precautions  were  taken  to 
meet  it.  The  firing  began  about  half-past  five  o’clock,  and 
it  being  heavy,  General  Hancock  was  at  once  directed  by 
General  Meade  to  send  a  division  in  double-quick  to  Tyler, 
and  to  hold  his  corps  ready  to  move  up.  General  Warren, 
being  the  nearest  at  hand,  was  directed  to  send  some  troops 
over,  and  the  Maryland  brigade  sent  by  him  got  to  the 
ground  in  time  to  take  an  active  and  effective  part  in  the 
fight.  The  First  Maryland  regiment,  returning  from  Fred¬ 
ericksburg,  had  at  once,  without  waiting  for  orders,  joined 
in  the  attack  on  Tyler’s  right. 

General  Hancock  ordered  up  Birney’s  division  in  double- 
quick,  directed  Barlow  and  Gibbon  to  be  ready  to  follow, 
and  went  himself  to  the  ground,  where  he  found  Tyler’s  divi¬ 
sion  “  fiercely  engaged  ”  with  the  enemy  in  front  of  the 
Fredericksburg  road.  As  soon  as  General  Birney’s  troops 
arrived  two  of  his  brigades  were  thrown  into  action  on 
Tyler’s  right,  but  the  severity  of  the  action  was  already 


114  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


over.  General  Crawford,  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  arrived  shortly 
after  Birney,  about  dark,  and  was  formed  in  support  of 
Kitching  and  the  Maryland  brigade  on  the  left. 

The  fighting,  General  Hancock  says,  continued  obstinate 
until  about  nine  o’clock,  when  the  enemy  gave  way,  retreat¬ 
ing  rapidly  across  the  Ny.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  in  killed 
and  wounded  was  severe,  and  about  400  prisoners  fell  into 
our  hands.  This  was  the  first  engagement  Tyler’s  troops  had 
taken  part  in,  and  they  acquitted  themselves  handsomely,  he 
says. 

General  Early  says  that  his  whole  corps  was  held  ready  to 
co-operate  with  Ewell,  should  his  attack  prove  successful, 
and  that,  to  create  a  diversion  in  his  favor,  Thomas’s  bri-  . 
gade  was  thrown  forward.  It  made  a  demonstration  on 
General  Cutler’s  front  so  far  as  to  drive  in  the  pickets  on  his 
right  flank. 

Bussell’s  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  massed  near  the 
Harris  house  during  the  night  of  the  19th,  and  on  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  20th  relieved  Birney’s  and  Tyler’s  divisions,  which 
joined  the  other  two  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  near 
Anderson’s  or  Clark’s  mill.  Crawford  and  Kitching  with 
Bussell  now  protected  the  right  flank  of  the  army.1 

1  I  was  surprised  to  find  in  Badeau’s  account  of  this  affair  the  following  state¬ 
ment  : 

“  Warren  had  participated  in  the  battle  on  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps,  and 
when  the  rebels  were  seen  to  be  repelled,  he  was  ordered  to  fall  upon  their  flank 
and  rear  with  the  view  of  cutting  off  and  capturing  Ewell’s  entire  column,  but  he 
failed  to  carry  out  his  instructions  and  under  cover  of  night  the  enemy  retired.” 

The  troops  from  both  corps  engaged  received  the  same  orders  from  General 
Meade,  and  continued  the  action  together,  both  equally  close  to  the  enemy  until 
its  close.  Nothing  took  place  on  the  field  nor  is  there  anything  on  record  to  sup¬ 
port  the  statement  of  Badeau.  Ewell  was  close  to  the  ford  near  Landron’s  when 
the  fighting  terminated,  two  miles  from  Warren,  who  was  with  Griffin’s  and  Cat- 
lin’s  divisions  close  up  to  the  Spottsyl vania  intrenchments,  under  orders  to  attack 
them  if  there  was  promise  of  success. 

Badeau  further  states  : 

“  Ferrero  with  his  colored  division  was  on  the  road  to  Fredericksburg  in  rear 
and  on  the  right  of  Tyler  and  near  the  point  where  Ewell  struck  the  National 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


115 


The  number  wounded  on  the  18tli  of  May,  almost  entirely 
of  the  Second  Corps,  was,  according  to  Medical  Director 
McParlin,  552,  and  on  the  19th,  chiefly  from  the  Second 
Corps,  1,100,  making  a  total  wounded  of  1,652.  Estimating 
by  the  rule  adopted,  we  have  for  killed,  371,  and  for  killed 
and  wounded  2,023.  Colonel  Coulter,  commanding  brigade 
in  Crawford’s  division,  was  severely  wounded  on  the  18th. 

Adding  the  number  of  wounded  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 


line.  This  road  formed  Grant’s  direct  communication  with  his  base  and  he  sent 
word  at  once  to  Ferrero :  ‘  The  enemy  have  crossed  the  N  y  on  the  right  of  our  lines 
in  considerable  force,  and  may  possibly  detach  a  force  to  move  on  Fredericksburg. 
Keep  your  cavalry  pickets  well  out  on  the  plank  road  and  all  other  roads  leading 
west  and  south  of  you,’  ”  etc.,  etc. 

Badeau  continues : 

“  The  rebels  did  indeed  push  on  as  far  as  the  Fredericksburg  road,  but  Ferrero 
and  his  colored  division  handled  them  severely.  Twenty-seven  wagons  were  cap¬ 
tured  in  the  first  surprise,  but  all  retaken  ;  and  on  the  soil  of  Virginia  men  who 
had  once  been  slaves,  beat  back  the  forces  of  those  who  had  held  them  in  slavery. 
It  was  the  first  time  at  the  East  when  colored  troops  had  been  engaged  in  any 
important  battle,  and  the  display  of  soldierly  qualities  obtained  a  frank  acknowl¬ 
edgment  from  both  troops  and  commanders,  not  all  of  whom  had  before  been 
willing  to  look  upon  negroes  as  comrades.  But  after  that  time,  white  soldiers  in 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  not  displeased  to  receive  the  support  of  black 
ones.  They  had  found  the  support  worth  having.” 

Ferrero’ s  division  of  colored  troops  was  not  in  rear  and  on  the  right  of  Tyler, 
nor  near  the  point  where  Ewell  struck  the  National  line,  nor  was  he  on  the  road 
forming  Grant’s  direct  communication  with  his  base  (the  Fredericksburg  and 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  road)  but  on  the  plank  road  from  Orange  Court  House 
to  Fredericksburg,  not  far  from  Salem  Church,  and  over  five  miles  north  of  the 
Harris  farm  where  Ewell  was  encountered  as  narrated  by  me.  General  Ferrero 
had  with  him  besides  his  division,  the  Second  Ohio  and  the  Third  New  Jersey 
(both  white  veteran  cavalry  regiments)  thrown  out  in  advance  of  his  infantry,  and 
this  cavalry  had  an  outpost  on  the  road  from  Alsop’s  to  Silver’s  on  the  Orange 
plank  road.  This  outpost  was  driven  in  about  half-past  five  in  the  afternoon 
by  some  cavalry  and  artillery  force  of  the  enemy.  This  force  the  Second  Ohio 
and  the  Third  New  Jersey  engaged,  and  Ferrero  formed  his  division  in  line  to 
support  them.  The  enemy  fell  back  with  slight  loss,  our  two  cavalry  regiments 
losing  2  enlisted  men  killed,  7  wounded,  and  2  missing.  The  colored  division  had 
not  a  casualty  of  any  kind  whatever,  handled  nobody,  severely  or  otherwise  ;  in 
fact,  were  not  engaged. 

The  wagons  captured  were  taken  near  the  Harris  farm,  and  were  retaken  by 
the  troops  there,  not  by  Ferrero’s  troops. 

This  affair  is  in  itself  insignificant,  but  I  have  found  it  to  be  characteristic  of 
the  spirit  of  Badeau’ s  volumes  in  much  that  concerns  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


116  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

mac  heretofore  stated  as  occurring  at  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  from  the  morning  of  the  8th  to  the  night  of  the  19th, 
we  have  a  total  wounded  of  10,821.  Medical  Director 
McParlin  states  it  to  have  been  10,531,  but  I  find  he  omits 
the  300  wounded  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederates  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  10th  of  May. 

The  number  of  killed,  according  to  the  regimental  re¬ 
ports,  he  states  to  have  been  1,781 ;  and  of  missing,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  same  authority,  2,077 ;  making  a  total,  by  his 
numbers,  of  14,389. 

But  many  of  those  counted  among  the  missing  were 
killed.  Using  the  numbers  I  have  given,  we  have  : 


Wounded . .* .  10,821 

Killed .  2,447 

Killed  and  wounded .  13,268 

Missing .  1,411 

Total .  14,679 


The  sum  of  the  killed  and  missing,  according  to  the  regi¬ 
mental  records,  is  probably  correct,  and  I  have  used  that 
sum,  apportioning  its  parts  differently. 

General  Burnside  states  his  losses  to  have  been  2,454 
killed  and  wounded,  and  590  missing.  These  numbers, 
added  to  those  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  give  killed  and 
wounded,  15,722;  missing,  2,001;  total  casualties,  17,723. 

Medical  officers  were  directed  to  retain  in  the  field -hos¬ 
pital  all  cases  of  slight  wounds,  but  it  was  difficult  to  exe¬ 
cute  the  order ;  men  would  slip  off  in  the  night,  and  find 
their  way  to  the  steamers.^  Several  hundred  were,  however, 
retained,  accompanying  the  army  in  ambulances. 

Medical  Director  McParlin  states  that  the  total  number  of 
wounded  received  in  Washington  from  Fredericksburg  (the 
wounded  of  the  Wilderness  and  Spottsylvania  Court  House) 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


117 


was  21,966,  of  which  19,766  belonged  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  2,200  to  the  Ninth  Corps.  The  number  I 
have  given  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  those  two  battles 
is  19,923.  The  number  reported  by  General  Burnside  for 
the  Ninth  Corps  is,  3,123  ;  total,  23,046,  an  excess  of  Surgeon 
McParlin’s  numbers  of  1,080.  But  that  excess  is  more 
than  made  up  by  the  number  of  slightly  wounded  accom¬ 
panying  the  army,  and  those  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Confed¬ 
erates  on  the  10tli  of  May. 

The  number  of  killed  and  wounded  in  the  two  battles  of 
the  Wilderness  and  Spottsylvania  Court  House  is  therefore 
28,207.  The  number  of  missing  4,903,  making  a  total  of 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  of  33,110. 

Surgeon  McParlin  further  states  that  the  number  of  sick 
sent  to  Washington  from  Fredericksburg  at  this  period  was 
4,225.  This  would  make  a  total  of  losses  in  this  period  of 
sixteen  days  of  37,335,  the  men  discharged  by  expiration  of 
their  term  of  service  not  included. 

The  casualties  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  according  to 
Badeau,  were  2,271  killed,  9,360  wounded,  1,970  missing ; 
total,  13,601.  The  source  of  error  in  his  figures  has  been 
already  pointed  out ;  his  number  of  wounded  is  too  small. 

I  have  no  means  of  presenting  an  accurate  account  of  the 
casualties  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  Spottsylvania 
Court  House.  Excepting  on  those  days  and  at  those  parts 
of  the  field  noted  in  the  narrative,  they  must  have  been 
much  fewer  in  number  than  our  own,  since  they  remained  on 
the  defensive  under  the  cover  of  intrenchments,  entangled 
in  their  front  in  a  manner  unknown  to  European  warfare, 
and,  indeed,  in  a  manner  new  to  warfare  in  this  country. 
Their  losses  were,  however,  severe. 

This  account  of  the  operations  shows  in  what  manner  the 
contest  between  the  two  armies  was  carried  on.  The  march¬ 
ing  was  done,  chiefly  at  night,  and  the  contact  was  so  close 


118  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  '64  AND  ’65. 


as  to  require  constant  vigilance  day  and  night,  and  allow  but 
little  time  for  sleep.  The  firing  was  incessant.  The  fatigue, 
the  loss  of  sleep,  the  watchfulness,  taxed  severely  the  powers 
of  endurance  of  both  officers  and  men.  Usually,  in  military 
operations,  the  opposing  armies  come  together,  fight  a  battle 
and  separate  again,  the  strain  lasting  only  a  few  days.  In  a 
siege  it  is  only  a  small  part  of  the  opposing  troops  that  are 
close  together.  But  with  these  two  armies  it  was  different. 
From  the  5th  of  May,  1864,  to  the  9th  of  April,  1865,  they 
were  in  constant  close  contact,  with  rare  intervals  of  brief 
comparative  repose. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


MOVEMENT  TO  THE  NORTH  ANNA  RIVER— THE  CAV¬ 
ALRY  CORPS  SENT  AGAINST  THE  CONFEDERATE 
CAVALRY,  AND  TO  HAXALL’S  LANDING  ON  JAMES 
RIVER. 

It  was  supposed  that,  if  one  of  the  corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  sent  some  twenty  miles  distant  on  the  road 
to  Richmond,  keeping  the  rest  of  the  army  ready  to  follow, 
Lee  ( might  endeavor  to  attack  the  corps,  thus  separated  be¬ 
fore  it  could  be  reinforced,  and  upon  the  first  indication  of 
such  intention  (or  even  before  it,  after  allowing  full  time 
for  the  intention  to  disclose  itself,  if  it  should  exist)  the  rest 
of  the  army  following  the  corps  might  be  able  to  attack  be¬ 
fore  Lee  could  intrench.  If  Lee  did  not  make  this  attempt 
on  the  isolated  corps,  then  the  movement  would  become 
simply  a  turning  or  flank  operation. 

With  this  view,  General  Grant,  on  the  18th,  directed  Gen¬ 
eral  Meade  to  move  Hancock  on  the  night  of  the  19th,  with 
all  his  force,  and  as  much  cavalry  as  could  be  got  together 
for  him  under  General  Torbert,  as  far  toward  Richmond  on 
the  line  of  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad  as  he  could  make,  he 
fighting  the  enemy  in  whatever  force  he  might  find  him.  If 
the  enemy  made  a  general  move  to  meet  this,  the  three 
other  corps  of  the  army  would  follow  and  attack,  if  possible, 
before  Lee  had  time  to  intrench. 

The  order  for  this  was  issued  early  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
19th,  but  the  encounter  with  Ewell  caused  the  movement  to 
be  postponed.  On  the  20th,  Hancock  was  directed  by  Gen- 


120  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


eral  Meade  to  move  as  soon  after  dark  as  practicable,  by  way 
of  Guinea  Station  and  Bowling  Green  to  Milford  Station, 
about  twenty  miles  distant  by  the  route  named,  and  take 
position  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Mattapony,  if  practicable, 
and  attack  the  enemy  wherever  found ;  he  was  to  report 
progress  constantly  to  headquarters. 

General  Warren  was  directed  to  make  all  preparations  to 
move  in  the  morning  of  the  21st  to  Massaponax  Church,  and 
thence  south  by  the  Telegraph  road,  crossing  the  Ny  at 
Smith’s  mill,  the  Po  at  Stannard’s  mill,  and  thence  south¬ 
ward  by  Mud  tavern,  Thornburg,  Nancy  Wright’s,  etc. 
Burnside  was  to  follow  Warren,  and  Wright,  who  was  to 
concentrate  in  the  vicinity  of  the  commanding  position  of 
the  Gayle  house,  was  to  withdraw  on  the  night  of  the  21st, 
and  follow  Hancock’s  route. 

General  Hancock  moved  on  the  night  of  the  20th,  arrived 
a':  Guinea  Station  (eight  miles  on  the  way),  at  daybreak  of 
the  21st,  where  there  was  experienced  a  little  opposition. 
About  ten  o’clock  in  the  morning,  Torbert,  with  the  cavalry 
in  advance,  came  upon  some  of  Kemper’s  infantry  brigade 
(Pickett’s  division)  intrenched  at  Milford  Station,  and  drove 
them  out  of  their  pits  and  across  the  Mattapony,  captured 
some  prisoners,  and  secured  the  wagon-road  bridge  as  well 
as  the  railroad  bridge  there.  By  midday  Barlow’s  division 
was  across  the  river,  in  position  and  intrenched,  the  rest  of 
the  corps  following. 

Very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  21st,  Burnside’s,  War¬ 
ren’s,  and  Wright’s  skirmishers  were  pressed  close  up  against 
the  enemy’s  intrencliments  to  ascertain  if  any  part  of  their 
force  had  been  withdrawn.  A  movement  of  troops  toward 
their  right  was  noted,  for  Lee,  learning  from  his  cavalry  de¬ 
tachment  at  Guinea  Station,  and  through  his  signal  stations, 
that  infantry  and  cavalry  of  our  army  had  passed  there  at 
daybreak,  brought  Ewell  at  a  very  early  hour  to  his  right, 


MOVEMENT  TO  THE  NORTH  ANNA  RIVER.  121 


and  posted  liim  along  the  south  bank  of  the  Po,  a  part  of 
his  force  holding  the  crossing  of  the  Telegraph  road  at 
Stannard's  mills.1 

At  ten  o’clock  General  Warren  began  to  withdraw.  His  in¬ 
structions  were  modified  so  as  to  bring  him  to  Guinea  Station 
where  he  crossed  the  river  (below  the  junction  of  the  Po  and 
the  Nv)  and  moved  out  the  road  running  southwest  to  Madi¬ 
son’s  store,  halting  for  the  night  at  Catlett’s  where  the  road 
from  Mud  tavern  comes  in,  and  sending  forward  detach¬ 
ments  toward  Mud  tavern  and  to  Madison’s  store  ;  the  latter 
place  is  about  a  mile  from  the  telegraph  road  at  Nancy 
Wright’s.  Detachments  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  were  at 
Guinea  bridge  when  General  Warren  crossed  and  kept  in 
front  of  his  detachments  on  both  roads.  The  modification  of 
General  Warren’s  route  was  made  to  bring  him  several  miles 
nearer  General  Hancock.  Wright’s  route  was  also  modified, 
he  to  follow  Burnside. 

General  Burnside,  in  accordance  with  his  instructions,  set 
his  corps  in  motion  as  soon  as  the  road  was  clear  of  the  Fifth 
Corps,  sending  a  brigade  of  Potter’s  division  in  advance  to 
secure  the  crossing  of  the  Po  at  Stannard’s  mill.  The 
enemy’s  pickets  were  found  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  a 
mile  in  advance  of  it,  and  were  driven  to  the  south  side,  and 
dispositions  were  made  by  General  Potter  to  carry  the  ford 


1  “  Spottsyuvanta  Court  House,  8.40  a.m.,  May  21,  1864. 

“  Hon.  J.  A.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War : 

“  The  enemy  is  apparently  again  changing  his  base.  Three  (3)  gunboats  came 
up  to  Port  Royal  two  days  since.  This  morning  an  infantry  force  appeared  at 
Guinea’s.  His  cavalry  advance  at  Downer’s  bridge  on  Bowling  Green  road.  He 
is  apparently  placing  the  Mattapony  between  us,  and  will  probably  open  commu¬ 
nication  with  Port  Royal.  lam  extending  on  the  Telegraph  road ,  and  will  regu¬ 
late  my  movements  by  the  information  .  ...  of  his  route.  I  fear  will 
secure  him  from  attack  till  he  crosses  Pamunkey.  R.  E.  Lee.” 

This  telegram  was  in  cypher.  The  part  apparently  confidential  is  omitted  in 
the  translation.  The  last  sentence  should  probably  read,  “  I  fear  it  will  secure 
him,”  etc.,  etc.  The  underlining  is  mine.  A.  A.  H. 

XII.— 6 


122  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’<54  AND  ’65. 


by  assault.  But  under  the  orders  he  had  received  General 

* 

Burnside  did  not  deem  it  advisable  to  attempt  this,  but  took 
the  alternative  in  his  instructions,  and  moved  by  the  road  to 
Guinea  Station,  the  head  of  his  column  arriving  there  at 
2  a.m.  of  the  22d,  on  their  way  to  Downer’s  bridge  by  the 
Bowling  Green  road.  The  corps  was  halted  as  soon  as  it 
cleared  Guinea  Station. 

The  withdrawal  of  so  much  force  from  contact  with  the 
enemy  led  to  General  Wilcox  of  Hill’s  corps  being  sent  out 
late  in  the  afternoon  with  two  of  his  brigades  to  ascertain 
what  force  of  our  army  still  remained  before  Spottsylvania 
Court  House.  As  soon  as  General  Warren  abandoned  his  in- 
trenchments  General  Wright  withdrew  to  his  new  lines  at 
the  Gayle  house  ;  about  six  o’clock  Wilcox’s  brigades  made  a 
brisk  attack  upon  Wright’s  picket  lines,  but  were  repulsed  by 
it  except  at  one  point  where  the  skirmishers  were  driven 
back  a  short  distance,  when  some  artillery  intervened  and  re¬ 
stored  their  line. 

As  soon  as  General  Burnside  "was  out  of  the  way  General 
Wright  withdrew  without  further  molestation,  and  arrived  at 
Guinea  Station  early  the  next  morning. 

During  the  day  the  enemy’s  cavalry  detachments  had 
been  busy  picking  up  information  of  our  movement,  and 
one  of  General  Hancock’s  despatches  was  captured.  General 
Hampton  had  some  of  his  cavalry  in  front  of  Hancock  on  the 
road  from  Milford  to  Hanover  Junction,  and  some  of  Pick¬ 
ett’s  infantry  on  the  same  road.  Other  of  Hampton’s  cavalry 
were  on  the  roads  between  the  Mattapony  and  the  Telegraph 
road.  General  Breckinridge  was  at  Hanover  Junction. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  which  could  not  be  con¬ 
cealed  from  the  enemy,  set  Lee’s  army  in  motion,  but  not  to 
attack  the  Second  Corps,  as  it  was  hoped  he  would,  but  to 
interpose  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  Richmond, 
and  to  cover  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  one  of  those 


MOVEMENT  TO  THE  NORTH  ANNA  RIVER  123 


roads  that  connected  Richmond  with  the  most  fertile  parts 
of  Virginia. 

This  road  coming  from  the  west  intersects  the  Fredericks¬ 
burg  and  Richmond  Railroad  between  the  North  and  South 
Anna  rivers,  a  few  miles  above  the  confluence  of  those 
streams,  and  there  turns  and  runs  south  to  Richmond,  keep¬ 
ing  east  of  the  Fredericksburg  road  and  five  or  six  miles  dis¬ 
tant  from  it.  The  point  of  crossing  of  these  roads  is  called 
Hanover  Junction,  after  the  county  of  that  name. 

Hanover  Junction  is  twenty-four  or  twenty-five  miles  north 
of  Richmond,  and  twenty-eight  miles  south  by  the  Telegraph 
road  from  the  right  of  Lee’s  Spottsylvania  Court  House  in- 
trenchments  at  Snell’s  bridge  on  the  Po. 

About  the  time  when  Lee  began  to  move,  Hancock’s  lead¬ 
ing  division  had  just  crossed  the  Mattapony  at  Milford  and 
taken  position  there,  but  this  fact  could  not  then  have  been 
known  to  Lee,  who  must  still  have  been  under  the  belief  that 
we  were  moving  east  of  the  Mattapony  to  cross  it  at  a  point 
much  lower  down  than  Milford,  and  then  avoiding  the  North 
and  South  Anna  rivers  to  cross  the  river  formed  by  their 
junction,  the  Pamunkey,  at  Littlepage’s  bridge  on  the  stage 
road  to  Richmond,  or  at  other  convenient  points  below. 
Lee’s  shortest  route  to  meet  this  movement  was  by  the  Tele¬ 
graph  road  through  Hanover  Junction ;  and  about  midday  of 
the  21st,  Ewell  set  out  on  that  road  for  the  Junction,  fol¬ 
lowed  by  Longstreet’s  corps  on  the  same  road.  Ewell  ar¬ 
rived  at  the  Junction  some  time  in  the  forenoon  of  the  22d  ; 
the  head  of  Longstreet’s  corps  reached  the  North  Anna  at 
the  Telegraph  road  bridge  about  midday.  The  bridge  is 
two  miles  north  of  the  Junction.  General  Lee  accompanied 
Ewell’s  corps.  Hill’s  corps  moved  in  the  night  of  the  21st, 
taking  a  route  west  of  the  Telegraph  road,  probably  passing 
through  Childsburg  and  crossing  the  North  Anna  at  Ander¬ 
son’s  bridge,  near  Beaver  Dam  Station.  It  united  with  the 


124  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


other  corps  at  Hanover  Junction  evidently  not  later  than  the 
morning  of  the  23d. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  21st  General  Hill  returned  to  the 
command  of  his  corps ;  and  General  Early  resumed  com¬ 
mand  of  his  division  on  the  morning  of  the  22d. 

General  Gordon  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  John¬ 
son’s  division,  to  which  his  own  brigade,  now  commanded  by 
Brigadier-General  Evans,  wTas  transferred.  Hoke’s  brigade, 
now  commanded  by  Colonel  Lewis,  joined  General  Early’s 
division  at  the  Junction  on  the  22d,  coming  from  Peters¬ 
burg.  Its  effective  force  is  put  down  by  Colonel  Taylor, 
Adjutant-General  of  Lee’s  army,  at  1,200. 

The  effective  total  of  infantry  with  General  Breckinridge 
was,  most  probably,  2,500.  Having  defeated  General  Sigel 
on  the  15th  of  May  at  New  Market,  in  the  Shenandoah  Val¬ 
ley,  with  severe  loss,  and  that  officer  having  retreated  behind 
Cedar  Creek,  General  Breckinridge,  by  General  Lee’s  direc¬ 
tion,  after  sending  off  his  temporary  force  and  leaving  Gen¬ 
eral  Imboden  with  his  mounted  infantry  to  look  after  the 
Valley,  brought  his  two  infantry  brigades  by  railroad  from 
Staunton  to  Hanover  Junction,  arriving  there  on  the  20th 
of  May. 

General  Pickett,  with  his  division,  had  also  arrived  at  the 
Junction,  his  effective  total  being,  according  to  the  best  in¬ 
formation,  5,000. 1 


1  Respecting  the  strength  of  Pickett’s  division  when  it  rejoined  Longstreet’s 
corps  at  this  time,  Badeau  states  that  Pickett’s  Division  Return  for  November 
27,  1863,  shows  his  present  for  duty  at  that  time  to  have  been  9,162,  and  then 
adds  some  information  concerning  the  division  subsequent  to  that  time,  indicat¬ 
ing  the  probability  of  its  not  being  materially  less  than  that  number  when  it 
rejoined  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  Hanover  Junction.  I  can  find  no 
Return  of  Pickett’s  division  of  the  27th  of  November,  1863,  or  for  any  day  of  No¬ 
vember  of  that  year,  in  the  Confederate  Archives  Office,  nor  for  any  date  subse¬ 
quent  to  November,  indicating  such  strength.  His  Return  of  his  division  for 
September,  1863,  gives  for  its  effective  total  4,419.  There  is,  however,  in  the 
Confederate  Archives  Office,  a  Return  by  General  Pickett  of  the  Department  of 
North  Carolina  for  November  27,  1863,  in  which  the  present  for  duty  of  all  arms, 


MOVEMENT  TO  THE  NORTH  ANNA  RIVER.  125 


General  Bntler  having  at  this  time  withdrawn  to  his  in- 
trenchments  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  in  the  forks  of  the  James 
and  Appomattox  rivers,  General  Beauregard  having  a  short 
line  of  intrenchments  in  Butler’s  front,  running  from  river 
to  river,  was  able  to  send  General  Pickett’s  division  to 
General  Lee.  Lee’s  reinforcements  at  Hanover  Junction, 
according  to  this  statement,  amounted  to  8,700  muskets  and 
probably  600  officers. 

Shortly  after  sending  General  Pickett  to  General  Lee, 
General  Beauregard  sent  General  Hoke’s  division  to  him. 
It  joined  General  Lee  at  Cold  Harbor  with  an  effective  total 
of  infantry  (enlisted  men)  a  little  less  than  6,000,  according 
to  Colonel  Walter  H.  Taylor. 

Warren’s  cavalry  outpost  at  Lebanon  Church,  near  Madi¬ 
son’s  store,  or  ordinary,  had  heard  the  noise  of  troops  passing 
along  the  Telegraph  road  all  night,  and  some  part  of  the 
trains  that  accompany  troops  were  in  view  from  Lebanon 
Church  early  in  the  morning  of  the  22d.  Information  was  re¬ 
ceived  from  the  detachment  sent  by  General  Warren  toward 
Mud  tavern  that  Ewell’s  and  Longstreet’s  corps  had  passed 
over  the  road  in  the  night. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  22d  General  Warren  was  di¬ 
rected  to  move  as  soon  as  the  Sixth  Corps  was  up  to  him,  by 
way  of  Madison’s  ordinary  and  Nancy  Wright’s  to  Harris’s 
store,  and  halt  there  for  the  night.  Harris’s  store  is  near 
the  Telegraph  road  and  on  the  cross-road  from  Childsburg 
to  Milford.  General  Wright  was  directed  to  move  to  Madi¬ 
son’s  ordinary  as  soon  as  his  corps  rested ;  General  Burnside 
to  resume  his  march  at  ten  o’clock,  cross  the  Mattapony  at 
Downer’s  bridge,  and  take  the  road  running  from  that  bridge 


officers  and  enlisted  men,  is  9,192.  General  Pickett  commanded  the  Department 
at  that  time.  Only  one  of  his  brigades  was  included  in  the  Return  of  that  De¬ 
partment.  Can  Badeau  have  mistaken  this  Return  for  a  Return  of  Pickett's  Di¬ 
vision  ? 


126  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  '64  AND  ’65. 


•  _ 
to  Hanover  Junction,  halting  at  New  Bethel  Church,  where 

there  is  a  cross-road  running  past  Madison’s  ordinary  to 

Bowling  Green. 

General  Hancock  was  directed  to  remain  at  Milford  during 
the  22d.  By  this  arrangement,  on  the  night  of  the  22d  the 
four  corps  were  at  points  three  or  four  miles  distant  from 
each  other.  Communication  was  kept  up  between  them 
during  the  day. 

Upon  arriving  at  Madison’s  ordinary  General  Warren  trans¬ 
ferred  part  of  his  corps  to  the  Telegraph  road,  the  other 
part  taking  a  road  one  mile  east  of  and  parallel  with  it. 
Stragglers  of  the  enemy’s  infantry  were  picked  up.  The 
rear  of  Longstreet’s  corps  was  reported  to  be  but  three 
miles  distant.  At  one  o’clock  p.m.  Rosser’s  cavalry  brigade 
was  encountered  at  the  crossing  of  the  Mat  River  near  Dr. 
Flipper’s. 

The  enemy’s  cavalry  pickets  hung  about  Hancock  during 
the  day,  and  one  body  of  them  was  at  Athens,  about  three 
miles  distant. 

Upon  leaving  Spottsylvania  Court  House  the  character  of 
the  country  in  great  part  changed.  It  was  now  open  and 
well  cultivated,  but  there  were  still  extensive  woods,  with 
thick  undergrowth  and  swamps. 

The  chief  object  of  Hancock’s  circuitous  movement  was 
not  accomplished. 1  There  would  probably  have  been  more 
chance  of  success  had  Hancock  moved  by  the  Telegraph 

1  It  has  been  already  stated  that  the  distance  from  the  right  of  Lee’s  intrench- 
ments  on  the  Po  to  Hanover  Junction  by  the  Telegraph  road  is  twenty-eight 
miles,  measured  on  the  map. 

From  the  position  of  the  Second  Corps  at  Anderson’s  mill  on  the  Ny  by  the 
Telegraph  road  to  Hanover  Junction  is,  by  the  map,  twenty-five  miles;  by  Han¬ 
cock’s  route  through  Bowling  Green  to  Hanover  Junction,  the  distance  is  thirty- 
four  miles. 

From  the  positions  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House, 
by  way  of  Guinea  Station  and  then  by  the  Telegraph  road  to  Hanover  Junction, 
the  distance  is  thirty  miles. 


MOVEMENT  TO  THE  NORTH  ANNA  RIVER.  127 


road  on  the  night  of  the  20th,  followed  by  Warren  ;  the 
Sixth  and  Ninth  Corps  to  be  moved  subsequently  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  developments  of  the  Second  and  Fifth  Corps  : 
that  would  perhaps  have  brought  on  a  collision  before  Lee 
could  intrench  on  new  ground. 

At  9.30  a.m.  of  the  22d  General  Lee  telegraphed  from 
Hanover  Junction  to  Richmond :  “I  have  arrived  at  this 
place  with  the  head  of  Ewell’s  corps.  Longstreet  is  close 
up.  Hill  I  expect  to  come  on  my  right,  but  I  have  not 
heard  from  him  since  I  left  him  last  night.  I  have  learned 
as  yet  nothing  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy  east  of  the 
Mattapony.”  But  it  could  not  have  been  much  after  mid¬ 
day  of  the  22d  when  General  Lee  received  information  from 
his  cavalry  of  our  advance  toward  the  North  Anna  by  the 
Telegraph  and  other  roads  west  of  the  Mattapony,1  and  be¬ 
gan  to  dispose  his  force  to  meet  our  attempt  to  cross  it. 

On  the  night'of  the  22d  Lee  was  at  Hanover  Junction  with 
two  of  his  corps  (the  third  joining  him  the  next  morning), 
while  the  leading  corps  of  Meade’s  army  were  fifteen  miles 
distant  from  it,  the  other  two  nineteen  miles. 

On  the  night  of  the  22d  General  Grant  directed  General 
Meade  to  hold  the  army  in  readiness  to  move  at  5  a.m.  on 
the  23d,  each  corps  to  send  at  that  hour  the  cavalry  detach¬ 
ments  serving  with  it,  with  some  infantry,  on  all  the  roads  in 
the  front  leading  south,  and  ascertain,  if  possible,  where  the 
enemy  was.  Similar  instructions  were  given  to  the  Ninth 
Corps.  The  corps  were  to  follow  their  reconn oitering 
parties.  If  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the 
North  Anna,  the  army  would  follow ;  the  Second  Corps 
would  move  to  Chesterfield  ford  (near  the  Fredericksburg 
andBichmond  Railroad  bridge) ;  the  Ninth  Corps  to  Jericho 


1  General  Bratton,  whose  brigade  was  the  rear  guard  of  Longstreet’s  corps, 
states  that  he  crossed  the  North  Anna  (by  the  Telegraph  road  bridge)  at  sunset  of 
the  22d. 


128  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


bridge  ;  the  Fifth  Corps  to  a  point  on  the  river  west  of 
Jericho  bridge.  There  were  but  two  roads  leading  south 
marked  on  our  maps,  and  corps  commanders  were  directed 
to  seek  for  plantation  or  other  roads  so  as  to  facilitate  our 
movements.  Our  maps  were  erroneous  in  many  places,  but 
especially  so  in  the  vicinity  of  the  North  Anna.  What  was 
marked  as  Jericho  bridge  was  really  Jericho  mills.  The 
bridge  across  the  North  Anna  was  where  the  Telegraph  road 
crossed  it,  four  miles  below  Jericho  mills  and  about  half  a 
mile  above  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad  bridge.  Chesterfield 
ford  was  at  the  site  of  the  Telegraph  road  bridge.  These 
map-errors  led  to  but  little  delay  or  embarrassment.  The 
general  intention  of  the  order  was  apparent,  and  the  corps 
commanders  arranged  their  troops  in  accordance  with  that. 
The  Sixth  Corps  followed  the  Fifth  on  the  Telegraph  road, 
that  being  found  the  better  arrangement.  The  Ninth  Corps 
used  in  part  plantation  roads  between  those  followed  by  the 
Second  and  Fifth  Corps. 

Rosser’s  cavalry  kept  in  front  of  the  Fifth  Corps  up  to  the 
vicinity  of  the  North  Anna. 

General  Warren  arrived  at  Mount  Carmel  Church  about 
eleven  a.m.,  and  from  that  point  moved  to  Jericho  mills, 
about  three  miles  distant,  so  as  to  give  place  for  the  Second 
Corps  in  its  movement  to  Chesterfield  ford  (bridge  over  the 
North  Anna).  At  Jericho  mills  no  enemy  was  visible  on  the  op¬ 
posite  bank,  and  to  secure  the  crossing-place  Bartlett’s  bri¬ 
gade  waded  over  and  formed  on  the  opposite  bank,  encounter¬ 
ing  only  a  few  of  the  enemy’s  pickets.  The  banks  of  the  river 
were  high  and  precipitous  and  the  road  on  both  sides  very 
rough,  consisting  of  a  series  of  rocky  steps.  The  laying  of 
a  ponton  bridge  was  at  once  commenced.  Upon  receiving 
this  information,  General  Meade,  with  the  sanction  of  Gen¬ 
eral  Grant,  directed  General  Warren  to  cross  the  river  with 
his  whole  corps.  By  4.30  p.m.  all  the  infantry  was  over, 


MOVEMENT  TO  THE  NORTH  ANNA  RIVER.  129 


Crawford’s  division  wading  across  while  Cutler’s  was  passing 
on  the  ponton  bridge.  Artillery  followed  the  infantry.  It 
was  learnt  that  Hill’s  corps  was  near  at  hand,  partially  in¬ 
trenched  on  the  Central  Railroad.  Line  of  battle  was  formed 
about  half  a  mile  from  the  river,  on  the  edge  of  a  wood  next 
to  the  river,  the  front  being  covered  by  the  wood.  On  the 
right  there  was  open  ground,  and  here  artillery  was  posted. 

Crawford  was  on  the  left,  resting  near  the  river ;  Griffin  in 

* 

the  centre  ;  and  Cutler  on  the  right.  Cutler  was  still  going 
into  position  when,  at  about  six  o’clock,  Hill  attacked  the 
centre  and  right  of  Warren’s  line  ;  the  attack  was  heaviest  on 
Cutler,  whose  troops  on  the  right  not  having  formed,  broke 
and  were  followed  by  the  enemy,  but  the  artillery  drove 
them  back,  and  being  repulsed  on  Griffin’s  front  they  fell 
back  to  the  railroad,  having  suffered  considerable  loss,  es¬ 
pecially  in  prisoners.  The  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was 
probably  equal  on  both  sides. 

The  head  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  at  Mount  Carmel  Church 
when  the  action  began,  and  the  corps  moved  at  once  to  the 
support  of  General  Warren,  but  did  not  cross  the  river  until 
the  morning  of  the  24th,  as  it  was  not  deemed  necessary. 
The  Fifth  Corps  intrenched  during  the  night. 

At  eleven  a.m.  of  the  23d  General  Hancock  reported  from 
Old  Chesterfield  (about  four  miles  from  the  North  Anna,  at 
the  railroad  and  Telegraph  road  bridges)  that  part  of  his  in¬ 
fantry  had  passed  that  point,  moving  toward  those  bridges,  his 
First  Division  massed  at  Old  Chesterfield  and  the  rest  coming 
up.  In  accordance  with  his  instructions,  advancing,  he  took 
position  on  the  north  bank  about  a  mile  from  the  river,  his 
right  across  the  Telegraph  road,  his  left  across  the  Freder¬ 
icksburg  Railroad ;  Birney  on  the  right,  Barlow  in  the 
centre,  and  Gibbon  on  the  left.  The  enemy  were  seen  in 
force  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  moving  in  column. 
They  had  batteries  in  position  on  the  high  southern  bank  of 
6* 


130  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


the  river,  as  well  as  infantry  intrenchments.  On  the  north 
side  they  had  intrenchments  covering  the  Telegraph  road 
bridge,  and  on  the  south  side,  close  to  both  bridges,  similar 
works.  The  bridge-head  works  were  held  in  force  by  a  part 
of  Kershaw’s  division.  After  examining  them  General  Bir- 
ney  was  of  opinion  they  could  be  taken,  and  about  six  o’clock 
General  Hancock  directed  him  to  make  the  attempt.  The 
force  sent,  Egan’s  and  Pierce’s  brigade  of  Birney’s  division, 
had  to  advance  several  hundred  yards  over  open  ground  as¬ 
cending  to  the  river  bank  under  artillery  and  infantry  fire, 
which  they  did  in  a  spirited  manner  carrying  the  works  and 
capturing  some  of  the  enemy,  the  rest  being  driven  over  the 
river.  The  bridge  was  taken  possession  of,  and  the  attempts 
of  the  enemy  to  burn  it  during  the  night  were  frustrated. 
The  south  end  of  the  railroad  bridge  was,  however,  held  by 
them  throughout  the  night,  and  that  end  was  burnt. 

General  Burnside  had  been  directed  to  take  position  on 
the  right  of  Hancock,  seize  Ox  ford,  which  was  about  a  mile 
above  the  Telegraph  road  bridge,  and  hold  it  if  practicable. 
But  on  his  approach  to  the  ford  it  was  found  to  be  in  the 
possession  of  the  enemy,  who  at  this  point  were  strongly  in¬ 
trenched  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river,  and  in  heavy  force. 

Oh  the  morning  of  the  24th  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  in 
front  of  the  Second  Corps  had  abandoned  his  advanced 
works  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river,  and  General  Hancock 
crossed  and  occupied  them.  Upon  examining  the  enemy’s 
position  it  was  seen  that  in  this  part  of  the  field  he  held  a 
strongly  intrenched  line,  having  slashing  and  abatis  ;  his 
left  rested  on  the  river  half  a  mile  above  the  bridge,  then  ex¬ 
tended  up  it  to  Ox  ford  ;  his  right  was  several  miles  below 
and  near  the  site  of  Morris’s  bridge,  the  line  being  about 
three  miles  long  and  running  in  a  southeast  direction  along 
the  chord  of  a  bend  in  the  river.  He  had  artillery  in  posi¬ 
tion,  and  traverses  were  being  added  where  the  line  was  ex- 


MOVEMENT  TO  THE  NORTH  ANNA  RIVER.  131 

I 

posed  to  enfilade  or  reverse  fire.  Ewell’s  corps  was  on  the 
right,  Longstreet’s  on  the  left.  The  Second  Corps  advanced 
and  intrenched  within  six  or  eight  hundred  yards  of  this 
line.  About  six  o’clock  in  the  evening  Smyth’s  brigade  of 
Gibbon’s  division,  which  was  on  his  left,  became  briskly  en¬ 
gaged,  the  enemy  pressing  Gibbon’s  outposts  but  gaining  no 
material  advantage.  Barlow’s  division  was  got  ready  to  at¬ 
tack,  but  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  were  found  to  be  so 
strong  that  the  design  was  abandoned.  Potter’s  division  of 
the  Ninth  Corps  was  sent  to  Hancock  and  occupied  the  right 
of  his  line. 

General  Burnside  was  ordered  on  the  morning  of  the  24th 
to  carry  Ox  ford  and  cross  with  his  corps  to  the  south  side 
of  the  river,  but  found  the  enemy  so  strongly  intrenched  on 
the  south  bank  at  this  point  that  he  did  not  attack.  Crit¬ 
tenden’s  division  crossed  the  river  at  Quarles’s  mill  (about  a 
mile  and  a  half  above  Ox  ford),  where  he  found  General 
Crawford  with  his  division.  These  two  advanced  toward 
the  enemy’s  position  at  Ox  ford,  with  a  view  to  carrying  it 
and  enabling  General  Willcox  to  cross  there  ;  but  the 
enemy  were  found  too  strongly  posted  and  in  too  strong 
force,  and  these  two  divisions,  after  a  brief  encounter,  with¬ 
drew.  Part  of  Griffin’s  division  and  part  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
were  thrown  forward  to  the  railroad. 

The  next  morning,  the  25tli,  the  Fifth  Corps  (with  Crit¬ 
tenden’s  division,  which  was  placed  under  General  Warren’s 
orders)  and  the  Sixth  Corps  were  thrown  forward  to  within 
six  or  eight  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy’s  line,  which  was 
found  to  run  south  from  Ox  ford  to  Anderson’s  mill  on 
Little  River,  a  distance  of  about  a  mile  and  a  half.  It  had 
been  partially  developed  the  day  before  by  Crawford.  It 
was  well  intrenched  and  traversed  throughout,  as  it  was  ex¬ 
posed  to  enfilade  and  reverse  fire  from  the  high  ground  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  North  Anna,  upon  which  General 


132  THE  VIRGINIA.  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Willcox  established  some  batteries.  This  part  of  Lee’s  line 
was  held  by  Hill’s  corps  and  Pickett’s  division. 

The  position  of  Lee’s  army,  we  now  soe,  was  well  chosen. 
With  its  left  resting  on  Little  River,  the  line  ran  north  in 
open  ground  to  the  North  Anna  at  Ox  ford,  extended  along 
the  river  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  and  then  ran  in  a  south¬ 
east  direction  to  the  river  at  the  site  of  Morris’s  bridge. 
His  army  was  concentrated.  The  two  parts  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  were  not  only  widely  separated,  with  only  a 
division  between  them,  but  the  river  Jiad  to  be  crossed 
twice  to  reinforce  one  part  from  the  other.  Lee  could  re¬ 
inforce  a  point  attacked  in  one-tliird  of  the  time  that  Meade 
could  reinforce  at  the  same  point.  Some  persons,  indeed, 
have  thought  that  Lee  should  have  left  a  small  part  of  his 
force  to  hold  the  intrenchments  of  his  left  and  attacked 

Hancock  with  the  rest  of  his  armv.  But  Hancock  was  in- 

«/ 

trenched,  and  Lee  knew  well  the  advantage  that  gave,  and 
he  could  not  afford  the  loss  that  he  would  have  inevitably 
suffered  in  such  an  attack.  It  was  only  by  surprise  at  some 
exposed  point  that  he  could  afford  to  attack.  Hancock’s 
force,  including  Potter’s  division,  did  not  probably  exceed 
24,000  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  infantry.  Leaving  7,000 
to  hold  the  west  face  of  his  intrenchments  and  the  apex  on 
the  river,  Lee  might  have  attacked  Hancock  with  about 
36,000  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  infantry ;  but  intrench¬ 
ments  make  up  for  greater  differences  than  that  in  numbers.1 

1  Colonel  Venable,  an  officer  of  General  Lee’s  staff,  in  his  address  at  the  Lee 
Memorial  Meeting  in  Richmond  on  the  3d  of  November,  1870,  said  that  at  this 
period  General  Lee  was  constantly  seeking  an  opportunity  to  attack  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  ;  that  he  hoped  to  strike  the  blow  at  the  North  Anna,  or  between  the 
Annas  and  the  Chickahominy ;  that  he  hoped  much  from  the  attack  on  Warren’s 
corps  at  Jericho  ford,  where  it  was  in  a  hazardous  position,  separated  from  the 
rest  of  the  army  ;  that  General  Hill  also  was  sanguine  of  success  in  this  attack  ; 
but  that  the  main  plan  miscarried  through  some  mishap,  though  one  or  two  minor 
successes  on  the  left  flank,  notably  the  one  by  Mahone’s  division,  were  effected. 

Colonel  Walter  H.  Taylor,  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  CAVALRY  CORPS. 


133 


The  strength  of  Lee’s  position  was  such  that  it  was 
determined  to  continue  the  movement  by  the  left  flank,  a 
movement  in  that  direction  being  considered,  under  the  ex¬ 
isting  conditions,  preferable  to  that  by  the  right  flank. 

During  the  25th  and  26th  portions  of  the  Central  and 
Fredericksburg  railroads  were  broken  up,  and  on  the  26th 
General  Wilson,  with  his  cavalry  division,  was  sent  across  the 
North  Anna  to  demonstrate  on  our  right,  and  also  to  aid  in 
the  destruction  of  the  Central  Railroad.  The  movements  of 
his  division  gave  General  Lee  the  impression,  as  it  was  de¬ 
signed  it  should,  that  it  was  contemplated  to  move  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  by  its  right  flank. 

According  to  the  report  of  Medical  Director  McParlin,  the 
wounded  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  21st  to  the 
26th  of  May,  both  days  included,  numbered  2,100,  that  being 
the  number  sent  from  Port  Royal  on  the  Rappahannock 
River  to  the  hospitals  in  Washington.* 1 

General  Benham,  at  Washington,  was  directed  on  the  26th 
of  May  to  proceed  to  Fort  Monroe  with  all  his  bridge-equi¬ 
page  and  materiel  and  be  ready  to  move  up  the  James 
River. 

General  Sheridan  returned  with  the  Cavalry  Corps  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  24th  of  May. 

In  compliance  with  his  instructions  of  the  8th  of  May  to 
concentrate  his  available  mounted  force  and  proceed  against 


also  says  of  this  period  that  if  General  Lee’s  army  had  been  of  even  reasonable 
proportion  in  comparison  with  that  of  his  adversary,  his  movement  would  have 
been  of  another  character  than  that  of  moving  parallel  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  one  of  the  two  wings  of  the  Federal  Army  would  have  been  assailed 
while  on  the  south  side  of  the  river. 

1  The  tabular  statement,  however,  of  the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  Ninth  Corps  during  that  time,  in  Part  First,  Medical  and  Surgical  History  of 
the  War,  does  not  altogether  agree  with  McParlin’s  report,  though  he  mentions 
this  tabular  statement.  The  dates  are  also  different.  Surgeon  McParlin’s  re¬ 
port  is,  I  believe,  correct.  The  tabular  statement  is,  from  the  23d  to  the  27th  of 
May,  223  killed,  1,460  wounded,  290  missing. 


134  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

the  enemy’s  cavalry,  replenish  his  supplies  at  Haxall’s  Land¬ 
ing  from  General  Butler’s  stores,  and  return  to  the  army, 
he  concentrated  in  the  vicinity  of  Aldrich’s,  on  the  Orange 
and  Fredericksburg  plank  road,  and,  on  the  morning  of  the 
9th,  moved  on  the  Telegraph  road  past  the  right  of  Lee’s 
army  to  cross  the  North  Anna,  and  get  out  of  the  reach 
of  Lee’s  infantry  before  encountering  Stewart’s  cavalry. 
Passing  through  Childsburg,  his  leading  division,  Merritt’s, 
crossed  the  North  Anna  at  Anderson’s  ford  by  dark.  Gor¬ 
don’s  (James  B.)  brigade  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  cavalry  division 
overtook  his  rear  guard,  Davies’  brigade,  Gregg’s  division, 
south  of  the  Ta  Biver,  and  continued  in  contact  with  Gregg’s 
and  Wilson’s  divisions  uhtil  a  late  hour,  these  divisions  halt¬ 
ing  for  the  night  on  the  north  side  of  the  North  Anna. 

Custer’s  brigade  was  sent  to  Beaver  Dam  Station,  on  the 
Virginia  Central  Railroad,  where,  on  the  10th,  it  destroyed 
ten  miles  of  the  road,  locomotives,  cars,  and  a  large  amount 
of  army  supplies,  and  recaptured  375  prisoners  taken  from 
us  at  the  Wilderness,  who  were  on  their  way  to  Richmond. 

•  On  the  10th  Sheridan  crossed  the  South  Anna  at  Ground 
Squirrel  bridge,  halting  for  the  night  on  the  south  bank. 

'  Gordon’s  brigade  of  Stewart’s  cavalry  clung  to  Gregg’s 
and  Wilson’s  divisions  while  they  were  crossing  the  North 
Anna  in  the  morning,  and  until  they  entered  the  Negro  Foot 
road,  about  five  miles  before  reaching  Ground  Squirrel 
bridge.  General  Fitzliugh  Tree’s  cavalry  division,  composed 
of  Wickham’s  and  Lomax’s  brigades,  had,  during  all  this 
time,  been  moving  by  a  circuitous  route  to  interpose  be¬ 
tween  Sheridan  and  Richmond. 

On  the  night  of  the  10th  Davies’  brigade  was  sent  to 
Ashland,  on  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad,  where  it  arrived 
at  daylight  before  the  Confederate  cavalry,  drove  out  some 
force  there,  destroyed  the  d^pot,  several  miles  of  the  road, 
a  train  and  a  large  amount  of  stores,  and  rejoined  the  main 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  CAVALRY  CORPS.  135 

body  at  Allen’s  Station.  There  it  was  ascertained  that 
Stewart  was  concentrating  at  the  Yellow  tavern  on  the  Brook 
pike,  six  miles  from  Richmond,  and  Sheridan’s  whole  force 
moved  on  that  point,  Merritt  in  advance,  Wilson  next,  then 
Gregg.  Sheridan  was  advancing  in  a  southeast  direction  on 
the  Mountain  road,  which  intersects  the  Brook  pike  at  Yel¬ 
low  tavern,  and,  upon  arriving  at  the  intersection,  formed  be¬ 
tween  that  road  and  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad.  Stewart 
was  formed  at  the  intersection  of  the  Brook  pike  and  Moun¬ 
tain  road,  facing  west  or  north  of  west.  Merritt  attacked 
and  gained  the  Brook  pike,  but  Stewart  got  a  position  on 
his  flank  and  enfiladed  his  line  with  artillery.  Then  Custer 
charged  this  flanking  force,  Wilson  supporting  him,  and 
captured  their  artillery,  two  guns,  with  their  gunners,  and 
broke  their  line.  Stewart’s  detached  force  under  Gordon 
now  attacked  Sheridan  in  rear,  but  Gregg  drove  it  toward 
Ashland  and  across  the  north  fork  of  the  Chickahominy ; 
Fitzhugh  Lee’s  division  fell  back  toward  Richmond. 

The  casualties  on  both  sides  were  severe,  and  especially 
on  the  Confederate  side,  their  brilliant  cavalry  commander, 
General  Stewart,  being  mortally  wounded,  and  Brigadier- 
General  James  B.  Gordon  killed. 

Following  up  the  part  of  Stewart’s  force  that  fell  back 
toward  Richmond,  General  Sheridan  crossed  Brook  Run 
aad  entered  the  most  advanced  line  of  intrenchments.  In- 
tending  to  keep  south  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  passing  by 
Fair  Oaks,  to  make  a  demonstration  in  favor  of  General 
Butler,  who,  he  was  informed,  was  on  the  south  side  of  the 
James  four  miles  from  Richmond,  he  massed  his  force  at 
daylight  of  the  12th  on  the  plateau  at  Meadow  bridge. 
Some  force  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  held  the  north  bank  at 
the  bridge,  which  had  been  so  injured  as  to  be  impassable. 
Merritt’s  division  repaired  it,  crossed  and  followed  up  the 
other  side  to  Gaines’s  mill. 


136  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

On  the  Mechanicsville  road  the  defensive  works  of  Rich¬ 
mond  extended  ont  close  to  the  Chickahominy,  and  Wilson 
found  that  he  could  not  pass  them.  Two  brigades  of  in¬ 
fantry,  Barton’s  and  Gracie’s,  with  some  dismounted  cavalry, 
advanced  from  these  works,  and  in  conjunction  with  their 
artillery  attacked  Wilson  and  Gregg,  and  at  first  with  suc¬ 
cess,  but  finally  they  were  forced  to  withdraw  within  their 
lines,  and  Wilson  and  Gregg  crossed  the  Chickahominy 
above  the  Mechanicsville  bridge.  The  corps  encamped  for 
the  night  between  Walnut  Grove  and  Gaines’s  mill.  Cross¬ 
ing  to  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy  at  Bottom  bridge 
the  next  day,  General  Sheridan  reached  the  vicinity  of  Hax- 
all’s  Landing  on  the  14th  of  May,  and  remained  there  until 
the  17th. 

The  casualties  on  our  part  in  this  operation  were  425 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  I  have  not  been  able  to  find 
any  Confederate  report  or  account  of  it  or  of  their  losses. 
In  returning  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  by  way  of  the 
White  House, 1  Custer  was  sent  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridges 
over  the  South  Anna  and  Gregg  to  Cold  Harbor  to  cover 
Custer’s  operations.  But  on  the  way  to  Hanover  Court 
House  Custer  encountered  so  large  a  force  of  infantry,  ap¬ 
parently  on  the  march  to  join  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir¬ 
ginia,  that  he  was  unable  to  accomplish  the  task,  and  they 
both  returned  to  General  Sheridan,  who,  as  before  stated, 
rejoined  the  army  on  the  24th  of  May. 

1  The  White  House  is  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Pamunkey  River,  where  the 
Richmond  and  York  River  Railroad  crosses  it. 


CHAPTER  Y. 


THE  CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
JAMES.— THE  BATTLE  OF  DRURY’S  BLUFF. 

The  Army  of  the  James  was  composed  of  the  Tenth  and 
Eighteenth  Corps,  commanded  respectively  by  Major-Gen¬ 
erals  Q.  A.  Gillmore  and  Wm.  F.  Smith,  and  a  cavalry  divi¬ 
sion  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  A.  V.  Kautz.  The 
Tenth  Corps,  drawn  from  the  troops  in  South  Carolina,  con¬ 
sisted  of  three  divisions  commanded  by  Brigadier-Generals 
Terry,  Turner,  and  Ames,  and  numbered,  present  for  duty, 
684  officers  and  16,128  enlisted  men  of  infantry,  and  36 
officers  and  1,078  enlisted  men  of  artillery,  with  44  guns  and 
2  siege  howitzers. 

The  Eighteenth  Corps  consisted  of  three  divisions  com¬ 
manded  by  Brigadier-Generals  Brooks,  Weitzel,  and  Hinks', 
and  numbered,  present  for  duty,  653  officers  and  14,325  en¬ 
listed  men  of  infantry,  and  25  officers  and  987  enlisted  men 
of  artillery,  with  36  guns.  Hinks’s  division  was  composed 
of  colored  troops.  Butler’s  infantry  force  was  therefore 
1,329  officers  and  30,543  enlisted  men  of  infantry,  with  82 
guns  served  by  61  officers  and  2,065  enlisted  men  of  artil¬ 
lery. 

Kautz’s  cavalry  numbered  97  officers  and  2,804  enlisted 
men,  with  6  guns.  There  was  also  a  brigade  of  colored  cav¬ 
alry  under  Colonel  West,  some  1,800  strong. 

General  Butler  had  been  instructed  by  Lieutenant-General 
Grant  that  Richmond  was  his  objective  point ;  that  he  was 


138  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


to  move  at  the  same  time  as  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  take 
City  Point  and  that  vicinity ;  intrench,  concentrate  all  his 
troops  for  the  field  there  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  operate 
on  the  south  side  of  the  James  against  Richmond,  holding 
dose  to  the  south  bank  of  the  river  as  he  advanced,  and 
using  every  exertion  to  secure  a  footing  as  far  up  the  river  as 
possible  ;  that  his  army  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were 
to  co-operate.  Should  General  Lee  fall  back  upon  Rich¬ 
mond,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  unite  with  the  Army 
of  the  James.  If  he,  Butler,  should  be  able  to  invest  Rich¬ 
mond  on  the  south  side  so  as  to  rest  his  left  upon  the  James 
above  the  city,  the  junction  of  the  two  armies  would  prefer¬ 
ably  take  place  there.  Under  any  circumstances  it  might  be 
advisable  to  make  the  junction  there,  and  if  he,  General 
Butler,  should  hear  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  ad¬ 
vancing  in  that  direction,  or  have  reason  to  believe  from  the 
action  of  the  enemy  that  they  apprehended  danger  from  that 
quarter,  then  he  was  to  attack  vigorously,  and  if  he  could 
not  carry  the  city  he  would,  at  least,  be  able  to  detain  a 
considerable  force  of  the  enemy  there. 

On  the  28  th  of  April  Butler  was  directed  to  move  on  the 
night  of  the  4th  of  May,  so  as  to  be  far  up  the  James  River 
by  daylight  of  the  5th  ;  and  to  push  from  that  time  with  all 
his  might  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  object  before  him. 

The  two  infantry  corps  of  Butler’s  army  were  concentrated 
at  Yorktown  and  Gloucester,  on  the  York  River,  when  the 
time  for  movement  was  near  at  hand,  in  order  to  give  the 
impression  that  he  was  to  advance  upon  Richmond  on  the 
line  taken  by  General  McClellan  in  1862. 

On  the  night  of  the  4th  of  May  they  embarked  on  trans¬ 
ports,  and  descending  the  York  River  moved  up  the  James 
early  on  the  5th,  convoyed  by  Rear-Admiral  S.  P.  Lee’s  fleet 
of  five  armored  ships  and  a  large  number  of  gunboats.  On 
the  afternoon  of  the  5th  the  fleet  of  transports  reached  Ber- 


MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  JAMES.  139 


muda  Hundred  Neck,  at  tlie  confluence  of  the  Janies  and 
Appomattox  rivers,  and  by  morning  of  the  6th  of  May  the 
troops  had  disembarked. 

Brigadier-General  Wilde’s  brigade  of  colored  troops  had 
landed  at  Fort  Powhatan,  on  the  south  bank  of  the  James, 
and  at  Wilson’s  wharf,  some  five  miles  below,  on  the  north 
bank.  General  Hink’s  division  of  colored  troops  (of  which 
General  Wilde’s  brigade  was  a  part)  landed  at  City  Point,  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Appomattox,  on  the  south  side.  His  divi¬ 
sion  "was  about  5,000  strong. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  May  Colonel  West,  with  his 
colored  brigade,  moved  up  the  Peninsula  to  cross  the  Chick- 
ahominy  and  unite  with  General  Butler,  which  he  accom¬ 
plished. 

On  the  same  morning  General  Kautz  set  out  from  Suffolk 
to  cut  the  Petersburg  and  Weldon  Railroad  at  the  crossings 
of  the  Nottoway  River,  Stony  Creek,  and  Rowanty  Creek, 
with  a  view  to  delay  the  arrival  at  Richmond  of  troops  on 
their  way  from  the  South,  as  well  as  to  seriously  impair  the 
roads  as  lines  of  supply  to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  the  troops  on  Bermuda  Hun¬ 
dred  Neck  advanced  some  six  miles  from  their  landing-place, 
and  taking  up  a  position  at  a  narrow  part  of  the  neck,  three 
miles  across,  with  their  right  on  the  James,  at  Trent’s  reach, 
and  their  left  on  the  Appomattox,  near  Port  Walthall,  in¬ 
trenched  there,  Smith  on  the  right,  Gillmore  on  the  left. 
About  two  and  a  half  miles  in  front  of  this  line  was  the  Rich¬ 
mond  and  Petersburg  Railroad,  and  running  near  it  the 
pike  between  those  towns.  A  brigade  was  sent  out  to  these 
roads,  which  returned  to  the  main  body  after  having  encoun¬ 
tered  some  force  of  the  enemy  at  Port  Walthall  Junction, 
about  six  miles  from  Petersburg  and  sixteen  from  Rich¬ 
mond.  This  force  was  a  part  of  Brigadier-General  Hagood’s 
South  Carolina  brigade,  which  had  just  arrived  from  South 


140  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Carolina,  having  been  halted  at  that  point  by  General  Pick¬ 
ett,  who  still  remained  in  command  at  Petersburg. 

The  defensive  works  of  Richmond  consisted  of  a  series  of 
field  forts  encircling  the  city  at  a  distance  from  it  varying 
from  a  mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half.  Outside  of  these,  on  the 
north  side  of  the  James,  there  was  a  connected  enveloping 
line  of  batteries  and  infantry  intrenchments,  in  most  places 
a  mile  beyond  the  forts,  in  others  one  and  a  half  or  two 
miles  beyond  them.  This  line  crossed  the  James  two  and  a 
half  miles  below  Richmond,  and  then  extended  westerly  to 
within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  river  above  the  city.  Beyond 
this  again  there  was,  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  a  discon¬ 
nected  line  of  intrenchments,  part  of  which  was  occupied  in 
1862,  varying  in  distance  from  the  line  already  described 
from  half  a  mile  to  three  miles.  It  abutted  on  the  James  at 
Chapin’s  Bluff,  some  seven  miles  by  the  road  below  the  city. 

At  Chapin’s  Bluff  and  the  bluff  a  little  higher  up  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  James  (Drury’s)  were  the  batteries,  with 
sea-coast  guns,  to  oppose  the  passage  of  the  river. 

There  were  also  several  gunboats  and  torpedo-boats  as¬ 
sembled  for  the  defence  of  the  river,  which  above  the  mouth 
of  the  Appomattox  was  very  narrow,  and  as  high  up  as 
Drury’s  Bluff  very  winding  ;  the  width  above  the  Appomat¬ 
tox  varied  from  six  hundred  to  one  thousand  feet,  in  some 
places  being  even  still  narrower.  The  armored  vessels  of 
Rear-Admiral  Lee’s  fleet  could  not  ascend  above  Trent’s 
Reach,  the  depth  on  its  bar  not  admitting  their  passage. 
The  right  of  Butler’s  army,  intrenched  on  Bermuda  Hundred 
Neck,  rested  on  the  James  just  below  the  bar,  which  was 
some  five  miles  below  Drury’s  Bluff  by  land  and  nine  by 
water. 

Torpedoes  had  been  planted  on  the  bars  of  the  James, 
some  of  them  to  be  exploded  from  the  land,  others  by  con¬ 
tact  with  the  vessel.  Notwithstanding  the  great  care  used 


MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  JAMES.  141 


in  dragging  for  them  as  Admiral  Lee’s  fleet  ascended  the 
river,  the  gunboat  Commodore  Jones  was  destroyed  by  a 
torpedo,  one-half  the  crew  being  killed  and  wounded. 

From  Drury’s  Bluff  a  line  of  intrenchments  extended 
westward  two  and  a  half  miles,  so  as  to  inclose  both  the 
Richmond  and  Petersburg  pike  and  railroad,  and  then  ran 
northerly.  This  line  of  intrenchments  was,  to  use  General 
Gillmore’s  language,  judiciously  located,  and  of  great 
strength  naturally  and  artificially,  with  deep  ditches,  and 
arranged  for  both  artillery  and  infantry.  An  advanced  line 
of  intrenchments,  equally  strong  as  the  one  just  described, 
left  the  interior  line  near  Drury’s  Bluff  and  ran  in  a  south¬ 
west  direction,  crossing  Proctor’s  Creek  at  the  railroad 
crossing  about  a  mile  in  front  of  the  interior  line  and  resting 
its  right  on  Wooldridge’s  Hill. 

For  the  defence  of  Petersburg,  as  early  as  1862,  a  circle  of 
strong  redans  or  batteries,  connected  by  infantry  parapets  of 
high  profile  had  been  erected  some  two  miles  outside  of 
the  city. 

The  troops  for  the  defence  of  these  two  cities  were  few  in 
number  on  the  1st  of  May.  Besides  the  artillery  for  the 
heavy  guns  at  Chapin’s  and  Drury’s  bluffs,  and  the  field  ar¬ 
tillery  of  the  intrenchments  of  Richmond,  the  effective  force 
of  infantry  there  (enlisted  men  present  for  duty)  did  not 
probably  exceed  6,000,  and  in  this  ■  number  is  included 
Hunton’s  brigade  at  Chapin’s  Bluff,  and  Bushrod  Johnson’s 
and  Gracie’s  brigades,  which  I  suppose  to  have  been  there 
by  that  time.  They  were  there,  certainly,  on  the  7th  of 
May,  but  the  information  concerning  the  force  there  on  the 
1st  of  May  is  very  defective.  The  number  6,000  does  not 
include  the  clerks  and  employes  and  others  in  Richmond, 
who  had  been  organized  as  military  companies  to  be  used 
in  exigencies.  At  Petersburg  General  Pickett  had  a  Vir¬ 
ginia  regiment  with  some  artillery,  and,  under  his  command. 


142  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


a  part  of  Clingman’s  North  Carolina  brigade  posted  along 
the  Black  water  to  look  after  any  force  approaching  from 
Norfolk  or  Suffolk.  General  Pickett  had  been  in  command 
of  the  Department  of  Southern  Virginia  and  North  Caro¬ 
lina,  but  had  been  relieved  of  that  command  by  General 
Beauregard  about  the  1st  of  May.  The  latter  officer  had 
commanded  the  Department  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and 
Florida,  and  had  been  relieved  from  the  charge  of  that 
Department  in  April  by  General  Sam  Jones,  to  enable  him 
to  take  command  of  the  force  for  the  defence  of  Richmond 
against  the  approach  by  James  River.  He  was  directed  to 
bring  or  send  forward  all  the  disposable  force  in  both  De¬ 
partments  for  the  defence  of  Richmond. 

So  far  as  I  can  ascertain,  the  troops  to  be  brought  or  sent 
forward  by  General  Beauregard  were  Barton’s,  Terry’s,  and 
Corse’s  brigades  of  Pickett’s  division,  which  had  been  serv¬ 
ing  in  North  Carolina  ;  Wise’s  Virginia  brigade,  Hoke’s, 
Ransom’s,  Clingman’s  and  Martin’s  North  Carolina  brigades  ; 
Hagood’s  South  Carolina,  and  Colquitt’s  Georgia  brigades ; 
General  W.  S.  Walker’s  Georgia  brigade  appears  also  to 
have  been  brought  from  South  Carolina.  There  were,  be¬ 
sides,  several  battalions  of  artillery,  and  Dearing’s  North 
Carolina  and  Walker’s  or  Butler’s  South  Carolina  brigades 
of  cavalry.  These  infantry  brigades,  not  including  Walker’s, 
gave  an  effective  force  of  infantry  (enlisted  men  present 
for  duty)  of  19,000.  Dearing’s  brigade  was  about  2,000 
strong. 

But  the  leading  troops  of  this  force,  excepting  a  part  of 
.Clingman’s  brigade,  had  only  begun  to  arrive  at  Petersburg 
by  the  Weldon  Railroad  on  the  5th  of  May.  These  (part  of 
Hagood’s  brigade)  General  Pickett  was  authorized  by  Gen¬ 
eral  Beauregard,  in  a  telegraphic  despatch  from  Weldon,  to 
retain  in  Petersburg,  and  also  to  take  command  of  all  troops 
arriving  there. 


MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  JAMES.  143 


When  Butler’s  fleet  of  transports  was  seen  moving  up  the 
James,  General  Pickett  called  in  Clingman’s  troops  from  the 
Blackwater,  hastily  collected  such  citizens  as  could  be 
found,  armed  them,  and  posting  the  artillery  he  had  in  the 
intrenchments,  moved  out  on  the  road  to  City  Point  with  his 
infantry,  numbering  about  a  brigade.  The  next  morning, 
the  6th,  he  sent  Hagood’s  troops  forward  to  Port  Walthall 
Junction  to  protect  the  Richmond  Railroad  from  the  force 
sent  out  by  General  Butler.  The  order  and  time  of  arrival 
in  Petersburg  and  movement  to  Richmond  of  Beauregard's 
troops  I  do  not  find  stated  anywhere.  On  the  7th,  Wise’s 
brigade,  or  a  part  of  it,  arrived  and  joined  the  troops  on  the 
City  Point  road.  Near  midday  of  the  7th,  General  Beaure¬ 
gard,  at  Weldon,  telegraphed  to  Richmond  that  Hoke  (divi¬ 
sion)  would  begin  to  arrive  at  Kingston  that  night,  that 
most  of  the  cavalry  was  with  him ;  that  half  of  Wise’s  bri¬ 
gade  was  expected  at  Weldon  in  a  few  hours  ;  that  Hagood’s 
last  detachment  had  passed  there  the  night  before. 

Kautz,  who  made  long  and  rapid  marches,  was  at  Wake¬ 
field  on  the  Norfolk  and  Petersburg  Railroad  on  the  even¬ 
ing  of  the  6th,  and  cut  the  road  and  telegraph  there.  The 
next  day,  the  7th,  he  destroyed  the  Weldon  Railroad  bridge 
over  Stony  Creek,  where  he  learned  that  three  trains  with 
Beauregard’s  troops  had  passed  there  at  twelve  o’clock,  and 
that  five  more  trains  with  troops  were  due  there  between 
five  and  six  o’clock  that  evening.  The  next  day,  the  8th, 
Kautz  was  unable  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge  over  Row- 
anty  Creek,  it  being  well  defended,  but  succeeded  in  de¬ 
stroying  the  bridge  over  the  Nottoway  River,  though  it  was 
well  defended  by  Colonel  Tabb  with  the  Fifty-ninth  Vir¬ 
ginia.  Having  accomplished  all  that  he  deemed  practicable, 
he  then  marched  to  City  Point,  arriving  there  on  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  10th. 

The  destruction  of  the  bridges  over  Stony  Creek  and  Not- 


144  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


toway  River  caused  some  delay  in  the  transportation  of 
Beauregard’s  troops.  On  the  12th  of  May  all  of  them  had 
not  yet  reached  Petersburg,  for  on  that  day  he  telegraphed 
from  Petersburg  to  Richmond  that  he  had  ordered  Hoke  at 
Drury’s  Bluff  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
that  he,  Beauregard,  would  join  him  (Hoke)  with  the  re¬ 
mainder  of  troops  as  soon  as  they  arrived.  The  evening  of 
the  11th  he  had  telegraphed  that  the  equivalent  of  two  bri¬ 
gades  was  still  to  arrive.  His  telegrams  to  Richmond  on  the 
11th  say  that  the  division  of  his  force  was  temporary  and 
made  to  meet  an  emergency;  that  the  movement  was  in 
progress  ;  and  that  he  would  unite  with  Ransom  (at  Drury’s 
Bluff)  as  soon  as  possible  ;  that  the  troops  at  Petersburg 
and  arriving  there  were  pushed  forward  as  rapidly  as  pos¬ 
sible  ;  that  they  had  to  make  a  flank  march  of  nine  miles 
across  a  country  occupied  by  a  powerful  enemy. 

It  is  inferred  from  these  despatches  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  that  while  Beauregard  had  sent  forward  the  larger  part 
of  his  troops  to  the  defence  of  Richmond  as  rapidly  as  pos¬ 
sible,  he  had  retained  a  part  of  his  force  in  Petersburg  to 
secure  that  place. 

By  the  15th  of  May,  or  it  may  be  a  day  or  two  earlier, 
General  Beauregard  had  collected  and  organized  an  active 
army  in  the  field  to  oppose  Butler’s  operations  against 
Richmond  and  Petersburg,  of  22,000  enlisted  men  of  in¬ 
fantry,  and  2,000  cavalry,1  with  a  due  proportion  of  artillery. 
This  force  does  not  include  Hunton’s  brigade  of  infantry  at 
Chapin’s  Bluff,  nor  the  Richmond  defences,  nor  the  artillery 
force,  heavy  and  field,  of  the  forts,  batteries,  and  intrench- 

ments  of  Richmond. 

* 

On  the  7th  of  May  General  Butler  sent  some  force  from 


1  More  than  double  that  number  of  cavalry,  if  Butler’s  brigade  is  counted.  It 
was  probably  there,  for  it  does  not  appear  with  Lee’s  army  before  the  28th  of  May. 


MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  JAMES.  145 


his  two  corps  to  the  railroad,  which  encountered  the  enemy 
without  any  important  result  either  way,  except  that  every 
day  that  passed  without  an  attack  in  full  force  upon  the 
slender  strength  of  the  enemy  was  an  important  gain  to 
them. 

On  the  9th  General  Butler  moved  out  of  his  intrencli- 
ments  with  a  large  part  of  his  command  under  General 
Gillmore  and  General  Smith,  and  destroyed  the  railroad 
between  Swift  Creek  on  the  south  and  Chester  Station 
on  the  north,  a  length  of  about  six  miles.  The  enemy 
in  some  force  held  the  south  bank  of  Swift  Creek,  a  stream 
that  was  not  fordable  and  the  bridges  of  which  were  de¬ 
fended. 

On  the  evening  of  the  9th,  Generals  Gillmore  and  Smith 
proposed  to  General  Butler  to  lay  a  ponton  bridge  that 
night  over  the  Appomattox,  and  cross  it  with  the  greater  part 
of  their  corps,  which  they  could  do  before  daylight  (leaving 
sufficient  force  to  hold  their  intrenched  line),  and  destroy 
the  railroads  entering  Petersburg,  and  take  that  city.  This 
General  Butler  disapproved,  stating  that  General  Kautz  was 
destroying  those  roads  so  that  they  would  be  useless,  and 
that  the  Danville  Railroad  must  be  destroyed  near  Rich¬ 
mond. 

General  Robert  Ransom  occupied  the  advanced  intrench- 
ments  of  Drury’s  Bluff  on  the  9th  of  May,  with  Barton’s  and 
Gracie’s  brigades,  and  at  daylight  of  the  lOtli  advanced 
toward  the  portion  of  Butler’s  force  covering  the  destruction 
of  the  railroad  in  that  vicinity  ;  but  only  some  skirmishing 
ensued. 

Butler’s  troops  returned  to  their  intrencliments  on  the 
10th. 

On  the  morning  of  the  12tli,  General  Butler  moved  along 
the  pike  toward  Richmond,  Smith’s  corps  on  the  right,  Gill- 
more’s  on  the  left,  meeting  with  only  slight  opposition,  and 
XII.— 7 


146  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


halting  for  the  night  on  Proctor’s  Creek,  the  right  resting 
near  James  River.  A  force  sufficient  to  hold  the  Bermuda 
Hundred  intrencliments  was  left  there.  Ames,  with  his  divi¬ 
sion,  was  posted  at  Walthall  Junction  to  cover  the  rear  from 
the  direction  of  Petersburg.  General  Kautz  set  out  on  a 
raid  from  Chester  Station  against  the  Richmond  and  Dan¬ 
ville,  and  the  Petersburg  and  Lynchburg  railroads,  as  soon 
as  Smith  and  Gillmore  were  so  posted  as  to  mask  his  move¬ 
ment.  Hinks’s  division  of  colored  troops  remained  at  City 
Point. 

The  object  of  the  movement,  besides  covering  Kautz’s 
raid,  is  stated  to  have  been  to  develop  the  full  strength  of 
the  enemy  in  and  about  Richmond,  and  force  him  into  his 
intrenchments  or  turn  them. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  Smith  crossed  Proctor’s 
Creek,  and  advanced  along  the  pike,  Brooks  on  its  left, 
Weitzel  on  its  right,  to  within  eight  hundred  yards  of  the 
enemy’s  outer  line  of  intrenchments,  which  were  here  in 
open  ground,  and  were  held  by  infantry  and  artillery.  So 
strong  was  the  line  that  General  Smith  reported  to  General 
Butler  that  if  held  in  force  it  could  not  be  carried  by  as¬ 
sault.  General  Gillmore  in  the  meantime  had,  as  directed 
by  General  Butler,  moved  to  the  left  to  turn  the  right  of  the 
intrenchments  on  the  head  of  Proctor’s  Creek.  The  enemy 
was  in  force  there,  their  right  on  Wooldridge’s  Hill,  a  com¬ 
manding  position  half  a  mile  west  of  the  railroad.  Terry 
attacked,  unsuccessfully,  and  while  preparing  for  a  second 
attack,  the  enemy  abandoned  their  line,  passing  down 
toward  Drury’s  Bluff,  Gillmore  pressing  them  until  dark, 
and  getting  a  mile  of  their  works. 

General  Butler  now  requested  Admiral  Lee  to  move  the 
monitors  above  Trent’s  Reach,  so  as  to  keep  pace  with  the 
Army.  But  this  Admiral  Lee  was  unable  to  do,  as  there  was 
but  thirteen  feet  of  water  at  high  tide  on  the  bar  of  Trent’s 


MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  JAMES.  147 


Reach, 1  a  fact  that  the  Coast  Survey  maps  showed,  and  the 
armored  ships  drew  fifteen  or  sixteen  feet.  For  the  gun¬ 
boats  there  was  ample  depth  of  water,  but  the  enemy  held 
the  left  bank  of  the  river,  from  which  they  controlled  torpe¬ 
does  and  commanded  the  decks  of  the  ships.  On  the  17tli 
of  May,  however,  Admiral  Lee’s  advance  division  (not  the 
monitors)  searched  for  torpedoes  until  they  came  under  the 
fire  of  the  guns  at  Chapin’s  Bluff. 

On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  Brook’s  division  of  Smith’s 
corps  occupied  a  part  of  the  enemy’s  intrencliments  on  the 
left  of  the  pike.  Gillmore’s  two  divisions,  Turner’s  and 
Terry’s,  occupied  them  on  Smith’s  left.  About  two  and  a 
half  miles  of  the  enemy’s  outer  line  of  works  were  thus  held 
by  our  troops.  The  Confederates  occupied  their  second 
line,  the  right  of  which  was  well  refused. 

Weitzel’s  division  was  on  the  right  of  the  pike.  The 
outer  and  the  inner  line  of  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  united 
in  his,  Weitzel’s,  front,  near  Drury’s  Bluff,  at  a  bastion 
salient  situated  on  an  eminence  which  completely  com¬ 
manded  Weitzel’s  position.  He  did  not  occupy  any  part  of 
the  enemy’s  intrenchments,  but  constructed  a  breastwork  of 
logs  along  his  line,  just  inside  the  edge  of  a  wood,  and 
stretched  a  telegraph  wire  a  short  distance  in  front  of  it. 
General  Heckman’s  brigade  was  on  the  right  of  the  division. 
From  some  cause  not  known  the  order  for  stretching  the 
wire  entanglement,  unfortunately  for  himself  and  his  bri¬ 
gade,  was  not  carried  out  on  his  front. 


1  Once  above  the  shoal  of  Trent’s  Beach,  the  monitors  could  have  ascended  to 
the  mouth  of  Kingsland  Creek,  one  mile  below  Chapin’s  Bluff.  There  a  shoal 
having  but  twelve  feet  water  at  high  tide  would  have  obstructed  their  passage. 
Beyond  that  there  was  water  enough  for  them  as  high  up  as  three  miles  above 
Drury's  Bluff. 

The  request  of  General  Butler  appears  to  indicate  that  there  was  not  a  thorough 
understanding  in  advance  between  him  and  Admiral  Lee  as  to  the  highest  point 
on  the  river  that  the  fleet  could  reach. 


148  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


An  assault  of  the  intrenchments  was  ordered  for  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  15tli,  but  was  abandoned  for  the  want  of  disposa¬ 
ble  troops  to  form  the  column  of  attack.  During  the  15th, 
Gillmore’s  skirmishers  were  constantly  engaged ;  his  artil¬ 
lery  frequently.  General  Smith,  examining  the  ground  on 
his  right  as  far  as  the  river,  found  it  offered  every  facility 
for  the  movement  of  a  heavy  force  on  his  right  and  rear. 
He  threw  back  the  right  of  Heckman’s  brigade  so  as  to  cover 
a  road  leading  to  the  Bermuda  Hundred  intrenchments  by  a 
route  shorter  than  that  by  the  pike  or  by  the  river  road. 
He  notified  General  Butler  that  he  had  a  thin  line  of  battle, 
with  no  reserves  to  repair  a  break  or  strengthen  his  right. 
Upon  this  three  regiments  of  Ames’s  division,  posted  at  the 
Half-way  House,  were  placed  at  his  disposal. 

The  means  now  at  hand  for  the  defence  of  Richmond  and 
Petersburg,  and  for  the  protection  of  their  lines  of  supply 
south  of  the  James,  were  very  different  from  what  they  had 
been  nine  days  before.  General  Beauregard  now  had,  in 
the  strong  intrenchments  resting  on  the  river  at  Drury’s 
Bluff,  a  movable  force  of  infantry  of  not  less  than  17,000 
enlisted  men,  formed  in  three  divisions,  commanded  by 
Generals  Ransom,  Hoke,  and  Colquitt,  with  a  battalion  of 
artillery,  and  a  regiment  of  cavalry  with  each  division. 1  In 
addition  to  these  troops  there  wrere  Hunton’s  brigade  at 
Chapin’s  Bluff,  the  troops  known  as  the  Defences  of  Rich¬ 
mond,  and  the  artillery  in  the  forts  and  batteries.  At 
Petersburg,  General  Whiting  had  the  brigades  of  Wise  and 
Martin,  numbering  not  less  than  4,600  muskets,  with  a  bat¬ 
talion  of  artillery  and  Dealing’s  brigade  of  cavalry,  about 
2,000  strong.  There  was  besides  some  other  force  of  in¬ 
fantry  and  artillery  in  Petersburg,  but  their  strength  I  am 
unable  to  state. 


*  The  battalion  of  artillery  usually  consisted  of  four  batteries  of  four  guns  each. 


MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  JAMES.  149 

The  number  of  General  Butler’s  infantry  before  the 
Drury’s  Bluff  intrenchments  did  not  exceed  that  of  the 
enemy,  Ames  being  at  Walthall  Junction  with  his  division, 
about  5,000  strong,  Hinks  with  his  division  of  5,000  at  City 
Point,  and  about  3,000  having  been  left  in  the  Bermuda 
Hundred  intrenchments.  Beauregard,  indeed,  was  in  a  bet¬ 
ter  position  now  than  Butler,  for  his  troops  occupied  an  un¬ 
assailable  line,  with  open  ground  in  front,  upon  which  they 
could  form  and  attack  Butler’s  weaker  line.  The  right  of 
Butler’s  line  was  especially  weak  ;  it  had  no  naturally  strong 
ground  to  rest  on,  and  was  a  mile  from  the  river. 

Thus,  while  General  Butler  had  made  no  material  advance 
toward  the  accomplishment  of  the  object  of  his  campaign 
during  the  nine  days  that  had  elapsed  since  he  landed,  Gen¬ 
eral  Beauregard,  who,  at  the  time  of  General  Butler’s  land¬ 
ing,  had  substantially  no  force  available  adequate  to  with¬ 
stand  or  even  delay  him,  had  in  those  eight  or  nine  days  got 
together  an  army  sufficiently  strong  to  take  the  offensive 
and  had  so  posted  it  as  to  control  the  situation.  General 
Butler  could  not  assault  the  Drury’s  Bluff  intrenchments, 
he  could  not  move  to  turn  them,  and  he  could  not  fall  back 
to  his  Bermuda  Hundred  lines,  or  to  a  new  position  on  the 
river  without  abandoning  his  campaign  against  Richmond 
with  the  Army  of  the  Janies.  In  other  words,  he  was  com¬ 
pletely  paralyzed  so  far  as  concerned  offensive  operations. 

General  Butler’s  true  policy  upon  landing  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Appomattox  would  have  been  to  disregard  Richmond 
for  a  time  and  turn  his  attention  to  attacking  Beauregard’s 
forces  in  detail  as  they  arrived  from  the  South,  first  taking 
Petersburg,  which  was  then  nearly  defenceless. 

The  Richmond  Cabinet  was  urgent  for  an  immediate 
attack  by  Beauregard,  especially  as  they  apprehended  that 
General  Sheridan  might  return  to  co-operate  with  Butler 
and  attempt  to  enter  the  city  north  of  the  James  at  the 


150  the  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 


same  time  tliat  Butler  moved  to  turn  and  attack  Beaure¬ 
gard’s  right.  They  had  probably  received  exaggerated 
statements  of  the  numbers -of  the  Army  of  the  James,  as 
its  fleets  of  transports  made  a  very  formidable  appearance  in 
ascending  the  river. 

Beauregard’s  army  was  composed  of  four  divisions,  com¬ 
manded  by  Major-General  Robert  Ransom,  Major-General 
Hoke,  Brigadier-General  Colquitt,  and  Major-General  'Whit¬ 
ing.1 

On  the  15tli  of  May  General  Beauregard  issued  his  in¬ 
structions  for  the  battle  of  the  next  day,  the  object  of  which, 
he  stated,  was  to  cut  off  the  enemy  from  his  base  of  opera¬ 
tions,  Bermuda  Hundred,  and  capture  or  destroy  him  in  the 
position  he  then  held.  With  this  object,  Major-General 
Ransom,  whose  division  constituted  Beauregard’s  left  wing, 
was  directed  to  form  his  command  outside  the  intrench- 
ments,  near  the  river,  during  the  nigh^  and  at  daybreak  to 
attack  and  turn  Butler’s  right  by  the  river  road. 

Major-General  Hoke  was  directed  to  form  his  division 
during  the  night  outside  of  the  intrenchments  on  his  right 
of  the  turnpike,  and  at  daylight  to  attack  with  a  heavy  skir¬ 
mish  line  sufficiently  to  prevent  reinforcements  being  sent 
to  Butler’s  right,  and  when  the  enemy’s  right  was  evidently 
turned  and  beaten,  to  attack  with  full  force. 

General  Colquitt’s  division  constituted  the  reserve,  and 
was  formed  in  the  centre  across  the  pike  in  rear  of  the  line 
of  Ransom  and  Hoke. 


1  General  Ransom’s  division  consisted  of  Barton's  (Colonel  Fry  commanding), 
Gracie’s,  Kemper’s  (Colonel  Terry  commanding),  and  Hoke’s  (Colonel  Lewis  com¬ 
manding)  brigades.  Its  effective  force  was  about  5,400.  General  Hoke’s  division 
consisted  of  Corse’s,  Clingman’s,  Bushrod  Johnson’s,  and  Hagood’s  brigades.  Its 
effective  force  was  about  7,000.  General  Colquitt’s  division  consisted  of  Colquitt’s 
and  Ransom’s  brigades.  Its  effective  force  was  about  4,900.  General  Whiting’s 
division  consisted  of  Wise’s  and  Martin's  brigades.  Its  effective  force  was  about 
4,600. 


BATTLE  OF  DRURY’S  BLUFF. 


151 


Each  division  had  its  battalion  of  artillery.  A  regiment 
of  cavalry  was  placed  on  Ransom’s  left  flank,  one  on  Hoke’s 
right  flank,  and  one  with  the  reserve. 

Major-General  Whiting  at  Petersburg  was  directed  to  take 
position  that  night  (the  15th)  on  Swift  Creek  with  Wise’s, 
Martin’s,  and  Dealing’s  brigades  and  two  regiments  of  Col¬ 
quitt’s,  with  abont  twenty  piece  of  artillery,  and  at  daybreak 
to  march  to  Walthall  Junction,  and  when  he  heard  the  en¬ 
gagement  in  his  front  (the  plan  of  the  battle  was  sent  to  all 
the  division  commanders)  he  was  to  advance  in  the  direction 
of  the  heaviest  firing  and  attack  the  enemy  in  rear  or  flank. 

The  Confederate  gunboats  were  to  unite  in  the  attack  on 
Butler’s  army,  but  on  neither  side  did  the  gunboats  tak6 
any  part  in  the  battle. 

This  plan  of  battle  was  submitted  to  President  Davis  in  a 
personal  conference  with  General  Beauregard  at  his  head¬ 
quarters  on  the  14th  of  May,  and  was  approved  except  that 
part  relating  to  General  Whiting’s  operation,  which  Mr. 
Davis  objected  to,  “because  of  the  hazard  during  a  battle  of 
attempting  to  make  a  junction  of  troops  moving  from  oppo¬ 
site  sides  of  the  enemy  ”  ;  and  he  proposed  “that  Whiting’s 
command  should  move  at  night  (on  the  14th)  by  the  Ches¬ 
terfield  road,  where  they  would  not  probably  be  observed 
by  Butler’s  advance.”  Whiting’s  division  could,  in  this 
way,  unite  with  the  troops  in  the  Drury’s  Bluff  intrench- 
ments  on  the  morning  of  the  15tli.  This  modification  of  the 
plan  was  not,  however,  carried  out,  though  Mr.  Davis  ex¬ 
pected  it  would  be.1 

The  night  was  sufficiently  clear  (there  being  moonlight), 
until  just  before  day,  when  a  dense  fog  suddenly  enveloped 
both  armies  so  that  a  horseman  could  not  be  seen  at  the  dis¬ 
tance  of  fifteen  paces.  During  the  night  repeated  attacks 

1  See  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  by  Jefferson  Davis, 
Vol.  II.,  pp.  511-513. 


152  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


were  made  on  the  reserve  of  Weitzel’s  pickets  posted  on  a 
hill  which  had  a  good  view  clear  up  to  the  Confederate  in- 
trenchments,  but  no  report  of  it  was  made  to  General  Weit- 
zel,  who  mentions  this  in  his  report,  and  adds  that  it  was 
stated  to  him  after  the  battle  that  word  had  been  sent  in 
from  this  post  that  the  enemy  were  forming  in  their  front. 

General  Ransom  began  to  move  out  of  the  trenches  at  two 
a.m.,  and  a  little  after  daylight  had  formed  two  lines  of  bat¬ 
tle  in  the  position  indicated  to  him  across  the  river  road, 
Gracie’s  brigade  on  the  left  of  his  first  line,  Lewis’s  on  the 
right ;  Terry’s  on  the  left  of  the  second  line,  Fry’s  on  the 
right.  Hoke’s  and  Colquitt’s  divisions  were  also  formed  as 
directed,  though  General  Hoke  was  delayed  by  the  fog. 

At  a  quarter  before  five  o’clock  Ransom  advanced  in  the 
dense  fog,  drove  in  Smith’s  skirmishers  across  open  ground, 
and  completely  surprised  Heckman’s  brigade ;  Gracie’s  bri¬ 
gade  attacked  it  in  front  and  rear  but  met  with  a  stubborn 
resistance.  At  the  end  of  an  hour,  however,  the  breastworks 
were  carried  and  Heckman’s  brigade  driven  in  confusion  to 
the  rear,  General  Heckman  and  several  hundred  of  his  men, 
and  five  stands  of  colors  being  captured. 

The  attack  on  Smith’s  right  and  right  rear  -was  quickly 
followed  by  repeated  attacks  on  his  front,  Weitzel’s  and 
Brooks’s  divisions,  all  of  which  were  repulsed.  General 
Smith,  who  had  been  up  a  short  time  before  daybreak,  when 
it  wras  clear  and  moonlight,  was  roused  soon  after  by  heavy 
musketry  and  artillery  fire  on  the  right  of  his  line.  Per¬ 
ceiving  that  a  heavy  fog  had  suddenly  fallen,  he  ordered  his 
artillery,  which  was  far  advanced,  to  be  withdrawn,  as  the 
fog  rendered  it  useless,  but  the  attack  in  his  front  followed 
that  on  his  right  so  quickly  that  the  order  did  not  reach  the 
more  advanced  guns,  five  in  number,  which  were  captured, 
the  sergeant  carrying  the  order  being  killed  when  near  the 
guns.  Two  of  the  regiments  from  the  Half-way  House  were 


i 


BATTLE  OF  DRURY’S  BLUFF. 


153 


sent  at  once  to  Weitzel,  who  posted  them  at  a  cross-roads  in 
the  rear  of  the  right,  which  they  held  against  the  efforts  of 
the  enemy. 

At  half -past  six  o’clock  General  Hoke,  who  had  been  de¬ 
layed  by  the  fog,  began  his  attacks  upon  General  Gillmore’s 
position,  which  were  repeated  twice  in  quick  succession.  A 
few  minutes  before  the  first  was  made,  General  Gillmore 
was  notified  by  General  Butler  of  the  attack  on  Smith,  and 
was  ordered  to  carry  the  enemy’s  line  in  his  front.  Notify¬ 
ing  General  Butler  of  the  attack  on  him,  and  that  his  judg¬ 
ment  was  against  trying  to  carry  the  enemy’s  intrenchments, 
General  Gillmore  was  authorized  to  use  his  discretion  in  the 
matter,  and  finding  that  General  Smith  needed  support,  sent 
him  what  he  could  spare,  four  regiments.  The  whole  line 
was  now  heavily  engaged. 

General  Ransom  found  his  troops  scattered  by  the  fog,  his 
line  confused  and  requiring  readjusting,  and  his  ammunition 
nearly  exhausted.  His  two  leading  brigades,  Grade’s  and 
Terry’s,  had  suffered  severe  loss.  To  reform  his  lines  and 
replenish  ammunition  he  withdrew  to  the  position  from 
which  he  had  assaulted  Smith’s  intrenchments.  As  soon  as 
his  line  was  readjusted,  he  moved  forward  again,  and  then 
by  his  left  flank  to  take  position  just  in  front  of  Heckman’s 
captured  breastworks.  This  flank  movement  was  reported 
to  General  Smith,  and  as  it  appeared  to  threaten  directly 
Butler’s  communications  and  Smith’s  artillery  and  ammuni¬ 
tion-train,  that  had  been  withdrawn  a  short  distance  and 
were  without  supports,  and  also  the  Bermuda  Hundred  lines 
left  feebly  defended,  General  Smith  immediately  ordered  a 
retirement  of  his  whole  line,  notifying  General  Gillmore’s 
adjoining  troops  to  conform  to  it.  While  falling  back  the 
fog  lifted  and  enabled  General  Smith  to  observe  his  right, 
when  he  ordered  the  line  forward  again,  but  the  changes 
that  had  already  taken  place  obliged  him  to  recall  the  order 


154  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


and  move  by  his  right  flank  to  cover  the  roads  east  of  the 
pike  leading  to  the  rear.  His  new  position  crossed  the  pike 
near  Half-way  House,  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  from 
the  outer  line  of  Confederate  intrenchments.  Here  it  re¬ 
mained  during  the  rest  of  the  day.  A  partial  advance  was 
made  to  bring  off  the  wounded  of  Heckman’s  brigade,  but 
the  ground  was  found  to  be  held  in  force  by  the  enemy,  and 
the  attempt  was  given  up. 

General  Gillmore,  finding  General  Smith’s  troops  moving 
to  the  right,  and  being  informed  by  General  Butler  that  the 
enemy  were  attempting  to  turn  Smith’s  right,  and  that 
Smith  was  moving  to  meet  the  attempt,  and  being  ordered 
to  move  by  his  right  flank  to  keep  up  the  connection,  moved 
along  the  intrenchments  in  that  direction  and  ordered 
Terry’s  and  Turner’s  divisions  to  attack  the  flank  of  the 
enemy  pressing  back  Smith.  These  divisions  were  in  mo¬ 
tion  to  carry  out  this  order,  when  General  Gillmore  was 
instructed  to  press  his  reinforcements  to  the  right,  that 
Brooks  and  Weitzel  were  falling  back.  The  fog  cleared 
away  about  nine  o’clock.  Moving  in  accordance  with  the 
several  instructions  received,  his  troops  were  hotly  engaged 
with  the  enemy  and  gaining  ground,  when,  at  about  ten 
o’clock,  he  was  ordered  by  General  Butler  to  fall  back,  press 
to  the  right,  and  get  in  the  rear  of  Smith’s  corps,  near  the 
Half-way  House,  and  clear  the  way  back  to  the  intrench¬ 
ments  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  This  was  followed,  General 
Gillmore  says,  by  several  verbal  and  written  orders  of  the 
same  purport.  General  Gillmore  accordingly  began  at  once 
to  withdraw  his  troops,  and  by  twelve  o’clock  reached  the 
position  on  the  pike  in  rear  of  the  Half-way  House. 

General  Ransom,  after  re-establishing  his  line  close  in 
front  of  the  breastworks  that  he  had  recently  taken,  reported 
in  person  to  General  Beauregard,  and  was  directed  to  halt 
for  further  arrangements. 


BATTLE  OF  DRURY’S  BLUFF.  155 

Rumors  during  the  day  of  the  approach  of  gunboats  to 
take  part  in  the  contest,  of  reinforcements  arriving,  and 
other  unfounded  statements  of  movements  on  both  sides,  led 
to  misapprehensions  and  mistakes. 

General  Beauregard  says  that  at  ten  a.m.  his  right  was 
still  heavily  engaged  and  that  all  his  reserves  had  been  sent 
to  the  right  and  left.  Nothing  had  been  heard  from  Whit¬ 
ing  ;  his  (Whiting’s)  guns  had  been  heard  at  eight  o’clock, 
but  not  since.  Between  nine  and  ten  o’clock  he  sent  an  or¬ 
der  to  him  to  press  forward,  and  the  day  would  be  complete. 
General  Ransom,  he  says,  not  only  ^reported  the  enemy 
strong  in  his  front,  but  was  of  opinion  that  the  safety  of  liis 
command  would  be  compromised  by  an  advance. 

Hoke,  with  Johnson’s  and  Hagood’s  brigades,  had  been 
hotly  engaged  on  the  pike.  They  it  was  who  captured  the 
five  guns.  Johnson’s  brigade  lost  heavily — one-fourth  of  its 
numbers.  Then  Clingman  and  Corse  were  thrown  forward, 
but  both  were  obliged  to  draw  back.  At  about  ten  o’clock 
the  fighting  in  front  of  Hagood  and  Johnson  was  stubborn 
and  prolonged.  In  the  language  of  their  reports,  the  enemy 
slowly  retiring  from  Johnson’s  right,  took  a  strong  position 
on  the  ridge  in  front  of  Proctor’s  Creek, ,  massing  near  the 
turnpike  and  occupying  advantageous  ground  at  Charles 
Friend’s.1  At  length  Johnson  rested  in  the  Confederate  line 
of  outer  works  ;  but  his  skirmishers  continued  engaged  some 
hours  longer,  the  enemy,  he  says,  having  fallen  back. 

General  Beauregard  states  that  he  now  suspended  further 
movement  to  hear  from  Whiting,  and  to  reform  his  troops, 
which  were  more  or  less  disorganized.  General  Whiting 
was  at  Swift  Creek  by  daylight  of  the  16th,  and  moved  for¬ 
ward  along  the  railroad  to  Walthall  Junction,  where  he  met 
a  stubborn  resistance  from  Ames,  and  formed  line  of  battle. 


1  This  was  the  position  to  which  Smith  and  Gillmore  fell  back. 


156  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’(35. 


No  sounds  of  Beauregard’s  battle  were  beard ;  no  despatch, 
no  information  was  received.  General  Dearing  was  directed  to 
move  on  the  left  and  communicate  with  General  Beauregard. 
The  day  wore  on  without  tidings  or  sound  of  battle,  though 
it  was  but  six  miles  distant.  The  wooded  country,  aided, 
perhaps,  by  the  wind,  had  deflected  all  sounds  of  the  contest 
from  them.  Receiving  information  (erroneous)  of  an  ad¬ 
vance  of  General  Hinks’s  force  from  City  Point  toward  Pe¬ 
tersburg  and  also  of  the  advance  against  him  on  his  left  of  a 
lie^y  force,  Whiting  fell  back  to  Swift  Creek.  There  Gen¬ 
eral  Dearing  reported  to  him  the  occurrences  of  the  day  with 
Beauregard,  he,  Dearing,  having  succeeded  in  communicating 
with  Beauregard  by  sending  a  small  detachment  on  a  very 
circuitous  route.  At  7.15  p.m.  General  Whiting  received 
General  Beauregard’s  despatch  of  4.15  p.m.,  saying:  “The 
enemy  has  been  driven  back  on  our  right.  Corse’s  and 
Clingman’s  forces  are  moved  to  the  line  of  works  on  hill 
west  of  railroad.  We  are  about  making  a  general  advance 
with  all  our  forces.  Can  you  not  aid  in  the  movement  at 
once  ?  ”  General  Whiting  replied :  ‘  ‘  Too  late  for  action  on 
my  part.” 

General  Beauregard  says  that  at  four  p.m.  he  abandoned  all 
hope  of  effective  co-operation  from  Whiting,  and  resumed 
his  original  formation  in  order  to  pursue  Butler  vigorously, 
and  drive  him  within  his  intrenchments.  A  heavy  and  long- 
continued  rain-storm  ensued,  and  it  was  dark  before  they 
were  ready  to  advance ;  the  advance  was  therefore  deferred 
until  the  following  morning. 

Toward  evening  General  Butler  fell  back  toward  his  Ber¬ 
muda  Hundred  intrenchments,  which  he  occupied  that  night. 

At  1.15  p.m.  General  Beauregard  sent  a  telegraphic  des¬ 
patch  to  Richmond,  saying:  “We  occupy  the  outer  lines; 
the  enemy  is  still  in  our  front  with  open  ground  between  us. 
Am  preparing  for  a  combined  attack,  reorganizing  commands 


BATTLE  OF  DRURY’S  BLUFF. 


157 


which  are  somewhat  scattered.  Some  of  the  brigades  are 
much  cut  up.  Nothing  from  Whiting.” 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th  General  Beauregard  took  up  a 
position  in  front  of  General  Butler’s  lines,  and  intrenched  it. 
“The  enemy,”  he  says,  “is  now  hemmed  in  by  our  lines, 
which  completely  cover  the  southern  communications  of  the 
capital,  one  of  the  principal  objects  of  our  attack.”  “  The 
complete  success,”  he  adds,  “was  lost  by  the  hesitation  of 
the  left  wing,  and  the  premature  halt  of  the  Petersburg  col¬ 
umn  before  obstacles  in  neither  case  sufficient  to  have  de¬ 
terred  from  the  execution  of  the  movements  prescribed.” 

In  the  case  of  the  Petersburg  column,  General  Ames’s 
division  was  sufficient  to  hold  that  in  check,  though  its  pre¬ 
sence  at  Walthall  Junction  did  not  justify  General  Whiting’s 
feeble  course.  As  to  the  left  wing,  the  fog,  the  resistance  of 
Heckman’s  brigade,  and  the  dispositions  of  Generals  Smith 
and  Weitzel,  account,  in  great  part,  for  the  failure  of  its 
entire  success.  The  attacks  by  the  left  wing  on  all  other 
parts  of  Weitzel’s  front  were  unsuccessful. 

The  fog  was  equally  detrimental  to  Smith’s  troops  as  to 
Bansom’s. 

General  Beauregard  reported  his  casualties  on  the  16th  as 
354  officers  and  enlisted  men  killed,  1,610  wounded,  and 
220  missing — a  total  of  2,184.  He  says  the  enemy  left  in 
his  hands  1,400  prisoners,  five  pieces  of  artillery,  and  five 
stands  of  colors. 

The  statements  of  losses  in  the  reports  and  accompanying 
papers  of  Generals  Smith  and  Gillmore  are  incomplete,  and 
it  is  apparent  that  the  Tabular  Statement  of  the  ‘  ‘  Medical 
and  Surgical  History  of  the  War  ”  is  not  correct.  I  do  not 
find  the  report  of  the  Medical  Director.  Badeau’s  Tabular 
Statement  furnishes  the  best  data.  According  to  it,  But¬ 
ler’s  loss  on  the  16th  was  390  officers  and  enlisted  men 
killed,  1,721  wounded,  and  1,390  missing — total,  3,500.  The 


158  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


losses  in  the  encounters  previous  to  the  16th  are  not  in¬ 
cluded. 

General  Kautz  in  his  raid  upon  the  Richmond  and  Dan¬ 
ville  Railroad  destroyed  the  stations,  tracks,  some  trains, 
and  large  stores  of  subsistence  and  other  supplies  at  Coal¬ 
field,  Powhatan,  and  Chula,  the  last,  south  of  the  Appomat¬ 
tox  River.  He  then  crossed  over  to  the  South  Side  Railroad 
(Petersburg  and  Lynchburg  Railroad),  and  after  destroying 
the  roads  and  stations  at  Black’s  and  White’s,  Wilson’s  and 
Wellsville,  returned  to  City  Point,  reaching  there  on  the 
evening  of  the  17tli.  On  the  16th  he  found  the  railroad 
bridge  over  the  Nottoway,  which  he  had  destroyed  on  the 
8tli,  replaced  by  a  new  structure. 

On  the  20tli,  the  advanced  rifle-pits  on  Butler’s  right, 
General  Ames’s  front,  and  a  part  of  General  Terry’s  were 
captured,  and  a  sharp  fight  ensued  to  regain  them,  unsuc¬ 
cessfully  on  Ames’s  front;  but  on  Terry’s  front,  Colonel 
Howell’s  brigade,  after  a  severe  contest,  conducted  with 
skill  and  gallantly,  retook  the  pits.  The  loss  was  severe, 
702  killed  and  wounded.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  was  equally 
great,  and  among  their  severely  wounded  was  their  Brigade 
Commander,  Brigadier-General  W.  S.  Walker,  who  was  cap¬ 
tured. 

On  the  22d  of  May,  while  the  movement  from  Spottsylva- 
nia  Court  House  was  going  on,  General  Grant  learnt  the 
result  of  General  Butler’s  operations,  and  at  once  directed 
him  to  send  all  his  troops  under  the  command  of  General 
Smith  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  except  a  number 
sufficient  to  keep  a  foothold  at  City  Point.  On  the  25th  the 
order  was  repeated,  and  the  forces  sent  were  directed  to  land 
at  the  White  House,  at  the  head  of  navigation  on  the  Pa- 
munkey.  They  were  embarked  during  the  night  of  the  28th 
and  the  morning  of  the  29th. 

General  Smith  took  with  him  Brooks’s  division  of  his  own 


BATTLE  OF  DRURY’S  BLUFF. 


159 


corps,  and  the  Second  and  Third  divisions  of  the  Tenth 
Corps,  commanded  by  General  .Devens  and  General  Ames. 
His  force  consisted,  according  to  his  report,  of  very  nearly 
16,000  infantry  (enlisted  men),  sixteen  guns,  and  a  squadron 
(100)  of  cavalry. 

General  Butler  retained  about  10,000  enlisted  men  of  in¬ 
fantry  ;  Kautz’s  cavalry,  2, 600 ;  and  Hinks’s  colored  cavalry, 
about  2,000. 

Before  General  Butler  sent  off  any  part  of  his  force,  Gen¬ 
eral  Beauregard  was  instructed  to  strengthen  his  line,  retain 
sufficient  force  to  hold  it,  and  send  forward  the  remainder 
to  General  Lee.  Under  this  order  Pickett’s  division  and 
Hoke’s  brigade  (Colonel  Lewis  commanding)  of  Early’s  divi¬ 
sion  joined  General  Lee  at  Hanover  Junction,  and  Hoke’s 
division,  consisting  of  Martin’s,  Clingman’s,  Hagood’s,  and 
Colquitt’s  brigades,  joined  him  later  at  Cold  Harbor. 

General  Beauregard  retained  Buslirod  R.  Johnson’s  divi-. 
sion,  about  5,000  strong,  consisting  of  Ransom’s,  Gracie’s, 
and  B.  R.  Johnson’s  brigades,  the  last  now  commanded  by 
Colonel  Fulton,  Wise’s  brigade,  about  2,400  strong,  and 
probably  General  W.  S.  Walker’s  South  Carolina  brigade, 
afterward  commanded  by  General  N.  G.  Evans,  making  a 
force  of  about  9,000  infantry.  Bearing’s  brigade  of  cavalry 
also  remained  with  him. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


PASSAGE  OF  THE  PAMUNKEY  RIVER— TOTOPOTOMOY 

AND  COLD  HARBOR. 

» 

In  accordance  with  instructions  received  from  General 
Grant,  General  Meade  set  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in 
motion  as  soon  as  it  was  dark,  on  the  evening  of  the  26th  of 
May,  to  cross  the  Pamnnkey  River  at  and  in  the  vicinity 
of  Hanover  Town,  some  thirty-two  or  thirty-three  miles,  by 
the  shortest  route,  below  the  position  then  occupied  by  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac. 

General  Sheridan,  with  Torbert’s  and  Gregg’s  divisions  of 
cavalry,  preceded  the  infantry,  taking  the  river  road  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  26th,  and  leaving  some  force  at  Little  Page’s 
bridge  and  Taylor’s  ford  to  deceive  the  enemy  and  watch 
those  crossings  until  the  army  had  passed.  He  was  followed 
by  Russell’s  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  was  to  make 
a  forced  march  to  Hanover  Town.  As  soon  as  it  was  dark 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  North  Anna  began,  and  by  three  o’clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  27th  was  completed,  the  ponton  bridges 
taken  up,  the  other  bridges  destroyed,  and  the  army  on  the 
march,  following  the  advanced  force.  General  Wilson’s 
cavalry  took  the  place  of  the  infantry  at  the  river  crossings, 
and  brought  up  the  rear.  The  night  was  intensely  dark, 
and  the  withdrawal  was  effected  apparently  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  enemy. 

General  Wright  with  Getty’s  and  Ricketts’  divisions  fol- 


PASSAGE  OF  THE  PAMUNKEY  RIVER. 


161 


lowed  Russell.  The  -Fifth  Corps,  followed  by  the  Ninth, 
which  now  formed  a  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
marched  on  a  road  more  distant  from  the  river,  and  were  to 
cross  the  Pamunkey  at  New  Castle  Ferry,  four  miles  below 
Hanover  Town.  The  Second  Corps  followed  the  route  of 
the  Sixth  Corps.  The  roads  were  not  cleared  for  the  Second 
and  Ninth  Corps  until  half-past  ten  in  the  morning. 

At  nine  a.m.  of  the  27tli,  General  Sheridan  reported  that 
he  then  occupied  Hanover  Town ;  that  the  crossing  was 
taken  with  but  little  opposition  ;  that  twTo  ponton  bridges 
were  laid  and  in  use ;  that  his  first  division  had  crossed,  and 
that  the  second  was  about  crossing. 

In  the  vicinity  of  Hanover  Town,  on  the  Hanover  Court 
House  road,  General  Barringer’s  (formerly  Gordon’s)  cavalry 
brigade  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  division  was  encountered  and 
forced  back  toward  the  Court  House  as  far  as  Crump’s  Creek, 
five  miles  northwest  from  Hanover  Town.  Our  cavalry  also 
occupied  the  road  from  Hanover  Town  to  Atlee’s  Station 
and  Richmond.  A  strong  force  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  was 
reported  to  be  at  Hanover  Court  House.  At  neon  of  the 
27th,  General  Russell  reported  from  the  south  side  of  the 
Pamunkey  that  his  division  had  reached  that  point  an  hour 
before. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  27th  the  routes  of  the  army  were 
changed  ;  the  Sixth  and  Second  Corps  were  directed  to  cross 
the  Pamunkey  at  Huntley’s,  four  miles  above  Hanover 
Town,  and  the  Fifth  and  Ninth  Corps  to  cross  at  Hanover 
Town. 

Some  brief  description  of  the  streams  and  roads  in  the 
section  of  country  in  which  the  operations  now  about  to  be 
described,  took  place,  seems  to  be  necessary. 

About  two  miles  below  Hanover  Town,  Totopotomov 
Creek,  after  a  course  nearly  due  east  of  twelve  miles,  empties 
into  the  Pamunkey.  It  rises  near  Atlee’s  Station  on  the 


162  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Virginia  Central  Railroad,  about  ten  miles  north  of  Rich¬ 
mond.  Three  or  four  miles  south  of  the  Totopotomoy  is 
Matadequin  Creek,  which  also  empties  into  the  Pamunkey. 
Both  these  streams  have  many  swampy  heads  and  affluents. 

The  Cliickahominy  rises  some  fourteen  miles  northwest  of 
Richmond,  and  running  in  a  southeast  direction,  passing 
four  miles  east  of  Richmond,  empties  into  the  James  about 
ten  miles  west  of  Williamsburg. 

The  Cliickahominy,  the  Totopotomoy,  the  Matadequin, - 
and  other  streams  in  this  section  of  country,  have  but  little 
slope,  have  low  swampy  banks  or  bottom  lands,  usually 
wooded,  and  quickly  become  impassable  swamps  in  the 
heavy,  early  summer  rains. 

From  Hanover  Junction,  the  central  point  of  Lee’s  posi¬ 
tion  on  the  North  Anna,  a  road  runs  down  the  south  bank  of 
the  North  Anna  and  Pamunkey  rivers,  at  no  great  distance 
from  them,  passing  through  Hanover  Court  House,  Hanover 
Town,  near  New  Castle  Ferry,  the  White  House  at  the  head 
of  navigation,  etc.  There  are  many  roads  from  the  Pamun-1 

key  to  Richmond,  crossing  this  river-road.  The  old  stage- 

» 

road  from  Fredericksburg  to  Richmond  crosses  the  Pamun¬ 
key  at  Little  Page’s  bridge,  and  passes  through  Hanover 
Court  House,  which  is  about  seventeen  miles  from  Rich¬ 
mond.  From  Hanover  Town  (also  seventeen  miles  from 
Richmond)  there  is  a  direct  road  to  Richmond,  passing 
through  Hawes’s  Shop  (four  miles  from  Hanover  Town),  Pole 
Green  Church  on  the  Totopotomoy,  Huntley’s  Corners,  and 
Shady  Grove  Church,  crossing  the  Chickaliominy  at  the 
Meadow  bridges,  and  also  from  Huntley’s  Corners  to  Rich¬ 
mond  by  way  of  Meclianicsville.  A  branch  from  the  Shady 
Grove  Church  road  runs  to  Atlee’s  Station.  A  road  corned 
in  at  Huntley’s  Corners  from  White  House  by  way  of  Old 
Church.  Again  a  road  leads  from  New  Castle  Ferry  on  the 
Pamunkey  to  Richmond,  passing  through  Old  Church,  and 


PASSAGE  OF  THE  PAMUNKEY  RIVER. 


leg 


by  tlie  Old  Church  road  past  Betliesda  Church  and  through 
Mechanicsville  ou  the  Chickahominy.  From  Old  Church 
another  road  leads  to  Richmond  by  way  of  Cold  Harbor  and 
New  Bridge.  Several  other  roads  lead  from  points  lower 
down  on  the  Pamunkey  to  Richmond,  crossing  the  Chicka¬ 
hominy  below  New  Bridge. 

All  these  roads  from  the  Pamunkey  to  Richmond  commu¬ 
nicate  with  each  other  by  numerous  small  cross-roads. 

From  Hanover  Junction  several  roads  lead  to  the  points 
where  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  cross  the  Pamunkey, 
and  to  the  roads  by  which  it  would  advance  after  crossing. 
The  first  and  shortest  was  the  river-road  already  mentioned, 
passing  through  Hanover  Court  House.  At  the  Court  House, 
besides  the  river-road  and  the  Richmond  stage-road,  there  is 
one  that  leads  due  south  to  Atlee’s  Station ;  another  that  leads 
in  a  southeast  direction  past  Hawes’s  Shop,  and,  after  crossing 
the  Totopotomoy,  enters  the  Old  Church  road.  This  last  de¬ 
scribed  road  from  the  Court  House  has  a  branch  before  cross¬ 
ing  Crump’s  Creek  that  leads  direct  to  Pole  Green  Church. 

Another  of  the  routes  from  Hanover  Junction  passes 
through  Ashland  and  Atlee’s  to  Shady  Grove  Church  and 
Huntley’s  Corners  on  the  Hanover  Town  road  to  Richmond. 

Another  route  from  Hanover  Junction  south,  midway  be¬ 
tween  Hanover  Court  House  and  Ashland,  passes  through 
Merry  Oaks  and  leads  to  Atlee’s  Station,  at  which  point  the 
roads  from  the  Pamunkey  to  Richmond  south  of  Atlee’s  Sta¬ 
tion  are  near  at  hand. 

Not  long  after  midday  of  the  28th,  the  Sixth  Corps  had 
crossed  the  Pamunkey  and  was  in  position  across  the  Han¬ 
over  Court  House  or  river-road,  at  Crump’s  Creek.  The 
Second  Corps  followed  the  Sixth  closely,  and  formed  on  its 
left,  completing  the  cover  of  the  road  from  Crump’s  Creek 
to  Hawes’s  Shop. 

The  Fifth  Corps  crossed  the  Pamunkey  before  midday  of 


164  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


the  28th,  and  was  posted  with  its  right  on  the  road  to  Rich¬ 
mond,  two  miles  in  front  of  Hanover  Town,  and  its  left  near 
the  Totopotomoy,  where  it  is  crossed  by  the  road  from 
Hawes’s  Shop  to  Old  Church. 

It  was  midnight  before  the  Ninth  Corps  crossed  the  river. 
General  Wilson  remained  on  the  north  bank,  covering  the 
crossing  of  the  trains  until  the  morning  of  the  30th  of  May. 

On  the  morning  of  the  28th  General  Sheridan  was  directed 
to  make  a  demonstration  on  the  road  from  Hanover  Town  to 
Richmond  to  ascertain  where  the  enemy  was  posted;  and 
about  a  mile  beyond  Hawes’s  Shop  Gregg’s  division  encoun¬ 
tered  the  enemy’s  cavalry,  dismounted  and  occupying  tem¬ 
porary  breastworks  of  rails.  This  force,  General  Sheridan 
says,  appeared  to  be  the  Confederate  cavalry  corps  and  a 
brigade  of  South  Carolina  troops  armed  with  long-range 
rifles,  reported  to  be  4,000  strong,  and  commanded  by  Col¬ 
onel  Butler. 

But  I  learn  from  General  Fitzhugh  Lee  that  the  Confed¬ 
erate  cavalry  force  there  on  the  28th  consisted  of  his  own 
division  of  two  brigades,  Hampton’s  division  of  two  brigades, 
and  a  brigade  under  the  command  of  Colonel,  afterward 
General,  Butler,  which  had  recently  arrived  from  South  Caro¬ 
lina.  1  Fitzhugh  Lee  was  on  the  right  of  their  line,  Hampton 
on  the  left. 

A  long,  hard  contest  ensued,  and  continued  until  late  in 
the  evening,  when  Custer’s  brigade  (of  Torbert’s  division) 
and  Gregg’s  division  carried  the  intrenchments  and  drove 


1  This  brigade  consisted  of  the  Fourth,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  South  Carolina  regi¬ 
ments  and  the  Twentieth  Georgia  battalion.  Part  were  armed  with  long-range 
rifles.  Butler  was,  or  had  been,  Colonel  of  the  Sixth  South  Carolina.  Although 
this  brigade  had  never  been  in  action,  yet,  General  Sheridan  says,  it  did  good 
service  in  this  encounter. 

General  Dunovant  succeeded  General  Butler  in  the  command  of  the  brigade 
when  General  Butler  succeeded  General  Hampton  in  command  of  his  division, 
then  composed  of  Young’s,  Kosser’s,  and  Dunovant's  brigades. 


PASSAGE  OF  THE  PAMUNKEY  RIVER. 


165 


back  the  enemy.  Torbert,  with  Devin’s  and  Merritt’s  bri¬ 
gades,  was  also  brought  in  from  Crump’s  Creek  in  the  after¬ 
noon,  and  formed  on  Gregg’s  right,  but  was  not,  General 
Sheridan  says,  seriously  engaged. 

At  six  p.m.  General  Sheridan  reported  that  his  prisoners 
stated  that  General  Longstreet’s  and  General  Ewell’s  corps 
were  four  miles  from  Hawes’s  shop. 

Let  us  see  what  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  been 
doing  since  the  evening  of  the  26tli. 

At  seven  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  General  Lee 
telegraphed  to  Richmond  that  the  enemy  had  retired  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  North  Anna  during  the  night ;  that  a  por¬ 
tion  of  his  force  was  still  visible,  but  that  some  of  his  cavalry 
and  infantry  had  crossed  the  Pamunkey  River  at  Hanover 
Town,  and  that  he  had  sent  his  cavalry  in  that  direction  to 
check  the  movement,  and  that  he  would  move  his  army  to 
Ashland.  Ashland  is  a  station  on  the  Fredericksburg  Rail¬ 
road,  ten  miles  south  of  the  position  then  held  by  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  and  fourteen  miles  north  of  Richmond. 
Roads  radiate  from  it  in  all  directions. 

Ewell’s  corps,  on  the  Confederate  right  at  Hanover  Junc¬ 
tion,  under  the  command  of  General  Early,  General  Ewell 
being  ill,  crossed  the  South  Anna  at  the  Central  Railroad 
bridge,  and  moved  by  way  of  Merry  Oaks  and  Atlee’s  Sta¬ 
tion  to  Huntley’s  Corners  at  the  intersection  of  the  road 
from  Hanover  Town  to  Richmond  by  way  of  Hawes’s  shop 
with  the  road  from  White  House  to  Richmond  by  way  of 
Old  Church  and  Shady  Grove  Church.  Here  he  placed  his 
troops  in  position  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28tli  of  May  (after 
a  march  of  twenty-four  miles  from  Hanover  Junction),  cover¬ 
ing  the  roads  mentioned,  his  right  resting  near  Beaver  Dam 
Creek,  which  empties  into  the  Cliickahominy  near  Meclian- 
icsville,  his  left  on  the  Totopotomoy,  near  Pole  Green 
Church,  about  four  miles  from  Hawes’s  shop. 


166  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

Longstreet’s  corps,  under  the  command  of  General  An¬ 
derson,  crossed  the  South  Anna  by  the  Fredericksburg 
Bailroad  bridge,  and,  moving  by  Ashland  and  Atlee’s,  halted 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  28th  on  Early’s  right,  between  Hunt¬ 
ley’s  Corners  and  Walnut  Grove  Church,  covering  the  road 
from  White  House  by  Old  Church,  Bethesda  Church,  and 
Mechanicsville  to  Bichmond. 

Breckinridge’s  command  and  Hill’s  corps  formed  along 
the  Totopotomoy,  and  extended  from  Early’s  left  to  the 
vicinity  of  Atlee’s  Station,  crossing  the  railroad  a  mile  north 
of  it.  The  Confederate  cavalry  was  at  Hawes’s  shop  and 
Hanover  Court  House. 

It  will  be  perceived  that  while  we  were  securing  the  roads 
from  the  Pamunkey  to  Bichmond,  upon  which  to  advance 
against  Lee,  Lee  was  endeavoring  to  cover  those  roads. 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th,  the  commanders  of  the  Sixth, 
Second,  and  Fifth  Corps  were  directed  to  make  reconnois- 
sances  in  their  front,  supported  by  their  whole  force.  Gen¬ 
eral  Wright  toward  Hanover  Court  House,  General  Hancock 
on  the  roads  from  Hawes’s  shop  to  Atlee’s  and  to  Bichmond, 
General  Warren  on  the  Shady  Grove  road.  General  Burn¬ 
side  was  held  in  reserve  near  Hawes’s  shop.  General  Sher¬ 
idan,  with  Torbert’s  and  Gregg’s  divisions,  was  on  the  left 
of  the  army  on  the  Old  Church  road,  wTatcliing  the  roads  to 
Mechanicsville,  Cold  Harbor,  and  White  House.  General 
Wright’s  leading  division,  Bussell’s,  proceeded  to  Hanover 
Court  House,  meeting  with  no  opposition,  and  encountering 
only  small  parties  of  cavalry.  There  was  no  infantry  force 
of  the  enemy  in  that  vicinity.  General  Hancock’s  leading 
division,  Barlow’s,  met  only  the  enemy’s  vedettes,  until  it 
arrived  at  the  crossing  of  the  Totopotomoy  by  the  Bichmond 
road,  when  the  enemy  was  found  in  force  intrenched  on  the 
south  side,  and  a  brisk  skirmish  ensued.  General  Birney 
and  General  Gibbon  were  ordered  up,  the  former  placed  on 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


167 


Barlow’s  right,  the  latter,  on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  on 
Barlow’s  left,  and  on  the  left  of  the  Richmond  road.  Gen¬ 
eral  Hancock  had  before  him  the  left  of  Early’s  corps, 
Breckinridge’s  command  and  Hill’s  corps,  the  Confederate 
left.  General  Griffin’s  division  of  General  Warren’s  corps 
crossed  the  Totopotomoy,  and  moved  along  the  Shady  Grove 
Church  road,  encountering  only  the  enemy’s  infantry  pickets, 
which  fell  back  before  it.  The  enemy  being  in  force  on  this 
road,  Cutler’s  division  moved  over  to  Griffin.  The  Ninth 
Corps  was  in  reserve  between  the  Fifth  and  Second  Corps. 

It  was  apparent  that  we  were  close  upon  Lee’s  whole  army, 
which  was,  in  fact,  -well  intrenched  in  the  position  it  had 
taken  on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  as  already  described. 

The  infantry  were  directed  to  move  close  up  to  the  en¬ 
emy’s  position  the  next  morning — General  Wright  to  move 
at  daylight  of  the  30th,  form  on  Hancock’s  right,  and  en¬ 
deavor  to  place  his  corps  across  the  enemy’s  left  flank. 
Unfortunately,  the  heads  of  Crump’s  Creek  lay  in  the  coun¬ 
try  through  which  the  Sixth  Corps  moved  on  the  morning 
of  the  30th,  after  leaving  the  road  from  Hanover  Court 
House  to  Richmond,  and  formed  a  swamp  and  tangle  of  the 
worst  character,  which  delayed  the  arrival  of  the  corps  on 
Hancock’s  right,  until  it  was  too  late  for  it  to  effect  anything 
against  the  enemy  that  afternoon.  On  Hancock’s  front  bat¬ 
teries  were  put  up,  and  the  enemy’s  artillery  fire  silenced. 
The  skirmishing  here  was  incessant,  and  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  most  of  the  enemy’s  strongly  intrenched  skirmish 
line. 

Burnside’s  corps  formed,  with  sharp  skirmishing,  on 
Hancock’s  left,  and  at  the  close  of  the  day  had  crossed  the 
Totopotomoy,  and  had  its  right  resting  on  that  stream  near 
the  Whitlock  House,  and  its  left  near  the  Shady  Grove 
Church  road. 

Warren’s  corps  moved  along  the  Shady  Grove  Church 


168  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


road,  Griffin  leading,  Cutler  and  Crawford  following.  The 
enemy’s  infantry  and  skirmishers  fell  back,  Warren’s  follow¬ 
ing  them  until  they  entered  thickly  wooded,  swampy  ground, 
formed  by  several  small  affluents  of  the  Totopotomoy,  which 
here  crossed  the  road.  On  the  opposite  side  of  this  swampy 
ravine  was  Huntley’s  Corners,  occupied  by  Early,  well  in¬ 
trenched.  Warren’s  skirmishers  on  the  Old  Church  and 
Mechanicsville  pike,  three-quarters  of  a  mile  south  of  the 
Shady  Grove  Church  road,  had  encountered  all  day  small 
parties  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry,  and  now  the  skirmishing  in¬ 
creased.  It  was  still  thought  to  be  with  cavalry,  but  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  30th  General  Early,  in  accordance  with 
orders  from  General  Lee,  moved  to  his  right  across  Beaver 
Dam  Creek  to  the  Mechanicsville  and  Old  Church  pike,  and 
out  the  pike  to  Betliesda  Church,  and  was  then  across  War¬ 
ren’s  left.  Supposing  this  increased  skirmishing  to  be  with 
cavalry  parties,  General  Crawford  sent  a  brigade  over  to  look 
after  them,  and  Cutler  moved  up  to  the  support  of  Griffin. 
The  brigade  sent  by  Crawford  had  scarcely  arrived  in  the 
vicinity  of  Bethesda  Church,  when  Rodes’s  division,  of 
Early’s  corps,  moved  down  the  road  to  attack  them.  The 
contest  was  brief  ;  the  brigade  was  driven  back  to  the  Shady 
Grove  Church  road,  the  enemy  following.  A  battery  had  been 
well  posted  where  the  cross-road  from  Bethesda  Church  en¬ 
ters  the  Shady  Grove  Church  road,  and  by  its  effective  fire 
delayed  the  enemy  until  Crawford’s  remaining  brigade  and 
the  scattered  brigades  of  Cutler’s  division  could  be  brought 
up  and  put  in  position.  The  enemy  made  a  resolute  attack, 
but  was  repulsed  and  forced  to  retire,  losing,  among  others, 
Colonel  Willis,  Twelfth  Georgia,  commanding  Pegram’s  bri¬ 
gade,  mortally  wounded,  and  Colonel  Terrill,  Thirteenth 
Virginia,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Watkins,  Fifty-second  Vir¬ 
ginia,  killed.  General  Early  says  this  last  attacking  force 
was  Pegram’s  brigade,  and  one  of  Rodes’s  which  he  had 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


169 


sent  forward  to  feel  the  enemy  and  ascertain  his  strength, 
and  as  this  movement  showed  that  the  enemy  was  moving  to 
the  Confederate  right  flank,  he  withdrew  at  night  a  short  dis¬ 
tance  on  the  Meclianicsville  pike,  covering  it. 

General  Warren  says  that  toward  evening  the  Maryland 
brigade  swung  around  on  our  left  over  to  the  pike,  driving 
back  the  enemy’s  pickets  to  Bethesda  Church,  and  that  by 
ten  o’clock  the  enemy  had  abandoned  the  field,  moving  back 
on  the  pike,  leaving  some  of  their  wounded  and  dead  in  our 
hands. 

To  relieve  the  attack  on  General  Warren,  if  it  should  prove 
to  be  serious,  General  Hancock  was  directed  to  attack  as  soon 
as  he  could  find  a  suitable  place.  This  despatch  he  received 
a  little  after  seven  p.m.  There  was  no  place  on  his  line 
where  an  assault  could  be  made  with  success  at  short  notice, 
but  to  relieve  General  Warren,  he  gave  the  order  for  General 
Barlow’s  division  to  attack.  Barlow,  he  says,  moved,  as 
usual,  with  most  commendable  promptness,  and  Brooke’s 
brigade  of  his  division  advanced  just  at  dark  over  obstacles 
which  would  have  stopped  a  less  energetic  commander,  and 
carried  the  enemy’s  advanced  line  of  rifle-pits.  At  7.40  Gen¬ 
eral  Meade  ordered  the  attack  to  cease. 

When  Early  moved  from  Huntley’s  Corners.  General  An¬ 
derson  took  his  place  there,  Pickett  on  his  right,  Field  in 
the  centre,  Kershaw  on  the  left. 

General  Sheridan,  with  Torbert’s  and  Gregg’s  divisions, 
covered  the  left  of  the  army.  Some  cavalry  force  of  the 
enemy  being  in  position  on  the  road  from  Old  Church  to  Cold 
Harbor,  at  the  crossing  of  the  Matadequin  Creek,  near  Old 
Church,  General  Sheridan  attacked  it  about  one  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon  with  Torbert’s  division  and  drove  it  to  Cold  Harbor, 1 

1  Cold  Harbor.  Probably  so  named  after  the  former  home  of  an  early  settler.  I 
find  on  the  Ordnance  maps  of  England,  Cold  Harbor  Point,  on  the  Thames,  ten 
miles  below  London,  and  a  cluster  of  buildings  at  the  Point  called  Great  Cold 

XII.— 8 


170  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Torbert  taking  up  position  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  that 
place. 

Wilson’s  cavalry  division  was  on  the  right  at  Cramp’s 
Creek,  under  orders  to  cover  that  flank  and  destroy  the 
bridges  of  the  two  railroads  across  the  South  Anna,  and  as 
much  of  the  railroads  south  of  the  river  as  practicable. 

At  midday  of  the  30th,  General  Smith’s  transports  began 
to  arrive  at  the  White  House,  and  General  Grant,  upon  learn¬ 
ing  it  that  evening,  informed  General  Meade  that  Smith 
would  probably  debark  his  troops  during  the  night,  and 
move  up  the  south  bank  of  the  Pamunkey,  starting  early  on 
the  31st,  and  that  it  was  not  improbable  that  the  enemy, 
being  aware  of  Smith’s  movement,  might  feel  to  get  on  our 
left  flank,  to  cut  Smith  off,  or,  by  a  dash,  to  crush  him,  and 
get  back  before  we  were  aware  of  it ;  that  Sheridan  should 
therefore  be  notified  to  watch  the  enemy’s  movements  well 
out  toward  Cold  Harbor  and  also  on  the  Mechanicsville 
road,  and  send  a  brigade  early  in  the  morning  of  the  31st  to 
Smith,  the  brigade  to  return  with  him. 

But  Lee  did  not  learn  of  the  arrival  of  Smith’s  command 
at  the  White  House  until  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  of  June, 
at  which  time  it  had  already  been  engaged  at  Cold  Harbor.* 1 

On  the  31st  the  infantry  corps  were  pressed  up  against  the 
enemy  as  close  as  practicable  without  assaulting,  but  the  po¬ 
sition  was  so  strong  naturally,  and  so  well  intrenched,  and 
the  intrenchments  so  strongly  held  that  an  assault  was  not 


Harbor,  apparently  a  farm  or  country  place.  A  mile  above  Great  Cold  Harbor  is 
another  cluster  of  buildings  called  Little  Cold  Harbor,  and  about  seven  miles 
southwest  of  London  another  cluster  called  Cold  Harbor. 

1  The  first  notice  to  be  found  in  General  Lee’s  despatches  of  the  arrival  of 
Smith’s  troops  at  the  White  House  is  in  his  despatch  to  Richmond  in  the  evening 
of  the  1st  of  June,  in  which  he  says,  among  other  things  ;  “  A  force  of  infantry 
is  reported  to  have  arrived  at  Tunstall’s  Station  from  the  White  House  and  to  be 
extending  up  the  York  River  Railroad.  They  state  that  they  belong  to  Butler’s 
force.”  Tunstall’s  railroad  station  is  five  miles  from  the  White  House,  on  the 
road  up  the  south  bank  of  the  Pamunkey. 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


171 


attempted  ;  the  skirmish  lines,  however,  were  kept  up  against 
the  enemy’s,  and  an  attack  threatened. 

On  the  same  day  General  Sheridan,  in  pursuance  of  his  in¬ 
structions,  finding  the  enemy  at  Cold  Harbor,  Fitzhugh  Lee’s 
division,  apparently  meditating  an  attack  on  Torbert’s  divi¬ 
sion,  anticipated  them,  and,  with  Torbert,  attacked  Lee  in  the 
afternoon  and  gained  possession  of  the  position  of  Cold  Har¬ 
bor.  Gregg  followed  Torbert.  But  Clingman’s  brigade  of 
Hoke’s  division  came  up  to  Lee’s  support  about  dusk,  and 
General  Sheridan  deeming  he  could  not  hold  the  position 
against  the  force  accumulating  against  him  (Hoke’s  division 
was  not  far  off),  directed  Torbert  to  withdraw,  but  receiving  an 
order  from  General  Meade  to  hold  Cold  Harbor  at  all  hazards, 
returned,  and  during  the  night  modified  the  breastworks. 

Cold  Harbor 1  was  an  important  point  to  us,  as  it  was  on 
the  line  of  our  extension  to  the  left,  and  roads  concentrated 
there  from  Bethesda  Church,  from  Old  Church,  from  White 
House  direct,  from  New  Bridge,  and,  directly  or  indirectly, 
from  all  the  bridges  across  the  Cliickahominy  above  and 
below  New  Bridge.  Some  of  these  roads,  and  others  con¬ 
nected  with  them,  furnished  great  facilities  to  us  in  the 
movements  and  operations  that  took  place  here  and  those 
that  followed. 

On  the  right,  General  Wilson,  in  pursuance  of  his  orders, 
had,  on  the  31st,  a  sharp  encounter  with  General  Young’s 
cavalry  brigade  near  Hanover  Court  House,  and  got  posses¬ 
sion  of  that  place. 

The  detachment  General  Sheridan  sent  to  the  White 
House  returned  and  reported  the  road  clear ;  that  they  could 
get  no  information  of  the  enemy  being  anywhere  in  the  sec¬ 
tion  of  country  passed  over,  and  that  Smith’s  troops  were 
still  debarking. 

1  Sometimes  called  Old  Cold  Harbor  to  distinguish  it  from  New  Cold  Harbor,  a 
mile  west  of  it. 


172  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 

On  the  31st  Anderson’s  corps  (Longstreet’s)  was  placed  on 
the  right  of  Early’s,  and  Early  moved  somewhat  to  the  left, 
having  Rodes’s  division  west  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  Hoke’s 
division,  which  had  joined  Lee  on  the  night  of  the  28tli, 
was  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  line  near  Cold 
Harbor ;  Kershaw’s  division  near  Beulah  Church  (Woody’s), 
about  a  mile  north  of  Cold  Harbor,  Pickett’s  division  on  his 
left,  reaching  to  or  toward  Walnut  Grove  Church  road,  and 
Field  on  the  left  of  the  corps,  his  left  on  the  Meclianicsville 
pike.  This  general  line  was  partly  intrenched.  It  was  the 
intention,  General  Anderson  says,  to  make  a  strong  movement 
from  his  right,  with  Hoke  and  Kershaw,  toward  Cold  Harbor 
and  Beulah  Church,  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  June. 

The  presence  of  General  Hoke  near  Cold  Harbor  was 
known  to  General  Meade  from  Sheridan’s  reports,  but  it  was 
not  known  that  Kershaw  was  near  him,  or  that  Anderson’s 
(Longstreet’s)  corps  was  on  the  right  of  Early,  between 
Bethesda  Church  and  Cold  Harbor. 

An  attack  of  the  enemy’s  position  on  the  Totopotomoy, 
and  covering  the  Shady  Grove  Church  road  and  Mechanics- 
ville  pike,  giving  no  promise  of  success,  it  was  determined  to 
send  two  infantry  corps  to  maintain  possession  of  Cold  Har¬ 
bor,  and  attack  the  enemy  there  before  they  and  the  troops 
sent  to  their  support  could  intrench.  General  Wright  was 
directed  to  move  that  night,  and  make  every  effort  to  get  to 
Cold  Harbor  by  daylight  of  the  1st  of  June,  for  it  was  be¬ 
lieved  that  Sheridan  would  be  attacked  heavily  at  daybreak. 
But  Wright’s  only  practicable  route  was  through  Hawes’s 
shop  and  across  to  the  road  from  Old  Church  to  Cold  Har¬ 
bor,  a  night  march  of  more  than  fifteen  miles,  through  a 
strange  country  covered  with  an  intricate  network  of  narrow, 
ill-defined  roads. 

General  W.  F.  Smith  had  landed  about  12,500  men  at  the 
White  House  by  three  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  31st, 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


173 


and  leaving  General  Ames  there  with  2,500  men  to  guard  the 
landing-place,  marched  with  10,000  men  and  all  his  artillery, 
sixteen  guns,  toward  New  Castle  on  the  Pamunkey,  to  which 
place  he  had  been  directed  to  proceed  by  despatches  of  the 
28th  from  General  Rawlins,  General  Grant’s  Chief-of-Staff. 
All  his  troops  had  not  arrived, -nor  had  any  of  his  wagons  or 
ammunition.  About  ten  o’clock  at  night  he  halted  at  Bas¬ 
sett’s,  near  Old  Church,  his  troops  suffering  from  the  heat  of 
the  day,  and  from  being  unaccustomed  to  heavy  marching. 
Reporting  by  despatch  for  orders,  the  next  morning  at  day¬ 
light  he  received  an  order  from  General  Grant’s  Headquarters 
to  proceed  at  once  to  New  Castle  Ferry,  and  take  position 
between  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps.  Cold  Harbor  was  in¬ 
tended.  Marching  at  once,  General  Smith  perceived,  upon 
arriving  at  New  Castle  Ferry,  that  there  must  be  some  mis¬ 
take  in  his  order,  and  sent  word  to  General  Grant,  who,  in 
the  meantime,  hearing  of  the  mistake  that  had  been  made, 
had  sent  Colonel  Babcock  to  correct  it.  Some  four  or  five 
hours  were  lost  in  this  way,  and  the  march  of  the  troops  in¬ 
creased  several  miles. 

On  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  June  Hoke  did  not  become 
engaged,  but  took  position  on  the  right.  Kershaw,  how¬ 
ever,  attacked  Sheridan  with  two  of  his  brigades,  one  of 
them  his  own,  but  was  repulsed  by  the  fire  of  repeating-car¬ 
bines  and  artillery.  He  repeated  the  attack  with  the  same 
result,  Colonel  Keitt’s  regiment,  the  Twentieth  South  Caro¬ 
lina,1  giving  way,  and  Colonel  Keitt  himself  being  mortally 
wounded  in  the  effort  to  rally  it.  The  attack  was  not  re¬ 
newed,  and  at  nine  o’clock  General  Wright  arrived,  the  head 
of  his  column  near  at  hand.  As  soon  as  it  was  up,  the  cav¬ 
alry  were  relieved,  and  moved  toward  the  Chickahominy, 
covering  the  left  of  the  dTrmy. 

1  This  is  called  a  big  regiment  in  the  Official  Diary,  First  Corps.  It  was  ap¬ 
parently  a  newly-raised  regiment. 


174  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Tlie  arrival  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  observed  by  the  enemy, 
and  Kershaw  at  once  closed  in  to  the  right  on  Hoke,  Pickett 
on  Kershaw,  and  Field  on  Pickett. 

This  closing  in  to  the  right  by  Longstreet’s  corps,  which 
occupied  about  an  hour,  and  was  made  under  cover  of  in- 
trenchments  in  Warren’s  front  and  beyond  his  left,  was  ob¬ 
served  by  him  at  half -past  ten,  and  under  General  Meade’s 
order  to  attack,  he  deployed  Lockwood’s  and  Cutler’s  divi¬ 
sions,  but  these  troops  were  embarrassed  and  delayed  in 
forming  by  the  wooded  swamps  of  the  Totopotomoy  and 
Matadequin,  and  by  the  time  they  were  in  line  in  open 
ground  the  enemy’s  movement  to  the  right  had  ceased. 
Their  intrenchments  were  too  formidable  to  attack. 

By  two  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  the  Sixth  Corps  was  all 
up,  and  covered  the  roads  to  Cold  Harbor  from  Bethesda 
Church,  New  Bridge,  and  Despatch  Station  on  the  York  Kiver 
Railroad  near  the  Chickaliominy. 

In  the  course  of  the  morning  General  Smith  had  been 
placed  under  the  orders  of  General  Meade,  and  was  directed 
to  take  position  on  the  right  of  General  Wright,  and  en¬ 
deavor  to  hold  the  road  from  Cold  Harbor  to  Bethesda 
Church,  and  co-operate  with  General  Wright  in  his  attack. 
By  six  o’clock  he  was  in  position  on  the  right,  ready  to  ad¬ 
vance  to  the  attack. 

The  main  line  of  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  was  about 
fourteen  hundred  yards  distant  from  the  preliminary  position 
of  Generals  Wright  and  Smith,  the  interval  between  being 
mostly  open  ground.  On  Smith’s  right  the  open  ground  was 
of  less  width.  The  intrenchments  of  the  enemy’s  picket  or 
skirmish  line  were  from  three  to  four  hundred  yards  in  ad¬ 
vance  of  their  main  line  ;  much  of  it  was  in  a  narrow  strip  of 
pine  wood. 

The  intrenchments  ran  across,  and  were  at  right  angles 
with  the  road  from  Old  Cold  Harbor  to  New  Cold  Harbor 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


175 


(Richmond  road).  The  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  General 
Ricketts’s  division,  was  to  move  along  this  road,  having  Rus¬ 
sell’s  division  on  its  left,  Getty’s  (General  Neill  command¬ 
ing)  next,  Neill’s  brigade  being  refused  to  protect  the  left 
flank. 

General  Smith’s  line  was  formed  with  General  Devens  on 
the  left,  connecting  with  the  Sixth  Corps,  General  Brooks 
next  on  the  right  of  Devens,  and  General  Martindale  on  the 
right  of  the  corps,  his  division  refused.  General  Martindale 
was  to  hold  the  roads  leading  to  Bethesda  Church  and 
toward  Mechanicsville. 

Hoke’s  division  formed 1  the  Confederate  right,  his  left 
resting  near  the  road  upon  which  Ricketts’s  division  was  to 
advance.  Kershaw’s  division  was  on  Hoke’s  left,  then  Pick¬ 
ett’s,  Field’s  division  forming  the  left. 

At  six  o’clock  Wright  and  Smith  advanced  to  the  attack, 
under  heavy  artillery  and  musketry  fire.  Ricketts’s  division 
struck  the  main  line  of  intrencliments  at  Hoke’s  left  and 
Kershaw’s  right,  and  carried  them,2  Clingman’s  brigade  giv¬ 
ing  way ;  Wofford’s  on  his  left,  being  flanked,  did  the  same, 
together  with  the  right  of  Bryan’s  brigade.  Kershaw  recov¬ 
ered  the  ground  lost  by  Bryan,  and  captured  some  prisoners 
and  a  stand  of  colors. 3  Hunton’s  brigade  was  sent  to  Hoke’s 
assistance,  and  Gregg’s  to  Wofford,  and  a  new  line  was 
formed  in  rear  of  the  part  captured. 

General  Ricketts  took  over  500  prisoners.  The  loss  of  his 
division  in  killed  and  wounded  was  severe.  The  right  of 
Russell’s  division,  Upton’s  brigade,  took  part  with  Ricketts 
in  the  capture  of  the  intrenchments,  the  leading  regiment, 
the  Second  Connecticut  Artillery,  losing  53  killed,  187 


1  General  Fitz  Lee’s  cavalry  was  on  their  extreme  right. 

8  It  is  stated  in  the  Official  Diary  of  Longstreet’s  Corps  that  the  enemy  pene¬ 
trated  an  interval  between  Hoke  and  Kershaw. 

8  Official  Diary,  First  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 


176  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


wounded,  and  146  missing ;  tlieir  colonel,  Kellogg,  was 
killed  at  the  head  of  his  command. 

The  right  of  Getty’s  division  (Neill  commanding)  kept 
pace  with  the  left  of  Russell’s,  but  the  left  of  the  division 
was  not  heavily  engaged. 

The  Sixth  Corps  lost  in  this  engagement  about  1,200  killed 
and  wounded. 

Devens’s  division  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  passed  over  the 
wide  space  of  open  ground  under  heavy  fire,  and  captured 
•  the  enemy’s  advanced  intrencliments  in  the  pine  wood,  with 
250  prisoners,  and,  passing  through  the  wood,  came  close 
upon  the  main  line  of  intrenchments,  which  being  too 
strong  to  attack,  the  division  held  the  line  of  woods.  Gen¬ 
eral  Devens’s  leading  brigade  lost  heavily  in  officers  and 
men,  among  them  its  gallant  commander,  Colonel  Drake,  of 
the  One  Hundred  and  Twelfth  New  York. 

The  leading  brigade  of  General  Brooks’s  division  pushed 
through  the  open  ground  in  their  front,  driving  the  enemy 
before  them,  and  through  the  pine  wood,  until  they  came 
upon  the  main  line,  when  they  received  so  heavy  a  fire  that 
they  fell  back  to  the  woods. 

The  loss  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  was  about  1,000  killed 
and  wounded. 

Both  corps  at  once  intrenched  the  positions  they  had 
gained.  The  right  of  Smith  crossed  the  Bethesda  Church 
road  at  Woody’s  near  Beulah  Church.  During  the  day  the 
skirmish  lines  of  the  army  were  incessantly  engaged,  as  well 
as  the  artillery. 

In  the  afternoon  General  Hancock  was  ordered  to  with¬ 
draw  early  in  the  night,  and  make  every  effort  to  reach  Cold 
Harbor  by  early  morning  to  reinforce  Wright’s  left.  Gen¬ 
eral  Wright  was  advised  of  it,  and  directed  to  attack  as  early 
as  possible  in  the  morning,  Smith  to  attack  in  conjunction 
with  him,  Warren  also,  supported  by  Burnside.  But  Smith 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


177 


was  nearly  out  of  ammunition,  and  this,  with  the  well-known 
exhausting  effect  of  a  night  march  upon  troops  in  hot 
weather,  on  dusty  roads,  especially  when  they  had  been  ac¬ 
tively  engaged  all  day  in  close  contact  with  the  enemy, 
caused  a  postponement  of  the  hour  of  attack  to  five  in  the 
afternoon. 

During  the  1st,  Sheridan,  after  being  relieved  by  Wright 
at  Cold  Harbor,  moved  to  the  left  with  Gregg’s  and  Torbert’s 
divisions. 

Wilson,  on  the  right  of  the  army,  sent  Chapman’s  brigade 
to  destroy  the  two  railroad  bridges  over  the  South  Anna, 
while  McIntosh’s  brigade  proceeded  to  Ashland  Station  to 
cover  the  operation  and  destroy  as  much  of  the  railroad  as 
practicable.  McIntosh,  at  Ashland,  was  attacked  in  rear 
from  the  direction  of  Hanover  Court  House  by  Hampton, 
with  Rosser’s  brigade 1  (Wilson  says  Young’s  brigade  and 
other  troops),  and  then  from  the  direction  of  Richmond, 
part  of  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  division  joining  Rosser  in 
this  attack.  A  hot  engagement  ensued,  during  which  Wilson 
sent  the  First  Maine  from  Chapman’s  brigade  to  attack  the 
enemy’s  rear.  But  the  enemy’s  force  was  too  strong  for  him, 
and  McIntosh  was  obliged  to  fall  back  rapidly  toward  Han¬ 
over  Court  House,  Hampton  following  him  closely  until 
dark.  Wilson  halted  his  division  for  the  night  near  the 
Court  House  on  the  river-road.  Both  railroad  bridges  were 
destroyed,  and  the  roads  otherwise  injured. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2d,  General  Warren  was  directed  to 
extend  his  left  so  as  to  unite  with  Smith  at  Woody’s,  and 
to  contract  his  right  to  such  extent  as  to  make  one-half  his 
force  available  for  attack.  This,  it  was  expected,  would 
bring  his  right  to  the  vicinity  of  Bethesda  Church.  General 
Burnside  was  directed  to  withdraw  his  force  and  mass  it  in 


1  Lee’s  despatch  to  Secretary  of  War,  Richmond. 
8* 


178  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


rear  of  Warren’s  right,  to  protect  that  flank  and  support 
Warren.  But  this  gave  General  Warren  a  line  about  three 
miles  long,  the  left  of  which  he  held  chiefly  with  artillery. 
It  was  interrupted  here  and  there  by  the  swamps  of  the  Mat- 
adequin,  which  virtually  shortened  his  lines,  as  he  could 
command  the  swamps  without  occupying  them.  General 
Wilson  was  directed  to  cover  the  right  of  the  army  from  the 
vicinity  of  Bethesda  Church  to  the  Pamunkey.  The  main 
body  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  on  Lee’s  left,  Fitz  Lee’s 
division  on  his  right. 

Early  on  the  night  of  the  1st,  General  Hancock  began  to 
withdraw  ;  his  route  was  necessarily  circuitous  ;  every  effort 
possible  was  made  to  reach  Cold  Harbor  early  the  next  morn¬ 
ing,  but  the  night  was  dark,  the  heat  and  dust  oppressive, 
and  the  roads  unknown.  An  attempt  to  take  a  short  cut 
with  one  of  the  divisions,  where  artillery  could  not  follow, 
turned  out  to  be  a  cause  of  delay.  Notwithstanding  these 
difficulties,  the  head  of  th&?  column  was  at  Cold  Harbor  at 
half-past  six  in  the  morning,  but  in  such  an  exhausted  con¬ 
dition,  that  a  little  time  was  required  to  close  up  and  cook 
rations  (the  attack  ordered  for  the  morning  had  been  post¬ 
poned  until  five  in  the  afternoon). 

At  7.30  a.m.  the  corps  was  placed  in  position  on  the  left  of 
Wright,  brisk  skirmishing  going  on  during  and  after  the  for¬ 
mation.  Gibbon  was  put  across  the  road  from  Cold  Harbor 
to  Despatch  Station  by  way  of  Barker’s  mill,  Barlow  on  his 
left ;  Birney  went  to  Smith  until  the  afternoon.  This  al¬ 
lowed  the  Second  Division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  (Neill)  to  be 
transferred  from  the  left  to  the  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  and 
take  Devens’s  place.  Devens  was  then  transferred  to  the 
right  of  Smith’s  corps,  the  Eighteenth.  Brisk  skirmishing 
went  on  during  and  after  the  formation. 

In  view  of  the  movement  of  troops  during  the  night  and 
the  morning,  the  heat  of  the  day,  and  the  short  time  had  for 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


179 


preparation,  the  attack  was  postponed  until  half -past  four  in 
the  morning  of  the  3d,  and  the  corps  commanders  were 
directed  to  make  all  the  required  preparations. 

Perceiving  the  withdrawal  from  our  right,  General  Lee, 
on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  sent  General  Breckinridge  and 
General  Hill,  with  Wilcox’s  and  Malione’s  divisions,  to  his 
right,  Breckinridge  forming  on  the  high  ground  on  Hoke’s 
right,  Hill  on  Breckinridge’s  right,  Fitz  Lee  moving  across 
the  Chickaliominy  and  picketing  down  toward  the  James. 

Kershaw  was  supported  by  Anderson’s,  Law’s,  and  Gregg’s 
brigades  of  Field’s  division.  Early  remained  on  the  left 
with  his  own  corps  and  Heth’s  division.  Intrenching  went 
on  all  day,  with  heavy  skirmishing  and  artillery  fire. 

But  General  Lee  directed  General  Early  to  get  upon  our 
right  flank  and  drive  down  in  front  of  the  Confederate  line. 
To  carry  out  this  order  Bodes’s  division  moved  out  the  Shady 
Grove  Church  road  in  the  afternoon,  Gordon  swung  around 
to  keep  pace  with  Bodes,  and  Heth,  following  Bodes,  took 
position  on  his  left.  This  movement  brought  on  sharp  fight¬ 
ing,  which  lasted  until  night,  but  did  not  accomplish  what 
was  designed.  It  found  General  Burnside’s  withdrawal  un¬ 
finished,  and  his  skirmish  line,  occupying  the  corps  intrench- 
ments,  was  driven  from  them  by  Bodes’s  division,  and  a  large 
number  of  prisoners  taken  from  it.  In  this  way  Bodes’s 
troops  got  in  rear  of  the  Fifth  Corps  skirmishers  unper¬ 
ceived,  and  captured  a  number  of  them. 

Cutler  and  Crawford  held  the  long  line  from  Bethesda 
Church  to  Smith’s  right.  Griffin’s  division  was  massed  at 
Bethesda  Church,  but  as  soon  as  Early’s  movement  was 
discovered  it  was  formed  in  line,  Ayres  on  the  left,  Bart¬ 
lett  in  the  centre,  Sweitzer  on  the  right,  and  moved  forward 
under  musketry  and  artillery  fire,  to  the  attack  of  Bodes’s 
division,  which  had  advanced  from  the  Shady  Grove  Church 
road.  Bodes  was  forced  back  to  the  road,  and  in  this  en- 


180  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


counter  lost  a  gallant  officer,  Brigadier-General  Doles,  who 
was  killed. 

General  Crittenden’s  division  brought  up  the  rear  in  the 
withdrawal  of  Burnside,  and  was  attacked  with  some  vigor  in 
doing  so,  but  held  Heth  in  check  until  Willcox  and  Potter 
got  into  position  and  stopped  his  further  advance. 

Early’s  troops  remained  on  the  Shady  Grove  Church  road, 
and  intrenched  during  the  night,  while  Ramseur’s  division 
held  the  intrenchments  on  the  left  of  Anderson’s  (Long- 
street’s)  corps. 

The  whole  army  was  now  ordered  to  attack  at  half-past 
four  in  the  morning  of  the  3d,  except  the  cavalry  on  the  left. 
Wilson,  reinforced  by  3,000  infantry  and  2,000  cavalry  from 
Port  Royal,  was  ordered  to  move  from  Hanover  Court  House 
to  Hawes’s  shop  and  attack  the  enemy’s  left  flank  and  rear.1 

Lee’s  position  was  naturally  strong  on  the  right,  and  was 
made  strong  throughout  by  intrenchments,  which  everywhere 
had  open  ground  in  front  except  for  a  short  distance  through 
the  swamp  on  the  right  and  parts  of  General  Early’s  front. 
It  had  artillery  in  position  with  direct  and  flanking  fire. 
The  right  rested  on  the  Chickahominy  in  swampy  ground, 
but  soon  rose  to  high  ground,  and  ran  in  a  direction  a  little 
west  of  north  to  the  right  of  Early’s  position,  the  line  of 
which  was  about  northeast.  The  road  from  Despatch  Sta¬ 
tion  past  Barker’s  mill  to  Cold  Harbor  ran  along  the  foot  of 
the  high  ground  on  Lee’s  right  until  it  diverged  to  the  right 
toward  Cold  Harbor,  near  and  in  front  of  the  point  where 
Gibbon’s  division  crossed  the  road.  Along  this  part  of  the 
road,  near  the  foot  of  the  high  ground,  was  an  advanced  line 
of  Confederate  intrenchment.  Hill  and  Breckinridge  with 

1  General  Wilson,  reporting  at  8.10  a.m.,  June  3d,  says  of  the  reinforcement: 
“  Colonel  Cesnola’s  command  has  been  marching  all  night,  all  day  yesterday,  and 
is  still  on  the  road,”  etc. ;  he  had  only  about  1,400  efficient  infantry  and  1,000 
good  cavalry,  the  rest  being  1,200  or  1,500  disarmed  stragglers,  and  “  an  indiffer¬ 
ent  force  of  dismounted  cavalry  regiments.” 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


181 


probably  a  part  of  Hoke’s  division  held  here  in  front  of  the 
Second  Corps ;  then  followed  Hoke,  Longstreet’s  corps,  and 
Early’s  as  before  noted. 

Lee’s  position  was  about  six  miles  from  the  main  line  of  the 
Richmond  exterior  intrenchments,  his  right  only  about  half 
that  distance  from  the  most  advanced  intrenchments. 

The  Chickahominy  was  in  its  lowest  stage  of  water,  and 
could  be  crossed  anywhere  by  infantry  above  Lee’s  right. 

This  proximity  to  the  defences  of  Richmond,  together  with 
the  condition  of  the  Chickahominy,  appeared  to  bring  turning 
movements  to  an  end,  though  from  what  took  place  subse¬ 
quently,  when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  crossing  the 
James,  it  appears  probable  that  such  a  movement  by  our  left 
would  have  brought  on  an  engagement  somewhere  between 
the  Chickahominy  and  Malvern  Hill,  though  on  conditions 
similar  to  those  that  had  attended  previous  encounters. 
Lee’s  right  was  secure.  His  left  being  among  the  wooded 
swamps  of  the  heads  of  the  Totopotomoy  and  Matadequin, 
made  it  difficult  of  attack.  The  front  was  the  assailable  part, 
though  it  had  not  been  reported  that  it  was  practicable  to 
carry  it  by  assault ;  and  the  question  was  whether  to  take  the 
chances  of  an  assault  there,  which,  if  successful,  would  give 
the  opportunity  of  inflicting  severe  loss  upon  Lee  when  fall¬ 
ing  back  over  the  Chickahominy,  as  that  must  necessarily  be 
attended  with  some  disorder  of  his  troops.  General  Grant 
decided  to  make  the  attack.  As  already  stated,  the  order 
was  issued  fixing  half-past  four  in  the  morning  for  the  hour. 

It  will  be  perceived  that  from  Smith’s  right  near  Woody’s 
to  Bethesda  Church,  a  distance  by  the  line  occupied  of  nearly 
three  miles,  no  effective  attack  could  be  made  upon  the 
enemy ;  the  Fifth  Corps  not  only  occupied  this  line,  but  ex¬ 
tended  nearly  a  mile  to  the  right  of  it,  uniting  then  with  Burn¬ 
side.  From  Field’s  division,  which  occupied  a  large  part  of 
the  Confederate  intrenchments  opposite  this  long  thin  line 


182  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

I 

from  Bethesda  Clrarch  to  Woody’s,  Law’s,  Gregg’s,  and  An¬ 
derson’s  brigades  had  been  sent  to  strengthen  Kershaw,  and 
Hunton’s  brigade  of  Pickett’s  division,  on  the  right  of  Field, 
had  been  sent  to  reinforce  Hoke. 

The  2d  of  June  was  a  hot,  sultry  day,  as  those  preceding 
it  had  been,  and  wherever  troops  and  wagons  moved  the 
dust  hung  in  dense  clouds.  About  five  o’clock  in  the  after¬ 
noon  it  began  to  rain,  and  the  rain  continued,  with  slight  in¬ 
termissions,  all  night,  proving  to  be  of  great  comfort  to  the 
men. 

The  assaulting  was  to  be  done  by  the  Second,  Sixth,  and 
Eighteenth  Corps.  Promptly  at  the  hour  these  corps  ad¬ 
vanced  to  the  attack,  under  heavy  artillery  and  musketry  fire, 
and  carried  the  enemy’s  advanced  rifle-pits.  But  then  the 
fire  became  still  hotter  and  cross-fires  of  artillery  swept 
through  the  ranks,  from  the  right  of  Smith  to  the  left  of 
Hancock.  Notwithstanding  this  destructive  fire  the  troops 
went  forward  close  up  to  the  main  line  of  intrenchments, 
but  not  being  able  to  carry  them,  quickly  put  themselves 
under  cover,  and  maintained  the  positions  they  had  gained, 
which  in  some  places  were  but  thirty,  forty,  and  fifty  yards 
from  the  enemy’s  works.  The  loss  in  officers  and  men 
was  heavy,  and  especially  so  in  brigade  and  regimental 
commanders,  who  are  the  leaders  in  action.  The  greater 
part  of  the  fighting  was  over  in  an  hour  or  less,  though 
attacks  were  renewed  after  that  time.  The  killed  and 
wounded  of  these  three  corps  in  that  time  exceeded  4,000. 
Including  the  Fifth  and  Ninth  Corps,  the  total  number 
killed  and  wounded  was  over  5, 600.  It  is  probable,  indeed, 
that  the  numbers  were  considerably  larger  than  those  I  have 
given. 

The  attack  of  the  Second  Corps  was  made  by  Barlow’s  di¬ 
vision  on  the  left,  Gibbon’s  on  the  right,  Birney  supporting 
them.  Barlow  formed  in  two  lines  of  battle,  the  brigades  of 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


183 


Miles  and  Brooke  in  the  front  line,  those  of  Byrnes  and 
McDongall  in  the  second  line.  Gibbon  formed  in  two  lines, 
the  first  in  line  of  battle  consisting  of  Tyler’s  and  Smith’s 
brigades,  the  second  consisting  of  McKeon’s  and  Owen’s 
brigades,  in  close  columns  of  regiments. 

Barlow7  advancing  came  against  the  salient  work  along  the 
road  from  Despatch  Station,  which,  after  a  severe  struggle, 
he  carried,  captured  two  or  three  hundred  prisoners,  a  color, 
and  three  guns,  turning  the  guns  upon  the  enemy,  and  fol¬ 
lowing  them  as  they  retreated  from  that  portion  of  the  line 
into  their  main  works.  But  his  second  line  did  not  get  up 
in  time  to  support  the  first,  w7hich  under  the  close  musketry 
and  artillery  fire  of  the  main  works  and  a  sweeping  enfilade 
artillery  fire  which  now  opened  on  them,  followed  by  an  at¬ 
tack  made  by  Breckinridge’s  troops,  reinforced  by  Hill’s, 
was  forced  out  of  the  captured  works  ;  but  taking  advantage 
of  a  slight  crest  some  thirty  to  seventy-five  yards  distant 
from  them,  maintained  a  position  there,  putting  themselves 
under  cover  in  a  short  time.  The  gallant  Colonel  Brooke 
was  severely  wounded  in  the  assault,  falling  at  the  moment 
his  troops  entered  the  enemy’s  works.  Colonel  Byrnes, 
Twenty-eighth  Massachusetts,  and  Colonel  Morris,  Sixty-sixth 
New  York,  tried  and  excellent  officers,  were  killed. 

Gibbon  had  ordered  his  second  line  to  follow  the  first 
promptly,  push  rapidly  forward  and  pass  over  the  front  line 
in  column,  and  effect  a  lodgment  if  possible  in  the  enemy’s 
works,  and  then  deploy.  His  line  was  cut  in  two  by  an  im¬ 
passable  swamp,  which  widened  as  he  advanced  toward  the 
enemy.  The  troops  pushed  gallantly  forward  close  up  to 
the  enemy’s  works,  under,  General  Gibbon  says,  a  terrific  fire 
of  artillery  and  musketry.  General  Tyler  fell  early  in  the 
action,  severely  wounded.  McKeon,  following  on  the  right 
of  Tyler’s  brigade,  struggled  against  the  heavy  fire  of  the 
enemy  until  he  and  many  of  his  command  were  killed,  and 


184  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


his  ranks  thinned  and  scattered.  Colonel  Haskell,  Thirty- 
sixth  Wisconsin,  succeeding  to  McKeon’s  command,  was  soon 
carried  from  the  field  mortally  wounded  in  a  second  attempt 
to  carry  the  enemy’s  works.  Colonel  McMahon,  One  Hun¬ 
dred  and  Sixty-fourth  New  York,  forming  the  left  of  Mc¬ 
Keon’s  brigade,  but  separated  from  it  by  the  swamps,  gained 
the  breastworks  with  a  portion  of  his  regiment,  and  whilst 
alongside  of  his  colors,  cheering  on  his  men,  fell,  with  many 
wounds,  dying  in  the  enemy’s  hands,  they  capturing  his  col¬ 
ors  and  the  men  with  them.  A  portion  of  Smith’s  brigade 
also  gained  the  enemy’s  intrenchments,  but,  General  Gibbon 
says,  bffing  unsupported  were  unable  to  hold  them,  for,  he 
adds,  General  Owen,  instead  of  pushing  forward  in  column 
through  Smith’s  line,  deployed  on  his  left  as  soon  as  the  lat¬ 
ter  became  fully  engaged,  and  thus  lost  the  opportunity  of 
supporting  the  lodgment  made  by  Smith  and  McMahon. 
To  the  names  of  the  officers  already  mentioned  must  be 
added  that  of  Colonel  Porter,  Eighth  New  York  Heavy  Ar¬ 
tillery,  who  was  killed  a  few  yards  from  the  enemy’s  works. 

The  division,  General  Gibbon  says,  lost  in  this  assault  65 
officers  and  1,032  men  killed  and  wounded ;  and  from  the 
3d  to  the  12th  of  June,  when  it  was  occupied  in  perfecting 
its  position  and  pushing  forward  works  toward  the  enemy, 
constantly  under  fire,  both  artillery  and  musketry,  day  and 
night,  it  lost  besides,  280  officers  and  enlisted  men  killed  and 
wounded. 

The  loss  of  the  two  divisions  on  this  day,  and  until  the 
army  moved  from  Cold  Harbor,  was  2,217  officers  and  men 
killed  and  wounded. 

The  assault  of  the  Second  Corps  could  not  be  renewed 
unless  the  enemy’s  enfilading  artillery  fire  could  be  silenced, 
and  there  were  no  good  artillery  positions  available  for  that 
purpose,  though  guns  were,  as  soon  as  practicable,  put  in 
covered  positions  for  the  purpose.  But,  anxious  as  both 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR.  185 

v  / 

General  Grant  and  General  Meade  were  that  the  attempt  to 
carry  the  works  shonld  be  renewed,  if  practicable,  General 
Hancock  did  not  consider  it  wise  to  make  another  assault. 

The  Sixth  Corps  advanced  to  the  attack,  with  Russell’s 
division  on  the  left,  Ricketts’s  in  the  centre,  Neill’s  (Getty’s) 
on  the  right.  The  advanced  rifle-pits  were  carried  on  the 
right,  and  then  the  assault  on  the  main  line  was  made,  but 
was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Yet  positions  were  gained 
and  held  close  to  the  works,  at  some  points  only  thirty  or 
forty  yards  from  them. 1 

During  all  the  time,  besides  the  direct  fire,  there  was  an 
enfilade  artillery  fire  that  swept  through  the  ranks  from  the 
right  and  from  the  left. 

The  casualties  of  the  corps  were  some  800  killed  and 
wounded,  among  the  number  valuable  officers. 

General  Smith,  in  his  report  of  this  battle,  gives  a  clear 
and  brief  account  of  the  part  taken  in  it  by  his  command. 
He  says  :  “In  front  of  my  right  was  an  open  plain  swept  by 
the  fire  of  the  enemy,  both  direct  and  from  our  right ;  on 
my  left  the  open  space  was  narrower,  but  equally  covered  by 
the  artillery  of  the  enemy.  Near  the  centre  was  a  ravine,  in 
which  the  troops  would  be  sheltered  from  the  cross-fire,  and 
through  this  ravine  I  determined  that  the  main  assault 
should  be  made.  General  Devens’s  division  had  been  placed 
on  the  right  to  protect  our  flank,  and  hold  as  much  as  possi¬ 
ble  of  the  lines  vacated  by  the  troops  moving  forward. 
General  Martindale,  with  his  division,  was  ordered  to  move 
down  the  ravine,  while  General  Brooks,  with  his  division, 
was  to  advance  on  the  left,  taking  care  to  keep  up  the  con¬ 
nection  between  Martindale  and  the  Sixth  Corps  ;  and  if,  in 
the  advance,  those  two  commands  should  join,  he  (Brooks) 
was  ordered  to  throw  his  command  behind  General  Martin- 

1  The  only  reports  on  file  are  those  of  five  brigade  commanders.  There  are 
none  from  the  corps  and  division  commanders. 


186  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


dale,  ready  to  operate  on  the  right  flank,  if  necessary.  The 
troops  moved  promptly  at  the  time  ordered,  and,  driving  in 
the  skirmishers  of  the  enemy,  carried  his  first  line  of  works, 
or  rifle-pits.  Here  the  command  was  halted,  under  a  severe 
fire,  to  readjust  the  lines.”  Inspecting  General  Martindale’s 
front,  General  Smith  found  that  he  had  to  form  a  line  of 
battle  faced  to  the  right  to  protect  the  right  flank  of  the 
moving  column  (the  enemy’s  intrenchments  making  a  partial 
re-entrant  here),  and  that  he  could  not  advance  farther  unless 
the  Sixth  Corps  covered  his  left  from  a  cross-fire — a  cross-fire, 
however,  from  which  we  have  seen  the  Sixth  Corps  was  also 
suffering.  General  Martindale  was  ordered  to  keep  his 
column  covered  as  much  as  possible,  and  to  move  only  when 
General  Brooks  moved.  General  Martindale,  hearing  the 
firing  in  front  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  mistook  it  for  Brooks’s, 
and  made  three  gallant  assaults  with  Stannard’s  brigade,  but 
was  repulsed  each  time.  This  brought  so  severe  a  cross-fire 
upon  Brooks,  who  was  forming  his  column  of  attack,  that  he 
was  ordered  to  keep  his  men  under  shelter  until  it  was  over. 
The  fire  from  the  right  came  from  a  part  of  the  enemy’s 
works  against  which  no  part  of  our  attack  was  directed,  and 
General  Smith  was  unable  to  keep  it  down  with  his  artillery. 
Reporting  the  condition  in  his  front,  General  Smith  said 
that  his  troops  were  very  much  cut  up,  and  that  he  had  no 
hope  of  being  able  to  carry  the  works  in  his  front  unless  the 
Sixth  Corps  could  relieve  him  from  the  galling  fire  on  his 
left  flank.  To  this  General  Meade  replied  (eight  a.m.)  that 
General  Wright  had  been  ordered  to  assault  without  refer¬ 
ence  to  his,  General  Smith’s,  advance,  and  that  he,  General 
Smith,  must  continue  his  assaults  without  reference  to  Gen¬ 
eral  Wright,  who  but  a  short  time  before  had  reported  that 
his  assault  was  waiting  for  General  Smith’s. 

To  this  General  Smith  says,  General  Devens’s  command, 
which  held  his  right,  had  been  so  much  cut  up  in  officers  and 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


187 


men  during  the  two  days  previous,  that  he  did  not  deem  it  in 
condition  to  do  more  than  act  on  the  defensive.  Of  the  two 
.  brigades  of  General  Martindale’s  division,  General  Stannard’s 
had  been  too  much  reduced  by  the  assault  to  be  sent  in 
again,  and  Colonel  Stedman’s  brigade,  in  addition  to  having 
been  repulsed,  was  holding  a  line  he  could  not  neglect.  Of 
the  three  brigades  of  General  Brooks,  two  had  suffered 
severely  during  the  first  advance  and  the  holding  of  the 
ground  gained  under  a  terrible  cross-fire  ;  and  there  was  left 
of  fresh  troops  only  the  brigade  of  General  Burnham,  which 
was  ordered  to  the  front  to  form  a  column  of  attack.  But 
the  severe  flank  fire  from  the  right,  which  General  Smith 
says  went  through  his  line  into  the  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
must  first  be  silenced  ;  and  later  in  the  day  additional  artil¬ 
lery  was  sent  him  for  the  purpose ;  but  at  half-past  one 
o’clock  General  Meade  suspended  all  further  offensive  opera¬ 
tions,  and  directed  corps  commanders  to  intrench  the  posi¬ 
tions  they  held,  and  make  reconnoissances  with  a  view  to 
moving  against  the  enemy’s  works  by  regular  approaches 
from  the  advanced  positions  they  held. 

The  killed  and  wounded  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  num¬ 
bered  about  a  thousand.  The  loss  in  leading  officers  on  this 
day,  as  well  as  on  the  1st  of  June,  was  severe.  Among  the 
killed  on  the  two  days  were  Colonel  Meade  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonels  Perry,  Anderson,  and  Marshall,  all  commanding 
regiments. 

The  order  of  General  Meade  suspending  the  attacks  was 
issued  upon  receiving  a  despatch  from  General  Grant,  stating 
that  as  the  corps  commanders  were  not  sanguine  of  success 
in  case  an  assault  was  made,  that  further  advance  might  be 
suspended  for  the  present ;  that  advances  to  advantageous 
positions  should  be  made  by  regular  approaches,  after  due 
reconnoissance  ;  that  to  aid  the  expedition  under  General 
Hunter  it  was  necessary  to  detain  all  the  army  then  with 


188  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 


Lee  until  Hunter  got  well  on  liis  way  to  Lynchburg.  This 
would  be  more  effectually  done  by  keeping  the  enemy  out  of 
the  intrenchments  of  Richmond  than  by  forcing  him  into 
them.  It  should  be  mentioned  that  as  early  as  seven  o’clock 
General  Grant  had  directed  General  Meade  to  suspend  the 
offensive  the  moment  it  became  certain  that  an  assault  could 
not  succeed. 

General  Burnside  threw  forward  Generals  Potter  and  Will- 
cox  early  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  and  took  the  advanced 
rifle-pits  of  Early’s  left  (those  taken  by  Willcox  having  been 
captured  from  him  the  evening  before)  and  established  these 
divisions  close  up  to  the  enemy’s  main  line.  One  o’clock  was 
fixed  upon  by  him  for  an  attack  upon  the  main  works  by  the 
three  divisions,  as  by  that  hour  it  was  expected  that  the  ar¬ 
tillery  put  in  position  would  silence  the  severe  enfilading  fire 
of  the  enemy.  General  Wilson  wTas  to  co-operate  by  an  at¬ 
tack  on  Early’s  rear. 

The  order  suspending  further  offensive  operations,  how¬ 
ever,  was  received  just  as  the  skirmishers  wTere  about  to  move, 
but  not  long  after  Early  attacked  vigorously  and  was  repulsed. 

The  fighting  was  sharp  during  the  day,  the  killed  and 
wounded  of  the  corps  numbering  about  800,  and  including, 
General  Burnside  says,  some  of  their  best  officers  and  men. 

General  Warren,  co-operating  with  General  Burnside,  had 
General  Griffin’s  division,  moving  and  attacking  Rodes’s  and 
Heth’s  divisions  in  concert  with  Burnside’s  troops  and  push¬ 
ing  Early  off  from  the  Shady  Grove  Church  road.  While 
Warren  was  thus  attacking  from  his  right,  Gordon  attacked 
his  right  centre,  but  was  repulsed.  The  Fifth  Corps  line 
was  too  extended  for  offensive  operations,  and  about  noon 
Birney’s  division  of  the  Second  Corps  was  sent  to  hold  its 
left.  But  the  order  suspending  offensive  operations  was  re¬ 
ceived  by  the  time  this  division  was  in  position.  The  losses 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  wrere  some  400  killed  and  wounded. 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


189 


General  Wilson,  after  establishing  Cesnola’s  force  on 
Burnside’s  right,  moved  across  the  Totopotomoy  to  Hawes’s 
shop,  attacked  the  enemy  there,  Barringer’s  brigade,  W.  H. 
F.  Lee’s  division,  and  drove  them  from  the  rifle-pits,  losing 
several  valuable  officers,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Preston  killed, 
and  Colonel  Benjamin  severely  wounded.  The  enemy  with¬ 
drew  on  the  road  to  Enon  Church  in  the  direction  of  their 
former  infantry  intrenchments  on  the  Totopotomoy.  Gen¬ 
eral  Wilson  then  attacked  Heth’s  left  rear  near  Via’s,  on  the 
road  running  south  from  Hawes’s  shop,  engaging  a  brigade 
of  three  regiments,  and  got  possession  of  their  rifle-pits, 
which  he  held  for  an  hour.  Failing  to  connect  with  Burn¬ 
side’s  infantry,  he  withdrew  to  Hawes’s  shop. 

General  Lee,  in  reporting  the  operations  of  the  day  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  at  Richmond,  says  of  this:  “General 
Hampton  encountered  the  enemy’s  cavalry  near  Hawes’s 
shop,  and  a  part  of  General  Wm.  H.  F.  Lee’s  division  drove 
them  from  their  intrenchments.” 

General  Early  says  :  “  There  were  repeated  attacks  on 
Rodes’s  and  Heth’s  fronts  on  the  3d,  those  on  Cook’s  brigade 
of  Heth’s  division  being  especially  heavy,  but  all  of  them 
were  repulsed.  There  was  also  heavy  skirmishing  on  Gor¬ 
don’s  front.  During  the  day  Heth’s  left  was  threatened  by 
the  enemy’s  cavalry,  but  it  was  kept  off  by  Walker’s  brigade 
under  Colonel  Fry,  which  covered  that  flank,  and  also  re¬ 
pulsed  an  effort  of  the  enemy’s  infantry  to  get  to  our  rear. 
As  it  was  necessary  that  Heth’s  division  should  join  its  corps 
on  the  right,  and  my  flank  in  this  position  was  very  much 
exposed,  I  withdrew  at  the  close  of  the  day  to  the  line  pre¬ 
viously  occupied,  and  next  morning  Heth  moved  to  the 
right.”  General  Early  does  not  mention  his  losses. 

About  eight  o’clock  in  the  evening,  the  right  of  Barlow 
and  the  left  of  Gibbon  were  sharply  attacked,  but  the  enemy 
was  repulsed.  The  Diary  of  Longstreet’s  Corps  says  of  this  : 


190  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


‘  ‘  At  dark  a  final  and  furious  assault  is  made  on  Martin,  the 
right  brigade  of  Hoke.  Hunton  also  severely  engaged.” 

General  Lee,  in  reporting  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the 
4th  of  June,  says:  “Last  night,  after  the  date  of  my  des¬ 
patch,  Generals  Breckinridge  and  Finnegan  were  attacked 
by  the  enemy  as  they  were  preparing  to  re-establish  their 
skirmish  line.  The  enemy  wTas  soon  repulsed.  Immediately 
afterward  an  attack  was  made  upon  General  Hoke’s  front, 
with  a  like  result.” 

The  lines  were  so  close  that  an  attempt  to  establish  a 
picket  line  brought  on  a  sharp  contest,  in  which  each  side 
thought  the  other  the  attacking  party. 

Although  the  lines  were  advanced  by  regular  approaches 
(they  were  so  close  to  the  enemy’s  intrenchments,  and  the 
ground  was  so  open,  they  could  not  be  advanced  in  any 
other  way),  yet  an  assault  gave  no  promise  of  success.  The 
army  remained  in  position  here  until  the  night  of  the  12th, 
when  it  withdrew  to  cross  the  James  River.  The  daily  skir¬ 
mishing  during  that  time  was  sharp,  and  caused  severe  loss 
in  some  divisions ;  during  the  nights  there  was  heavy  artil¬ 
lery  firing,  and  sometimes  heavy  musketry.  The  labor  in 
making  the  approaches  and  strengthening  the  intrenchments 
was  hard.  The  men  in  the  advanced  part  of  the  lines, 
which  were  some  miles  in  length,  had  to  lie  close  in  narrow 
trenches  with  no  water,  except  a  little  to  drink,  and  that  of 
the  worst  kind,  being  from  surface  drainage  ;  they  were  ex¬ 
posed  to  great  heat  during  the  day ;  they  had  but  little 
sleep ;  their  cooking  was  of  the  rudest  character.  For  over 
a  month  the  army  had  had  no  vegetables,  and  the  beef  used 
was  from  cattle  which  were  exhausted  by  a  long  march 
through  a  country  scantily  provided  with  forage.  Dead 
horses  and  mules  and  offal  were  scattered  over  the  country, 
and  between  the  lines  were  many  dead  bodies  of  both  parties 
lying  unburied  in  a  burning  sun.  The  country  was  low  and 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


191 


marshy  in  character.  The  exhausting  effect  of  all  this  began 
to  show  itself,  and  sickness  of  malarial  character  increased 
largely.  Every  effort  was  made  to  correct  this  ;  large  quan¬ 
tities  of  vegetables  were  brought  up  to  the  army,  and  a  more 
stringent  police  enforced.  So  much  was  every  one  absorbed 
in  the  offensive  operations  against  the  enemy  that,  for  a  brief 
time,  the  police  duties  for  the  maintenance  of  cleanliness 
and  health  had  not  been  as  closely  looked  after  as  usual. 
The  good  effect  of  these  efforts  was  soon  apparent. 

According  to  the  report  of  the  Medical  Director,  Surgeon 
McParlin,  the  wounded  brought  to  the  hospitals  from  the 
battle  of  the  3d  of  June  numbered  4,517.  The  killed  were 
at  least  1,100.  The  wounded  brought  to  the  hospitals  from 
the  battle  of  the  1st  of  June  were  2,125;  the  killed  were  not 
less  than  500.  The  wounded  on  the  1st  and  3d  of  June  were, 
therefore,  6, 642,  and  the  killed  not  less  than  1, 600 ;  but 
adopting  the  number  of  killed  and  missing  furnished  Gen¬ 
eral  Badeau  from  the  Adjutant-General’s  Office,  1,769  killed, 
1,537  missing  (many — most,  indeed — of  them,  no  doubt, 
killed),  we  have  8,411  for  the  killed  and  wounded,  and  for 
the  total  casualties,  9,948.  Previous  to  June  1,  and  after 
crossing  the  Pamunkey,  we  have  1, 622  wounded, 1  400  killed, 
and  about  1,000  missing,  making  a  total  of  10,433  killed  and 
wounded,  and  a  total  of  casualties  of  12, 970. 2 


1  Received  at  the  hospitals  from — 

Second  Corps . 

Fifth  Corps . 

Sixth  Corps . 

Ninth  Corps . 

Cavalry  Corps . 


732  wounded. 


5C0 

14  “ 

76  “ 

300 


Total .  1,622 

2  Surgeon  McParlin  further  states  in  his  report  that  the  number  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing  from  the  time  of  crossing  the  Pamunkey  to  the  evening  of  the  12th 
of  June,  may  be  estimated  as  follows,  excluding  the  Eighteenth  Corps.  Number 
of  wounded,  according  to  the  classified  returns,  7,545 ;  number  of  wounded,  strag¬ 
gling,  and  unrecorded  (slightly  wounded,  A.  A.  H.),  900  ;  total,  8,445.  Number 
killed,  according  to  regimental  reports,  1,420  ;  number  missing,  1,864.  Total  of 


192  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


At  tlie  close  of  tlie  day  on  the  3d  of  June  there  were  many 
of  our  wounded  lying  between  the  lines  and  very  near  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments,  completely  covered  by  the  fire  of  his 
pickets  and  sharpshooters.  But  our  men  made  extraordinary 
efforts  by  night  to  get  in  their  wounded  comrades,  and  so 
far  succeeded  that  very  few  were  left.  There  were  many 
dead  of  both  sides  lying  there  unburied,  and  General  Grant 
proposed  an  arrangement  with  General  Lee  for  bringing  in 
the  wounded  and  burying  the  dead.  This  proposition  was 
made  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5tli,  but  no  cessation  of  hos¬ 
tilities  for  the  purpose  took  place  until  the  afternoon  of  the 
7tli,  when  a  truce  was  agreed  upon  from  six  to  eight  in  the 
evening.  Yery  few  wounded  were  collected.  Of  those  not 
brought  in  at  night  by  their  comrades,  as  before  mentioned, 
the  greater  number  had  died  of  their  wounds  and  exposure. 
The  dead  were  buried  where  they  lay. 

The  number  of  casualties  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
during  this  period,  from  the  27th  of  May  to  the  12th  of  June, 
are  nowhere  stated.  General  Lee  reported  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  on  the  3d  of  June,  that  his  loss  that  day  was  small. 
Up  to,  and  including,  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  June,  they 
were  probably  nearly  equal  to  our  own ;  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  1st  of  June,  less  than  ours,  but  still  severe  ;  on  the  3d  of 
June,  very  much  less  than  ours.  According  to  the  Tabular 
Statement  of  the  “  Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the  War,” 
the  number  of  its  wounded,  from  the  1st  to  the  12th  of  June, 
was  1, 200 ;  its  missing,  500.  This  would  make  its  killed  and 
wounded  about  1,500.  The  authority  for  the  statement  is 
not  given.  The  actual  number  was  probably  much  greater. 
But  even  that  number,  when  added  to  the  probable  number 
of  killed  and  wounded  between  the  27th  of  May  and  midday 


casualties,  11,729.  The  losses  in  the  Eighteenth  Corps  he  estimates  at  1,900 
wounded,  500  killed  and  missing;  total,  2,400.  Grand  total,  14,129.  The  num¬ 
ber  of  sick  sent  to  general  hospitals  North,  3,000.  Total  loss,  17,129. 


TOTOPOTOMOY  AND  COLD  HARBOR. 


193 


of  tlie  1st  of  June,  would  give  between  three  and  four  thou¬ 
sand  killed  and  wounded  for  the  whole  period  we  are  consid¬ 
ering,  and,  including  the  missing,  not  less  than  between  four 
and  five  thousand.  Besides  the  Confederate  general  officers 
already  mentioned  as  killed  or  wounded,  it  is  noted  in  the 
Tabular  Statement  of  Casualties  that  General  Kirkland  of 
Hetli’s  division,  General  Lane  of  Wilcox’s,  General  Finnegan 
of  Malione’s,  and  General  Law  of  field’s  divisions  were 
wounded.  In  the  Diary  of  Longstreet’s  Corps  it  is  men¬ 
tioned  that  General  Law  was  wounded. 

On  the  5tli  General  Birney  was  returned  to  the  Second 
Corps,  and  extended  its  left  to  the  Cliickahominy.  General 
Warren  was  withdrawn  to  the  rear  of  Cold  Harbor,  and  Gen¬ 
eral  Burnside,  with  his  left  on  Smith’s  right,  was  extended 
along  the  Matadequin  toward  Allen’s  mill-pond. 

On  the  7th  Griffin’s  and  Cutler’s  divisions  moved  to  the 
Cliickahominy,  and  held  from  the  left  of  Hancock  to  Des¬ 
patch  Station. 

Two  attempts  were  made  by  Lee  to  attack  the  right  flank 
and  rear  of  our  army — one  on  the  6th,  the  other  on  the  7th. 
On  the  6th  General  Early  moved  out  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Matadequin,  getting  as  far  as  Boslier’s  on  Burnside’s 
right  flank,  but  becoming  entangled  in  the  swamps  of  that 
stream,  and  troops  from  Anderson’s  corps  failing  to  co¬ 
operate  in  time,  probably  owing  to  the  same  cause,  he  could 
effect  nothing,  and  retired  to  his  intrencliments.  On  the  7th 
he  made  a  similar  effort  on  the  south  side  of  the  Matadequin, 
wrhich  failed  from  the  same  cause. 

XII.— 9 


CHAPTER  VII. 


PASSAGE  OF  JAMES  RIVER— ASSAULTS  UPON  THE  IN- 
TRENCHMENTS  OF  PETERSBURG. 

A  few  days  after  tlie  Battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  General  Hal- 
leck  proposed  to  General  Grant  that  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac  should  invest  Richmond  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James. 
This  would  have  given  greater  security  to  Washington,  but 
it  would  have  left  open  to  Richmond  not  only  all  the  lines  of 
supply  on  the  south  bank  of  the  James,  but,  through  railroad 
connections  with  Lynchburg,  the  supplies  of  the  Valley  of 
Virginia  and  of  West  Virginia  would  have  also  been  available 
for  it.  The  original  plan  of  campaign  was  therefore  adhered 
to.  The  Central  and  Fredericksburg  railroads  had  not  been 
sufficiently  damaged,  and,  on  the  5th  of  June,  General  Sheri¬ 
dan  was  directed  to  move  to  Charlottesville  with  two  of  his 
divisions,  starting  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  destroy  the 
railroad  bridge  over  the  Rivanna  near  that  town,  and  the 
Central  Railroad  from  that  point  to  Hanover  Junction,  if 
practicable,  which  being  effected,  he  would  rejoin  the  army. 
General  Sheridan  carried  instructions  to  General  Hunter 
(whom  he  was  expected  to  meet  at  Charlottesville)  to  unite 
his  forces  with  Sheridan’s,  and,  after  thoroughly  destroying 
the  Central  Railroad,  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

General  Hunter,  moving  up  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah, 
had,  on  the  5th  of  June,  encountered  a  force,  consisting  of 
Jones’s,  Vaughn’s,  and  Imboden’s  brigades,  under  bfrigadier- 
General  J ones,  at  Piedmont,  about  ten  miles  northeast  from 


PASSAGE  OF  JAMES  RIVER. 


195 


Staunton,  defeated  it,  and  captured  1,500  men,  with  three 
guns.  On  the  8th  of  June  he  formed  a  junction  with  Crook 
and  Averill  at  Staunton,  and  moved  by  way  of  Lexington 
upon  Lynchburg,  the  possession  of  which,  with  its  manufac¬ 
turing  establishments  and  stores,  was  important  to  the  Con¬ 
federates.  General  Vaughn,  who  succeeded  to  Jones’s  com¬ 
mand,  fell  back  to  Waynesboro’  at  Rockfish  Gap,  on  the 
railroad  to  Charlottesville. 

As  soon  as  General  Lee  received  information  of  Jones’s 
defeat,  General  Breckinridge  was  sent  back  to  the  Valley 
with  the  force  he  had  brought  with  him  from  it,  and  on  the 
11th  of  June  General  Early  moved  his  corps  to  the  rear,  near 
Gaines’s  mill.  In  the  evening  of  the  12th,  he  was  directed 
to  move  at  three  o’clock  the  next  morning  for  the  Shenan¬ 
doah  Valley,  by  way  of  Louisa  Court  House  and  Charlottes¬ 
ville  ;  to  strike  Hunter’s  force  in  rear,  and,  if  possible,  to 
destroy  it ;  then  to  move  down  the  Valley,  cross  the  Potomac 
near  Leesburg  or  Harper’s  Ferry,  and  threaten  Washington. 
General  Breckinridge  was  directed  to  unite  with  him. 

General  Hunter  was  supposed  by  General  Lee  to  be  at  that 
time  at  Staunton,  and  Breckinridge  at  Waynesboro’.  General 
Early  marched  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  at  two  o’clock.1 

The  object  in  threatening  Washington  appears  to  have 
been  the  protection  of  Lynchburg  and  the  upper  part  of  the 
Valley  of  Virginia.  It  could  hardly  have  been  made  with 

1  General  Early,  mentioning  the  condition  of  the  Second  Corps,  refers  to  its 
heavy  loss  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  “where  it  lost  nearly  an  entire  division, 
including  its  commander,  Major-General  Johnson,  who  was  made  prisoner.”  Of 
the  brigadier-generals  with  it  at  the  commencement  of  the  campaign,  he  says : 
“  Only  one  remained  in  command  of  his  brigade.  Two  (Gordon  and  Ramseur) 
had  been  made  major-generals ;  one  (G.  H.  Stewart)  had  been  captured  ;  four 
(Pegram,  Hays,  J.  A.  Walker,  and  R.  D.  Johnston)  had  been  severely  wounded ; 
and  four  (Stafford,  J.  M.  Jones,  Daniel,  and  Doles)  had  been  killed  in  action. 
Constant  exposure  to  the  weather,  a  limited  supply  of  provisions,  and  two  weeks’ 
service  in  the  swamps  north  of  the  Chickahominy,  had  told  on  the  health  of  the 
men.  Divisions  were  not  stronger  than  brigades  ought  to  have  been,  nor  bri¬ 
gades  than  regiments.” 


196  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


the  expectation  of  drawing  off  from  around  Richmond  any 
very  large  part  of  our  forces  operating  against  it. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  June,  General  Lee  learnt 
from  Major-General  Hampton  that  General  Sheridan  had 
crossed  the  Pamunkey  the  day  before,  and  had  encamped 
that  night  between  Aylett’s  and  Dunkirk  on  the  Mattapony  ; 
and  that  he  had  with  him  artillery,  ambulances,  wagons,  and 
beef  cattle.  General  Hampton  was  directed  to  follow  him 
with  two  divisions,  and  he  at  once  set  out  for  Gordonsville 
and  Charlottesville  with  his  own  division,  directing  General 
Fitz  Lee  to  follow  as  speedily  as  possible  with  his  division. 

On  the  9tli  of  June  General  Meade  directed  Major  Duane, 
Chief-Engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  to  select  and 
intrench  a  line  in  the  rear  of  the  position  at  Cold  Harbor,  to 
be  held  while  the  army  was  withdrawing.  The  intrenchment 
extended  from  Elder  Swamp  to  Allen’s  mill-pond,  passing 
by  Cold  Harbor,  and  was  finished  on  the  morning  of  the 
11th  of  June. 

On  the  10th,  General  Warren  was  directed  to  move  his 
two  divisions  held  in  reserve  near  Leary’s,  on  the  lltli  to 
Moody’s  on  the  New  Kent  Court  House  road,  four  miles  from 
Bottom  Bridge,  keeping  them  out  of  the  observation  of  the 
enemy.  He  was  advised  confidentially  of  the  part  his  corps 
would  take  in  the  march  to  the  James,  and  directed  to  be 
prepared  to  move  as  soon  as  it  was  dark  on  the  evening  of 
the  12th. 

On  the  9th  of  June,  General  Butler  sent  General  Gillmore 
and  General  Kautz  on  an  expedition  against  Petersburg,  the 
object  being  to  capture  the  city  and  destroy  the  railroad 
bridge  across  the  Appomattox.  General  Gillmore  had  with 
him  1,800  infantry  of  his  own  troops,  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  Hawley,  and  1,200  of  General  Hinks’s,  which  were  to 
move  up  from  City  Point  and  join  him.  General  Kautz  had 
about  1,500  cavalry.  General  Gillmore  says  that  the  ponton 


PASSAGE  OP  JAMES  RIVER. 


197 


bridge  over  the  Appomattox  at  Port  Walthall  was  not  muf¬ 
fled  as  it  was  promised  it  should  be,  and  that  the  crossing  of 
Kautz’s  cavalry  could  be  heard  for  miles,  and,  no  doubt,  put 
the  enemy  on  his  guard.  General  Wise,  with  his  brigade, 
2,400  strong,  and  such  local  troops  as  could  be  got  together 
under  exigencies,  had  charge  of  the  defences  of  Petersburg. 
General  Gillmore  arrived  before  the  works  on  the  City  Point 
road  at  seven  o’clock  in  the  morning  ;  General  Hinks  at  the 
same  hour  before  those  on  a  road  a  mile  from  Gillmore’s  left. 
General  Kautz  moved  on  the  Jerusalem  plank  road  four  or 
five  miles  on  the  left  of  Gillmore,  and  was  expected  to  at¬ 
tack  at  nine  o’clock.  Wise’s  command  held  the  intrench- 
ments  in  front  of  Gillmore  and  Hinks.  Manned  as  strongly 
as  they  were,  General  Gillmore  was  satisfied,  after  careful 
examination  (in  which  opinion  General  Hinks  and  Colonel 
Hawley  both  concurred),  that  he  could  not  cany  them.  He 
did  not,  therefore,  make  the  attempt.  Receiving  no  com¬ 
munication  from  General  Kautz  during  the  day,  he  withdrew 
at  half -past  one  from  the  front  of  the  intrencliments,  and  at 
three  o’clock  began  his  return  march. 

Kautz  attacked  the  intrencliments  on  the  Jerusalem  plank 
road  with  Colonel  Spear’s  brigade  at  half -past  eleven.  The 
force  defending  them  was  small,  for  no  part  of  Wise’s  brigade 
was  posted  there,  but  it  was  sufficient  to  repel  three  front  at¬ 
tacks.  The  works  were  then  turned  with  a  part  of  the  bri¬ 
gade,  and  Kautz  advanced  close  to  the  water-works  of  the 
town.  But  here  he  found  an  earth  intrenchment  and  stock¬ 
ade  on  Reservoir  Hill,  which  had  infantry  and  artillery  in  it. 
General  Dearing’s  brigade,  sent  over  by  General  Beauregard, 
now  came  up,  and  the  artillery  opened.  Kautz,  satisfied 
that  he  could  not  capture  the  town,  withdrew,  followed  by 
Dearing.1 

1 1  could  not  find  any  report  of  this  affair  from  General  Kautz  on  the  files  of  the 
War  Department. 


198  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


In  the  course  of  the  day  General  Beauregard  sent  all  the 
force  he  could  spare  from  his  intrenchments  to  Petersburg, 
and  telegraphed  to  Richmond  that,  without  the  troops  he 
had  sent  to  General  Lee,  he  should  be  obliged  to  abandon 
the  lines  of  Bermuda  Hundred  or  those  of  Petersburg. 

To  return  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  There  was  some 
delay  in  the  arrival  at  Fort  Monroe  of  the  bridge  materiel  for 
crossing  the  James.  Some  of  it  had  been  sent  to  Harper’s 
Ferry  for  General  Hunter’s  use.  Steamers  and  steamboats 
of  different  kinds  had  been  collected  at  Fort  Monroe  to  ferry 
troops  over  and  thus  expedite  the  crossing  of  the  army. 

The  object  of  crossing  the  James  was,  as  already  stated,  to 
carry  out  the  plan  with  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
began  the  campaign,  that  is,  to  destroy  the  lines  of  supply  to 
the  Confederate  depot,  Richmond,  on  the  south  side  of  the 
James  as  close  to  that  city  as  practicable,  after  those  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river  had  been  rendered  useless. 

The  capture  of  Petersburg  would  leave  but  one  railroad  in 
the  hands  of  the  Confederates,  though,  with  that  and  its 
connections,  they  would  still  retain  access  to  a  large  region 
of  supply.  Following  the  possession  of  Petersburg  would 
be  the  turning  of  Beauregard’s  intrenchments  in  front  of 
Butler  and  an  advance  toward  Richmond.  Finally,  but  not 
immediately,  the  remaining  railroad  would  be  severed,  or,  in 
anticipation  of  it,  Richmond  would  be  abandoned,  and  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  would  retreat  toward  Danville  or 
Lynchburg. 

The  place  of  crossing  the  James,  the  vicinity  of  Wilcox’s 
Landing,  was  judiciously  chosen,  both  in  its  general  and 
local  features.  Herring  Creek  covered  it  on  the  west,  and  the 
river  on  the  east.  Positions  for  protecting  the  rear  were  se¬ 
lected  by  the  Engineers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  advance 
of  the  arrival  of  troops  there,  the  right  of  the  line,  looking 
north,  crossing  Weynook  Neck,  and  resting  on  the  river. 


PASSAGE  OF  JAMES  RIVER. 


199 


To  cross  so  wide  and  deep  a  river  with  so  large  an  army 
with  all  its  artillery,  together  with  its  ammnnition,  subsist¬ 
ence,  quartermaster,  ambulance,  and  hospital  trains,  was  a 
difficult  operation,  and  exposed  the  army  to  attack  under 
disadvantages -while  crossing.  Should  General  Lee  attempt 
to  interrupt  the  crossing  at  the  point  selected,  he  must  ad¬ 
vance  a  long  distance  from  Richmond,  and  thus  expose  him¬ 
self  in  turn  to  attack. 

The  vicinity  of  Malvern  Hill  would  have  afforded  better 
bridging  places  of  the  James  than  that  at  "Wilcox’s  Landing, 
and  the  routes  to  Butler’s  intrenchments,  and  to  Petersburg 
from  Cold  Harbor,  would  have  been  ten  or  fifteen  miles 
shorter  than  those  by  way  of  Wilcox’s  Landing  (which  ex¬ 
ceeded  fifty  miles  in  length  to  Petersburg),  but  the  crossing 
near  Malvern,  as  well  as  the  preparations  for  it,  would  have 
been  under  the  observation  of  the  enemy,  and  exposed  to  in¬ 
terruption.  Lee,  at  Cold  Harbor,  was  about  twenty-four 
miles  from  Butler’s  intrenchments  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  by 
way  of  Drury’s  Bluff,  and  about  thirty-four  from  Petersburg. 

In  the  movement  of  the  army  from  Cold  Harbor  to  James 
River,  the  Chickahominy  must  be  crossed.  Obviously,  the 
crossings  should  be  at  points  so  far  below  Cold  Harbor  that 
a  sufficient  force  could  be  over  that  stream  and  in  position 
to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  remainder  of  the  army  by  the 
time  Lee  should  learn  that  the  movement  had  taken  place. 

The  chief  road-crossings  of  the  Chickahominy  below  Lee’s 
position  were  Bottom  Bridge,  eight  miles  below  Cold  Har¬ 
bor,  Long  Bridge,  fifteen  miles,  Jones’s  Bridge,  twenty  miles, 
and  Window  or  Windsor  Shades,  the  head  of  navigation, 
twenty-four  miles  below  Cold  Harbor.  The  bridges  at  these 
places  had  been  destroyed. 

Two  miles  below  Bottom  Bridge,  the  White  Oak  Swamp 
empties  into  the  Chickahominy.  The  head  of  the  swamp  is 
about  a  mile  northwest  of  Seven  Pines.  The  general  course 


200  the  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


of  the  stream  is  east,  bending  first  toward  the  south,  then, 
for  the  last  three  miles,  to  the  north.  It  is  about  ten  miles 
long,  and  is  similar  in  character  to  the  streams  of  this  sec¬ 
tion  of  country  already  described,  and  is,  therefore,  difficult 
to  cross.  Three  miles  above  its  mouth  it  is  crossed  on  a 
bridge  by  a  road  running  due  south  from  the  vicinity  of 
Bottom  Bridge,  which  road,  at  a  mile  south  of  the  bridge, 
intersects  the  Long  Bridge  road.  No  main  road  crosses  the 
White  Oak  Swamp  above  this  point,  though  some  plantation 
roads  do. 

Between  White  Oak  Swamp  and  James  River  there  are 

three  roads  leading  to  Richmond,  the  Charles  City  road,  the 

0 

most  northerly,  the  Central  road,  and  New  Market  or  river- 
road.  The  general  direction  of  the  Long  Bridge  road,  after 
crossing  the  Chickahominy,  is  southwesterly.  Five  miles 
from  Long  Bridge  it  is  entered  by  the  road  from  White 
Oak  Bridge ;  a  mile  further  on  it  is  entered  by  the  Charles 
City  road  and  by  the  Quaker  road  from  the  south,  coming 
from  the  River  road  at  Malvern  Hill.  At  this  point  of  meet¬ 
ing  of  the  three  roads  is  Riddell’s  shop.  Three  miles  far¬ 
ther  on,  the  Long  Bridge  road  is  entered  by  the  Central 
road,  and  a  mile  farther  it  is  merged  in  the  river-road. 

It  was  determined  that  Warren  and  Hancock  should  cross 
the  Chickahominy  at  Long  Bridge,  Wright  and  Burnside  at 
Jones’s  Bridge,  and  the  great  trains  moving  from  White 
House,  at  Windsor  Shades  and  Coles’s  Ferry.  Wilson  had 
one  of  his  cavalry  brigades  on  the  right  of  the  army,  and  the 
other  on  the  left,  picketing  the  Chickahominy.  The  brigade 
on  the  left  was  to  precede  Warren.  The  one  on  the  right 
was  to  withdraw  at  the  same  time  as  the  Second  and  Sixth 
Corps,  and  cover  the  rear  of  the  army  and  the  trains  during 
the  movement.  Ponton  bridges  accompanied  each  of  the 
columns.  Smith  was  to  move  with  the  Eighteenth  Corps  to 
White  House,  having  the  right  of  way  over  everything,  em- 


PASSAGE  OF  JAMES  RIVER. 


201 


bark  his  command,  and  proceed  with  all  possible  despatch 
to  Bermuda  Hundred  and  report  to  General  Butler.  His 
artillery  and  trains  were  to  join  the  main  trains  of  the  army 
at  Tunstall’s  Station. 

The  army  was  to  commence  withdrawing  from  Cold  Har¬ 
bor  as  soon  as  it  was  dark  on  the  evening  of  the  12th,  Han¬ 
cock  and  Wright  to  occupy  the  intrenched  line  in  rear  from 
Elder  Swamp  to  Allen’s  mill-pond,  until  the  roads  for  their 
corps  were  cleared,  when  they  were  to  move.  The  order  for 
the  movement  will  be  found  in  Appendix  H. 

The  routes  for  the  movement  of  the  corps  and  trains,  and 
directions  as  to  precedence  where  routes  joined,  were  care¬ 
fully  prescribed.  Upon  crossing  the  Chickahominy,  General 
Warren  was  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  army  toward  James 
Biver,  and  then  follow  the  Second  Corps,  which  was  to  move 
toward  Charles  City  Court  House  by  way  of  St.  Mary’s 
Church,  Walker’s,  etc.  The  Sixth  Corps  was  to  take  the 
route  from  Jones’s  Bridge  to  Charles  City  Court  House,  by 
way  of  Vandorn’s,  and  the  Ninth  Corps  a  route  passing  east 
of  Charles  City  Court  House,  by  Vandorn’s,  Clapton,  and 
Tyler’s  mill.  The  depot  at  White  House  was  to  be  main¬ 
tained  with  its  garrison  until  the  arrival  of  General  Hunter 
and  General  Sheridan. 

In  preparing  the  programme  of  movement,  it  appeared  to 
me  important  that  General  Warren  should  move  out  the 
Long  Bridge  road,  not  only  far  enough  to  cover  the  crossing 
of  the  Chickahominy  by  the  army,  but  so  far  as  to  hold  the 
bridge  over  the  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  to  look  toward  the 
three  roads  to  Richmond  already  mentioned,  which  substan¬ 
tially  met  at  Riddell’s  shop,  about  a  mile  in  advance  of  the 
position  General  Warren  was  directed  to  take.  He  could 
not  well  advance  to  Riddell’s  shop,  since  that  would  have 
exposed  him  to  attack  in  rear  from  White  Oak  Bridge.  It 
was  expected  that  such  a  movement  by  General  Warren 
9* 


202  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 


would  deceive  Lee,  and  give  him  the  impression  that  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  advancing  upon  Richmond,  or,  if 
intending  to  cross  the  James,  that  it  would  do  so  near  Mal¬ 
vern  Hill,  at  City  Point,  or  above.  The  movement  made  the 
desired  impression  upon  him,  and  to  a  greater  extent  than 
was  contemplated,  for,  as  we  shall  see  farther  on,  he  was  un¬ 
certain  what  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  doing  until  the 
afternoon  of  the  17th  of  June. 

The  movement  to  J ames  River  took  place  as  ordered,  with¬ 
out  interruptions  or  delays.  The  ponton  bridge  at  Long 
Bridge  was  laid  at  one  a.m.  of  the  13tli,  and  Wilson’s  cavalry 
at  once  crossed,  and  moved  out  to  White  Oak  Bridge  and  to 
Riddell’s  shop,  meeting  with  sharp  opposition  from  Bar¬ 
ringer’s  cavalry  brigade  and  some  mounted  force  under  Gen¬ 
eral  Geary.  Wilson  was  followed  by  two  divisions  of  the 
Fifth  Corps  to  the  position  General  Warren  was  directed  to 
take,  the  other  two  divisions  of  the  corps  being  held  in  sup¬ 
port.  As  soon  as  the  Fifth  Corps  relieved  Wilson  at  White 
Oak  Bridge,  where  there  was  some  force  of  the  enemy,  he 
pushed  parties  out  the  Charles  City  and  Central  roads,  which 
had  sharp  skirmishing.  His  losses  and  those  of  Crawford 
during  the  day  were  some  300  killed  and  wounded. 

The  Second  Corps  followed  the  Fifth  in  crossing  at  Jones’s 
Bridge,  and  reached  the  vicinity  of  Wilcox’s  Landing  at  half¬ 
past  five  on  the  13th.  The  Sixth  and  Ninth  Corps  reached 
there  on  the  14th.  The  Fifth  Corps  withdrew  to  St.  Mary’s 
Church  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  and  arrived  at  Charles  City 
Court  House  at  noon  of  the  14th. 

The  marches  were  very  long  and  exhaustive,  being  from 
twenty-five  to  thirty-five  or  forty-five  miles  in  length. 

General  Butler  turned  over  all  his  bridge  materiel  and 
vessels  of  every  kind,  not  in  use,  to  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac  to  aid  in  crossing  the  river.  General  Weitzel,  his  Chief 
Engineer,  was  charged  with  constructing  roads  through  the 


PASSAGE  OF  JAMES  RIVER. 


203 


swamps  at  the  two  ends  of  the  bridge  and  at  the  landing- 
places  for  the  ferrying  vessels.  The  approaches  to  the  bridge 
being  completed,  and  everything  ready  for  its  construction, 
the  battalion  of  engineers,  under  Major  Mendell  (Major 
Duane,  Chief  Engineer),  commenced  laying  it  at  four  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  and  finished  it  by  midnight.1 

The  artillery  and  trains  of  the  Ninth,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Corps 
began  at  once  to  cross  upon  it,  in  the  order  stated,  that  being 
the  order  in  which  the  corps  were  to  cross  the  river.  By 
midnight  of  the  16th  the  army,  with  all  its  artillery  and 
trains,  was  over  the  James,  General  Wright  covering  the  op¬ 
eration,  and  being  the  last  to  reach  the  right  bank. 

General  Wilson’s  cavalry  held  their  advanced  positions 
toward  the  White  Oak  Swamp  and  Malvern  Hill,  until  they 
were  drawn  in  by  General  Wright  to  precede  him  over  the 
bridge. 

The  navy  also  assisted  with  its  armored  ships  and  gun¬ 
boats  in  covering  the  passage  of  the  river. 

General  Butler  had,  in  the  latter  part  of  May,  procured 
several  vessels  to  sink  upon  Trent’s  Beach  bar,  at  the  right  of 
his  line  of  intrenchments,  if,  he  stated  in  his  correspondence 
with  Admiral  Lee,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Naval  Commander 
this  obstruction  would  add  to  the  security  of  the  fleet. 
Upon  those  terms  Admiral  Lee  declined  to  sink  them.  But 
General  Grant,  upon  learning,  on  the  13th  of  June,  that  his 
order  to  General  Butler  to  obstruct  the  navigation  in  this 
■way  had  not  been  carried  out,  again  directed  him  to  sink 


1  The  site  of  the  bridge  was  between  Windmill  Point  and  Port  Powhatan, 
where  the  river  was  2,100  feet  wide.  The  depth  in  mid-channel  was  from  twelve 
to  fifteen  fathoms.  The  tidal  current  was  strong ;  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  tide 
four  feet.  The  number  of  pontons  was  one  hundred  and  one.  In  the  channel 
the  pontons  were  anchored  to  vessels  above  and  below,  moored  for  the  purpose. 
Here  there  was  a  draw  for  the  passage  of  vessels.  The  bridge  was  commenced 
from  each  end  and  built  by  successive  pontons  and  by  rafts.  After  considerable 
progres.  was  made  under  Major  Duane,  G-eneral  Benham  arrived  and  took 
charge  of  the  operation. 


204  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


them,  as  it  was  deemed  a  military  necessity,  essential  to  tlio 
success  of  the  campaign.  Upon  learning  this  from  General 
Grant,  Admiral  Lee  rendered  every  aid  required  in  obstruct¬ 
ing  the  channel,  which  was  now  accomplished. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13tli  General  Lee  discovered  that 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  withdrawn  from  Cold  Harbor, 
and  learned  that  it  was  advancing  toward  Richmond  on  the 
Long  Bridge  road.  His  army  was  at  once  set  in  motion, 
General  Anderson  moving  with  his  corps  past  Fair  Oaks  and 
Seven  Pines  over  White  Oak  Swamp  to  the  Charles  City 
road,  and  down  that  road  a  few  miles  to  Williams’s,  when, 
turning  from  it,  he  halted  for  the  night  near  the  battlefield 
of  Frazier’s  farm,  between  Malvern  Hill  and  Riddell’s  shop. 
General  Hill  crossed  White  Oak  Swamp  lower  down,  and 
moving  out  the  Charles  City  road,  took  up  a  position  at  Rid¬ 
dell’s  shop,  where  he  intrenched,  having  some  skirmishing 
with  Wilson’s  cavalry.  Lee  was  thus  holding  from  Malvern 
Hill  to  White  Oak  Swamp. 

In  the  night  of  the  13th  Wilson  withdrew  to  St.  Mary’s 
Church,  where  ho  established  McIntosh’s  brigade,  which  by 
that  time  had  joined  him.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  14tli  and 
morning  of  the  15tli,  McIntosh  advanced  toward  White  Oak 
Swamp,  and  Chapman  toward  Malvern  Hill,  the  latter  to  ascer¬ 
tain  if  it  was  held  by  the  enemy,  and  in  what  force.  He  was 
also  to  ascertain  whether  a  crossing  could  be  secured  from 
Shirley  to  Bermuda  Hundred  or  City  Point.  Colonel  Chapman 
reached  Turkey  Creek  bridge  at  the  foot  of  Malvern  Hill,  and 
ascertained  that  the  enemy’s  cavalry  occupied  the  hill  in  force. 
These  cavalry  reconnoissances  caused  the  retention  of  Anderson 
and  Hill  in  the  positions  they  took  on  the  evening  of  the  13th. 

As  soon  on  the  14tli  as  any  boats  were  available,  General 
Hancock  began  crossing  his  troops  from  Wilcox’s  Landing  to 
Windmill  Point,  and  by  four  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the 
15th  all  his  infantry  and  four  batteries  of  artillery  had  landed 


PASSAGE  OF  JAMES  RIVER. 


205 


on  the  south  bank.  The  means  of  crossing  were  very  lim¬ 
ited,  and  the  landing-places,  wharfs,  and  roads  were  incom¬ 
plete.  At  half-past  six  in  the  morning  of  the  15th  three 
ferry-boats  were  added  to  his  means  of  crossing  and  greatly 
facilitated  the  passage  of  his  artillery  and  wagons. 

On  the  evening  of  the  14th  he  was  directed  by  General 
Meade  to  hold  his  troops  in  readiness  to  move,  and  was  in¬ 
formed  that  it  was  probable  he  would  be  instructed  to  march 
toward  Petersburg,  and  that  rations  for  his  command  would 
be  sent  him  from  City  Point.  At  ten  o’clock  that  night  the 
following  despatch  was  sent  him  by  General  Meade  :  ‘  ‘  Gen¬ 
eral  Butler  has  been  ordered  to  send  to  you  at  Windmill 
Point  60,000  rations.1  So  soon  as  these  are  received  and  is¬ 
sued,  you  will  move  your  corps  by  the  most  direct  route  to 
Petersburg,  taking  up  a  position  where  the  City  Point  Rail¬ 
road  crosses  Harrison’s  Creek,  where  we  now  have  a  work. 
After  Barlow  has  crossed  you  will  cross  as  much  of  your  ar¬ 
tillery  and  ammunition  train  as  possible  up  to  the  moment 
you  are  ready  to  move,  and  if  all  is  quiet  at  that  time  the 
ferriage  of  the  rest  can  be  continued  and  they  can  join  you.” 
But  the  rations  did  not  arrive,  as  expected,  that  night  or  the 
next  morning,  and  the  corps  marched  without  them  at  half¬ 
past  ten  on  the  15th.2 


1  Three  days’  rations.  The  Second  Corps  had  20,000  enlisted  men,  not  28,000, 
as  has  been  stated. 

2  At  7.30  a.m.  o f  the  15th,  after  receiving  several  despatches  from  General 
Hancock  concerning  the  rations,  and  the  readiness  of  the  corps  for  movement, 
General  Meade  sent  a  despatch  to  him  saying:  “  You  will  not  wait  for  the  ra¬ 
tions,  but  move  immediately  to  the  position  assigned  you  last  evening,”  etc.,  etc. 
Then,  continuing,  “  Your  despatch  just  received  ”  [concerning  the  reported  arri¬ 
val  of  rations,  which  turned  out  to  be  erroneous].  “  It  is  important  you  should 
move.  Exercise  your  judgment  as  to  which  will  be  best,  to  issue  rations  now, 
or  send  them  as  directed  in  the  foregoing.”  At  nine  o’clock,  finding  that  the  ra¬ 
tions  had  not  arrived.  General  Hancock  ordered  the  corps  to  move,  but  the  Signal 
officer  by  whom  the  order  was  sent  failed  in  some  way  to  communicate  it ;  and 
the  boat  in  which  Colonel  Morgan,  who  carried  the  same  order,  crossed  the  river 
grounded,  so  that  the  column  did  not  begin  to  move  until  half-past  ten. 


206  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


General  Smith  withdrew  from  the  intrenchments  of  Cold 
Harbor  shortly  after  dark  on  the  night  of  the  12th  of  June, 
and  at  daylight  had  arrived  at  the  White  House,  when  the 
embarkation  began,  but  delay  occurred  from  the  want  of 
transportation.  By  sunset  of  the  14th  he  had  reported  in 
person  to  General  Butler  at  Bermuda  Hundred  and  received 
orders  to  move  at  daylight  on  Petersburg.1 

General  Butler  had  a  ponton  bridge  over  the  Appomattox 
near  the  left  of  his  line,  at  Point  of  Bocks  or  Broadway 
Landing,  about  two  miles  below  Port  Walthall.  Near  this 
landing  General  Smith’s  transports  continued  to  arrive  all 
through  the  night.  General  Butler’s  cavalry  under  Briga¬ 
dier-General  Kautz,  2,400  strong,  and  the  available  part  of 
the  division  of  colored  troops  under  Brigadier-General 
Hinks  2  (3,700  officers  and  enlisted  men,  infantry  and  artil¬ 
lery)  were  assigned  to  General  Smith,  in  addition  to  his  own 
infantry,  10,000  enlisted  men.  General  Kautz  was  ordered  to 
cross  the  river  at  one  o’clock  in  the  morning,  and  threaten 
the  intrenchments  near  the  Norfolk  and  Petersburg  Bailroad, 
and  at  the  same  time  protect  the  left  flank  of  the  infantry  ; 
Hinks  to  follow  Kautz,  and  take  a  position  across  the  Jor¬ 
dan’s  Point  road  as  near  as  possible  to  the  enemy’s  works  ; 
Brooks  to  follow  Hinks  and  form  on  his  right,  and  General 
Martindale  to  proceed  on  the  river-road  to  a  point  near  the 
City  Point  Bailroad  and  await  orders.  It  will  be  recollected 
that  the  Petersburg  intrenchments  encircled  the  city  at  the 
distance  of  two  miles  from  it,  and  consisted  of  a  series  of 
strong  redans  or  batteries  connected  by  infantry  parapets 
with  high  profiles,  all  with  ditches.  General  Smith’s  in- 

1  In  the  latter  part  of  May,  just  before  embarking  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac,  General  Smith  had  proposed  to  capture  Petersburg,  as  he  regarded  it  to  be 
of  great  importance  to  us  from  its  railroad  connections  and  its  giving  us  the  line 
of  the  Appomattox. 

2  The  remainder  of  the  division  was  at  Wilson's  Landing,  Fort  Powhatan,  City 
Point,  and  Bermuda  Hundred. 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  207 


fantry  would  have  a  march  of  six  or  seven  miles  to  come  up 
to  them.  General  Kautz,  General  Smith  says,  was  unavoida¬ 
bly  delayed  in  his  march,  so  that  the  movement  from  Broad¬ 
way  did  not  'take  place  until  after  daylight.  He  soon  met 
the  enemy’s  skirmishers,  and  came  upon  a  rifle-pit  near  the 
railroad,  about  two  miles  in  front  of  the  enemy’s  intrench- 
ments,  which  was  held  by  some  dismounted  cavalry  and  a 
light  battery.  Some  time  was  required  to  take  this  isolated 
intrenchment,  which  Hinks’s  troops  accomplished,  capturing 
one  of  the  guns.  General  Hinks  moved  to  his  assigned  po¬ 
sition  by  the  flank,  while  General  Brooks  deployed  and 
moved  forward  along  the  City  Point  Bailroad  and  wagon- 
road.  A  mile-and-a-lialf’s  march  brought  them  under  the 
fire  of  the  enemy’s  artillery,  and  General  Smith  began  to  re¬ 
connoitre  the  position  and  form  the  troops  for  assault.  Gen¬ 
eral  Martindale  had  come  up  on  the  right  of  the  railroad. 
In  his  front,  extending  to  the  Appomattox,  was  a  broad,  low 
valley,  cut  up  by  ditches  and  ravines,  completely  swept  by 
the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  artillery,  the  intrenchments  here 
being  withdrawn  some  six  hundred  yards  from  the  salient  at 
and  about  Jordan’s  Hill  (where  the  City  Point  Bailroad  en¬ 
tered),  in  front  of  which  was  Brooks’s  division.  The  line  of 
works  in  front  of  Hinks’s  division  was  similarly  withdrawn, 
though  not  to  the  same  extent.  Deep  ravines  were  found  all 
along  these  fronts  also.  The  enemy  had  a  cross-fire  of  artil¬ 
lery  upon  the  front  threatened. 

The  reconnoissances  were  necessarily  slow.  Very  little  in¬ 
fantry  could  be  seen  in  the  works,  but,  General  Smith  says, 
that  was  not  positive  proof  that  it  was  not  there,  and  it  did 
not  seem  probable  to  him  that  the  number  of  guns  at  work 
against  him  would  be  there  without  support.  But  in  fact 
the  whole  force  in  the  intrenchments  at  that  time,  besides 
the  artillery,  consisted  of  Wise’s  brigade,  2,400  strong,  the 
militia,  and  Dealing’s  brigade  of  cavalry.  Heavy  artillery 


208  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’G4  AND  ’65. 


firing  was  going  on  against  Kantz.  About  five  o’clock,  after 
completing  a  careful  reconnoissance,  General  Smith  con¬ 
cluded  not  to  assault  in  column  under  such  a  heavy  artillery 
fire,  but  to  mass  his  artillery  upon  the  salient  hear  General 
Brooks’s  centre,  and  try  to  carry  the  works  with  a  very  strong 
skirmish  line,  which  he  could  do  if  they  were  thinly  held  by 
infantry.  The  troops  were  formed  accordingly,  but  his  chief 
of  artillery  had,  without  authority,  taken  everything  to  the 
rear  to  water  the  horses,  and  this  caused  a  further  delay  of 
an  hour.  About  seven  o’clock  the  skirmishers  advanced, 
and  the  artillery  opened  upon  the  salient  (Bedans  5  and 
6),  which  made  no  reply.  The  skirmishers  met  a  sharp  in¬ 
fantry  fire,  but  carried  the  works,  taking  between  200  and 
300  prisoners  and  four  guns.  The  lines  of  battle  followed 
and  occupied  the  intrenchments.  General  Brooks  was 
formed  to  resist  an  attack,  while  General  Martindale  on  the 
right,  and  General  Hinks  on  the  left,  wTere  following  up  the 
advantage  gained.  Five  of  the  redans  on  the  left,  from 
No.  7  to  11,  both  inclusive,  which  commanded  the  position 
at  the  centre,  were  captured  by  Hinks’s  division,  the  last, 
No.  11,  at  the  Dunn  house,  about  nine  o’clock  in  the  even¬ 
ing.  Artillery  was  captured  in  each.1  A  mile  and  a  half  of 
the  intrenchments,  with  sixteen  guns,  were  thus  captured, 
and  this  showed  that  the  infantry  force  defending  Petersburg 
was  very  small. 

The  four  redans  from  the  river  to  the  City  Point  Bailroad 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  as  did  those  on  our 
left  of  No.  11. 

About  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  General  Smith  was 
informed  by  a  staff  officer  sent  by  General  Grant,  that  the 

1  General  Hinks  reported  the  loss  of  his  division  to  be  507  killed  and  wounded, 
among  the  latter  Colonel  H.  S.  Russell,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  and  Lieu¬ 
tenant-Colonel  Nathan  Goff,  Jr.,  Twenty -second  Regiment  United  States  Colored 
Troops.  The  loss  of  Brooks  and  Martindale  I  do  not  find  mentioned.  It  is  in¬ 
cluded  in  the  general  statement  of  the  loss  of  the  army  during  this  period. 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  209 


Second  Corps  was  marching  toward  him  on  the  road  from 
Windmill  Point.  Upon  receiving  this  intelligence  General 
Smith  at  once  sent  a  despatch  to  General  Hancock,  request¬ 
ing  him  to  come  up  as  rapidly  as  possible.  This  despatch 
General  Hancock  received  at  half-past  five,  about  a  mile 
from  Old  Court  House,  and  about  four  miles  from  Smith’s 
left.  A  few  minutes  before,  General  Hancock  had  received 
a  despatch  from  General  Grant  at  City  Point,  directing  all 
haste  to  be  made  in  getting  up  to  the  assistance  of  General 
Smith,  who,  it  stated,  had  attacked  Petersburg,  and  carried 
the  outer  works  in  front  of  that  city. 1  The  head  of  Birney’s 
division  was  just  passing  a  country  road  that  led  directly  to 
Petersburg  when  these  despatches  were  received,  and  was  at 
once  turned  in  that  direction,  Gibbon’s  division  following, 
and  orders  were  sent  to  General  Barlow  to  march  toward  the 
same  point  from  Old  Court  House,  on  the  road  to  which  he 
was  moving. 

As  soon  as  he  received  General  Grant’s  despatch,  General 
Hancock  sent  Colonel  Morgan  to  inform  General  Smith 
where  his  column  was,  and  that  he  was  marching  to  his  sup¬ 
port  with  all  despatch.  This  information  General  Smith 
probably  received  shortly  after  six  o’clock. 

General  Beauregard,  apprehensive  that  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  in  withdrawing  from  Cold  Harbor,  would  move 
directly  upon  Petersburg,  had  urged  General  Lee  to  send 
him  troops  sufficient  to  defend  it,  while  he  held  his  lines  in 
front  of  Butler.  But  Lee,  not  satisfied  that  Richmond  was 
not  the  object  of  the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
would  not  withdraw  Hill  and  Anderson  from  their  position 
at  Riddell’s  shop.  He  directed  Hoke’s  division,  however, 
to  return  to  Beauregard.  It  left  Drury’s  Bluff  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  15th,  having  eighteen  miles  to  march  to  the 

1  This  evidently  referred  to  the  rifle-pit  captured  by  General  11  inks  early  in  the 
day. 


210  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Petersburg  intrencliments  where  threatened.  General  Beau¬ 
regard  says  that  the  leading  brigade,  Hagood’s,  arrived  by 
rail  about  sunset,  and  was  placed  on  Wise’s  left,  his,  Ha¬ 
good’s,  left  extending  to  the  Appomattox.  The  rest  of 
Hokes’s  division,  he  says,  arrived  during  the  night,  and  was 
put  on  Hagood’s  right.  All  the  division  was  probably  put 
in  position  before  nine  o’clock,  and  intrencliments  were 
thrown  up  in  rear  of  the  captured  part  of  the  defences  dur¬ 
ing  the  night. 

General  Smith  says  that  he  had  heard  some  hours  before 
the  last  works  were  captured,  that  Lee’s  army  was  rapidly 
crossing  at  Drury’s  Bluff,  and  that  he  deemed  it  wiser  to 
hold  what  he  had,  than,  by  attempting  to  reach  the  bridges, 
to  lose  what  he  had  gained,  and  have  the  troops  meet  with  a 
disaster.  He  knew  also,  he  says,  that  some  portion  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  coming  to  aid  him ;  and  therefore 
the  troops  were  placed  so  as  to  occupy  the  commanding  po¬ 
sitions  and  wait  for  daylight.  Upon  the  arrival  of  General 
Hancock  he  requested  him  to  relieve  his  troops  and  allow 
them  to  rest,  which  request  General  Hancock  complied  with. 

It  is  probable  that  an  immediate  advance  of  the  wThole  of 
Smith’s  force  when  the  salient  was  carried,  or  at  nine  o’clock, 
when  it  would  have  been  supported  by  two  divisions  of  the 
Second  Corps,  would  have  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Peters¬ 
burg  and  the  possession  of  the  north  bank  of  the  Appo¬ 
mattox.  1 

It  was  a  march  of  at  least  sixteen  miles  by  the  direct  road 
from  Windmill  Point  (through  Prince  George  Court  House) 
to  the  Petersburg  intrencliments  where  intersected  by  the 
City  Point  Railroad.  Had  General  Hancock’s  instructions 
merely  directed  him  to  move  his  corps  by  the  most  direct 


1  General  Hinks  says  it  was  about  seven  o’clock  when  General  Birney's  arrival 
was  reported  to  him  by  Colonel  Livermore  of  his  (Hinks’s)  staff  (see  Paper 
Massachusetts  Military  Historical  Society). 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  211 


route  to  the  intrenchments  of  Petersburg,  as  soon  as  the 
rations  were  issued,  it  would,  in  his  judgment,  notwithstand¬ 
ing  the  delay  caused  by  the  matter  of  rations,  have  arrived 
there  by  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon.  Certainly  it  would 
have  been  there  by  six  o’clock,  and  in  time  to  attack  with 
Smith’s  force.  It  would  have  found  no  infantry  and  but 
little  artillery  in  the  intrenchments  on  Smith’s  left,  and 
continuing  to  advance,  would  have  secured  the  possession 
of  Petersburg.  Why  General  Hancock  was  not  ordered  to 
march  at  daylight  of  the  15th,  I  have  been  unable  to  ascer¬ 
tain.  He  could  have  done  so  as  readily  as  at  half-past  ten, 
and  it  would  have  brought  him  up  to  Smith  at  midday. 

He  was  to  “take  up  a  position  where  the  City  Point  Rail¬ 
road  crossed  Harrison’s  Creek,  where  we  now  have  a  work,” 
and  this  condition  did  not  admit  of  his  continuing  on  the 
most  direct  road,  but  obliged  him  to  leave  it ;  and,  turning 
to  the  right,  take  one  several  miles  longer,  after  much  delay 
in  seeking  in  vain  to  ascertain  from  the  people  of  the  coun¬ 
try  where  Harrison’s  Creek  was,  and  what  roads  led  to  it,  for 
the  maps  in  use  were,  for  this  section  of  country,  so  errone¬ 
ous  as  to  be  not  only  useless  but  misleading.  Harrison’s 
Creek  was,  in  fact,  inside  the  enemy’s  intrenchments,  and 
was  such  an  insignificant  rivulet  as  probably  not  to  be  known 
by  any  name  much  beyond  the  limits  of  Petersburg.  There 
was  a  run  marked  on  the  map  as  Harrison’s  Creek,  but  erro¬ 
neously  laid  down.  This  stream,  according  to  the  map,  was 
crossed  by  the  railroad  about  three  and  a  half  miles  from 
Petersburg.  There  was  actually  a  diminutive  stream  crossed 
by  the  City  Point  Railroad  half  way  between  City  Point  and 
Petersburg,  about  five  miles  from  each,  and  this  rivulet 
emptied  into  the  Appomattox  near  the  ponton  bridge  of 
General  Butler  at  Broadway  Landing,  where  there  was  a 
bridge-head,  as  there  was  at  the  site  of  the  ponton  bridge,  a 
mile  and  a  half  above.  These  works  appear  to  be  referred  to 


212  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


in  the  despatch  by  the  phrase  11  where  we  now  have  a  work” 
for  we  had  no  work  where  the  railroad  crossed  the  run. 1 

Apparently  it  was  designed  that  the  Second  Corps  should 
be  in  position  at  the  railroad  crossing  of  Harrison’s  Creek  to 
support  General  Smith,  the  erroneous  map  misleading  as  to 
its  distance  from  the  Petersburg  works.  General  Hancock 
states  in  his  report  that  the  messages  from  Lieutenant-Gen¬ 
eral  Grant  and  from  General  Smith  were  the  first  and  only 
intimations  he  had  that  Petersburg  was  to  be  attacked  that 
day,  and  that  up  to  that  hour  he  had  not  been  notified  from 
any  source  that  he  was  expected  to  assist  General  Smith  in 
assaulting  that  city.  The  artillery  firing  which  he  had  heard 
he  attributed  to  a  raid  or  a  reconnoissance  which  the  people 
of  the  country  informed  him  Kautz  was  making.2 

The  head  of  Birney’s  division,  General  Hancock  says,  ar¬ 
rived  at  the  Bryant  house,  about  a  mile  in  rear  of  Hinks’s 
position,  at  half-past  six  o’clock.  Leaving  instructions  for 
Birney  and  Gibbon  to  move  forward  as  soon  as  they  could 
ascertain  where  they  were  needed,  General  Hancock  rode  to 
General  Smith  and  informed  him  that  two  of  his  divisions 
were  close  at  hand,  ready  for  any  movements  which  in  his 

judgment  should  be  made.  General  Smith,  informing  him 

• 

that  the  enemy  had  been  reinforced  during  the  evening,  re¬ 
quested  him  to  relieve  his  troops  in  the  front  line  of  the 
captured  works.  This  relief  was  completed  by  eleven  o’clock, 
by  which  time,  General  Hancock  says,  it  was  too  late  and  too 
dark  for  an  immediate  advance.  About  midnight  General 
Hancock  was  informed  by  General  Grant  that  the  enemy 


1  “  Taking  up  a  position  where  the  City  Point  Railroad  crosses  Harrison’s  Creek, 
where  ive  now  have  a  work."  I  cannot  recall  where  this  information  “  where  we 
now  have  a  work  ”  came  from.  Evidently  the  information  and  instruction  had  its 
origin  at  General  Butler’s  Headquarters.  The  order  was  written  and  signed  by 
General  Meade.  I  was  not  at  the  headquarters  at  the  time. — A.  A.  H. 

2  No  such  information  was  sent  him  through  me,  nor  did  General  Meade  com¬ 
municate  such  information  to  me  if  he  possessed  it. 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  213 


were  throwing  reinforcements  into  Petersburg,  and  he  was 
directed,  if  Petersburg  should  not  be  taken  in  the  night,  to 
take  up  a  defensive  position,  and  maintain  it  until  all  our 
forces  were  up. 1 

At  six  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  15th  General  Burn¬ 
side  wTas  informed  of  what  was  transpiring  at  Petersburg, 
and  directed  to  cross  the  river  at  once  on  the  ponton  bridge, 
and  move  up  to  Harrison’s  Creek  and  form  on  Hancock’s 
leffc.  His  advance  reached  the  vicinity  of  Petersburg  on  the 
left  of  the  Second  Corps  at  ten  a.m.  of  the  16tli.  General 
Warren  at  the  same  time  was  directed  to  cross  his  artillery 
and  trains  after  Burnside  and  to  begin  to  cross  his  troops  by 
ferrying,  at  daylight  of  the  16th,  and  to  push  forward  his 
corps  to  Petersburg  by  divisions  as  soon  as  each  crossed. 
By  midnight  of  the  16th  the  corps  halted  a  few  miles  from 
Petersburg. 

General  Beauregard,  during  the  evening  of  the  15tli,  de¬ 
termined  to  withdraw  Johnson’s  division  from  the  Bermuda 

1  It  appears  to  me  that  General  Grant’s  plan  for  capturing  Petersburg  was 
something  like  the  following,  though  I  am  without  positive  information  on  the 
subject.  The  force  holding  that  town  was  known  to  General  Butler  to  be  very 
small,  merely  the  artillery  of  the  works,  Wise’s  brigade,  2,400,  with  some  local 
militia,  to  be  called  from  their  daily  vocations  at  need,  and  Deario^’s  cavalry, 
2,000.  In  the  Bermuda  Hundred  lines  there  was  Johnson’s  division,  which,  with¬ 
out  Evans’s  or  Elliott’s  brigade,  was  4,500,  with  it  probably  6,800,  making  a  total 
of  0,000  infantry,  or  without  Evans  about  7,000  infantry. 

With  the  return  of  General  Smith’s  command,  General  Butler  would  have 
23,000  or  24,000  infantry,  and  with  3,000  cavalry  and  14,000  infantry,  with  due 
proportion  of  artillery,  sent  with  Smith  against  Petersburg  early  in  the  day,  and 
some  10,000  infantry  and  sufficient  artillery  at  the  Bermuda  Hundred  lines,  the 
capture  of  Petersburg  seemed  to  be  certain.  The  undertaking  might  very  prop¬ 
erly  be  considered  to  belong  to  Butler’s  command,  and  apparently  it  was  de¬ 
signed  that  the  Second  Corps  and  such  of  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
as  might  need  to  follow,  should  not  take  part  in  the  capture,  which  was  most 
amply  provided  for,  but  go  into  position  as  a  support,  where  the  City  Point  road 
crossed  Harrison’s  Creek,  so  called,  which  even  by  the  erroneous  maps  was  a  mile 
and  a  half  distant  from  the  Petersburg  intrencliments.  With  this  support  at 
hand  and  such  other  force  as  might  be  needed  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
which  could  be  got  up  quicker  than  Lee’s  army,  not  only  the  retention  of  Peters¬ 
burg  seemed  to  be  secured,  but  more  than  that. 


214  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

Hundred  lines,  leaving  at  first  General  Grade’s  brigade,  about 
1, 000  strong,  to  do  what  he  could  to  hold  them  until  General 
Lee  could  reoccupy  or  retake  them.  This  he  telegraphed 
to  General  Lee,  who  received  the  notice  at  two  a.m.  of  the 
16tli,  Anderson’s  corps  being  then  at  Malvern  Hill,  Hill’s  at 
Riddell’s  shop.  At  four  a.m.  General  Lee  had  arrived  at 
Drury’s  Bluff  with  Pickett’s  division  on  its  wTay  to  the  Ber¬ 
muda  Hundred  lines,  of  which  he  gave  notice  to  Beauregard 
and  to  Richmond.  Pickett  was  followed  closely  by  Field, 
Kershaw  remaining  at  Malvern  and  Hill  at  Riddell’s  shop. 
At  half-past  ten  a.m.  he  telegraphed  Beauregard  that  he  did 
not  know  the  position  of  Grant’s  army  and  could  not  strip  the 
north  bank.  At  three  p.m.  he  telegraphed  he  had  not  heard  of 
Grant’s  crossing  James  River.  At  that  hour  only  the  Sixth 
Corps  and  Wilson’s  cavalry  remained  on  the  north  bank. 

About  ten  o’clock  in  the  night  of  the  15th,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Greely,  Tenth  Connecticut,  in  command  of  the 
picket  line  on  the  right  of  Butler’s  intrenchments,  discovered 
that  the  enemy  were  moving  in  their  works,  and  crawling 
forward  upon  his  hands  and  knees  close  up  to  their  pickets  at 
different  points,  ascertained,  between  two  and  three  o’clock 
in  the  morning  of  the  16tli,  that  a  large  number  had  with- 
drawn,  and  that  the  movement  was  still  going  on.  This  he 
reported  to  General  Terry  about  three  o’clock  in  the  morn¬ 
ing,  and  with  his  sanction  advanced  at  daylight,  captured 
many  of  the  pickets,  and  finally,  though  with  some  resist¬ 
ance,  the  enemy’s  main  line,  taking  a  large  number  of  pris¬ 
oners,  among  them  several  officers.  General  Terry  at  once 
moved  out  and  took  possession  of  the  works. 

About  six  p.m.  Pickett’s  division  came  upon  the  ground, 
driving  in  our  skirmishers,  and  advanced  upon  the  works, 
•  when  (General  F.  A.  Osborn  says  J)  orders  were  received  from 


1  Papers,  Massachusetts  Military  Historical  Society. 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  215 


headquarters  to  retire,  and  the  command  abandoned  the 
works,  and  withdrew  to  the  line  of  rifle-pits  formerly  occu¬ 
pied  by  their  advanced  pickets.  Pickett  assaulted  this  line 
about  dusk,  but  was  repulsed.  The  despatches  of  General 
Lee  to  Richmond  and  to  General  Beauregard,  together  with 
the  Diary  of  General  Anderson’s  Corps,  indicate  that  the 
whole  of  the  enemy’s  Bermuda  Hundred  intrenchments  were 
not  retaken  on  the  16tli,  but  General  Osborn  is  positive  that 
they  were,  and  he  was  on  the  ground. 

General  Johnson’s  division,  whose  effective  strength,  with¬ 
out  Gracie’s  brigade,  was  3,500,*  ought,  from  the  preceding 
account,  to  have  been  in  position  in  the  Petersburg  in¬ 
trenchments  early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th.  Upon  arriv¬ 
ing  it  was  placed  on  the  right  of  Hoke’s  division,  Wise  being 
on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  infantry  force,  his 
right  not  reaching  the  Jerusalem  plank-road  by  half  a  mile. 
From  his  right  westwardly,  four  and  a  half  miles,1 2  to  the 
Appomattox  River,  the  intrenchments,  General  Beauregard 
states,3  were  entirely  unoccupied,  except  by  a  few  cavalry 
pickets  stationed  there  to  give  him  timely  notice  of  danger 
in  that  direction.  General  Dearing’s  cavalry,  he  says,  were 
principally  occupied  outside  of  the  lines  on  the  enemy’s 
(our)  left  flank,  watching  his  movements  to  give  timely  no¬ 
tice  of  his  approach  from  that  direction,  which  would,  he 
thought,  have  endangered  his  command,  and  compelled  him 
to  abandon  Petersburg  with  but  little  resistance.  But  with 
this  disposition  of  Dearing’s  cavalry  he  would  have  had  no¬ 
tice  of  our  approach  in  time  to  have  transferred  troops  to 
the  unoccupied  intrenchments  before  we  could  have  got  up 
to  them.  Our  attack  made  in  that  manner  would,  however, 

1  This  number  does  not  include  Colonel  Elliott’s  South  Carolina  brigade,  which, 
from  the  best  information  I  have  been  able  to  get,  was  2,300  strong.  Both  Gen¬ 
erals  Walker  and  Evans  were  wounded  on  the  20th  of  May,  and  were  now  absent. 

2  Our  maps  make  it  five  miles. 

3  Papers,  Massachusetts  Military  Historical  Society. 


216  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

have  been  more  likely  to  succeed  than  attacking  connectedly 
as  we  did,  though  our  attacks  were  now  directed  against  in- 
trenchments  thrown  up  in  a  night,  whereas  the  works  beyond 
our  left  were  the  original,  carefully  built  intrenchments,  the 
character  of  which  has  been  already  stated. 

From  the  right  of  Wise  to  the  left  of  Hoke  was  about  five 
miles.  Besides  the  artillery,  General  Beauregard  probably 
had  about  14,000  effective  force  of  infantry  in  these  intrench¬ 
ments  earlv  on  the  16tli.  He  received  no  further  reinforce- 
ments  until  the  morning  of  the  18th,  when  Kershaw  and 
Field  arrived,  and,  later  in  the  day,  Hill. 

The  Petersburg  intrenchments  ran  from  the  Appomattox 
River  east,  a  mile  to  the  City  Point  Railroad ;  then  south, 
three  miles  to  the  Norfolk  Railroad ;  then  west,  four  miles 
to  a  point  a  mile  west  of  the  Weldon  Railroad ;  then  north, 
two  miles  to  the  Appomattox  River.  The  length  of  the  in¬ 
trenchments  from  the  Norfolk  Railroad  west  to  the  Jerusa¬ 
lem  plank-road  was  a  mile  and  a  half. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th  General  Hancock,  who  was 
placed  in  command  of  all  the  troops  that  were  up,  made 
reconnoissances  in  his  front,  in  the  course  of  which,  he  says, 
General  Egan’s  brigade  made  a  spirited  attack  upon  a  re¬ 
doubt  on  Birney’s  left  (Redan  No.  12),  and  carried  it  in  his, 
Egan’s,  usual  intrepid  manner.  General  Hancock  was  now 
ordered  to  attack  in  his  front  at  six  p.m.,  General  Meade  hav¬ 
ing  arrived  upon  the  ground.  This  programme  was  carried 
out,  and  a  spirited  assault  was  made  by  the  Second  Corps, 
supported  by  two  brigades  of  the  Eighteenth  on  the  right, 
and  two  of  the  Ninth  on  the  left,  which  resulted  in  the  cap¬ 
ture  of  Redans  No.  4  on  the  right,  and  Nos.  13  and  14  on 
the  left,  together  with  their  connecting  lines,  and  in  driving 
back  the  enemy  along  the  whole  line.  The  attacking  force 
suffered  severely.  The  heavy  fighting  ceased  at  dark,  but 
several  vigorous  attempts  were  made  by  the  enemy  during 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  217 


tlie  niglit  to  retake  their  ground.  The  gallant  commander 
of  the  Irish  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps,  Colonel  Patrick 
Kelly,  Eighty-eighth  New  York,  was  killed,  leading  his  com¬ 
mand,  and  Colonel  Beaver,  One  Hundred  and  Forty-eighth 
Pennsylvania,  severely  wounded. 

At  the  first  dawn  of  day  in  the  morning  of  the  17tli,  the 
division  of  General  Potter  (Ninth  Corps)  carried,  in  the  most 
gallant  manner,  the  redans  and  lines  on  the  ridge  where  the 
Shind  or  Shand  house  stood,  capturing  four  guns,  five  col¬ 
ors,  600  prisoners,  and  1,500  stands  of  small  arms. 

The  troops,  Griffin’s  and  Curtin’s  brigades  of  Potter’s 
division,  were  formed  in  two  lines  in  a  deep  ravine  with 
precipitous  slopes,  close  up  to  the  works  they  were  to  at¬ 
tack.  They  were  ordered  not  to  fire  a  shot,  but  to  depend 
on  the  bayonet.  The  command,  Forward ,  was  passed  along 
the  lines  in  whispers,  and  the  lines,  without  firing  a  shot, 
at  once  swept  over  the  enemy’s  works,  taking  them  com¬ 
pletely  by  surprise,  and  carrying  everything  before  them. 
The  Confederate  troops  were  asleep,  with  their  arms  in  their 
hands.1 

1  General  Griffin,  in  a  paper  contributed  to  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Soci¬ 
ety,  says  that  General  Potter  entrusted  him  with  the  charge  of  the  assault,  as¬ 
signing  Curtin’s  brigade  to  his  support.  He  says  :  “  I  then  spent  the  entire  night 
moving  my  troops  through  the  felled  timber,  getting  them  in  proper  position,  and 
preparing  for  the  attack.  I  placed  my  brigade  on  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps  in 
a  ravine  immediately  in  front  of  the  Shand  house,  which  the  enemy  held,  and 
within  one  hundred  yards  of  their  lines,  with  Curtin  on  my  left  and  a  little  fur¬ 
ther  to  the  rear  on  account  of  the  conformation  of  the  ground.  We  were  so  near 
the  enemy  that  all  our  movements  had  to  be  made  with  the  utmost  care  and  cau¬ 
tion  ;  canteens  were  placed  in  knapsacks  to  prevent  rattling,  and  all  commands 

were  given  in  whispers.  I  formed  my  brigade  in  two  lines . Colonel 

Curtin  formed  his  in  the  same  way . My  orders  were  not  to  fire  a  shot, 

but  to  depend  wholly  on  the  bayonet  in  carrying  the  lines. 

“Just  as  the  dawn  began  to  light  up  the  east,  I  gave  the  command,  ‘  Forward.’ 
It  was  passed  along  the  lines  in  whispers,  the  men  sprang  to  their  feet  and  both 
brigades  moved  forward  at  once  in  well-formed  lines,  sweeping  directly  over  the 
enemy’s  works,  taking  them  completely  by  surprise,  and  carrying  all  before  us. 

“One  gunner  saw  us  approaching  and  fired  his  piece.  That  was  all  we  heard 
from  them,  and  almost  the  only  shot  fired  on  either  side.  The  rebels  were  asleep 

XII.— 10 


218  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


The  ground  in  the  ravine  from  which  General  Potter  made 
his  attack  was  covered  thickly  with  slashed  timber,  making 
it  difficult  to  get  up  Ledlie’s  division  to  follow  up  Potter’s 
success.  Potter,  however,  pushed  forward  until  he  found 
the  enemy  in  a  new  intrenched  position  on  the  west  slope  of 
Harrison’s  Creek,  which  extended  from  Redan  No.  3,  near 
the  Appomattox  to  the  works  at  and  hi  the  vicinity  of  the 
Norfolk  Railroad. 

In  the  course  of  the  day  General  Willcox *  1  made  an  attack 
on  this  line,  but  owing  to  the  musketry  fire  in  front,  and 
artillery  fire  from  the  left,  without  success.  General  Barlow 
supported  him  on  the  right  and  pushed  forward  his  line  with 
sharp  fighting.  Late  in  the  afternoon  General  Ledlie’s  divi¬ 
sion  (commanded  by  Colonel  Gould,  Fifty-ninth  Massachu¬ 
setts)  was  directed  to  attack  at  the  point  where  Willcox  had 
failed.  This  attack  after  some  time  succeeded,  a  portion  of 

with  their  arms  in  their  hands,  and  many  of  them  sprang  up  and  ran  away  as  we 
came  over.  Others  surrendered  without  resistance. 

“  We  swept  their  line  for  a  mile  from  where  my  right  rested,  gathering  in  pris¬ 
oners  and  abandoned  arms  and  equipments  all  the  way.  Four  pieces  of  artillery, 
with  caissons  and  horses,  a  stand  of  colors,  600  prisoners,  fifteen  hundred  stand 
of  arms,  and  some  ammunition  fell  into  our  hands.” 

1  On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  General  Meade  requested  me  to  pass  the  day  with 
General  Burnside,  who  was  to  attack  on  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps.  The  day 
before  I  had  examined  the  enemy’s  works  as  far  to  our  left  as  the  Norfolk  Rail¬ 
road,  and  got  the  impression  that  the  Ninth  Corps  would  attack  there,  and  the 
Fifth  Corps  in  the  course  of  the  day  on  its  left,  that  is,  about  where  the  Jerusalem 
plank  road  passed  through  the  line  of  works,  and  where,  according  to  General 
Beauregard,  there  were  no  troops.  Not  seeing  the  Ninth  Corps  anywhere  (they 
were  at  that  time  in  some  of  the  numerous  deep  ravines),  I  rode  to  the  Norfolk 
Railroad,  and  remained  there  some  hours,  expecting  from  time  to  time  that  the 
Ninth  Corps  would  arrive.  The  enemy  at  the  Norfolk  Railroad  redan  seemed 
uneasy  at  the  presence  there  of  my  small  party,  and  kept  up  a  pretty  constant 
fire  of  shrapnel  upon  us,  but  without  hurting  any  one. 

Seeing  neither  the  Ninth  nor  the  Fifth  Corps,  I  was  satisfied  at  length  that  I 
had  mistaken  the  place  of  attack,  and  rode  back  to  where  I  knew  the  Second 
Corps  to  be,  and  found  General  Burnside  at  battery  or  Redan  No.  14,  which  had 
been  captured  on  the  afternoon  of  the  16th,  and  in  front  of  which  General  Will¬ 
cox  was  attacking.  This  position  was  a  mile  north  of  the  Norfolk  Railroad  redan. 
The  line  of  intrenchments  under  attack  by  the  Second  and  Ninth  Corps  was  about 
two  miles  in  extent. 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  219 


the  intrenchments  being  carried,  but  only  after  many  casual¬ 
ties.  A  hundred  prisoners  and  a  stand  of  colors  were  cap¬ 
tured.  The  attacking  force  was  under  a  severe  musketry 
fire  in  front  as  well  as  an  artillery  fire  on  the  right  and  left, 
the  opposing  batteries  keeping  up  a  quick  and  effective  fire 
throughout.  The  part  of  the  division  that  carried  the  line 
exhausted  its  ammunition,  and  was  then  driven  out  of  the 
trenches  it  had  captured,  General  Beauregard  says,  by 
Gracie’s  brigade,  which  took  many  prisoners.  General  Bar- 
low  supported  the  attack  of  the  Ninth  Corps  on  the  right, 
losing  heavily  ;  1  General  Crawford  of  the  Fifth  Corps  sup¬ 
ported  the  last  attack  on  the  left ;  Gibbon  and  Birney  pushed 
forward  during  the  day,  making  lodgments  close  to  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments  on  the  west  side  of  Harrison’s  Creek. 
But  at  midnight  the  enemy  still  held  from  the  Appomattox 
to  Redan  No.  3,  their  intrenchments  from  that  point  running 
south  along  the  high  ground  west  of  Harrison’s  Creek  to  the 
Norfolk  Railroad. 

During  the  17th  General  Beauregard  determined  to  with- 
draw  in  the  night  from  the  position  he  was  holding,  across  a 
ravine  five  hundred  yards  in  his  rear,  where  his  line  of  battle 
would  be  much  shortened,  and  the  position  would  be  advan¬ 
tageous.  He  sent  his  Chief  Engineer,  Colonel  D.  B.  Harris 
of  Virginia,  to  lay  out  the  line  and  make  all  the  preliminary 
arrangements  with  staff  officers  of  the  generals  of  his  com¬ 
mand.  The  new  line  was  from  five  hundred  to  one  thousand 
yards  in  rear  of  the  one  he  was  occupying,  and  intersected 

1  It  is  stated  that  this  capture  was  made  at  or  before  sunset,  and  the  intrench¬ 
ments  held  until  ten  o’clock,  but  I  think  it  must  have  been  later  when  the  enemy's 
line  was  penetrated,  as  I  witnessed  the  contest  from  a  near  point  of  view,  and  the 
attack  had  not  succeeded  up  to  the  time  of  my  leaving  the  Ninth  Corps,  which 
was  after  dark.  Nor  does  it  seem  probable  that  it  was  held  so  long  as  stated,  for 
General  Burnside  was  near  at  hand,  and  General  Warren  not  far  off,  and  we  can¬ 
not  suppose  that  either  would  have  failed  to  throw  forward  more  troops  at  once 
when  they  learnt  the  intrenchment  was  carried.  The  line  was  probably  retaken 
before  either  knew  it  had  been  captured. 


220  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


the  original  line  of  intrenchments  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Jeru¬ 
salem  plank  road.  He  withdrew  to  it  after  midnight,  and 
the  work  of  intrenchment  at  once  began. 

When  General  Grant  learnt  on  the  16th  that  General 
Butler  occupied  Beauregard’s  Bermuda  Hundred  lines,  being 
anxious  that  they  should  be  held,  and  a  footing  on  the  rail¬ 
road  secured,  he  directed  General  Meade  to  send  General 
Wright  with  two  of  his  divisions  by  boat  to  General  Butler, 
when  they  abandoned  the  crossing-place  of  the  army.  Ac¬ 
cordingly  they  embarked  at  midnight,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  17th  General  Wright  reported  with  them  to  General 
Butler,  but  Beauregard’s  lines  were  then  held  by  Pickett 
and  Field,  and  General  Wright  was  directed  to  support  Gen¬ 
eral  Terry  in  an  attack  upon  them.  The  attack,  however, 
giving  no  great  promise  of  success,  was  not  made. 

About  two  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  17th,  General 
Lee  telegraphed  General  Beauregard  : 

“  The  Fifth  Corps,  Warren’s,  crossed  the  Chickahominy  at  Long 
Bridge  on  the  13th — was  driven  from  Riddel’s  shop  by  Hill,  leaving 
many  dead  and  prisoners  on  our  hands.  That  night  it  marched  to 
Westover.  .  .  .  Have  not  heard  from  it  since.  .  . 

At  half  past  three  he  telegraphed  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee, 
at  Malvern  Hill,  to  push  after  the  enemy  and  endeavor  to  as¬ 
certain  what  had  become  of  Grant’s  army,  and  to  inform 
General  Hill. 

At  half -past  four  he  telegraphed  General  Hill  at  Riddell’s 
shop  that  General  Beauregard  reported  that  large  numbers 
of  Grant’s  troops  had  crossed  James  River  above  Fort  Pow¬ 
hatan  the  day  before,  and,  if  he  had  nothing  contradictory  of 
it  to  move  to  Chapin’s  Bluff. 

At  five  o’clock  he  telegraphed  Mr.  Davis  at  Richmond, 
that  at  four  o’clock  he  had  assaulted  that  portion  of  his  Ber¬ 
muda  Hundred  front  line  held  by  the  enemy,  and  had  driven 
him  from  it,  and  that  he  held  the  entire  line. 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  221 


General  Osborn,  whom  I  have  already  quoted,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  says  that  at  daybreak  of  the  17th  the  enemy  again 
assaulted  their  line  (their  original  advance  picket  line,  now 
strengthened  and  held  by  them  in  force),  and  were  repulsed, 
and  that  at  four  p.m.  the  enemy  made  another  fierce  attack, 
and  for  a  time  gained  some  little  advantage,  breaking  into  the  line 
and  driving  back  a  part  of  it.  But  this  was  soon  regained. 

Beauregard  had  made  urgent  calls  upon  Lee  for  troops, 
and  Kershaw  having  arrived  at  the  Bermuda  lines,  marched 
at  three  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  18tli  for  Petersburg, 
followed  by  Field,  leaving  Pickett  to  hold  the  lines.  Both 
were  in  position  on  Beauregard’s  right  in  the  morning,  Ker¬ 
shaw  relieving  J ohnson’s  division,  Field  on  his  right.  Gen¬ 
eral  Lee  arrived  with  them.  Hill  got  up  in  the  course  of  the 
day,  and  was  posted  on  the  right  of  Anderson. 

Late  at  night  on  the  17th  General  Meade  ordered  an  as¬ 
sault  in  strong  columns,  well  supported,  upon  the  enemy’s 
works  at  four  o’clock  in  the  following  morning,  by  the  Fifth, 
Ninth,  and  Second  Corps. 

Brigadier-General  Neill,  temporarily  commanding  the  Sec¬ 
ond  Division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  had  relieved  the  Eighteenth 
Corps  on  the  17th,  except  Martindale’s  division,  and  General 
Smith  returned  to  General  Butler  at  Bermuda  Hundred. 
Martindale  and  Neill  were  held  ready  to  support  an  attack. 

Upon  advancing  to  the  assault  on  the  morning  of  the  18th, 
it  was  found  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  the  intrencli- 
ments  they  had  so  successfully  held  the  day  before.  The 
ground  in  front  of  the  points  assaulted  was  thickly  covered 
with  the  killed,  and  the  trenches  at  those  points  were  filled 
with  Confederate  dead. 

Finding  the  line  abandoned,  General  Meade  at  once  ordered 
the  army  to  press  forward  and  attack  before  reinforcements 
could  arrive,  for  he  had  learnt  from  prisoners  that  Beaure¬ 
gard’s  intrenchments  were  merely  such  as  he  had  been  able 


222  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’C4  AND  ’65. 


to  put  up  after  occupying  liis  new  position,  and.  they  must 
necessarily  be  imperfect.  He  had  also  learnt  from  the 
same  source  what  force  Beauregard  actually  had.  This  in¬ 
formation  was  communicated  to  the  corps  commanders,  but 
before  any  assault  was  made  Anderson’s  corps,  Field’s  and 
Kershaw’s  divisions,  was  in  position,  and  before  the  assaults 
in  the  afternoon  Hill’s  troops  had  begun  to  arrive. 

General  Birney  was  temporarily  in  command  of  the  Second 
Corps,  General  Hancock  being  disabled  by  the  opening  of 
his  wound  in  the  evening  of  the  17th. 

The  Second  Corps  found  itself  sooner  than  the  other  troops 
close  to  the  enemy’s  new  intrenchments,  being  at  the  Hare 
house  (near  which  were  both  the  enemy’s  new  and  abandoned 
lines),  only  some  three  hundred  yards  distant.  Its  advance 
was  in  great  part  concealed  by  woods.  The  Ninth  Corps,  on 
the  left  of  the  Second,  had  to  advance  nearly  a  mile,  when  it 
found  itself  in  contact  with  a  force  of  the  enemy  occupying 
the  Norfolk  Bailroad  cut,  and  a  ravine  some  four  or  five 
hundred  yards  in  advance  of  and  nearly  parallel  with  their 
main  line.  The  Fifth  Corps,  on  the  left  of  the  Ninth,  had  a 
still  greater  distance  to  advance  over,  and  had  similar  ob¬ 
stacles  in  its  front  interposed  between  it  and  the  enemy’s 
main  line  as  the  Ninth  Corps,  that  is,  deep  ravines  and  the 
Norfolk  Bailroad  cut,  which  was  here  very  deep  and  difficult 
to  cross,  and  was  held  by  the  enemy  at  its  northern  end. 
Its  direction  was  such,  curving  to  the  north,  as  to  embarrass 
troops  advancing  in  line  of  battle.  General  Meade,  finding 
that  serious  delays  were  occurring  from  the  attempt  to  make 
a  simultaneous  attack,  without  fixing  the  hour,  owing  to  the 
different  conditions  existing  on  the  fronts  of  the  several 
corps,  fixed  it  himself  and  ordered  all  the  corps  to  attack  at 
twelve  o’clock,  with  strong  columns  of  assault.  Birney  car¬ 
ried  out  this  order,  making  two  assaults  about  midday,  with 
Gibbon’s  division,  on  the  right  of  the  Prince  George  Court 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  223 


House  road,  both  of  which  were  repulsed  with  severe  loss, 
Brigadier-General  Pierce  and  Colonel  Ramsey,  brigade  com¬ 
manders,  being  wounded. 

General  Burnside  was  occupied  in  endeavoring  to  drive 
the  enemy  out  of  the  railroad  cut  in  his  front  as  a  necessary 
preliminary  to  getting  close  enough  to  the  intrenchments  to 
assault.  General  Warren  was  similarly  engaged.  The  ground 
he  had  to  pass  over  was  intricate  and  difficult  to  cross,  and 
being  chiefly  in  open  ground,  was  exposed  to  the  enemy’s  artil¬ 
lery  fire  for  a  long  distance.  General  Meade  again  ordered 
assaults  by  all  the  corps,  with  their  whole  force  at  all  hazards, 
as  soon  as  possible,  as  he  found  it  useless  to  appoint  an  hour 
to  effect  co-operation.  All  the  corps  assaulted  late  in  the 
afternoon,  and  at  hours  not  widely  apart,  General  Birney 
with  all  his  disposable  force — Mott  from  the  Hare  house,  on 
the  left  of  the  Prince  George  Court  House  road,  supported 
by  one  of  Gibbon’s  brigades,  Barlow  on  Mott’s  left — but  was 
repulsed  with  considerable  loss. 

General  Burnside  found  the  task  of  driving  the  enemy  out 
of  the  railroad  cut  a  formidable  one,  but  succeeded,  and, 
assaulting,  established  his  corps  within  a  hundred  yards  of 
the  enemy’s  main  line.  He  praises  highly  the  manner  in 
which  Potter’s  and  Willcox’s  divisions,  under  Major-General 
Parke’s  directions,  accomplished  this. 

General  Warren’s  assault  was  well  made,  some  of  Griffin’s 
men  being  killed  within  twenty  feet  of  the  enemy’s  works, 
but  it  was  no  more  successful  than  the  others.  His  losses 
were  very  severe.  Among  the  desperately  wounded  was 
Colonel  Chamberlain,  of  the  Twentieth  Maine,  who  led  his 
brigade  under  a  destructive  fire.  On  previous  occasions  he 
had  been  recommended  for  promotion  for  gallant  conduct 
and  efficient  service. 

On  the  right,  Martindale  advanced  and  gained  some  rifle- 
pits,  but  did  not  assault  the  main  line. 


224  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

The  positions  gained  by  the  several  corps  close  against  the 
enemy  were  intrenched,  and  the  two  opposing  lines  in  this 
part  of  the  ground  remained  substantially  the  same  in  posi¬ 
tion  to  the  close  of  the  wTar. 

Toward  evening  General  Meade  had  reason  to  believe  that 
General  Beauregard  had  been  reinforced  by  Lee’s  army,  and 
that  reinforcements  were  still  arriving. 

At  the  close  of  the  day  General  Grant,  expressing  himself 
perfectly  satisfied  that  all  had  been  done  that  could  be  done, 
and  that  the  assaults  were  called  for  by  all  the  information 
that  could  be  obtained,  directed  that  the  troops  should  be 
put  under  cover  and  have  some  rest,  which,  indeed,  they 
greatly  needed. 

The  Medical  Director  states  that  during  this  attempt  to 
take  Petersburg,  from  the  15th  to  the  18th  of  June,  the 
number  of  wounded  brought  to  the  hospitals  from  the  differ¬ 
ent  corps  was :  from  the  Second  Corps,  2, 212 ;  from  the  Fifth 
Corps,  1,145  ;  from  the  Ninth  Corps,  1,197  ;  and,  in  addition, 
1,656,  the  corps  of  which  he  does  not  note.  This  makes  a 
total  brought  to  the  hospitals  of  6,210.  Taking  the  usual  pro¬ 
portion  for  the  killed,  we  have  1,240,  and  killed  and  wounded, 
7,450.  The  number  of  killed  and  wounded  of  the  Eighteenth 
Corps  is  not  included.  It  was  probably  not  less  than  700. 1 

This  makes  the  loss  in  killed  and  woimded  to  be  8,150. 
The  Tabular  Statement  of  the  ‘  ‘  Medical  and  Surgical  His¬ 
tory  ”  has  under  the  head  of  “  Missing,”  1,814.  The  total  is 
then  9,964. 

The  figures  of  the  Tabular  Statement  are :  killed,  1,298 ; 
wounded,  7,474;  lulled  and  wounded,  8,772;  missing,  1,814. 
Total  loss,  10,586.  The  stragglers  are  probably  included  in 
these  numbers. 


1  The  class  the  Medical  Director  designates  as  stragglers  wounded,  that  is,  who, 
slightly  wounded,  will  not  report  to  the  hospitals,  but  try  to  straggle  away,  must 
have  numbered  five  or  six  hundred ;  they  are  not  included  in  the  figures  above. 


ASSAULTS  ON  PETERSBURG  INTRENCHMENTS.  225 


I  can  find  no  official  statement  of  the  losses  of  Lee’s  and 
Beauregard’s  troops  during  these  operations,  but  notwith¬ 
standing  that  they  were  intrenched,  my  own  observation 
leads  me  to  believe  they  were  severe. 

The  incessant  movements,  day  and  night,  for  so  long  a 
period,  the  constant  close  contact  with  the  enemy  during  all 
that  time,  the  almost  daily  assaults  upon  intrenchments  hav¬ 
ing  entanglements  in  front,  and  defended  by  artillery  and 
musketry  in  front  and  flank,  exhausted  officers  and  men. 
The  larger  part  of  the  officers,  who  literally  led  their  com¬ 
mands,  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  a  large  number  of  those 
that  filled  the  ranks  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  were 
absent.  It  is  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the  troops  were 
not,  for  a  time,  so  exhausted  as  to  need  rest,  and  equally  un¬ 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  their  opponents  were  not  in  a 
similar  condition,  though  to  a  less  degree,  since  they  had  not 
marched  so  much  at  night  nor  attacked  intrenchments. 

10* 


CHAPTER  VIH. 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  WELDON  AND  SOUTH  SIDE 
RAILROADS — THE  CAVALRY  ENGAGEMENTS  IN  THE 
VICINITY  OF  TREVYLIAN  STATION  ON  THE  VIR¬ 
GINIA  CENTRAL  RAILROAD,  AND  REAMS’S  STATION 
ON  THE  WELDON  RAILROAD— THE  CASUALTIES  IN 
THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  FROM  THE  COM¬ 
MENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  UNTIL  THE  30th 
OF  JUNE— THE  DEMONSTRATION  AGAINST  WASH¬ 
INGTON. 

It  was  now  determined  to  invest  Petersburg  partially  by  a 
line  of  intrenchments  directed  toward  the  Lynchburg  (South 
Side)  Railroad.  These  intrenchments  were  to  consist  of  re¬ 
doubts  connected  by  lines  of  infantry  parapets,  with  ditches 
and  entanglements  of  slashing  or  abatis,  which  the  army 
might  be  withdrawn  from  at  any  time,  leaving  a  sufficient 
force  to  hold  them,  and  move  to  intercept  the  railroads  and 
attack  Lee’s  army  in  unexpected  quarters  south,  or  even 
north,  of  the  James.  The  work  of  intrenching  wTent  on  on 
both  sides,  at  first  with  constant  picket  and  artillery  firing. 
The  Confederate  intrenchments  were  similar  to  ours  except 
that  their  works  were  not  closed  in  the  rear. 

General  Kautz  had  returned  to  General  Butler  in  the  night 
of  the  16th  and  17th,  and  a  small  cavalry  force  watched  the 
left  of  the  army.  The  two  divisions  of  the  Sixth  Corps  were 
returned  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  evening  of  the 
19th. 

On  the  21st  the  Ninth  Corps  extended  its  right  to  the 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  RAILROADS. 


227 


Prince  George  Court  House  road  at  the  Hare  house,  so  as  to 
join  the  troops  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  and  relieve  the 
Second  and  Sixth  Corps.  The  right  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
joined  the  left  of  the  Ninth ;  its  left,  on  the  evening  of  the 
21st,  rested  on  the  Jerusalem  plank-road,  where,  a  short  time 
afterward,  Fort  Sedgwick  was  built. 

The  Second  Corps,  followed  by  the  Sixth,  was  moved,  on 
the  21st,  across  the  Jerusalem  plank-road,  with  the  intention 
of  taking  possession  of  the  Weldon  Railroad  on  the  next 
day,  and  with  the  expectation  of  securing  the  Lynchburg  or 
South  Side  Railroad.  The  Second  Corps  was  placed  in  posi¬ 
tion  on  the  left  of  the  Fifth,  the  Sixth  Corps  at  night  being 
in  rear  of  the  left  of  the  Second.  During  the  day  General 
Barlow  made  a  reconnoissance  toward  the  Weldon  Railroad, 
and  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  moved  down  the  road 
to  meet  it. 

General  Birney  was  instructed  by  General  Meade,  on  the 
21st,  that  he  was  to  take  position  on  the  left  of  the  Fifth 
Corps,  and  extend  as  far  as  practicable  to  the  left,  envelop¬ 
ing  and  keeping  as  close  as  possible  to  the  enemy’s  line  ; 
that  it  was  hoped  he  would  be  able  to  get  possession  of  the 
Weldon  Railroad,  though  it  was  probable  the  enemy  would 
attempt  to  cover  and  defend  it ;  that  the  Sixth  Corps  would 
be  sent  at  night  to  take  post  on  his  left,  and  that  it  was  de¬ 
sired  to  stretch  to  the  Appomattox. 

On  the  evening  of  the  21st  General  Wright  was  directed 
by  General  Meade  to  take  position  on  the  left  of  Birney,  and 
pressing  up  against  the  enemy,  drive  them  into  their  main 
works,  but  not  to  take  the  offensive  so  far  as  to  assault 
them ; 1  that  General  Birney  was  forming  on  Warren’s  left, 
which  rested  on  the  Jerusalem  plank-road,  and  would  extend 
as  far  as  possible,  holding  his  line  defensively ;  that  the  ob- 

1  The  enemy’s  intrenchments  west  of  the  Jerusalem  plank-road  were  the  orig¬ 
inal  works,  running  here  east  and  west. 


228  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 


ject  of  the  transfer  of  the  two  corps  to  the  left  was  to  encir¬ 
cle  Petersburg  so  far  as  to  hold  the  two  railroads,  the  Wel¬ 
don  and  the  Lynchburg  ;  that  he  would  therefore  extend 
from  Birney’s  left  as  far  as  practicable  consistent  with  its 
security  as  a  defensive  line. 

In  order  that  the  enveloping  line  should  be  at  a  suitable 
distance  from  the  Confederate  works,  General  Birney,  com¬ 
manding  the  Second  Corps,  was  further  directed,  on  the  22d, 
to  swing  forward  its  left,  the  right  of  Gibbon’s  division, 
which  connected  with  the  Fifth  Corps,  being  the  pivot,  and 
then  intrench ;  and  General  Wright  was  directed  to  move  to 
the  Weldon  Railroad  by  the  Williams  house  road  (the  dis¬ 
tance  between  the  Jerusalem  plank-road  and  the  Weldon 
Railroad  being  about  three  miles),  get  possession  of  the  rail¬ 
road  and  intrench,  connecting  with  Birney.  At  first  these 
corps  commanders  were  directed  to  keep  up  connection ;  but 
as  that  led  to  misapprehensions  between  their  troops  and  to 
delays,  they  were  ordered  to  move  irrespective  of  each  other, 
taking  the  requisite  precaution  to  insure  the  safety  of  their 
exposed  flanks.  The  two  corps  were  moving  chiefly  through 
densely-wooded  thickets,  the  Second  Corps  to  the  edge  of 
the  open  ground  in  front  of  the  enemy’s  works,  the  Sixth 
Corps  nearly  at  light  angles  to  it,  toward  the  Weldon  Rail¬ 
road  near  the  Globe  tavern.  The  enemy’s  skirmishers  were 
very  active  and  embarrassing  on  the  front  and  flank  of  the 
Sixth  Corps,  the  main  line  of  which  did  not  advance  more 
than  half-way  to  the  railroad.  It  was  late  in  the  afternoon 
before  General  Gibbon  had  intrenched  his  part  of  the  new 
line,  General  Mott  was  still  at  work  upon  his.  General  Bar- 
low  was  only  partially  in  position,  but  General  Birney  had 
not  taken  the  requisite  precautions  to  secure  his  left  in 
swinging  forward. 

General  A.  P.  Hill  had  been  sent  down  the  Weldon  Rail¬ 
road  to  meet  Meade’s  attempt  upon  it,  having  Wilcox’s  and 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  RAILROADS. 


229 


Mahone’s  divisions  with  him,  supported  by  B.  R.  Johnson’s. 
Leaving  Wilcox  to  make  head  against  Wright,  he  passed 
through  the  opening  between  Birney  and  Wright,  and  the 
first  information  Birney  had  of  his  presence  was  a  fire  upon 
the  flank  and  rear  of  Barlow’s  division,  which  sent  it  back  in 
some  confusion  to  the  position  it  had  in  the  morning  ;  and 
with  the  loss  of  many  prisoners.  Mott’s  division,  partly 
seeing  what  had  occurred,  went  back  precipitately  also  to  the 
position  from  which  it  had  advanced,  and  by  doing  so  lost 
much  fewer  prisoners  than  Barlow’s  division,  but  left  Gib¬ 
bon’s  division,  without  any  warning,  to  receive  a  fire  in  the 
rear  of  its  left  brigade,  which  at  once  followed  the  example 
of  the  troops  on  its  left,  and  abandoned  a  battery  of  four 
guns  on  its  right  to  the  enemy,  who  quickly  turned  it  on 
them.  So  sudden  and  unexpected  was  this  attack  on  Gib¬ 
bon’s  left,  that  the  greater  part  of  several  regiments  were 
captured  with  their  colors.  An  immediate  attempt  was 
made  by  General  Gibbon  to  recover  his  line,  but  without 
success.  He  lost  about  as  many  prisoners  as  the  First  Di¬ 
vision,  the  total  loss  of  the  corps  being  about  1,700  pris¬ 
oners,  four  guns,  and  several  colors.  The  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  not  severe.  Hill  returned  to  his  intrenchments 
at  dusk,  leaving  some  force  on  the  railroad. 

The  Second  Corps  was  thrown  forward  that  evening,  but 
it  was  not  until  early  the  next  morning  that  it  advanced  and 
established  itself  on  the  line  it  had  been  driven  from.  The 
Sixth  Corps  formed  on  its  left,  thrown  back  facing  the  Wel¬ 
don  Railroad,  and  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  it,  its  picket 
line  close  to  the  road. 

In  this  general  position  the  two  armies  remained  for  some 
weeks.  Two  strong  redoubts  were  built  on  the  line  running 
south  on  the  Jerusalem  plank-road,  about  half  a  mile  apart, 
the  first,  Fort  Davis,  being  half  a  mile  from  Fort  Sedgwick. 
They  were  finished  and  occupied  about  the  11th  of  July. 


230  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


By  this  time  the  musketry  and  artillery  fire,  which  had  been 
continuous  on  the  lines  from  the  Appomattox  to  the  left  of 
the  Fifth  Corps,  and  was  especially  severe  on  the  Ninth 
Corps  front,  where  the  two  lines  were  very  close  to  each 
other,  had  gradually  ceased  during  the  day,  but  was  con¬ 
tinued  during  the  night,  because  of  the  danger  of  a  surprise.1 

It  has  been  already  stated  that  on  the  morning  of  the  7th 
of  June,  General  Sheridan,  with  two  of  his  divisions,  with 
certain  supplies,  train,  and  a  canvas  ponton  bridge  equipage, 
marched  for  Charlottesville,  from  which  point  he  was  to  be¬ 
gin  the  destruction  of  the  Central  Railroad,  and  to  continue 
it  to  Hanover  Junction,  which  being  accomplished,  he  was 
to  rejoin  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  expected  that  he 
would  meet  General  Hunter  at  Charlottesville,  and  that  both 
forces  would  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  when  the  de¬ 
struction  of  the  railroad  was  completed. 

Moving  up  the  north  bank  of  the  North  Anna,  General 
Sheridan  crossed  that  river  on  the  evening  of  the  10th  at 
Carpenter’s  ford  and  encamped  there  for  the  night  on  the 
road  to  Trevylian  Station  (on  the  Central  Railroad),  which 
was  nine  or  ten  miles  distant  in  a  southwest  direction.  On 
the  9th  he  had  learnt  that  Breckinridge’s  infantry  division 
was  moving  slowly  up  the  railroad  to  Gordonsville,2  and  that 
the  enemy’s  cavalry  were  marching  on  Gordonsville  by  the 
Richmond  and  Gordonsville  road,  on  the  south  side  of  the 
North  Anna. 

General  Hampton  with  his  division  encamped  on  the 
night  of  the  lOtli  in  Green  Spring  Valley,  three  miles  north¬ 
west  of  Trevylian  Station  ;  Fitzhugh  Lee  near  Louisa  Court 
House,  about  six  miles  east  of  Trevylian  Station.  Hearing 

1  The  men  themselves  gave  each  other  notice,  upon  the  approach  of  night,  be¬ 
fore  they  commenced  firing. 

2  This  was  erroneous.  Breckinridge,  according  to  Confederate  authorities, 
moved  direct  from  Cold  Harbor  to  Lynchburg,  a  very  important  point  for  the 
Confederates  to  hold  against  Hunter. 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  RAILROADS. 


231 


during  the  night  where  General  Sheridan’s  force  was,  Gen¬ 
eral  Hampton  determined  to  attack  it  at  Clayton’s  store, 
which  is  on  the  road  from  Carpenter’s  ford  to  Trevylian 
Station,  and  about  equidistant  from  both.  His  division  was 
to  move  by  way  of  the  station,  Fitz  Lee’s  by  a  direct  road 
from  Louisa  Court  House  to  the  store,  a  march  of  about  six 
miles.  By  this  movement  General  Hampton  expected  also 
to  prevent  General  Sheridan  from  reaching  Gordonsville  by 
passing  his  left.  At  daylight  Hampton  had  reached  Tre¬ 
vylian  Station  and  was  moving  out  the  road  to  Clayton’s 
store  with  two  of  his  brigades,  Butler’s  and  Young’s,  Ros¬ 
ser’s  advancing  in  the  same  direction  by  a  road  on  his  left. 
Fitz  Lee  was  moving  from  Louisa  Court  House  to  the  same 

point,  but  separated  by  several  miles  from  Hampton.  Move- 

* 

ments  of  this  character  are  always  risky  when  the  opponent 
is  enterprising,  and  especially  so  in  a  wooded  country,  so 
favorable  to  concealed  enterprises. 

Hampton  and  ‘Lee  met  Sheridan’s  forces  before  reaching 
Clayton’s  store,  and  before  uniting,  for  General  Sheridan, 
advancing  on  the  morning  of  the  11th  on  the  road  to  Trevyl¬ 
ian  Station,  Torbert’s  division  leading,  encountered  Hamp¬ 
ton’s  division  about  three  miles  from  Trevylian  Station,  in 
dense  timber,  and,  General  Sheridan  says,  behind  a  line  of 
breastworks.  General  Custer  was  now  sent  by  a  wood  road 
on  his  left  to  Hampton’s  rear,  to  attack  the  horses  of  his 
troops  that  were  fighting  on  foot.  Custer  passed  unnoticed 
between  Hampton  and  Lee,  and  got  to  Trevylian  Station  un¬ 
opposed.  General  Sheridan  says  that  as  soon  as  he  learnt 
this,  the  two  remaining  brigades  of  Torbert’s  division  were 
dismounted,  assailed  the  enemy’s  works,  and  carried  them, 
driving  Hampton’s  division  pell-mell,  and  at  a  run,  back  on 
Custer  at  Trevylian  Station,  some  of  it  through  Custer’s 
lines,  and  that  Custer  commenced  fighting  in  all  directions, 
capturing  many  of  Hampton’s  men.  Gregg  in  the  meantime 


232  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


attacked  Fitz  Lee  on  the  Louisa  Court  House  road,  drove 
him  in  that  direction,  and  continued  the  pursuit  until  night. 
Hampton’s  division  made  its  way  in  the  direction  of  Gor- 
donsville,  and  was  joined  by  Fitz  Lee  during  the  night,  he 
making  a  detour  for  that  purpose.  General  Sheridan  en¬ 
camped  at  Trevylian  Station.1 

General  Hampton  says  of  this  encounter,  that  whilst  he 
was  driving  the  enemy  in  his  front,  who  at  first  had  taken 
position  behind  works,  he  found  that  Custer’s  brigade  had  got 
in  his  rear,  passing  between  his  division  and  Lee’s.  “  This 
forced  me,”  he  says,  “to  withdraw  in  front,  and  to  take  up 
a  new  line.  This  was  soon  done,  and  the  brigade  which  at¬ 
tacked  me  in  rear,  Custer’s,  was  severely  punished,  for  I  re¬ 
called  Rosser’s  brigade,  which  charged  them  in  front,  driving 
them  back  against  General  Lee,  who  was  moving  up  to 
Trevylian’s,  and  capturing  many  prisoners.  In  this  sudden 
attack  on  my  rear  the  enemy  captured  some  of  my  led  horses, 
a  few  ambulances  and  wagons,  and  three  caissons.  These 
were  all  recaptured  by  General  Ros  er  and  General  Lee,  the 
latter  taking,  in  addition,  four  caissons,  and  the  headquarters 
wagon  of  Brigadier-General  Custer. 2  My  new  line  being  es¬ 
tablished,  I  directed  General  Lee  to  join  me  with  his  com¬ 
mand  as  soon  as  possible.  The  enemy  tried  to  dislodge  me 
from  my  new  position,  but  failed,  and  the  relative  positions 
of  the  opposing  forces  remained  the  same  during  the  night. 
The  next  day,  at  twelve  m.,  General  Lee  reported  to  me,  and 

1  See  General  Sheridan’s  report  for  this  account. 

2  Upon  meeting  General  Ewell  in  Philadelphia  in  the  autumn  of  1865,  his  first 
Inquiry  was  concerning  the  orders  of  movement  issued  from  the  Headquarters  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac ;  and  he  stated  that  in  Custer’s  baggage,  captured  at 
Trevylian  Station  in  June,  1864,  copies  were  found  of  the  series  of  orders  from 
those  headquarters  directing  the  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the 
campaign  then  going  on,  and  he  asked  several  questions  concerning  them,  for  he 
thought  both  the  orders  and  the  system  of  furnishing  them  to  the  general  officers 
of  the  army  admirable,  adding  that  they  had  nothing  of  that  kind  in  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia. 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  RAILROADS. 


233 


his  division  was  placed  so  as  to  support  mine  in  case  the 
enemy  attacked.  ”  General  Hampton’s  new  position  was  evi¬ 
dently  west  of  Trevylian  Station. 

It  is  apparent  from  these  accounts  that  General  Hamp¬ 
ton  was  defeated  and  driven  several  miles  from  the  posi¬ 
tion  he  had  determined  to  hold  against  Sheridan’s  further 
advance. 

At  night  General  Sheridan  learnt  from  prisoners  (he  had 
captured  about  500)  that  General  Hunter  was  moving  on 
Lynchburg ;  that  Ewell’s  corps  was  on  its  way  there,  moving 
by  the  south  side  of  J ames  River ; 1  and  that  General  Breck¬ 
inridge  was  at  Gordonsville  or  Charlottesville,  having  passed 
up  the  railroad.  He  therefore  determined  to  return,  and  es¬ 
pecially  as  another  engagement  would  have  reduced  the  sup¬ 
ply  of  ammunition  to  a  very  small  amount. 

The  conclusion  of  Sheridan  on  the  night  of  the  12th  was 
evidently  sound;  the  movement  of  Hunter  had  rendered  it 
impracticable  for  him  to  carry  out  his  orders  in  the  presence 
of  Hampton.  Hampton’s  being  there  accomplished  the  ob¬ 
ject  of  General  Lee  in  sending  him. 

On  the  morning  of  the  12th  Gregg’s  division  was  set  to 
work  destroying  the  railroad  toward  Louisa  Court  House, 
and  in  the  afternoon  Torbert  was  sent  up  the  Gordonsville 
road  to  secure  a  by-road  leading  over  Mallory’s  ford  of  the 
North  Anna  to  the  Catharpin  road,  as  General  Sheridan  in¬ 
tended  to  return  by  way  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House  and 
the  White  House.  Torbert,  he  says,  became  heavily  engaged 
with  the  enemy,  the  battle  continuing  until  after  dark,  and 
the  result  made  it  impossible  to  cross  at  Mallory’s  ford  next 
day  without  a  battle,  in  which  case  his  ammunition  would 
have  been  consumed,  leaving  none  to  get  back  with. 

During  the  night  of  the  12th  he  moved  back,  recrossing 


1  The  information  about  Ewell’s  corps  was  altogether  erroneous. 


234  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


the  North  Anna  at  Carpenter’s  ford,  leaving  three  hospitals 
with  90  of  his  own  wounded  not  transportable,  and  many  of 
the  enemy’s,  carrying  with  him,  in  such  vehicles  as  could  be 
collected  in  the  country,  about  500  of  his  own  wounded. 
He  also  earned  with  him  about  500  prisoners.  He  reached 
the  "White  House  on  the  21st,  where  he  found  supplies,  and 
drove  off  such  of  Hampton’s  force  as  were  attacking  General 
Abercrombie. 

General  Hampton  says  that  “at  3.30p.m.  (of  the  12tli)  a 
heavy  attack  was  made  on  my  left,  where  Butler’s  brigade 
was  posted.  Being  repulsed,  the  enemy  made  a  succession 
of  determined  assaults,  which  were  all  handsomely  repulsed. 
In  the  meantime  General  Lee  had,  by  my  direction,  rein¬ 
forced  Butler’s  left  with  Wickham’s  brigade,  while  he  took 
Lomax’s  across  to  the  Gordonsville  road  so  as  to  strike  the 
enemy  on  his  right  flank.1  This  movement  was  successful, 
and  the  enemy,  who  had  been  heavily  punished  in  front, 
when  attacked  on  his  flank,  fell  back  in  confusion,”  etc.  “  I 
immediately  gave  orders  to  follow  him  up,  but  it  was  day¬ 
light  before  these  orders  could  be  carried  out,  the  fight  not 
having  ended  until  ten  p.m.  In  this  interval  the  enemy  had 
withdrawn  entirely,”  etc.  “  We  captured,  in  addition  to  the 
wounded  in  the  fight  and  pursuit,  570  prisoners.  My  loss, 
in  my  own  division,  was  59  killed,  258  wounded,  and  295 
missing — total,  612.”  Among  the  killed  of  his  division  was 
Lieutenant-Colonel  McAllister,  Seventh  Georgia,  “who  be¬ 
haved  with  great  gallantry.”  Among  the  wounded  was 
Brigadier-General  Bosser,  while  charging  at  the  head  of  his 
brigade,  Colonel  Aiken,  Sixth  South  Carolina,  and  Lieu¬ 
tenant-Colonel  King,  Cobb  Legion  (Georgia). 

The  loss  of  General  Lee’s  division  is  not  given. 

General  Hampton  moved  to  the  White  House,  keeping  on 

1  Lee’s  cavalry  dismounted  were  mistaken  by  General  Torbert  and  General 
Sheridan  for  infantry. 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  RAILROADS. 


235 


the  south  side  of  the  North  Anna,  having,  he  says,  no  pon¬ 
tons.1 

The  dSpot  at  White  House  was  broken  up  on  the  22d,  and 
a  train  of  nine  hundred  wagons  set  out  under  cover  of  Gen¬ 
eral  Sheridan  to  cross  the  James  on  the  ponton  bridge  at 
Bermuda  Hundred.  It  crossed  the  Chickahominy  at  Jones’s 
bridge  and  moved  to  Charles  City  Court  House,  en  route 
past  Malvern  Hill,  in  advance  of  which  were  Hampton  and 
Fitz  Lee.  Holding  Torbert  with  the  train,  Gregg  was  sent 
to  St.  Mary’s  Church  to  cover  the  exposed  flank,  and,  Gen¬ 
eral  Hampton  says,  intrenched  in  a  strong  position.  There, 
on  the  24th,  he  was  attacked  by  Hampton  and  Lee  in  front 
and  on  his  right  flank,  and  after  a  stubborn  fight,  which 
lasted  until  after  dark,  was  forced  to  give  way,  when  he 
retired  in  some  confusion,  pursued  by  the  enemy  to  within 
two  and  a  half  miles  of  Charles  City  Court  House. 

The  trains  were  moved  back  to  Doutliard’s  Landing  on  the 
25th,  and  were  ferried  over  the  J ames,  the  cavalry  following 
them.  On  the  26th,  before  their  crossing  was  completed, 
General  Meade  directed  General  Sheridan  as  soon  as  he  had 
crossed  to  take  position  on  the  J erusalem  plank-road  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  army,  and  on  the  27th  to  join  the  army  as 
soon  as  practicable  to  aid  the  return  of  General  Wilson.  A 
force  of  more  than  1,000  cavalry  had  been  seen  on  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  27th  moving  south  from  Petersburg,  near  the 
Weldon  Railroad.  It  was  a  part  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  division. 
Respecting  this  movement  of  the  trains,  General  Meade  was 
of  opinion  that  Sheridan  would  not  get  to  the  Bermuda  Hun¬ 
dred  ponton  bridge  in  the  face  of  Hampton,  unless  he  was 
able  to  give  him  a  serious  defeat. 

When  it  was  perceived  by  the  enemy  that  General  Sheri¬ 
dan  was  crossing  the  James,  General  Hampton  and  General 


1  See  Appendix  I,  for  some  remarks  on  General  Hampton's  report. 


236  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Fitz  Lee  were  ordered  to  Drury’s  Bluff,  where  they  arrived 
on  the  evening  of  the  26tli,  and,  on  the  following  morning, 
were  directed  against  General  Wilson,  who  was  engaged  in  a 
raid  upon  the  Petersburg  and  Lynchburg  and  Kiclimond  and 
Danville  railroads. 

Resting  a  few  days  after  crossing  James  River,  General 
Wilson  was  directed  to  move  at  two  o’clock  in  the  morning 
of  the  22 d  by  the  shortest  routes  to  the  intersection  of  the 
Petersburg  and  Lynchburg,  and  Richmond  and  Danville 
railroads  at  Burkesville,  and  destroy  both  those  roads  to 
the  greatest  extent  possible,  continuing  their  destruction 
until  driven  from  it  by  such  attacks  of  the  enemy  as  he 
could  no  longer  resist.  He  was  informed  that  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  those  roads  to  such  an  extent  that  they  could  not  be 
used  by  the  enemy  in  connection  with  Richmond  during  the 
remainder  of  the  campaign  was  an  important  part  in  the 
plan  of  campaign.  He  was  notified  that  General  Sheridan 
had  reached  the  White  House,  and  that  General  Hampton 
was  before  that  place,  and  that,  for  that  reason,  he  should 
march  out  at  the  earliest  moment.1  He  was  also  informed 
that  General  Hunter  was,  according  to  most  recent  intelli¬ 
gence,  near  Lynchburg.  General  Meade  in  his  correspond¬ 
ence  with  General  Grant  stated  that  he  trusted  General 
Sheridan  would  keep  General  Hampton  occupied  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  James  during  General  Wilson’s  raid.2 


1  See  Appendix  J,  for  General  Wilson’s  instructions. 

2  In  the  evening  of  the  21st  I  received  a  despatch  from  General  Wilson,  acknowl¬ 
edging  the  receipt  of  his  orders,  and  stating  in  what  manner  he  should  carry 
them  out.  He  inquired:  “Before  starting  I  would  like  to  know  if  our  infantry 
forces  cross  the  Weldon  Road  ?  ”  To  this  I  replied  that  they  did  not,  but  that  we 
should  take  that  road  the  next  day,  the  22d,  and  that  we  expected  to  take  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  Petersburg  and  Lynchburg  Railroad  soon  after.  At  this  day  I  hold 
the  same  opinion  that  I  held  then,  that  we  ought  to  have  taken  possession  of  the 
Weldon  Railroad  on  the  22d,  and  have  made  the  attempt  upon  the  Lynchburg  Rail¬ 
road  immediately  afterward,  though  the  possession  of  that  road,  owing  to  its  great 
importance  to  the  enemy,  could  only  be  gained  by  a  heavy  battle.  Respecting  the 
extent  of  his  raid,  he  remarked,  “  If.  Sheridan  will  look  after  Hampton,  I  appre- 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  RAILROADS. 


237 


General  Wilson  set  ont  on  the  expedition  against  the  rail¬ 
roads  as  ordered,  his  force  consisting  of  his  own  division  and 
Kautz’s,  the  whole  numbering  about  5,500. 

Crossing  the  Weldon  Railroad  at  Reams’s  Station,  which 
was  destroyed,  he  reached  the  Lynchburg  Railroad  about 
fourteen  miles  from  Petersburg.  From  this  point  to  the 
crossing  of  the  Danville  Railroad,  at  Burkesville,  thirty 
miles  of  the  Lynchburg  Railroad  was  destroyed.  At  the 
Burkesville  Junction  everything  was  destroyed,  and  the 
command  then  turned  to  and  moved  along  the  Danville 
Railroad,  destroying  it  as  they  advanced,  until  they  reached 
Staunton  River,  by  which  time  about  thirty  miles  of  this 
road  also  were  destroyed. 

General  W.  H.  F.  Lee  with  his  cavalry  division  had  fol¬ 
lowed  Wilson  closely,  and  on  the  Lynchburg  Railroad,  near 
Nottoway  Court  House,  interposed  between  Wilson  and 
Kautz,  bringing  on  a  sharp  engagement,  but  did  not  materi¬ 
ally  interfere  with  the  destruction  of  the  roads. 

At  Staunton  River  the  bridge  was  guarded  on  the  south 
bank  by  a  large  force  of  militia,  intrenched,  with  artillery. 
The  river  was  not  fordable.  Kautz  attacked,  but  could  not 
gain  possession  of  the  bridge.  At  the  same  time  Lee  at¬ 
tacked  Wilson  in  rear.  Finding  that  he  could  not  push 
further  south  (he  was  now  nearly  one  hundred  miles  from 
Petersburg),  General  Wilson  determined  to  return,  and, 
marching  at  midnight,  moved  eastward  eighty  miles  or 
more,  through  Christiansburg  and  Greensborough,  crossing 
the  Meherrin  River  at  Saffold’s  bridge,  and  arrived  at  the 
Double  bridges  over  the  Nottoway  River  at  noon  of  the  28th. 
This  point  is  about  thirty  miles  south,  and  eight  or  ten  west 

hend  no  difficulty  and  hope  to  be  able  to  do  the  enemy  great  damage.'”  Regard¬ 
ing  this  condition,  having  already  informed  him  that  Sheridan  and  Hampton 
were  at  and  near  White  House,  I  referred  as  an  assurance  that  they  would  con¬ 
tinue  near  each  other  to  Hampton’s  close  contact  with  Sheridan  since  early  in 
June.  See  Appendix  J,  for  General  Wilson’s  letter. 


238  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


of  Petersburg,  and  ten  miles  west  of  tlie  Weldon  Railroad  at 
Jarratt’s  Station.  The  left  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
not  across  the  Weldon  Railroad,  but  about  two  miles  east  of 
it.  This,  however,  General  Wilson  had  no  means  of  know¬ 
ing  ;  on  the  contrary,  he  had  every  reason  to  believe  that  we 
held  the  road.  But  if  we  had  taken  the  Lynchburg  Railroad 
he  would  necessarily  have  heard  of  it  from  the  people  of  the 
country,  since  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  fight  a  battle 
for  its  possession,  an  event  that  would  have  been  known  far 
and  wide. 

At  the  Double  bridges  General  Wilson  learned  that  there 
was  only  a  small  force  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  and  infantry  at 
Stony  Creek  Depot  on  the  Weldon  Railroad,  about  ten  miles 
northeast  of  him.  The  road  from  Double  bridges  to  Prince 
George  Court  House,  Wilson’s  most  direct  route  to  the  rear 
of  the  army,  passes  two  miles  west  of  this  d6pot,  intersecting 
there  the  road  from  the  depot  to  Dinwiddie  Court  House, 
and  as  he  could  learn  of  no  other  force  being  there  than  the 
small  one  mentioned,  General  Wilson  moved  rapidly  to  that 
point. 

General  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  who  had  continued  to  follow  Wil¬ 
son  closely,  kept  General  Lee  well  informed  of  Wilson’s 
route.  To  intercept  him  on  his  return  General  Hampton  was 
sent  on  the  27th  to  Stony  Creek  Depot,  which  he  reached  at 
midday  on  the  28th,  finding  there  General  Chambliss’s  bri¬ 
gade  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  division.  General  Fitz  Lee  followed 
'  General  Hampton  as  far  as  Reams’s  Station,  where  also,  at 
the  suggestion  of  General  Hampton,  Mahone,  with  two  of 
his  brigades  of  infantry,  and  some  artillery,  was  subsequently 
posted.  Reams’s  Station  is  about  ten  miles  north  of  Stony 
Creek  Depot,  and  the  same  distance  south  of  Petersburg. 
It  was  between  eight  and  ten  miles  from  our  left  by  the  road 
we  must  take. 

When  General  Wilson  arrived  at  the  crossing  of  the  Stony 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  RAILROADS. 


239 


Creek  D6pot  and  Dinwiddie  Court  House  road,  near  Sappony 
Church,  he  was  attacked  in  force  by  Hampton,  the  fight  con¬ 
tinuing  until  ten  o’clock  at  night.  Finding  so  strong  a  force 
in  his  front,  General  Wilson  endeavored  to  evade  it  by  mov¬ 
ing  westward  to  the  old  stage-road  to  Petersburg  (called  the 
Halifax  road),  Kautz  being  sent  in  advance.  But  it  was  day¬ 
light  before  he  could  begin  to  withdraw  his  own  division. 
His  first  line  he  withdrew,  but  before  he  could  withdraw  his 
second,  Hampton  attacked  its  left  flank  with  Butler’s  and 
Rosser’s  brigades,  while  his  other  force  attacked  its  front, 
driving  it  to  the  rear,  and  separating  it  for  a  time  from  the 
other  part  of  Wilson’s  command.  Following  Wilson  closely 
for  two  miles,  and  seeing  in  what  direction  he  was  moving, 
General  Hampton  turned  back  and  moved  past  Stony 
Creek  Depot  so  as  to  get  on  the  Halifax  road  and  intercept 
Wilson  should  he  try  to  cross  the  Weldon  Railroad  south  of 
Reams’s  Station,  but  Wilson’s  main  force  had  already  passed 
before  Hampton  gained  the  Halifax  road,  and  he  encount¬ 
ered  only  the  rear  of  Wilson’s  column.  Kautz  arrived  at 
Reams’s  Station  early  in  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  finding 
Fitz  Lee’s  cavalry  there,  he  intrenched,  expecting  assistance 
from  General  Meade,  to  whom  Captain  Whitaker  of  General 
Wilson’s  staff  was  sent.  This  officer  dashed  through  a  thin 
part  of  the  enemy’s  lines,  losing  half  his  escort,  and  reached 
General  Meade’s  headquarters  on  the  Jerusalem  plank-road, 
about  eight  miles  from  Reams’s  Station,  between  ten  and 
eleven  o’clock.  When  Wilson  joined  Kautz  he  learnt  that 
the  Weldon  Railroad  was  not  in  our  possession,  and  the 
enemy’s  infantry  now  made  their  appearance. 

Finding  himself  so  nearly  surrounded  with  so  heavy  a 
force,1  he  issued  all  his  ammunition,  destroyed  his  wagons 


1  According  to  the  Return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  of  July  10,  1864, 
there  were  8,962  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  cavalry  present  for  duty.  The  Re¬ 
turn  of  June  30  is  imperfect. 


240  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


and  caissons,  and  at  noon  began  to  move  back  by  way  of  the 
stage  (Halifax)  road  and  Double  bridges  to  the  south  side  of 
the  Nottoway  Eiver,  intending,  after  he  had  crossed  that 
river,  to  move  eastward  some  twenty  miles  before  turning 
north  again  toward  Petersburg.  General  Fitz  Lee,  screened 
by  woods,  had  moved  his  division,  part  of  it  dismounted, 
past  Wilson’s  left,  and  when  Mahone  attacked  Wilson’s  cov¬ 
ering  force  in  front,  and  broke  in  between  Kautz  and  Mc¬ 
Intosh,  Lee  took  McIntosh  in  flank  and  reverse,  and  Wilson’s 
whole  rear  was  thrown  into  confusion.  Kautz,  finding  that 
he  could  not  reach  the  stage-road  and  reunite  with  Wilson, 
endeavored  to  get  around  the  enemy’s  left,  which  he  suc¬ 
ceeded  in  doing  without  opposition,  crossed  the  railroad 
between  Eeams’s  Station  and  Eowanty  Creek,  and  reached 
the  lines  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  after  dark.  As  he 
passed  through  woods,  his  artillery  could  not  get  through 
with  him,  and  was  abandoned  in  a  swamp,  the  guns  spiked. 
McIntosh,  of  Wilson’s  division,  succeeded  in  forming  a  strong 
rear  guard,  though  Maynadier’s  battery  was  abandoned  in 
woods. 

At  Stony  Creek  the  enemy  made  a  vigorous  push,  opening 
with  artillery,  and  throwing  the  rear  into  some  confusion, 
but  the  troops  got  over.  A  thousand  negroes  who  had  fol¬ 
lowed  Wilson  were  necessarily  abandoned.  After  crossing 
Stony  Creek  the  contest  was  not  renewed,  and  General  Wil¬ 
son  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Nottoway  Eiver  between  ten 
and  eleven  o’clock  at  night  without  serious  opposition.  He 
then  moved  eastward  to  Jarratt’s  Station,  where  he  halted 
until  daylight  of  the  30th.  Continuing  his  march  eastward, 
he  crossed  the  Nottoway  again  at  Peters’s  bridge,  where  he 
rested  five  or  six  hours,  resuming  his  march  at  half-past  six 
in  the  evening  for  Blunt’s  bridge  over  the  Blackwater.  The 
bridge  was  in  great  part  destroyed,  and  the  river  not  forda¬ 
ble.  Cutting  string-pieces  from  the  woods,  he  repaired  the 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  THE  RAILROADS. 


241 


bridge,  crossed  over  and  destroyed  it,  for  Hampton  and  Fitz 
Lee  were  following  him.  Here  their  pursuit  ended,  and 
General  Wilson  arrived  at  Light  House  Point  in  the  after¬ 
noon  of  the  2d  of  July,  having  been  gone  ten  and  a  half  days, 
during  which  time  he  had  marched  over  three  hundred  miles, 
and  destroyed  sixty  miles  of  railroad.  At  no  place  had  he 
rested  more  than  six  hours,  and  for  the  last  four  days  at  no 
time  longer  than  four  hours.  Great  credit,  he  says,  "was  due 
the  officers  and  men  for  their  endurance,  sleepless  exertions, 
and  gallantry. 

His  casualties  in  both  divisions  were  240  hilled  and 
wounded,  and  1,261  missing,  making  a  total  of  1,501.  Twelve 
guns  were  abandoned ;  his  wagons  were  burnt  or  captured. 

Kautz  says  all  his  efficient  men  came  through  ;  1,000  of 
Wilson’s  division  came  with  him,  while  500  of  his  men  came 
in  with  Wilson.  For  nine  days  and  nights,  he  says,  his  men 
were  in  the  saddle,  or  destroying  railroads,  and  were  so  tired 
they  fell  asleep  under  fire ;  many  were  captured  asleep  on 
the  road. 

Captain  Whitaker  brought  General  Meade  the  first  intelli¬ 
gence  he  had  received  from  General  Wilson  since  he  had  set 
out  on  his  expedition.  A  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  at 
once  sent  to  Wilson’s  assistance,  followed  by  the  whole  corps 
as  soon  as  it  could  be  drawn  out  of  its  lines.  The  corps  was 
at  Reams’s  Station  that  afternoon,  but  the  enemy  had  with¬ 
drawn  before  the  leading  division  reached  there.  General 
Sheridan,  wTho  was  moving  up  from  Fort  Powhatan,  near 
which  he  had  crossed  the  James,  was  also  ordered  to  Reams’s 
Station,  but,  as  already  stated,  the  enemy’s  infantry  withdrew 
at  once  to  their  lines,  and  their  cavalry  by  circuitous  routes 
on  the  1st  of  July. 

Notwithstanding  our  attempts  to  destroy  the  Confederate 
lines  of  supply,  they  still  remained  sufficient  for  the  wants  of 
the  Confederacy.  The  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  with  its 
XII.— 11 


242  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 

connections  along  tlie  Valley  of  Virginia  and  with  Lynchburg, 
remained  under  their  control,  and  there  were  large  supplies  of 
food  in  southwestern  Virginia.  There  was  railroad  commu¬ 
nication  also  from  Lynchburg  to  the  crossing  of  the  Danville 
Railroad  at  Burkesville,  and  thence  by  the  Danville  Railroad 
to  Richmond.  The  Weldon  Railroad  remained  in  their  hands, 
the  injuries  to  it  being  soon  repaired.  The  repair  of  the  two 
roads  injured  by  Wilson  was  begun  at  once. 

There  has  been  some  discussion,  perhaps  controversy,  as  to 
the  casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  beginning 
of  the  campaign  in  May  until  June  30th,  or  until  a  later  day. 

From  May  4tli  to  June  19th,  including  the  Eighteenth 
Corps  at  Cold  Harbor  and  Petersburg,  the  total  killed  were 
8,802;  wounded,  40,518;  missing,  9,544.  Total,  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  58,864.  Deducting  the  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  (2,700),  we 
have  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  56,164  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing.  To  these  must  be  added  the  casualties  of 
Sheridan  on  the  Trevylian  Station  expedition,  and  of  Wilson 
on  his  raid:  that  is  840  killed  and  wounded,  and  over  1,400 
missing.  The  losses  of  the  infantry  corps  before  Petersburg, 
from  the  20tli  to  the  30th  of  June,  were  not  less  than  1,000 
killed  and  wounded  and  2,000  missing;  making  a  total  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  that  date  of  61,400,  and  of  killed 
and  wounded  nearly  50,000. 

Tne  Army  of  the  James  lost  during  this  period,  not  in¬ 
cluding  the  smaller  actions  on  the  picket  line,  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  4,203,  exclusive  of  the  losses  of  the 
Eighteenth  Corps  at  Cold  Harbor  and  before  Petersburg 
from  the  15th  to  the  30tli  of  June.  Including  the  losses  of 
that  corps  the  number  was  6,903. 

A  large  number  of  sick  were  sent  from  the  army  during 
this  period. 

The  information  that  I  have  been  able  to  collect  concerning 


DEMONSTRATION  AGAINST  WASHINGTON.  243 

tlic  casualties  in  tlie  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  during  that 
period  does  not  admit  of  any  precise  or  even  general  state¬ 
ment  concerning  them.  It  was  evidently  their  policy  not  to 
make  pubb'c  their  losses,  and  the  few  official  data  to  be  got 
concerning  them  do  not  afford  the  means  of  making  any  com¬ 
parative  statement. 

The  weather  had  become  oppressively  hot.  No  rain  fell 
from  the  3d  of  June  to  the  19th  of  July,  a  period  of  forty- 
seven  days.  There  was  no  surface-water;  the  springs,  the 
marshes,  the  ponds,  and  even  streams  of  some  magnitude 
were  dry.  The  dust  was  several  inches  thick  upon  the  roads 
and  bare  plains,  and  the  passage  of  troops  or  trains  over 
(hem  raised  great  clouds  of  fine  dust.  Any  movement  of 
troops  occasioned  severe  suffering  among  them.  But  the 
surface-soil  was  porous,  and  at  no  great  depth  below  it  were 
strata  of  clay  or  marly  clay,  where  there  was  abundance  of 
cool  water  that  did  not  prove  unhealthy  ;  and  the  troops, 
wherever  they  halted  at  once  sunk  wells. 

General  Breckinridge  and  General  Early  arrived  at  Lynch¬ 
burg  in  time  to  prevent  General  Hunter  from  gaining  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  town.  After  remaining  two  days  in  front  of  it, 
General  Hunter  withdrew  on  the  19tli  of  June,  and  re¬ 
treated  by  way  of  the  Great  Kanawha  River,  the  Ohio  River, 
and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  to  Harper’s  Ferry. 
This  left  the  Shenandoah  Valley  open  for  several  weeks,  and 
General  Early  moved  down  it  to  make  his  demonstration 
against  "Washington.  To  meet  General  Early’s  movement, 
General  Ricketts,  with  his  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  was 
sent  to  Baltimore,  arriving  there  on  the  morning  of  the  8th 
of  July,  and  going  by  rail  to  the  Monocacy  near  the  crossing 
of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  where  he  joined  the 
Commander  of  the  Department,  General  Wallace,  who  had 
moved  from  Baltimore  to  meet  General  Early.  His  troops 
were  mostly  new  and  undisciplined. 


244  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 

General  Early  crossed  tlie  Potomac  near  Shepherdstown, 
moved  through  the  passes  of  South  Mountain,  and  on  the 
9fch  attacked  and  defeated  General  Wallace,  who  then  fell 
back  upon  Baltimore. 1  The  next  day  General  Early  moved 
toward  Washington,  the  head  of  his  command  arriving  be¬ 
fore  it  on  the  Seventh  Street  road,  its  north  front,  by  the 
afternoon  of  the  11th. 

At  midnight  of  the  9th  General  Wright,  with  Getty’s  and 
Bussell’s  divisions  of  the  Sixth  Corps,2  marched  to  City  Point 
and  embarked  for  Washington,  arriving  there  at  the  same 
time  as  General  Early’s  force,  and,  moving  to  the  point 
menaced  by  him,  defeated,  General  Early  says,  ‘  ‘  our  hopes 
of  getting  possession  of  the  works  by  surprise,”  etc. 

A  part  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps,  Major-General  Emory 
commanding,  brought  from  New  Orleans,  arrived  in  Wash¬ 
ington  at  the  same  time. 

Notwithstanding  that  a  column  was  seen  to  file  into  the 
intrencliments  on  the  afternoon  of  the  11th,3  before  his  ad¬ 
vance  force,  Bodes’s  division,  could  be  brought  up,  and  skir¬ 
mishers  were  thrown  out  from  their  intrencliments  and  their 
artillery  opened  upon  him,  General  Early  determined,  after 
consultation  with  his  officers  that  evening,  to  assault  in  the 
morning,  although  he  had  ascertained  the  formidable  char¬ 
acter  of  the  works  by  a  personal  reconnoissance  of  them ; 
but  hearing  that  night  that  two  corps  of  infantry  had  arrived 
in  Washington,  he  delayed  the  attack  next  morning,  and 
examining  the  works  again,  found  them  lined  with  our 
troops.  He  then  reluctantly  abandoned  all  hope  of  the 
capture  of  Washington,  and  withdrew  from  it  on  the  night 
of  the  12th,  crossing  the  Potomac  near  Leesburg,  in  Lou- 

1  In  this  action  General  Ricketts,  conspicuous  for  his  gallantry,  was  severely 
wounded. 

2  General  Getty  returned  to  the  command  of  his  division  on  the  28th  of  June, 
having  been  absent,  owing  to  a  severe  wound  received  in  the  Wilderness. 

3  Six  hundred  dismounted  cavalrymen,  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


1 


11  1  A 


DEMONSTRATION  AGAINST  WASHINGTON.  245 

doun  County.  General  Wriglit  followed  in  pursuit  on  the 
13th.1 

Although  it  was  the  intention  of  General  Grant  to  bring 
the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps  to  the  armies  operating 
against  Richmond,  leaving  General  Hunter,  who  had  reached 
Harper’s  Ferry,  to  defend  Washington,  the  subsequent  move¬ 
ments  of  General  Early  prevented  this. 


1  According  to  the  report  of  General  Barnard  on  the  Defences  of  Washington, 
the  line  of  forts  with  the  connecting  infantry  intrenchments  was  garrisoned  on 
the  north  side  of  the  Potomac  by  1,834  artillery  and  1,819  infantry  (the  infantry 
being  100-days  men)  ;  on  the  south  side  by  1,772  artillery  and  4,064  infantry  (the 
infantry  100-days  men).  There  were  besides,  in  Washington  and  Alexandria, 
3,900  effectives,  composed  of  District  of  Columbia  volunteers,  veteran  reserves, 
and  detachments;  and  about  4,400  veteran  reserves  (six  regiments  of),  five  field 
batteries  at  the  artillery  camp  of  instruction,  and  800  cavalry  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  C.  R.  Lowell.  The  artillery  garrisons  must  necessarily  remain  in  their 
works,  and  such  of  the  100-days  infantry  garrison  in  the  vicinity  of  the  points  at¬ 
tacked  were  the  only  parts  of  that  force  available  for  defence  there.  The  movable 
infantry  force  to  man  the  infantry  lines  at  the  point  of  attack,  was  the  District  of 
Columbia  Volunteers,  Veteran  Reserves,  and  detachments,  numbering  8,300.  To 
these  must  be  added  2,000  quartermaster  employes  under  General  Meigs,  that  re¬ 
ported  for  duty  on  the  evening  of  the  10th,  and  were  put  in  the  lines. 

The  front,  exposed  to  attack  by  the  two  roads  leading  to  Washington  from  the 
north,  the  Seventh  Street  road  and  the  Georgetown  road,  was  six  miles  in  extent 
from  Fort  Totten,  on  the  right  (Bladensburg  road),  to  Fort  Bayard,  on  the  left  of 
the  Georgetown  road. 

General  Barnard,  in  summing  up  the  troops  of  every  kind,  states  that  they  con¬ 
stituted  “a  total  of  about  20,400  men.  Of  that  number,  however,  but  9,600, 
mostly  perfectly  raw  troops,  constituted  the  garrison  of  the  defences.  (They 
were  the  artillery  and  100-days  men  ]  Of  the  other  troops,  a  considerable  portion 
were  unavailable,”  etc. 

The  arrival  of  the  Sixth  and  a  part  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  was  opportune, 
and  they  formed  the  only  force  that  could  follow  General  Early. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 
AGAINST  THE  INTRENCHMENTS  OF  PETERSBURG 
TO  BE  BY  REGULAR  APPROACHES— MOVEMENT  TO 
THE  NORTH  BANK  OF  THE  JAMES-THE  PETERS¬ 
BURG  MINE. 

Upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  Sixth  Corps  from  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  the  left  was  drawn  in  to  the  Jerusalem  plank- 
road,  and  refused  in  the  manner  heretofore  stated. 

The  greater  part  of  July  was  devoted  to  strengthening 
the  line  of  intrencliments  from  the  Appomattox  to  the  Jeru¬ 
salem  plank-road,  and  constructing  redoubts  and  siege- 
batteries. 

Colonel  H.  L.  Abbot,  an  Engineer  officer,  commanding 
First  Connecticut  Artillery,  a  regiment  1,700  strong,  had 
been  directed,  on  the  20th  of  April,  to  prepare  a  siege 
train,  with  which  he  was  to  report  to  Brigadier-General 
Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  when 
the  time  arrived  for  the  use  of  the  train.  It  consisted  of 
forty  rifled  siege  guns  (44-incli  ordnance,  or  30-pounder 
Parrotts),  ten  X-inch  mortars,  thirty  VHI-inch  mortars, 
twenty  Coehorn  mortars,  with  a  reserve  of  six  100-pounder 
Parrotts. 

Colonel  Abbot  reported  to  General  Butler  with  his  troops 
and  part  of  the  siege  train  on  the  13tli  of  May,  but  the  whole 
train  did  not  arrive  until  the  23d  of  June,  when,  by  order  of 
General  Grant,  Colonel  Abbot  reported  to  General  Hunt. 


MOVEMENT  TO  NORTH  BANK  OF  THE  JAMES.  247 


The  depot  for  the  train  was  established  at  Broadway  Land¬ 
ing  on  the  Appomattox.1 

On  the  9th  of  July  an  order  was  issued  by  General  Meade 
directing  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  against 
the  intrenched  position  of  the  enemy  defending  Petersburg, 
to  be  conducted  by  regular  approaches  on  the  front  opposed 
to  General  Burnside’s  and  General  Warren’s  corps  ;  and  de¬ 
tailed  instructions  were  issued  by  him  for  the  conduct  of 
those  operations. 

On  the  25th  of  July  General  Grant  determined  to  send 
the  Second  Corps  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry  secretly  to 
the  north  bank  of  the  James  by  the  ponton  bridges  at  Deep 
Bottom  (Jones’s  Neck,  Bermuda  Hundred),  the  cavalry  to 
make  a  dash  upon  Richmond  if  the  chances  seemed  favorable 
for  it,  but  if  not,  to  destroy  the  two  railroads  from  the  vicin¬ 
ity  of  Richmond  as  far  as  the  Anna  rivers  (which  was  indeed 
the  chief  object  of  the  crperation).  Kautz’s  division  was  to 
join  Sheridan  at  Deep  Bottom.  The  Second  Corps,  moving 
up  to  Chapin’s  Bluff,  was  to  support  the  cavalry  if  it  got 
into  Richmond,  but  at  any  rate  to  prevent  the  enemy’s  troops 
from  being  sent  across  at  that  point  to  interfere  with  the 

1  Noticing  the  effect  upon  our  troops  produced  by  the  single  VIH-inch  mortar 
from  the  Confederate  lines  of  Yorktown,  Colonel  Abbot  had  paid  great  attention 
to  training  the  gunners  in  the  use  of  this  arm  while  in  the  defences  of  Washing¬ 
ton,  especially  in  those  details  upon  which  the  effect  of  vertical  fire  depends.  The 
enemy  suffered  severely  for  the  first  few  days  when  the  mortars  were  opened 
upon  them  at  Petersburg.  Having  no  mortars  with  which  to  reply,  and  no  bomb- 
proofs  for  cover,  and  yet  being  compelled,  by  the  proximity  of  the  main  lines,  to 
keep  their  own  fully  manned  in  order  to  guard  against  assault,  the  effect  upon 
their  troops  was  depressing.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  could  obtain  mortars,  they 
placed  them  in  position ;  and  from  that  time  to  the  evacuation  the  mortar  fire 
was  frequent  and  severe,  though  Colonel  Abbot’s  gunners  retained  their  advan¬ 
tage  of  greater  precision  of  fire.  Mortars  were  introduced  chiefly  with  a  view  to 
preparing  for  an  assault  and  keeping  the  enemy’s  artillery  quiet  while  it  was 
being  made.  This  purpose  they  effectually  accomplished.  They  were  also  used 
to  keep  down  picket  firing  and  to  compel  the  silence  of  certain  very  annoying 
batteries,  which  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Appomattox  River  enfiladed  the  right 
of  our  line. 


\  I  /. f  i  i 

.!  1  ■iS-VlJg 


248  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

cavalry.  This  movement  General  Grant  thought  might  cause 
such  a  reduction  in  the  strength  of  the  force  holding  the 
Petersburg  lines  as  to  give  fair  promise  of  success  in  as¬ 
saulting  them,  upon  springing  a  mine  General  Burnside  had 
prepared.  This  mine  was  placed  under  a  redan  held  by  El¬ 
liott’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division.  It  was  opposite  the 
centre  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  where  the  opposing  lines  were 
only  one  hundred  yards  apart. 

The  success  of  this  movement,  as  General  Hancock  says, 
depended  upon  the  contingency  that  the  enemy’s  works 
would  be  thinly  occupied,  and  the  movement  be  a  surprise. 

General  Hancock  and  General  Sheridan  marched  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  26th,  and  about  two  o’clock  in  the  morning 
of  the  27th,  the  Second  Corps,  followed  by  the  cavalry,  be¬ 
gan  crossing  the  James.  There  were  two  ponton  bridges  at 
Deep  Bottom  (the  north  end  of  Jones’s  Neck  is  so  called), 
one  just  above  the  mouth  of  Bailey’s  Creek,  the  other  just 
below  it ;  the  creek  is  about  twelve  miles  from  Richmond ; 
it  is  four  or  five  miles  long,  running  from  north  to  south, 
crossing  the  Central  or  Darby  road  (at  Fussell’s  mill),  the 
Long  Bridge  road,  and  the  New  Market  or  river-road.  It 
was  impassable  near  its  mouth,  and  probably  from  its  char¬ 
acter  there  gave  rise  to  the  name  of  Deep  Bottom.  General 
Foster  of  the  Tenth  Corps  held  the  two  ponton  bridges. 
There  was  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  intrenched  op¬ 
posite  the  upper  bridge,  but  their  line  appeared  to  extend 
only  a  short  distance  beyond.  General  Hancock  determined 
to  cross  by  the  lower  bridge,  and  turn  the  enemy’s  left  flank, 
while  General  Foster  threatened  them  in  front.  The  Second 
Corps  and  cavalry  were  over  the  river  before  daybreak,  and 
as  soon  as  it  was  light,  moved  forward,  the  cavalry  on  the 
right.  The  enemy’s  advanced  force  on  the  east  side  of 
Bailey’s  Creek  was  soon  driven  out  of  the  way,  and  a  battery 
of  four  20-pounder  Parrott  guns  captured  on  the  New  Mar- 


MOVEMENT  TO  NORTH  BANK  OF  THE  JAMES.  249 


ket  road  by  the  skirmish  line  of  Barlow’s  division.  The 
command,  swinging  on  its  left,  advanced  by  the  New  Market 
and  Long  Bridge  roads  to  Bailey’s  Creek,  the  cavalry  on  the 
right,  on  the  Long  Bridge  and  Central  roads.  The  enemy 
was  found  in  strong  force  intrenched  on  the  west  bank  of 
Bailey’s  Creek,  from  the  mouth  to  Fussell’s  mill,  where 
their  left  was  refused.  Wilcox’s  and  Kershaw’s  divisions 
had  been  sent  across  the  river  from  Petersburg  before  our 
movement  began,  and  held  this  line.  Heth’s  division  joined 
them  on  the  27th. 

It  was  not  desired  by  General  Grant  that  the  enemy’s 
works  should  be  assaulted,  but  that  their  position  should  be 
turned  by  the  cavalry  on  the  Central  or  on  the  Charles  City 
road,  while  Foster  should  make  a  vigorous  demonstration  in 
his  front  and  the  Second  Corps  on  theirs.  But  the  enemy 
having  been  reinforced,  Kershaw  advanced  against  Sheri¬ 
dan’s  cavalry  and  drove  it  back  over  the  ridge  upon  which 
it  was  posted.  Dismounting  his  men,  General  Sheridan 
formed  them  just  behind  the  crest,  where  the  fire  of  their 
repeating  carbines  at  close  quarters  drove  the  attacking  force 
back  in  confusion,  leaving  250  prisoners  and  two  colors  in 
the  hands  of  the  cavalry.  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  cavalry  division 
now  joined  the  enemy’s  infantiy  on  the  north  side  of  the 
James,  and  on  the  29th  Field’s  and  Fitz  Lee’s  divisions 
united  with  them. 

On  the  night  of  the  28th  Mott’s  division  was  sent  back  to 
relieve  Ord’s  corps  in  our  intrenchments  on  the  right  of 
Burnside,  and  on  the  night  of  the  29th  Hancock  and  Sheri¬ 
dan  recrossed  the  James  to  take  part  in  the  assault  on  the 
Petersburg  works  in  front  of  Burnside.  The  expedition 
had  accomplished  one  important  result :  it  had  reduced  the 
force  holding  the  Petersburg  intrenchments  to  three  infantry 
divisions,  and  had  likewise  drawn  two  of  their  three  cavalry 
divisions  to  the  north  bank  of  the  James.  The  casualties  of 
11* 


250  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


this  movement  to  the  north  bank  of  the  James  amounted  to 
some  300. 

In  the  latter  part  of  June  General  Potter  proposed  to 
General  Burnside  to  mine  a  redan  of  the  enemy’s  works  in 
his  front,  the  proposition  coming  from  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pleasants,  Forty-eighth  Pennsylvania,  a  regiment  composed 
chiefly  of  miners  from  Schuylkill  County,  Pennsylvania, 
Colonel  Pleasants  himself  being  an  experienced  and  skilful 
mining  engineer.  This  work  was  authorized  by  General 
Burnside,  and  its  continuance  was  subsequently  assented  to 
by  General  Meade. 

The  redan  to  be  mined  was  known  as  Elliott’s  salient,  the 
intrenchments  there  being  held  by  his  brigade.  The  ground 
on  our  side  was  favorable  to  running  the  gallery  of  the  mine 
screened  from  observation,  but  the  position  was  not  in  other 
respects  suitable,  Elliott’s  salient  being  a  re-entrant  of  the 
general  line  of  intrenchments,  and  the  salient  itself,  as  well 
as  all  the  ground  between  it  and  Burnside’s  advanced  line  of 
•  intrenchments,  being  exposed  to  a  flank  fire  on  the  right  and 
left. 

Though  the  work  met  with  many  serious  difficulties,  it  was 
finished  ready  for  charging  by  the  23d  July.1 

In  continuance  of  the  operations  against  the  enemy,  it  was 
in  question  whether  an  attack  should  be  made  on  his  in¬ 
trenchments,  or  a  movement  to  destroy  the  Weldon  Railroad 
effectually  should  be  undertaken.  The  final  result  of  an 
assault  seemed  doubtful,  as,  apparently,  the  enemy  had  a 
second  line  running  along  the  crest  about  five  hundred  yards 
in  rear  of  the  first  line,  and  commanding  it.  A  careful  ex¬ 
amination  of  the  whole  front,  including  that  of  Bermuda 
Hundred,  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  chances  of  carrying 


1  The  main  gallery  was  511  feet  long,  the  two  lateral  galleries  37  and  38  feet. 
There  were  eight  magazines,  each  of  which  was  charged  with  one  thousand 
pounds  of  powder. 


THE  PETERSBURG  MINE. 


251 


the  enemy’s  intrenchments  were  better  on  Burnside’s  front 
than  on  any  other,  though  the  existence  of  a  second  line  in 
rear  of  the  first  made  it  more  than  doubtful  whether  the  at¬ 
tempt  would  be  judicious.  Thus  matters  stood  on  the  24tli 
of  July.  But  on  the  25th  and  26th  very  careful  examinations 
were  made  of  this  second  line  from  a  newly  erected  signal 
station,  and  it  was  found  tllat  the  enemy  had  detached 
works,  batteries  probably,  along  the  ridge  in  front  of  Bum- 
side,  but  not  a  connected  line.  This  fact  increased  greatly 
the  chances  of  a  successful  assault,  and  it  was  determined  to 
make  it  in  connection  with  the  springing  of  Burnside’s  mine. 
General  Burnside  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy  had 
not  discovered  his  mine.  His  mining  work,  however,  had  not 
escaped  detection  by  them,  and  General  Beauregard  at  first 
directed  countermining,  but  abandoned  it,  and  threw  up  in¬ 
trenchments  at  the  gorge  of  the  salient  against  which  the 
mining  was  apparently  directed.  Batteries  of  VIII-  and 
X-incli  mortars  were  also  established  by  him  to  give  a  front 
and  cross  fire  on  the  points  threatened. 

The  siege  and  field  artillery  of  our  forces  had  been  put  in 
position  to  keep  down  both  the  front  and  flank  fire  of  the 
enemy  wherever  we  might  attack  their  intrenchments,  and 
on  Burnside’s  front  great  care  was  taken  to  establish  it  so  as 
to  keep  down  their  fire  upon  the  flanks  of  our  columns  of  at¬ 
tack  against  the  Elliott  salient,  and  to  keep  back  their  rein¬ 
forcements. 

Upon  a  call  from  General  Meade  on  the  26fli  of  July, 
General  Burnside  on  the  same  day  reported  a  plan  of  assault 
with  his  corps  in  connection  with  the  explosion  of  the  mine, 
by  which  the  two  brigades  of  General  Ferrero’s  colored 
division  in  close  column  of  attack  were  to  lead.  Upon  pass¬ 
ing  through  the  openings  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  mine, 
the  regiments  in  front  were  to  move  down  the  enemy’s  lines, 
while  the  others  moved  directly  to  the  crest  near  the  ceme- 


252  THG  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


tery,  about  five  hundred  yards  beyond.  These  two  columns 
were  to  be  followed  by  the  other  divisions  of  the  corps  as 
soon  as  they  could  be  thrown  in. 

General  Burnside’s  reason  for  the  selection  of  Ferrero’s 
division  to  lead  was,  that  his  three  divisions,  commanded  by 
Potter,  Willcox,  and  Ledlie,  owing  to  their  closeness  to  the 
enemy’s  line,  had  been  subjected  to  a  musketry  and  artillery 
fire,  day  and  night  for  thirty-six  days,  with  a  daily  loss  of 
from  30  to  60  killed  and  wounded  (Colonel  Loring,  Inspector- 
General,  says,  more  than  30), 1  while  Ferrero’s  division  had 
not  been  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  and  had  been 
drilled  to  manoeuvre  with  a  special  view  to  their  use  in  the 
assault.  As  General  Ferrero’s  division  had  never  been  in 
contact  with  the  enemy,  this  selection  was  not  approved,  and 
the  assault  fell  to  the  lot  of  the  First  Division,  commanded 
by  General  Ledlie,  an  officer  whose  total  unfitness  for  such  a 
duty  ought  to  have  been  known  to  General  Burnside,  though 
it  is  not  possible  that  it  could  have  been.  It  was  not  known 
to  General  Meade. 

General  Lee  having  sent  Field’s  and  Kershaw’s  divisions 
of  Longstreet’s  corps,  and  Heth’s  and  Wilcox’s  of  Hill’s  corps 
to  the  north  side  of  the  James  (together  with  the  cavalry 
divisions  of  the  two  Lees),  leaving  only  Hoke’s,  Johnson’s, 
and  Mahone’s  divisions  in  the  Petersburg  intrencliments, 
General  Meade,  with  the  approval  of  General  Grant,  on  the 
28th  of  July,  fixed  upon  the  morning  of  the  30th  as  the  time 
when  the  mine  should  be  fired  and  the  assault  made.  Han¬ 
cock  and  Sheridan  were  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  north  side 
of  the  James  as  soon  as  it  was  dark  on  the  night  of  the  29th, 
so  as  to  take  part  in  the  operation,  and  General  Ord,  now 
commanding  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  with  a  division  of  his 


1  According  to  Colonel  Loring,  a  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  of  1,300.  But  this 
is  a  very  loose  way  of  stating  losses.  The  enemy  had  also  suffered  severely  from 
the  same  cause. 


THE  PETERSBURG  MINE. 


253 


own  corps  under  General  Ames,  and  one  of  the  Tenth  under 
General  Turner,  was  also  to  take  part  in  it,  General  Mott,  of 
the  Second  Corps,  relieving,  in  due  time,  the  Eighteenth 
Corps,  which  held  the  intrenchments  on  Burnside’s  right. 

The  morning  of  the  30th  was  fixed  upon  because  it  was 
desired  to  put  more  heavy  guns  and  mortars  in  position  for 
the  attack,  and  the  night  of  the  29th  was  required  to  make  such 
preliminary  arrangements  as  the  massing  of  the  troops,  remov¬ 
ing  the  parapets  and  abatis  for  the  passage  of  the  assaulting 
columns,  and  bringing  into  position  the  supporting  troops. 

The  order  for  the  attack  was  issued  on  the  29th.  It  ex¬ 
presses  concisely  what  was  to  be  done  by  each  commander.1 

General  Burnside  was  to  form  his  troops  during  the  night 
for  assaulting  the  enemy’s  works  at  daylight  of  the  30th,  pre¬ 
pare  his  parapets  and  abatis  for  the  passages  of  the  columns, 
have  the  pioneers  equipped  to  open  passages  for  artillery,  to 
destroy  the  enemy’s  abatis,  etc.,  and  the  intrenching-tools  of 
the  corps  (with  which  all  the  corps  were  amply  supplied)  dis¬ 
tributed  for  effecting  lodgments,  etc. 

General  Warren  was  to  reduce  the  number  of  his  troops 
holding  the  intrenchments  to  the  minimum,  and  concentrate 
on  his  right,  prepared  to  support  the  assault  of  General 
Burnside.  He  wTas  to  make  the  same  preparations  as  to  pio¬ 
neers  and  intrenching-tools  as  the  Ninth  Corps. 

General  Ord  was  to  put  Mott’s  division  in  the  intrench¬ 
ments  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  and  form  his  troops  in  rear 
of  the  Ninth  Corps,  ready  to  support  it  in  the  assault. 

The  field  artillery  of  each  corps  was  to  be  held  ready  to 
move. 

General  Hancock  was  to  move  at  dark  from  Deep  Bottom, 
and  be  in  position  in  rear  of  Mott’s  division  (resuming  com¬ 
mand  of  it)  at  daylight,  ready  to  follow  up  the  assault. 


1  See  Appendix  K,  for  a  copy  of  the  order. 


254  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  '65. 


General  Sheridan  was  to  proceed  at  dark  to  Lee’s  mill, 
and  at  daylight  against  the  enemy’s  troops  on  our  left  by 
roads  heading  to  Petersburg  from  the  southward  and  west¬ 
ward. 

Major  Duane  was  to  have  the  ponton  trains  close  at  hand 
prepared  to  move  (to  cross  the  Appomattox),  and  suj:>plies  of 
sand-bags,  gabions,  fascines,  etc.,  near  the  lines,  ready  for 
use.  He  was  to  detail  engineer  officers  for  each  corps. 

General  Burnside  was  to  spring  his  mine  at  half-past  three 
in  the  morning  of  the  30th.  His  assaulting  columns  were  to 
move  at  once  rapidly  upon  the  breach,  seize  the  crest  in  the 
rear  and  effect  a  lodgment  there.  He  was  to  be  followed 
by  General  Ord  on  the  right,  and  General  Warren  on  the 
left.  Upon  the  explosion  of  the  mine  the  artillery  of  all 
kinds  in  battery  was  to  open  upon  those  points  of  the  enemy’s 
works  whose  fire  covered  the  ground  over  which  our  columns 
must  move. 

These  orders  were  carried  out  thoroughly  by  all  the  com¬ 
manders  except  General  Burnside.  His  parapets  and  abatis 
were  not  prepared  for  the  passage  of  the  columns  of  attack, 
his  pioneers  not  effectively  prepared  for  work,  nor  were  his 
intrenching-tools  distributed.  In  a  personal  interview  with 
General  Burnside  and  Generals  Willcox,  Potter,  and  Ledlie 
on  the  29th,  General  Meade  had  endeavored  to  impress  upon 
them,  first,  that  immediate  advantage  must  be  taken  of  the 
confusion  of  the  enemy  caused  by  the  explosion  of  the  mine, 
to  gain  the  crest  beyoiid  ;  that  holding  the  crater  would  be 
of  no  possible  use  ;  second,  that  if  the  assault  was  unsuc¬ 
cessful  the  troops  must  be  withdrawn  at  once. 

The  work  mined  was  on  General  Johnson’s  front,  at  the 
centre  of  General  Elliott’s  brigade.  General  Wise’s  brigade 
was  on  Elliott’s  right,  General  Ransom’s  on  his  left,  Gen¬ 
eral  Grade’s  on  Ransom’s  left.  General  Hoke’s  division 
held  from  Johnson’s  left  to  the  Appomattox  ;  Colquibt’s  bri- 


THE  PETERSBURG  MINE. 


255 


gade  was  sent  to  Johnson’s  on  the  28th,  and  was  placed  on 
Wise’s  right.  General  Mahone’s  held  on  Johnson’s  right, 
his  own  right  being  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  mine, 
excejjt  one  brigade  on  the  Weldon  Railroad  four  miles  off. 

A  defect  in  the  fuse  delayed  the  firing  of  the  mine  until 
twenty  minutes  to  five.  At  once  all  the  heavy  guns  and 
mortars,  eighty-one  in  all,  and  about  the  same  number  of 
field  guns,  opened,  and  kept  down  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s 
salients  and  his  batteries  at  all  points  except  two,  which, 
owing  to  the  character  of  the  ground  and  woods  that  con¬ 
cealed  them,  could  not  be  effectively  reached. 

A  few  minutes  after  the  explosion,  General  Ledlie’s  divi¬ 
sion,  the  Second  Brigade  leading,  filed  through  Burnside’s 
advanced  intrenchments,  and  moved  up  to  the  crater,1  into 
which  it  filed,  filling  it  with  a  confused  mass.  General  Led- 
lie  did  not  accompany,  much  less  lead,  his  division.  He 
remained,  according  to  the  testimony  before  the  Court  of 
Inquiry  that  followed,  in  a  bomb-proof  about  fifty  yards  in¬ 
side  our  intrenchments,  from  which  he  could  see  nothing 
that  was  going  on.  He  could  not  have  given  the  instruc¬ 
tions  he  received  to  his  brigade  commanders.  Had  the 
division  advanced  in  column  of  attack,  led  by  a  resolute,  in¬ 
telligent  commander,  it  would  have  gained  the  crest  in  fif¬ 
teen  minutes  after  the  explosion,  and  before  any  serious  op¬ 
position  could  have  been  made  to  it.  It  was  expected  by 
General  Meade  that  the  whole  of  the  Ninth  Corps  -would 
have  been  formed  in  columns  of  attack  in  the  hollow  ground 
in  the  vicinity  of  our  advanced  line  of  trenches,  and  would 
have  advanced  quickly  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  leading 
division,  and  that  in  half  an  hour  after  the  explosion  of  the 
mine  the  corps  would  have  had  possession  of  the  crest. 


1  The  crater  was  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  long,  sixty  wide  and  twenty- 
five  deep.  It  was  about  one  hundred  yards  from  Burnside's  advanced  line  of  in¬ 
trenchments. 


256  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 


The  mine  overwhelmed  the  battery  in  Elliott’s  salient,  the 
whole  of  the  Eighteenth  and  part  of  the  Twenty-third  South 
Carolina  Infantry,  and  for  some  minutes  caused  the  utmost 
consternation  among  the  troops  there.  For  some  consider¬ 
able  time  they  abandoned  the  intrenchments  for  the  space  of 
two  or  three  hundred  yards  on  each  side  of  the  mine.  But 
the  appearance  of  General  Ledlie’s  division  going  into  the 
crater  aroused  them,  and  they  began  a  scattering  musketry 
fire,  which  by  the  time  the  rear  of  Ledlie’s  division  got  up 
to  the  crater,  was  somewhat  effective.  General  Elliott,  in 
endeavoring  to  form  a  line  on  the  higher  ground  beyond 
the  crater,  was  severely  wounded,  and  the  command  devolved 
upon  Colonel  McMaster,  who  formed  a  part  of  the  brigade  in 
a  ravine  in  rear  of  the  crater  (the  salient),  the  fire  from  which, 
with  the  flanking  fire  of  the  rest  of  the  brigade  and  Ran¬ 
som’s  troops  in  the  intrenchments  on  our  right  of  the  crater, 
together  with  Wright’s  battery,  repulsed  all  the  attempts 
made  to  advance  from  the  crater.  Of  these  there  were 
several,  but  only  two  or  three  hundred  men  could  be  got  be¬ 
yond  the  crest  of  the  mine  to  make  them.  It  was  half  an 
hour  after  the  explosion  before  the  enemy’s  musketry  was  at 
all  effective,  and  nearly  an  hour  before  their  artillery  fire 
from  two  batteries,  in  all  six  guns,  was  so.  Then  Wright’s 
battery  of  four  field  guns  opened.  It  was  some  six  hundred 
yards  on  our  right  of  the  mine,  concealed  in  woods,  and  well 
covered  by  traverses,  so  that  we  could  not  silence  it.1  It 
swept  the  ground  between  our  intrenchments  and  the  crater, 
the  crater  itself,  and  the  ground  on  our  right  of  it,  firing 
over  the  heads  of  Ransom’s  troops,  who  were  formed  in  a 
covered  way  running  along  a  ravine.  A  two-gun  battery  in 


1  Major  Coit,  who  commanded  four  of  the  batteries  in  this  part  of  the  Confed¬ 
erate  intrenchments,  says  this  battery  was  literally  battered,  and  the  ground 
around  it  and  in  its  rear  was  honeycombed  by  the  explosion  of  mortar  shells.  The 
battery  was  well  traversed. 


THE  PETERSBURG  MINE. 


257 


a  ravine  on  our  left  of  the  mine,  equally  difficult  to  reach 
with  our  fire,  also  became  effective,  and  as  the  contest  con¬ 
tinued,  batteries  were  put  in  position  on  the  crest  so  often 
mentioned,  though  their  fire  was  in  a  great  degree  kept 
down,  as  was  that  of  their  mortars. 

General  Potter’s  division  went  forward  by  the  flank 1  (filed 
out)  soon  after  General  Ledlie’s  commenced  advancing. 
The  leading  brigade,  General  Griffin’s,  moved  toward  the 
right  when  it  reached  the  vicinity  of  the  mine,  and  taking 
possession  of  the  partially  abandoned  intrenchments,  began 
an  attack  upon  the  enemy,  whose  works  at  that  point  were 
intricate,  the  ground  being  cut  up  with  covered-ways  and 
rifle-pits.  After  a  long,  sharp  contest  the  intrenchments 
were  taken,  and  Elliott’s  troops  driven  back  upon  Ransom’s, 
holding  in  the  ravine. 2 

General  Willcox’s  division  followed  General  Ledlie’s,  his 
leading  brigade  going  into  the  crater,  his  second  brigade 
moving  to  the  left  of  it,  and  getting  possession  of  the  en¬ 
emy’s  intrenchments  there,  but  not  without  fighting.  His 
instructions,  he  says,  were  to  bear  to  the  left  and  take  up  a 
position  on  the  Jerusalem  plank-road,  and  that  he  endeav¬ 
ored  to  form  his  division  so  that  its  right  flank  would  rest 
on  that  road,  and  protect  the  left  flank  of  Ledlie’s  division, 
but  that  he  was  unable  to  do  so  ;  and  when,  some  time  after, 
he  was  ordered  to  advance  to  Cemetery  Hill,  the  enemy  had 
concentrated  such  a  fire  that  he  could  not  go  forward. 

An  hour  after  the  mine  exploded  General  Meade,  receiving 
a  despatch  from  Colonel  Loring,  staff  officer  to  General 
Burnside,  stating  that  Ledlie’s  division  was  in  the  crater,  but 

1  General  Potter  says  his  division  was  to  have  been  formed  left  in  front,  to  move 
forward  by  the  flank,  so  that  when  his  troops  had  passed  the  line  of  the  enemy's 
intrenchments  they  would  face  to  the  right,  to  cover  the  right  of  Ledlie. 

2  When  General  Potter  first  got  up  there,  he  says,  the  intrenchments  were  par¬ 
tially  abandoned  by  the  enemy  for  the  space  of  two  hundred  or  three  hundred 
yards  on  each  side  of  the  mine. 


258  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


could  not  be  got  forward,  at  once  ordered  Burnside  to  push 
with  all  his  troops  to  the  crest,  and  directed  General  Ord  to 
move  his  troops  forward  at  once ;  at  six  o’clock  he  directed 
General  Ord  to  push  for  the  crest  independently  of  Burn¬ 
side’s  troops,  and  make  a  lodgment  there.  Just  before  this 
direction  was  given,  General  Burnside  having  reported  that 
no  enemy  was  seen  in  their  line  of  intrencliments,  General 
Warren  was  informed  of  it,  and  ordered  to  go  forward  with 
his  troops,  independently  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  try  to 
carry  the  works  if  there  was  apparently  any  chance  for  it. 
But  he  reported  that  so  far  as  they  could  see  none  of  the 
enemy  had  left  their  front,  meaning  the  part  of  the  enemy’s 
line  within  his  view.  And  on  Hancock’s  front  the  enemy’s 
intrencliments  were  well  manned,  and  opened  a  heavy  and 
close  fire  whenever  they  perceived  any  indication  of  an  at¬ 
tack. 

At  six  o’clock,  prisoners  taken  having  stated  that  they  had 
no  line  in  their  rear,  that  they  were  falling  back  when  our 
troops  advanced,  and  that  none  of  the  troops  had  returned 
from  the  north  side  of  the  James,  General  Meade,  informing 
General  Burnside  of  this,  ordered  him  to  push  forward  his 
men,  black  and  white,  at  all  hazards,  and  rush  for  the  crest. 
Ferrero  was  ordered  repeatedly  by  Burnside  to  go  forward 
with  his  division,  but  instead  of  having  it  massed  close  to 
the  advanced  line  ready  to  move,  it  lay  crowded  in  the  cov¬ 
ered-ways  leading  down  to  that  line,  and  it  was  eight  o’clock 
before  it  filed  out  of  them.  As  most  of  the  other  troops  of 
the  Ninth  Corps  had  done,  it  passed  out  of  the  intrench- 
ments  by  twos  and  threes  and  fours.  It  went  forward  with 
alacrity,  but  a  large  part  of  it  crowded  through  the  crater  of 
the  mine,  notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  the  commanders  of 
the  two  brigades  to  keep  them  out  of  it.  This  threw  them 
into  confusion,  but  a  part  of  them  were  led  off  to  the  right, 
and  got  off  into  the  intrencliments  there,  when  they  had 


THE  PETERSBURG  MINE. 


259 


some  fighting,  capturing  200  prisoners  and  a  color.  Its  divi¬ 
sion  commander  remained  in  the  bomb-proof  with  General 
Ledlie. 

There  was  now  a  crowded  mass  in  and  in  rear  of  the  crater, 
and  for  some  distance  on  its  right  in  and  about  the  some¬ 
what  confused  intrenchments  taken  from  the  enemy.  The 
day  was  one  of  intense  heat,  the  thermometer  several  de¬ 
grees  above  90°,  and  the  sun  beating  down  in  the  deep  hole 
of  the  crater  caused  great  suffering. 

General  Ord’s  troops  were  very  much  delayed  in  passing 
through  the  Ninth  Corps  intrenchments,  owing  to  the  para¬ 
pets  and  abatis  not  having  been  prepared  for  it,  and  the 
crowds  still  in  them  and  in  the  covered-ways. 

General  Turner  says  that  at  half-past  six  the  last  of  Pot¬ 
ter’s  troops  had  just  passed  out,  and  that  seeing  the  confused 
mass  of  troops  in  and  about  the  crater,  and  the  colored  troops 
lying  down  and  trying  to  cover  themselves  in  a  very  slier!: 
line  on  the  right  of  the  mine,  he  moved  his  leading  brigade 
to  the  right  of  the  colored  troops,  and  took  possession  of 
about  one  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy’s  works.  His  Second 
Brigade  passed  out  still  further  to  the  right  and  attacked, 
but  without  success.  His  First  Brigade  was  in  the  act  of 
charging  down  the  enemy’s  line  to  the  right,  he  says,  and 
his  Second  Brigade  about  to  advance,  when  looking  to  the 
left,  he  saw  the  troops  in  large  numbers  rushing  back,  and 
immediately  the  whole  of  his  First  Brigade,  and  then  his 
Second,  fell  back  to  our  intrenchments. 

At  about  six  o’clock  General  Lee  was  informed  of  the 
springing  of  the  mine,  and  at  once  ordered  two  brigades  of 
Mahone’s  division  to  be  brought  up  from  the  right.  In  a 
short  time  he  was  at  the  Gee  house,  a  commanding  posi¬ 
tion  five  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  crater,  where  he  met 
General  Beauregard.  Hill  had  gone  to  the  right  to  bring 
up  the  troops,  having  first  sent  batteries  to  the  crest. 


260  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Malione  arrived  with  Weisiger’s  and  Wright’s  brigades  be¬ 
tween  eight  and  nine  o’clock,  and  seeing  what  a  large  body 
of  our  troops  were  in  their  intrenchments,  sent  for  Sanders’s 
brigade  of  his  division.  Weisiger’s  brigade  had  just  formed 
a  little  before  nine  o’clock  in  the  ravine  a  short  distance  in 
rear  of  the  mined  salient,  where,  it  has  been  stated,  Elliott’s 
men  had  aided  so  effectively  in  repelling  every  effort  of  our 
troops  in  the  crater  to  advance.1  Wright’s  brigade  was  not 
yet  in  position  when  Colonel  Thomas,  commanding  the 
Second  Brigade  of  colored  troops,  having  with  Colonel  Sig- 
fried,  commanding  the  First  Brigade,  received  an  order  from 
General  Ferrero  to  take  the  crest,  attempted  to  carry  out  the 
order  by  charging  with  his  brigade,  but  only  succeeded  in 
getting  two  of  his  regiments  and  part  of  a  third 2  over  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments  they  had  possession  of,  and  advanc¬ 
ing  a  short  distance,  when  Weisiger’s  brigade,  with  some  of 
Elliott’s,  advanced  against  them,  charged  and  drove  them 
back  in  confusion,  the  whole  division  rising  from  the  ground 
and  running  in  wild  disorder  back  to  our  intrenchments, 
carrying  with  them  many  of  Potter’s  troops,  both  of  Turner’s 
brigades,  and  most  of  the  men  lying  around  and  in  rear  of 
the  crater.  Some  of  the  colored  division  took  refuge  in  the 
crater,  or  must  have  remained  there  from  the  beginning,  for 
many  were  captured  there,  and  according  to  General  Burn¬ 
side’s  report  of  casualties  801  were  missing.  Some  of  Pot¬ 
ter’s  division  also  were  driven  into  the  crater.  This  attack 
left  the  enemy  in  possession  of  nearly  all  their  intrenchments 
on  our  right  of  the  mine. 

Satisfied  that  the  time  for  success  had  passed,  and  that 
any  further  attempt  would  only  result  in  useless  sacrifice  of 
life,  General  Meade,  with  the  concurrence  of  General  Grant, 


1  This  ravine  extended  some  distance  to  our  right  of  the  mine. 

2  Colonel  Charles  S.  Russell,  commanding  one  of  the  regiments,  says  only  150 
or  200  men  went  forward  from  the  intrenchments. 


THE  PETERSBURG  MINE. 


261 


directed  the  suspension  of  further  offensive  movements,  and 
the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  to  our  lines  when  it  could* be 
done  with  security,  leaving  it  discretionary  with  General 
Burnside  and  General  Ord  to  withdraw  them  during  the  day 
or  at  night.  Our  batteries  were  held  ready  to  keep  down 
the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  that  they  controlled,  should  they  at¬ 
tempt  to  open  upon  the  troops  in  withdrawing.  For  my  own 
part,  I  had  no  expectation  of  success  after  reading  Colonel 
Loring’s  despatch  from  the  mine,  written  an  hour  after  the 
explosion,  for,  if  in  that  time  they  had  not  gained  the  crest 
in  force,  the  opportunity  we  had  counted  on  in  the  surprise 
and  confusion  of  the  enemy  upon  the  springing  of  the  mine 
must  have  been  lost. 

At  half -past  six  a  despatch  was  received  from  the  officer  at 
the  signal  station  on  the  Jerusalem  plank-road,  reporting 
that  a  column  of  the  enemy’s  infantry,  at  least  a  strong  bri¬ 
gade,  was  marching  toward  our  right,  and  that  they  came 
from  the  vicinity  of  the  Lead  Works  (Weldon  Railroad), 
where  all  the  camps  had  been  broken  up,  and  the  troops 
moved  toward  our  right.  General  Warren  was  notified  of 
this  and  instructed  to  make  an  attack  in  that  direction  if 
practicable.  (The  point  indicated  was  at  least  four  miles 
from  his  right,  where  the  greater  part  of  his  corps  was  con¬ 
centrated.  ) 1 

To  this  General  Warren  replied  that  all  his  troops  were  on 
the  right  except  Crawford’s,  to  whom  he  had  sent  directions 
to  do  what  he  could,  and  asked  if  he  should  send  Ayres  there  ; 
but  General  Meade  preferred  that  CrawTford  should  be  heard 


1  General  Wilson  was  directed  to  make  a  lodgment  on  the  Weldon  Railroad 
and  move  up  along  it  to  the  enemy’s  unoccupied  intrenchments,  the  other  cavalry 
divisions  to  support  him.  But  the  march  prescribed  for  the  cavalry  was  too  long 
to  carry  out  this  programme  before  the  operation  of  the  mine  was  concluded. 
General  Sheridan  was  then  directed  to  make  a  reconnoissance  instead  of  an  at¬ 
tack,  to  feel  the  enemy’s  right  flank,  and  to  be  governed  in  anything  further  by 
his  own  judgment. 


262  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  '64  AND  ’63. 


from  before  giving  further  orders.  The  report  of  Crawford, 
received  about  eight  o’clock,  was  not  favorable  to  the  attempt, 
owing  to  the  distance  of  the  point  of  attack.  Ayres  was  di¬ 
rected  to  attack  on  Burnside’s  left  and  to  take  the  2-gun 
battery  of  the  enemy  on  our  left  of  the  mine,  which  had  a 
most  destructive  fire  in  that  quarter,  and  was  not  only  very 
much  concealed,  owing  to  its  position  in  a  ravine,  but  was 
hidden  by  a  group  of  trees  from  our  14 -gun  battery,  where 
six  4^ -inch  guns  had  been  put  in  position,  one  of  its  objects 
being  the  silencing  of  this  2-gun  battery.  General  Burnside 
had  been  requested  and  ordered  to  have  these  trees  cut  down, 
but  they  remained  standing.  Ayres  was  about  to  go  forward 
when,  as  already  stated,  all  our  troops  on  the  right  of  the 
mine  fell  back  in  confusion  to  our  intrenchments,  and  Gen¬ 
eral  Meade  directed  all  offensive  operations  to  cease.  This 
was  at  a  quarter  of  ten.  At  half-past  ten  Malione  made  an 
attack  on  the  crater  and  on  Willcox’s  troops  in  the  enemy’s 
intrenchments  on  our  left  of  the  crater.  This  was  repulsed 
by  the  musketry  of  the  troops  attacked,  and  by  our  artillery, 
and  Mahone’s  men  were  forced  to  seek  cover  in  one  of  their 
trenches  near  by.  Between  one  and  two  o’clock  another,  a 
third  and  last  attack,  was  made  with  Johnson’s  and  Mahone’s 
troops,  Sanders’s  brigade  having  arrived  in  the  meantime. 

The  order  to  withdraw  from  the  crater  to  our  own  lines 
was  sent  by  General  Burnside  at  half-past  twelve  o’clock  to 
the  brigade  commanders  there,  leaving  them  to  consult  and 
decide  upon  the  time  and  manner  of  withdrawal.  This  they 
did* returning  the  order  endorsed  with  a  request  that  our 
artillery  and  infantry  should  open  when  they  fell  back,  but 
before  the  despatch  reached  General  Burnside  the  enemy 
advanced  to  the  last  attack,  and  two  of  the  brigade  com¬ 
manders  in  the  crater,  seeing  them  close  at  hand,  hastily 
gave  the  order  to  retire,  when  the  larger  part  of  the  troops 
fell  back  to  our  lines,  losing  many  men  by  the  infantry  and 


THE  PETERSBURG  MINE. 


263 


artillery  fire  of  the  enemy,  though  the  distance  to  our  in- 
trenchments  was  but  little  more  than  one  hundred  yards.  A 
large  number  of  officers  and  men  were  captured  in  the  crater, 
among  them  the  two  brigade  commanders  of  Ledlie’s  division, 
Brigadier-General  W.  F.  Bartlett,  whom  General  Burnside 
mentions  as  a  most  brave  and  efficient  officer,  who  was  severely 
wounded  in  the  Wilderness,  and  Colonel  E.  G.  Marshall. 

General  Meade  reported  his  casualties  at  4,400  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  all  except  about  100  being  the  loss  of 
the  Ninth  Corps.  He  also  stated  that  246  prisoners  and  two 
colors  had  been  captured.  General  Burnside’s  report  does 
not  state  what  his  loss  was  at  the  mine,  but  gives  the  whole 
number  of  his  casualties  from  June  12  to  July  30  ;  his  miss¬ 
ing  during  that  time  was  1,396.  As  his  colored  division 
was  in  no  other  engagement  than  the  mine  during  that  time, 
its  casualties  there  are  given  and  are  stated  to  have  been  176 
killed,  688  wounded,  and  801  missing. 

The  Tabular  Statement  of  the  Medical  Department  puts 
down  the  loss  at  419  killed,  1,679  wounded  and  1,910  miss¬ 
ing  ;  total,  4,008.  The  number  of  the  killed  and  missing- 
are,  I  believe,  too  great :  the  total  was  probably  3, 500. 1  Its 
Tabular  Statement  of  the  Confederate  loss  is  evidently 
erroneous,  400  killed,  600  wounded,  200  missing. 

Colonel  McMaster  states  that  the  loss  of  Elliott’s  brigade 
was  677,  and  that  that  was  more  than  half  the  Confederate 
loss  that  day.  Weisiger’s  brigade  lost  heavily  also,  the  com¬ 
mander  being  among  the  wounded. 

The  great  mass  of  the  Ninth  Corps  were  so  huddled 
together  that  they  could  do  no  fighting,  but  those  that  were 
disengaged  from  the  mass  did  good  fighting.  The  propor¬ 
tion  of  killed  and  wounded  among  the  officers  of  the  colored 
troops  was  unusually  large. 

1  General  Mahone  states  that  the  number  of  prisoners  taken  in  the  crater  was 

1,101. 


264  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


At  the  request  of  General  Meade  the  President  ordered  a 
Court  of  Inquiry  to  examine  into  and  report  upon  the  facts 
and  circumstances  attending  this  affair,  and  also  to  report 
their  opinion,  and  what  officers,  if  any,  were  answerable  for 
the  want  of  success  of  the  assault.  The  statements  of  most  of 
the  officers  commanding  troops  before  this  Court  were  not 
very  clear  and  precise  as  to  their  positions,  and  those  of  the 
enemy  where  the  troops  were  in  contact,  and  the  accounts  of 
the  details  of  the  contest,  are  confused. 

The  opinion  of  this  Court  will  be  found  in  Appendix  K. 

The  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  "War  also  inquired 
into  the  facts  in  the  following  winter. 

The  principal  facts  being  known,  it  was  apparent  that  the 
assault  failed  from  mismanagement  and  misbehavior  on  the 
part  of  several  of  the  chief  actors,  unless,-  indeed,  which  I  do 
not  believe,  the  troops  were  in  such  condition  that  the  best 
management,  the  best  handling,  and  the  best  leading  would 
have  been  lost  upon  them.  This  in  brief  was  the  opinion  of 
the  Court.  General  Grant,  when  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  said  that  General  Meade  made  his 
orders  most  perfectly ;  even  at  the  time  of  giving  his  testi¬ 
mony,  when  all  the  facts  were  known,  he  did  not  think  he 
could  improve  upon  the  order,  and  that  if  the  troops  had  been 
properly  commanded,  and  led  in  accordance  with  that  order, 
we  would  have  captured  Petersburg,  but  that  the  opportun¬ 
ity  was  lost  in  consequence  of  the  division  commanders  not 
going  in  with  their  men,  but  allowing  them  to  go  into  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments  and  spread  themselves  there,  without 
going  on  further,  thus  giving  the  enemy  time  to  recover 
from  his  surprise,  collect  his  troops,  and  organize  against 
them. 

He  said  further  that  General  Burnside  did  not  prepare  his 
parapets  and  abatis  as  he  was  ordered  to  do,  and  that  the 
preparation  ordered  was  essential  to  success,  and  could  have 


THE  PETERSBURG  MINE. 


265 


been  made  without  its  discovery  by  the  enemy ;  that  had  he 
been  a  corps  commander  entrusted  with  the  duty  General 
Burnside  was  charged  with,  he  would  have  been  upon  the 
ground  and  seen  that  the  preparations  were  made  as  ordered ; 
and  that  had  he  been  a  division  commander,  he  would  have 
gone  in  with  his  division  ;  and  he  added  that  there  were  a 
great  many  officers  there  (with  the  army)  who  would  have 
done  the  same  thing. 

General  Ledlie  left  the  army  a  short  time  after  the  mine 
affair,  and  resigned. 

According  to  the  Return  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on 
the  20th  of  July,  its  effective  force  of  infantry  (enlisted  men 
present  for  duty  equipped)  was  37,984 ;  its  effective  force  of 
cavalry,  10,280. 

The  effective  force  of  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  James  on 
the  31st  of  July  was  24,009  ;  of  its  cavalry,  1,880. 

The  effective  force  of  infantry  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  on  the  10tli  of  July  was  39,295 ;  of  cavalry,  8,436. 

The  Sixth  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Sec¬ 
ond  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  were  detached 
and  are  not  included  in  the  Returns.  Johnson’s  and  Hoke’s 
divisions  are  included  in  the  strength  of  the  Army  of  North¬ 
ern  Virginia.1 

The  engineers  now  went  on  with  perfecting  our  redoubts 


1  General  Gibbon,  commanding  the  Second  Division,  Second  Corps,  in  conclud¬ 
ing  his  report  of  the  service  of  his  division  from  May  3d  to  July  31st,  states  that 
when  the  division  left  its  camp  on  May  3d,  it  consisted  of  three  brigades  with  an 
aggregate  number,  6,789  (officers  and  enlisted  men)  ;  that  between  the  dates  men¬ 
tioned  it  had  been  reinforced  to  the  number  of  4,263,  making  a  total  of  11,062, 
and  had  been  divided  into  four  brigades ;  that  it  lost  77  officers  and  971  enlisted 
men  killed,  202  officers  and  3,825  enlisted  men  wounded,  being  a  total  of  5,075; 
that  the  brigades  had  had  seventeen  different  commanders,  of  whom  three  had 
been  killed  and  six  wounded.  Of  the  279  officers  killed  and  wounded,  40  were 
regimental  commanders.  That  many  of  the  bravest  and  most  efficient  officers  and 
men  were  among  those  who  fell.  He  continues:  “  The  effect  upon  the  troops  of 
the  loss  of  such  leaders  as  Tyler,  Webb,  Carroll,  Baxter,  Conner,  McKeon,  Ram¬ 
sey,  Blaisdell,  Coons,  Haskell,  Porter,  Murphy,  McMahon,  Macy,  Curry,  Pierce, 

XII.— 12 


266  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


and  return-works,  so  that  our  lines  could  be  held  by  a  small 
part  of  our  troops,  leaving  the  larger  part  free  for  move¬ 
ment. 

A  second  line  of  redoubts  without  connecting  lines,  in  rear 
of  the  first  line,  was  contemplated,  but  was  not  thrown  up. 


Abbot,  Davis,  Curtis,  and  a  host  of  others  can  be  truly  estimated  only  by  one  who 
has  witnessed  their  conduct  in  the  different  battles.” 

The  names  he  mentions  are  those  of  general  officers  and  regimental  command¬ 
ers,  nearly  all  of  whom  I  knew  personally  ;  they  were  soldiers  in  every  meaning 
of  the  word,  gallant,  skilful,  full  of  zeal  and  energy. 


CHAPTER  X. 


MOVEMENT  TO  THE  NORTH  BANK  OF  THE  JAMES  TO 
THREATEN  RICHMOND— CAPTURE  OF  THE  WELDON 
RAILROAD  AT  THE  GLOBE  TAVERN— THE  BATTLE 
OF  REAMS’S  STATION. 

Early  in  August  General  Sheridan  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  all  the  troops  operating  against  General  Early, 
who  was  then  in  the  vicinity  of  Winchester ;  General  Hunter 
on  the  Monocacy  at  the  railroad  crossing. 

General  Lee  sent  Kershaw’s  division  and  Fitz  Lee’s  cav¬ 
alry  division  to  reinforce  General  Early ;  and  General  Tor- 
bert’s  and  General  Wilson’s  cavalry  divisions  were  sent  to 
General  Sheridan. 

Between  this  time  and  the  month  of  March,  1865,  several 
movements  of  portions  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  of  the 
Army  of  the  James  were  made  to  the  right  and  to  the  left, 
which  resulted  in  the  extension  of  our  lines  of  intrenchments 
in  both  directions,  and  caused  a  corresponding  extension  of 
the  Confederate  intrenchments  on  our  left,  and  their  occupa¬ 
tion  in  stronger  force  of  their  intrenchments  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  James.  By  this  process  their  lines  finally  be¬ 
came  so  thinly  manned  when  the  last  movement  to  our  left 
was  made  in  March,  1865,  as  to  be  vulnerable  at  one  or  two 
points,  where  some  of  the  obstructions  in  their  front  had 
been  in  a  great  measure  destroyed  by  the  necessities  of  the 
winter. 

These  fiank  movements  had  not  only  that  general  object 


2G8  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


of  Confederate  extension  in  view,  but  other  special  objects 
also,  which  were  important  at  the  time,  and  which  were  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent  accomplished. 

During  the  period  mentioned,  the  plan  of  leaving  garri¬ 
sons  in  the  enclosed  works  and  moving  in  force  against  the 
Confederate  lines  of  supply  from  the  south,  and  to  turn 
Lee’s  right  flank,  was  never  carried  out.  A  partial  attempt 
of  this  character  was  made  in  the  latter  part  of  October,  by 
way  of  the  Boydton  plank-road,  but  it  failed,  and  chiefly 
because  it  was  of  a  partial  character,  and  not  a  decided, 
vigorous  attempt  with  all  the  force  that  could  have  been 
taken  from  the  lines  to  turn  Lee’s  right. 

Information  received  from  various  sources  leading  General 
Grant  to  believe  that  General  Lee  had  detached  three  divi¬ 
sions  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry  from  Petersburg  to  rein¬ 
force  General  Early,  he  sent  General  Hancock  with  his  corps 
and  Gregg’s  cavalry,  together  with  the  Tenth  Corps,  or  part 
of  it,  under  General  Birney,  to  threaten  Richmond  from  the 
north  side  of  the  James,  in  order  to  prevent  further  detach¬ 
ments  from  being  made  by  Lee,  and,  if  possible,  to  draw 
back  those  sent.  General  Hancock’s  instructions  were  the 
same  as  those  sent  him  on  the  25th  of  July  for  his  former 
movement,  except  as  to  the  manner  of  crossing  the  James. 
Great  care  was  taken  to  conceal  the  movement,  and  to  give 
the  impression  that  the  troops  were  destined  for  Washing¬ 
ton.  The  Second  Corps  was  marched  to  City  Point,,  and 
embarked  on  steamers  which  left  City  Point  for  the  lower 
ponton  bridge  at  Deep  Bottom  at  ten  o’clock  at  night  of  the 
13th  August.  The  cavalry  and  artillery  went  by  land.  It 
was  expected  that  the  troops  would  have  disembarked,  and 
the  movements  have  begun  by  daylight,  but  the  steamers 
were  not  adapted  to  the  transportation  of  troops,  and,  owing 
to  the  shoal  water,  could  not  run  near  enough  to  the  shore, 
and  the  tide  was  ebbing.  This  caused  delay,  and  it  was 


MOVEMENT  TO  THREATEN  RICHMOND. 


269 


nine  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  14th  before  the  corps  had 
disembarked. 

The  plan  of  operations  was  for  Mott  to  move  on  the  river- 
road  (New  Market),  and  drive  the  enemy  into  his  intrenched 
line  behind  Bailey’s  Creek,  and  beyond  it,  if  practicable. 
General  Barlow — General  Gibbon  being  absent — with  the 
First  and  Second  Divisions,  to  move  to  Mott’s  right  and  as¬ 
sault  the  enemy’s  lines  near  the  J ennings  house  (in  the  vicin¬ 
ity  of  Fussell’s  mill),  Gregg  to  cover  the  right  flank.  If 
Barlow  carried  the  lines,  he  was  to  move  to  the  left,  uncover 
Mott’s  front,  and  both  were  then  to  advance  along  the  river 
road.  As  soon  as  the  infantry  uncovered  the  Charles  City 
and  Central  (Darby)  roads,  Gregg  was  to  move  on  the  for¬ 
mer,  make  a  dash  on  Richmond,  if  the  chance  offered,  and  if 
not,  to  destroy  the  railroads  entering  it.  General  Birney 
was  to  attack  the  enemy’s  right  near  the  ponton  bridge 
above  the  mouth  of  Bailey’s  Creek,  and  if  successful,  was  to 
move  up  the  Kingsland,  Varina,  and  Mill  roads,  all  of  which 
are  near  the  river  bank. 

If  this  iflan  could  have  been  carried  out,  the  enemy’s  in- 
trenchments  would  have  been  turned,  and  we  should  have 
had  possession  of  Chapin’s  Bluff,  the  works  of  which,  with 
those  of  Drury’s  Bluff,  were  the  chief  fortifications  guarding 
the  river  approach  to  Richmond.  But  General  Field’s  divi¬ 
sion  had  remained  at  the  Deep  Bottom  or  Bailey’s  Creek  in- 
trenchments,  and  General  Wilcox’s  at  Chapin’s  Bluff,  and  in 
fact,  only  Kershaw’s  division  of  infantry  had  been  sent  to 
Early.  Wilcox  at  once  joined  Field,  and  Mahone’s  division, 
with  Hampton’s  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  cavalry  divisions,  were 
sent  across  the  river  to  reinforce  them,  Dealing’s  brigade 
being  the  only  cavalry  force  left  with  Beauregard. 

Mott  found  the  enemy  in  their  strong  position  on  Bailey’s 
Creek  at  the  river  road  crossing.  It  was  intended,  General 
Hancock  says,  that  General  Barlow  should  attack  near  Fus- 


270  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


sell’s  mill  with  the  greater  portion  of  two  divisions,  when  by 
mere  weight  of  numbers  he  would  have  broken  through  the 
enemy’s  line,  which  at  that  point  was  thinly  held ;  but  that 
he  extended  from  Mott’s  right  to  the  vicinity  of  Fussell’s  (a 
distance,  according  to  the  maps,  of  nearly  a  mile  and  a  half), 
through  thick  woods,  and  about  four  o’clock  assaulted  with 
only  one  brigade  (of  Gibbon’s  division),  and  made  several 
unsuccessful  attempts  upon  the  enemy’s  line ;  that  General 
Barlow’s  personal  example  to  the  troops  was  all  that  could 
be  expected  or  desired  from  his  well-known  gallantry  and 
devotion  to  duty,  but  was  of  no  avail.  He  adds  that  Gen¬ 
eral  Barlow’s  report  reflects  but  little  credit  on  the  troops, 
and  attributes  their  failure  to  respond  to  the  leading  of  their 
commander,  to  the  large  number  of  new  men  among  them, 
and  the  small  number  of  experienced  officers  left  to  com¬ 
mand  them.1  To  meet  General  Barlow’s  threatening  move¬ 
ment,  the  enemy  weakened  their  right,  opposite  Birney, 
to  such  an  extent  that  he  was  able  to  seize  a  part  of  their 
line  with  trifling  loss,  capturing  four  guns,  but  could  get 
no  further.  Gregg  advanced  well  up  the  Charles  City 
road. 

During  the  night  the  greater  part  of  Birney’s  command 
with  Colonel  Craig’s  brigade  of  Mott’s  division  was  massed 
on  the  right,  in  the  vicinity  of  Fussell’s,  and  dispositions 
were  made  for  him  to  attack  in  the  morning.  Gibbon’s 
division,  Smythe  commanding,  was  massed  on  Birney’s  left,, 
Barlow’s  near  the  fork  of  the  Darby  and  Long  bridge  roads, 
and  Mott’s  on  the  river-road.  Birney  was  to  find  the  enemy’s 
left  the  next  morning,  and  turn  it,  or,  failing  in  that,  to  at¬ 
tack.  Gregg  was  to  cover  the  movement  on  the  right.  But 
General  Birney  took  so  wide  a  circuit  to  his  right  between 
the  Darby  and  Charles  City  roads  that  it  .was  near  night  be- 

1  See  the  remarks  of  General  Gibbon,  at  the  close  of  the  previous  chapter,  upon 
the  loss  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  in  the  division. 


MOVEMENT  TO  THREATEN  RICHMOND. 


271 


fore  lie  reported  that  lie  liad  found  the  enemy’s  line,  but 
could  not  attack  before  morning. 

Birney  was  ordered  to  attack  on  the  16th,  and  Gregg, 
with  Miles’s  brigade  of  Barlow’s  division,  to  move  up  the 
Charles  City  road  to  divert  the  enemy’s  force  from  Birney. 

General  Gregg  advanced  at  an  early  hour  to  the  vicinity  of 
White’s  tavern  (seven  miles  from  Richmond),  driving  the 
enemy’s  advanced  force  of  cavalry  before  him,  their  com¬ 
mander,  General  Chambliss,  being  killed.  At  ten  o’clock 
General  Terry,  with  his  division  of  Birney’s  corps,  and 
Craig’s  brigade  of  Mott’s  division,  together  with  a  brigade  of 
colored  troops  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Birney, 
advanced  against  the  enemy’s  works  above  Fussell’s  mill, 
and  after  a  severe  contest  carried  them,  capturing  three 
colors  and  between  200  and  300  prisoners  from  Wilcox’s  and 
Mahone’s  divisions.  Colonel  Craig,  who  had  just  returned 
to  the  army  from  an  absence  on  account  of  wounds  received 
during  the  campaign,  was  killed.  The  enemy  soon  retook 
their  line,  Birney  retaining  only  the  advanced  line  of  pits, 
the  picket  line.  The  wooded  character  of  the  country  pre¬ 
vented  personal  examination  by  General  Hancock,  and  it  was 
some  hours  before  he  was  fully  informed  of  the  state  of 
affairs. 

Early  in  the  afternoon  the  enemy’s  cavalry,  now  in  large 
force  and  supported  by  infantry,  advanced  upon  Gregg  and 
Miles  and  forced  them  back  to  and  across  Deep  Creek. 
Miles,  with  his  brigade  and  Brooke’s,  formed  on  Birney’s 
right.  It  was  now  fully  ascertained  that  the  information 
upon  which  General  Hancock  had  been  sent  to  the  north 
side  of  the  James  was  erroneous,  but  he  was  retained  there 
during  the  17th,  18th,  19th,  and  20th,  until  dark,  keeping  up 
a  threatening  attitude  with  constant  skirmishing,  though 
directed  not  to  assault  the  enemy’s  works.  On  the  night  of 
the  20th  his  command  was  withdrawn  to  their  former  posi- 


272  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


tions  before  Petersburg  and  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  General 
Kautz  held  the  left  of  the  army  during  General  Gregg’s  ab¬ 
sence. 

There  was  a  sharp  encounter  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th, 
when  the  enemy  left  their  works  above  FusseH’s  mill  and 
attacked  Birney  ;  they  were  repulsed,  General  Miles  on  the 
right  aiding  by  an  attack  on  their  left  flank. 

The  casualties  of  the  command,  according  to  the  statement 
furnished  me  from  the  Adjutant-General’s  Office  by  Mr.  J.  W. 
Kirkley,  taken  by  him  from  the  nominal  lists  of  casualties, 
were  321  killed,  1,840  wounded,  625  missing;  total,  2,786.* 
I  have  not  found  a  statement  of  the  Confederate  casualties. 
Among  the  severely  wounded  of  the  Second  Corps,  on  the 
15tli,  was  Colonel  Macy,  Twentieth  Massachusetts,  who  was 
particularly  mentioned  by  General  Barlow  for  good  conduct. 
He  had  only  returned  to  his  command  on  the  morning  of  the 
15th,  having  been  absent,  owing  to  a  wound  received  during 
the  campaign.1 2 

While  General  Hancock  was  keeping  the  enemy  occupied 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  James,  General  Warren  was  with¬ 
drawn  from  the  lines,  the  Ninth  Corps  extending  its  left  to 
occupy  the  place  of  the  Fifth,  and  sent  at  four  o’clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th,  by  a  route  well  away  from  the  enemy’s 
lines,  to  seize  and  hold  the  Weldon  Railroad  at  the  Globe 
tavern,  about  four  miles  south  of  the  outskirts  of  Petersburg. 
As  he  would  need  reinforcements,  Mott’s  division  was  sent 
back  on  the  night  of  the  18th  to  relieve  a  part  of  the  Ninth 
Corps  (now  commanded  by  General  Parke)  in  the  intrench- 
ments,  so  that  it  might  be  sent  to  reinforce  the  Fifth  Corps. 

On  the  night  of  the  14th  and  15th,  the  Fifth  Corps  was  re- 


1  The  casualties,  according  to  the  Tabular  Statement  found  in  Badeau’s  volumes, 
ai-e  1,498  killed  and  wounded,  515  missing  ;  total,  2,013. 

2  The  effective  force  of  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  this  time  was 
33,684  ;  of  the  Army  of  the  James,  18,449. 


MOVEMENT  TO  THREATEN  RICHMOND. 


273 


lieved  by  the  Ninth  in  its  intrenchments,  and  held  ready  to 
move.  On  the  16th,  General  Meade,  satisfied,  from  the  re¬ 
port  of  General  Hancock,  the  observation  of  signal  officers, 
and  other  sources  of  information,  that  Lee  had  but  three 
infantry  divisions  in  the  Petersburg  intrenchments,  directed 
General  Warren  to  move  by  daylight  of  the  17th  to  the 
Weldon  Railroad  near  the  intersection  of  the  Vaughan  road 
(about  two  miles  from  Petersburg),  and  if  the  enemy  held 
their  intrenchments  weakly  in  that  vicinity  to  endeavor  to 
carry  them  and  occupy  the  crest  in  the  rear  of  their  line  op¬ 
posite  the  line  held  by  the  Ninth  and  Eighteenth  Corps. 
Kautz  was  to  move  on  his  left  flank.  But  General  Grant,  not 
being  altogether  satisfied  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  enemy, 
preferred  to  wait  for  further  developments,  and  the  order  was 
suspended.  On  the  next  day  General  Grant  authorized 
sending  the  Fifth  Corps  and  some  cavalry  to  destroy  as 
much  of  the  Weldon  Railroad  as  practicable,  but  not  to  as¬ 
sault  fortifications  ;  the  movement  to  be  rather  a  reconnois- 
sance  in  force,  during  which  General  Warren  might  take 
advantage  of  any  weakness  of  the  enemy  he  discovered.  In 
certain  contingencies  he  was  to  remain  on  the  road.  Gen¬ 
eral  Grant’s  despatch  concluded  :  “I  want,  if  possible,  to 
make  such  demonstrations  as  will  force  Lee  to  withdraw  a 
portion  of  his  troops  from  the  Valley,  so  that  Sheridan  can 
strike  a  blow  against  the  balance.” 

Accordingly  General  Warren  was  instructed,  on  the  17th, 
to  move  the  next  morning  at  four  o’clock,  and  make  a  lodg¬ 
ment  upon  the  Weldon  Railroad,  near  the  Gurley  house 
(two  miles  south  of  the  intersection  of  the  Vaughan  road),  or 
as  near  the  enemy’s  lines  as  juacticable,  and  destroy  the  road 
as  far  south  as  possible.  In  addition  to  the  destruction  of 
the  road,  he  was  to  consider  the  movement  a  reconnoissance 
in  force,  and  take  advantage  of  any  weakness  the  enemy 
might  betray.  A  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Colonel  Spear 
12* 


274  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 


was  attached  to  his  command.  In  the  course  of  General 
Warren’s  operations  on  the  18tli,  it  was  determined  to  with¬ 
draw  General.  Mott’s  division  from  Hancock  in  the  night,  to 
take  the  place  of  a  part  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  that  General 
Ord  should  extend  his  left,  so  that  the  two  would  enable 
Willcox’s,  White’s,  and  finally  Potter’s  divisions  to  be  sent 
to  the  left  on  the  19th  to  co-operate  with  General  Warren. 
These  three  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps  had  altogether 
about  6, 000  men,  but  all  these  were  not  available.  General 
Warren  moved  as  directed,  taking  possession  of  the  Weldon 
Railroad  at  the  Globe  tavern  (some  three  miles  west  of  our 
left),  finding  only  Dealing’s  cavalry  brigade  to  oppose  him. 
Griffin’s  division  was  formed  along  the  road  looking  west, 
and  began  its  destruction.  The  day  was  oppressively  hot 
and  close,  as  were  those  that  followed,  and  a  heavy  rain  fell 
throughout  the  day.  Ayres’s  division  moved  up  the  railroad 
a  mile  or  more  from  Griffin  and  to  within  half  a  mile  of  the 
Vaughan  road  intersection,  having  Hayes’s  brigade  on  the 
right  of  the  railroad,  Dusliane’s  Maryland  brigade  on  his  left 
moving  by  a  flank.  Crawford  moved  up  on  Ayres’s  right, 
his  right  in  dense  woods  with  close  underbrush.  A  large 
field  of  Indian  corn  in  front  of  Crawford’s  left  and  Ayres’s 
right  hid  everything  from  their  view.  Cutler’s  division  re¬ 
mained  in  rear  in  support. 

General  Dearing  had  reported  to  General  Beauregard  the 
appearance  of  some  force  on  the  railroad,  and  General  Hetli, 
with  Davis’s  and  Walker’s  brigades,  was  sent  to  his  support. 
Moving  out  by  the  Vaughan  road,  about  two  o’clock  General 
Heth  made  a  sudden  attack  on  Ayres’s  left,  caught  the 
Maryland  brigade  unawares,  and  drove  it  back.  Ayres,  to 
prevent  his  line  of  battle  being  taken  in  flank,  drew  it  back, 
but  then  advancing,  drove  the  enemy  from  the  ground. 
Crawford’s  left,  Lyle’s  brigade,  was  partly  engaged.  War¬ 
ren’s  loss  was  544  killed  and  wounded,  392  missing — total, 


MOVEMENT  TO  THREATEN  RICHMOND. 


275 


936.  General  Warren  says  the  enemy’s  loss  must  have  ex¬ 
ceeded  ours  ;  he  left  his  dead  and  wounded  on  the  ground. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19tli,  General  Bragg  of  Cutler’s 
division  was  sent  with  his  brigade  to  the  right  of  Crawford, 
to  support  him  and  establish  connection  by  a  skirmish  line 
with  the  pickets  of  the  Ninth  Corps.  There  was  great  diffi¬ 
culty  in  doing  this,  the  whole  face  of  the  country  being 
covered  with  dense  woods  and  underbrush,  the  wood-roads  or 
cart-tracks  through  which  were  unknown  to  any  of  our  troops. 
The  line  was  probably  imperfectly  formed,  but  at  best  would 
constitute  a  very  imperfect  guard  against  an  active  enemy, 
acquainted  in  detail  with  the  woods,  which,  at  the  distance 
of  twenty  paces,  effectually  screened  everything  from  sight. 

Upon  learning  from  General  Beauregard  that  the  Fifth 
Corps  or  a  part  of  it  was  on  the  Weldon  Railroad,  General 
Lee  sent  Mahone’s  and  Lee’s  divisions  back  to  Petersburg. 
In  the  course  of  the  day  Willcox’s  division,  then  White’s, 
and  later  in  the  afternoon.  Potter’s,  were  sent  to  General 
Warren. 

General  A.  P.  Hill,  with  Davis’s  and  Walker’s  brigades 
under  General  Heth,  and  Weisiger’s,  Colquitt’s,  and  Cling- 
man’s  under  General  Mahone,  with  Lee’s  cavalry  and  Peg- 
ram’s  batteries,  moved  to  the  Vaughan  road  intersection. 
Heth  was  to  attack  Ayres,  while  Mahone,  familiar  with  the 
woods,  was  to  move  concealed  by  it,  some  distance  beyond 
Crawford’s  right,  break  through  Bragg’s  skirmish  line,  and 
take  Bragg  and  Crawford  in  rear.  About  half-past  four  in 
the  afternoon  General  Mahone  with  his  command  formed 
in  columns  of  fours,  broke  through  Bragg’s  skirmish  line, 
faced  to  the  right,  and  swept  rapidly  down  toward  General 
Warren’s  right  flank,  taking  all  Crawford’s  skirmish  line  and 
part  of  his  line  of  battle  in  rear.  His  skirmish  line  fell 
back  in  the  greatest  confusion,  and;  in  doing  so,  masked  the 
fire  of  his  line  of  battle,  and  forced  it  to  fall  back,  together 


276  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


with  a  part  of  the  right  of  General  Ayres’s  division.  Heth 
at  the  same  time  opened  on  Ayres’s  centre  and  left ;  General 
"Warren,  reforming  the  parts  of  Ayres’s  and  Crawford’s  divi¬ 
sions  that  were  broken,  brought  them  forward  again  and 
regained  the  ground  temporarily  lost,  taking  some  prisoners 
and  two  flags.  General  Willcox  was  ordered  up  to  attack ; 
and  "White’s  division  was  formed  facing  to  the  right,  and 
engaging  Colquitt’s  brigade,  drove  it  back  and  captured 
some  prisoners.  Mahone’s  command  fell  back  rapidly  in 
great  confusion  to  their  intrenchments,  carrying  with  them 
the  parts  of  Warren’s  command  disorganized  by  the  attack 
on  their  rear  in  the  woods,  and  a  large  portion  of  the  pickets. 

Heth  made  repeated  attempts  to  drive  Ayres  back,  but 
failed.  General  Beauregard,  telegraphing  General  Lee,  said 
Colquitt  and  Clingman  in  advancing  through  thick  under¬ 
growth  lost  their  organization  and  were  ordered  to  their 
camps  to  rally  them.  Mahone’s  brigade  was  also  ordered 
into  the  lines.  Heth’s  two  brigades  remained. 

General  Warren’s  casualties  were  382  killed  and  wounded, 
2,518  missing,  of  which  1,805  were  from  Crawford’s  divi¬ 
sion.  General  Hayes,  of  Ayres’s  division,  was  among  the 
captured.  The  enemy’s  loss,  General  Warren  says,  must 
have  been  heavy  in  killed  and  wounded.  General  Cling¬ 
man  was  among  the  latter. 

The  necessity  of  remaining  stationary,  even  a  single  day, 
in  a  dense  wood  like  that  in  which  the  greater  part  of  Gen¬ 
eral  Warren’s  troops  were  posted,  subjects  a  command  to 
having  some  part  of  it  taken  suddenly  in  flank  or  rear, 
broken,  thrown  into  confusion,  and  many  of  them  captured. 1 

1  General  Warren  was  directed  toward  night  on  the  18th,  if  his  contingent  ob¬ 
jects  could  not  be  accomplished  that  night,  to  intrench  as  close  up  to  the  enemy's 
works  as  he  could  get;  he  was  informed  that  he  would  be  reinforced  by  the  Ninth 
Corps  the  next  day ;  on  the  19th  he  was  instructed  to  maintain  his  hold  on  the 
railroad,  at  all  hazards,  and,  if  practicable,  extend  to  connect  with  the  Ninth 
Corps ;  he  was  also  to  push  the  enemy  back  nearer  their  own  lines.  These  were 


MOVEMENT  TO  THREATEN  RICHMOND. 


277 


Satisfied  that  the  enemy  would  renew  their  efforts  to  drive 
him  from  the  railroad,  General  Warren  on  the  20th  selected 
a  position  on  it  a  mile  or  two  in  rear  of  his  line  of  battle  on 
the  19th,  chiefly  in  open  ground,  and  favorable  for  the  use 
of  artillery,  and  intrenched  so  as  to  have  a  considerable  in¬ 
fantry  reserve. 

On  the  21st  General  Lee,  finding  our  forces  had  been  with¬ 
drawn  from  the  north  side  of  the  James,  directed  Field  to 
send  two  of  his  brigades  to  Petersburg,  and  General  Hamp¬ 
ton  to  bring  over  his  cavalry  division  (now  commanded  by 
General  Butler).  Wilcox’s  division,  in  whole  or  in  part,  had 
already  been  moved  to  Petersburg. 

On  the  morning  of  the  21st,  General  A.  P.  Hill,  with  his 
own  corps,  part  of  Hoke’s  division  with  Lee’s  cavalry,  at¬ 
tacked  Warren,  opening  with  thirty  guns  on  his  front  and 
right  flank,  and  at  ten  o’clock  assaulting  them,  but  was 
everywhere  repulsed.  Later  Malione  attempted  an  assault 
on  the  left  flank,  but  the  artillery  broke  his  infantry  before 
it  came  under  musketry  fire.  In  the  assault,  General  War- 
ren  says,  General  Hagood’s  brigade  being  nearly  surrounded 
close  in  on  our  works,  every  one  thought  they  had  surren¬ 
dered,  and  ceased  firing,  but  when  our  troops  advanced  to 
bring  them  in  their  officers  commenced  firing.  In  the 
mixed  condition  of  his  men  and  the  enemy  s,  his  line  could 
not  fire,  and  many  of  the  enemy  escaped.  However  he  cap¬ 
tured  517  officers  and  men  and  six  flags,  the  larger  part  from 
Hagood’s  brigade. 

The  enemv’s  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  must  have  been  se- 

v 

vere,  as  General  Warren  savs  211  of  their  dead  were  buried 
by  his  troops.  General  Sanders  of  Mahone’s  division  was 
among  their  killed.  Warren’s  own  loss  was  301  killed, 


too  many  conditions  to  impose  upon  him  on  ground  of  the  character  he  was  operat¬ 
ing  in.  Informed  of  the  general  object  he  was  to  accomplish,  everything  else  as 
far  as  possible  should  have  been  left  to  his  judgment. 


278  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  64  AND  ’65. 


wounded,  and  missing.  Colonel  Dusliane,  commanding  the 
Maryland  brigade,  a  gallant  officer,  was  killed,  General  Cut¬ 
ler  wounded. 

General  Warren  says  the  heat  of  the  first  day  was  excessive, 
and  many  fell  out  of  the  ranks,  who  were  counted  among  the 
missing.  An  oppressive,  warm  rain  fell  all  the  time,  making 
the  side  roads  and  fields  almost  impassable  for  artillery. 

The  cavalry  under  General  Spear  were  active  in  watching 
the  left  flank  and  rear  ;  Steadman’s  brigade  took  part  in  the 
repulse  of  the  enemy  on  the  21st. 

No  further  attempts  upon  General  Warren’s  position  were 
made.  The  intrencliments  were  now  extended  by  the  Ninth 
Corps  from  the  Jerusalem  plank-road  to  unite  with  General 
Warren’s  on  the  Weldon  Railroad. 

The  extension  of  our  left  to  the  Weldon  Railroad  at  the 
Globe  tavern  would  not  prevent  the  enemy  from  using  that 
road  as  a  line  of  supply  up  to  a  point  within  a  day’s  hauling 
by  wagon  to  Petersburg.  By  destroying  the  road  as  far 
down  as  Rowanty  Creek,  about  thirteen  miles  beyond  War¬ 
ren’s  left,  they  would  be  obliged  to  haul  by  wagon  from 
Stony  Creek  Depot  to  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  and  thence 
by  the  Boydton  plank-road  to  Petersburg,  a  distance  of  thirty 
miles  at  least.  It  was  determined,  therefore,  to  destroy  the 
railroad  as  far  as  Rowanty  Creek,  and  on  the  22d,  General 
Hancock  with  his  Pirst  and  Second  Divisions  and  Gregg’s 
cavalry  was  charged  with  this  work, 1  and  set  about  it  at  once, 
Gregg  looking  out  for  the  enemy  on  the  roads  leading  to  the 
railroad  from  the  left  and  to  Hancock’s  rear.2  By  the  night 

1  His  Third  Division,  Mott’s,  held  the  intrenchments  at  and  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  Jerusalem  plank-road. 

2  General  Hancock  says  of  his  return  march  from  Deep  Bottom,  that  it  was  one 

of  the  most  fatiguing  and  difficult  performed  by  the  troops  during  the  campaign, 
owing  to  the  wretched  condition  of  the  roads.  The  men  arrived  in  camp  greatly 
exhausted  early  in  the  morning  of  the  21st.  After  a  very  brief  rest  they  were  or¬ 
dered  to  the  Strong  house,  and  then,  in  the  afternoon,  to  the  Gurley  house,  in  rear 
of  General  Warren’s  position.  * 


MOVEMENT  TO  THREATEN  RICHMOND. 


279 


of  the  24th  they  had  accomplished  the  work  as  far  as  Ma¬ 
lone’s  cross-road,  about  three  miles  south  of  Reams’s  Sta¬ 
tion,  and  had  still  about  five  miles  of  the  road  to  destroy. 
The  two  divisions  were  held  at  Reams’s  Station  during  the 
night. 

But  the  Weldon  Railroad  was  deemed  to  be  too  important 
as  a  line  of  supply  to  the  Confederate  forces  to  admit  of  this 
destruction  without  an  attempt  to  prevent  it,  and  General 
A.  P.  Hill 1  was  assigned  to  this  task,  having  with  him  the 
larger  part  of  his  own  corps,  together  with  Anderson’s  bri¬ 
gade  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  and  General  Hampton  with  his 
two  cavalry  divisions. 

About  dark  of  the  24th  signal  officers  reported  that  there 
were  large  bodies  of  the  enemy’s  infantry,  estimated  at  8,000  or 
10,000,  passing  south  from  their  intrenchments  by  the  Hali¬ 
fax  and  Vaughan  roads.  Both  General  Hancock  and  General 
Warren  were  advised  of  this,  and  that  these  troops  were  most 
probably  directed  against  General  Hancock.  In  the  morning 
of  the  25tli,  General  Hancock  ascertained  that  the  enemy’s 
cavalry  was  in  force  on  his  left,  supported  by  infantry. 

The  intrenchments  at  Re'ams’s  Station  were  slight,  and  had 
been  hastily  thrown  up  by  troops  sent  to  "Wilson’s  relief  in 
June.  They  ran  along  the  railroad  about  twelve  hundred 
yards,  having  a  return  about  eight  hundred  or  one  thousand 
yards  long  at  each  end,  the  returns  being  nearly  at  right 
angles  with  the  railroad.  This  direction  of  the  returns  sub¬ 
jected  the  troops  in  them  to  a  reverse  artillery  fire.  The 
Second  Division,  commanded  by  General  Gibbon,  occupied 
the  left  half  of  these  intrenchments ;  the  First  Division,  com¬ 
manded  by  General  Miles,  occupied  the  right  half. 

1  Hill’s  infantry  was  McGowan’s,  Lane’s,  and  Scales’s  brigades  of  Wilcox’s  divi¬ 
sion,  Anderson's  brigade  of  Field’s  division,  and  Cock's  and  McRae’s  brigades  of 
Heth’s  division,  and  two  brigades  of  Mahone’s  division.  General  Wilcox  was 
first  on  the  ground,  and  made  the  preliminary  attacks  with  his  own  brigades  and 
Anderson’s  brigade. 


280  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


About  two  p.m.  General  Wilcox  made  two  spirited  attacks 
on  Miles’s  front,  both  of  which  were  quickly  repulsed. 
About  this  time  General  Hancock  received  a  despatch  from 
General  Meade  informing  him  that  Mott  was  directed  (about 
half-past  one  o’clock)  to  send  him  all  his  available  force  (about 
1,800  men)  down  the  plank-road,  taking  a  battery  with  it  ; 
and  as  the  railroad  could  not  be  further  destroyed  at  pres¬ 
ent,  he  might  be  governed  by  his  own  judgment  as  to  with¬ 
drawing  his  command  to  his  former  position,  or  remaining 
where  he  was.  To  this  General  Hancock  rejdied  that,  al¬ 
though  there  was  no  necessity  for  his  remaining  there 
longer,  since  the  presence  of  the  enemy  prevented  further 
destruction  of  the  railroad,  and  although  it  was  more  impor¬ 
tant  that  he  should  join  Warren  than  remain  there,  yet  he 
was  then  too  closely  engaged  with  the  enemy  to  withdraw, 
but  that  he  would  do  so  at  night.  At  two,  or  half-past  two, 
General  Meade  ordered  General  Willcox’s  division  to  move 
down  the  plank-road  to  General  Hancock’s  support.  Gen¬ 
eral  Meade  notified  General  Hancock  of  this,  saying  all  he 
apprehended  was  that  the  enemy  might  be  able  to  interpose 
between  him  and  Warren,  and  some  more  of  Warren’s  forces 
were  held  ready  for  contingencies.  It  was  this  apprehen¬ 
sion,  no  doubt,  that  induced  him  to  send  General  Willcox 
by  the  plank-road  instead  of  by  the  railroad.  But  by  the 
plank-road  his  march  was  twelve  miles  long  (about  the  same 
length  as  that  of  Mott’s  troops),  whereas  had  he  gone  by  the 
railroad,  which  continued  open  until  five  o’clock,  he  would 
have  had  not  more  than  five  miles  to  march,  would  have  got 
to  Hancock  by  half-past  four  or  five,  and  managing  his 
movement  skilfully,  might  have  taken  a  paid  of  the  enemy’s 
force  in  flank  or  rear. 

Meanwhile  Hill  was  preparing  his  forces  for  attack,  -which 
he  began  at  five  o’clock  with  a  heavy  artillery-fire  that  did 
little  actual  damage  (that  is,  caused  few  casualties),  but  had 


MOVEMENT  TO  THREATEN  RICHMOND. 


281 


the  effect  of  shaking  a  portion  of  the  command  exposed  to 
its  reverse  lire.  The  shelling  continued  about  fifteen  min¬ 
utes,  when  General  Heth  and  General  Wilcox,  with  Cook’s 
and  Lane’s,  McRae’s  and  Scales’s  brigades,  Anderson's  and 
part  of  McGowan’s  brigades  supporting,  assaulted  a  part  of 
General  Miles’s  front,  and,  just  at  the  time  when  a  few  min¬ 
utes’  longer  resistance  would  have  repulsed  the  enemy  (who 
were  thrown  into  a  good  deal  of  disorder  by  the  severity  of 
the  lire  they  received,  and  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  their 
advance),  a  part  of  the  line,  composed  of  troops  recently 
raised,  gave  way  in  confusion.  A  small  reserve  brigade  of 
the  Second  Division  wTas  ordered  forward  to  fill  the  gap,  but 
could  neither  be  made  to  go  forward  nor  to  fire.  McKnight’s 
batteiy  was  turned  on  the  opening  with  good  effect,  but  the 
enemy,  running  along  under  cover  of  the  rifle-pits,  captured 
the  battery.  Murphy’s  brigade  of  the  Second  Division  on 
the  left  of  the  break  was  driven  back,  and  two  more  batteries 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  after  having  been  served 
with  marked  gallantry,  and  after  losing  a  large  proportion  of 
officers,  men,  and  horses.  General  Hancock  ordered  Gib¬ 
bon’s  division  to  retake  the  position  and  the  guns,  but  his 
troops  responded  feebly  to  the  order,  and  fell  back  on  re¬ 
ceiving  a  slight  fire  ;  being  now  exposed  to  attack  in  reverse 
and  on  the  flank  they  were  obliged  to  occupy  the  reverse 
side  of  their  breastworks.  The  moment  was  a  critical  one, 
and  General  Hancock  says,  woufd  have  ended  still  more 
disastrously  but  for  the  steadiness  of  a  part  of  the  First 
Division,  and  the  fine  conduct  of  its  commander,  General 
Miles,1  who  succeeded  in  rallying  a  small  force  of  the  Sixty- 
first  New  York,  and  forming  a  line  at  right  angles  with  the 
breastworks,  swept  off  the  enemy,  and  retook  McKnight’s 
guns  and  a  considerable  portion  of  his  own  line.  An  at- 

1  The  historian  must,  in  justice,  add, — and  the  bearing  of  General  Hancock  him¬ 
self. 


282  T13.E  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


tempt  v/as  made  to  get  some  of  Gibbon’s  troops  to  assist  in 
tbirs  operation,  but  their  commanders  reported  that  they 
could  not  be  got  to  advance.  Hampton  with  his  dismounted 
cavalry  now  made  an  attack  on  the  left,  driving  General  Gib¬ 
bon’s  division  from  its  breastworks,  the  division  offering 
very  little  resistance.  Pressing  on  with  loud  cheers,  Hamp¬ 
ton’s  cavalry  was  met  by  a  heavy  flank  fire  from  Gregg’s  dis¬ 
mounted  cavalry,  which  checked  their  advance.  Then  they 
turned  upon  Gregg,  who  was  forced  to  fall  back  and  form  on 
the  left  of  the  new  line  which  General  Gibbon  had  estab¬ 
lished  a  short  distance  in  rear  of  the  intrenclnnents. 

General  Miles’s  troops,  with  Werner’s  New  Jersey  artil¬ 
lery,  held  the  road  running  to  the  Jerusalem  plank-road  until 
dark,  checking  every  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  advance  be¬ 
yond  the  portion  of  the  intrencliments  they  had  captured. 
General  Miles  and  General  Gregg  offered  to  retake  their 
breastworks,  but  General  Gibbon  stated  that  his  division 
could  not  retake  theirs.  As  it  was  essential  either  to  with¬ 
draw  or  to  retake  the  lost  works  in  order  to  protect  the  only 
communication  open  to  the  rear,  and  as  no  reinforcements 
had  arrived  by  dark,  the  troops  were  then  ordered  to  with¬ 
draw.  Neither  General  Mott’s  detachment  nor  General 
Willcox’s  division  reached  the  field.  The  enemy  made  no 
attempt  to  follow  up  their  advantage,  but  returned  to  the 
Petersburg  intrencliments,  leaving  Hampton’s  cavalry  at  the 
Station. 

General  Hancock  says  that  if  his  troops  had  behaved  as 
well  as  they  had  done  before,  he  would  have  been  able  to 
defeat  the  enemy ;  or  had  a  force  been  sent  down  the  rail¬ 
road  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank,  or  had  a  small  reserve 
been  on  the  field  at  about  six  o’clock,  it  would  have  accom¬ 
plished  the  same  end.  He  attributed  the  bad  conduct  of 
some  of  his  troops  to  their  great  fatigue  and  to  their  heavy 
losses  during  the  campaign,  especially  in  officers.  Besides, 


MOVEMENT  TO  THREATEN  RICHMOND. 


283 


there  were  several  regiments  largely  made  up  of  recruits  and 
substitutes ;  one,  General  Hancock  mentions  particularly, 
being  entirely  new,  and  some  of  its  officers  unable  to  speak 
English. 

His  casualties  were  610  officers  and  enlisted  men  killed 
and  wounded,  the  proportion  of  officers  being  unusually 
large ;  his  missing,  1,762,  making  a  total  of  2,372.  Nine 
guns  were  lost. 

General  A.  P.  Hill  reported  his  loss  to  be  720,  chiefly,  if 
not  almost  entirely,  killed  and  wounded.  His  captures,  he 
stated,  were  12  stands  of  colors,  9  guns,  10  caissons,  2,150 
prisoners,  3,100  stands  of  small  arms. 

The  extent  of  the  injurious  effect  of  the  large  number  of 
raw  recruits  recently  received  had  not  been  anticipated,  or 
reinforcements  would  have  been  sent  to  General  Hancock 
early  in  the  morning.1 

The  work  of  intrenching  the  newly-added  front  and  rear 
went  on  vigorously  during  September. 


1  The  larger  part  of  the  troops  furnished  by  the  States  under  the  several  calls 
made  this  year,  and  until  the  close  of  the  war,  were  supplied  by  the  re-enlistment 
of  the  veteran  regiments  whose  terms  of  service  exph'ed.  But  there  were  many 
vacancies  in  those  regiments,  and  in  those  whose  terms  had  not  expired,  and 
those  vacancies  were  filled  and  new  regiments  formed  by  volunteer,  drafted,  and 
substitute  raw  recruits.  Owing  to  the  absence  on  account  of  wounds  and  sick¬ 
ness  of  large  numbers  of  those  who  had  entered  the  service  in  the  early  part  of 
the  war,  these  raw  recruits  in  some  cases  formed  a  large  majority  of  those  pres¬ 
ent  for  duty  in  old  regiments  of  high  reputation,  and  sometimes  completely 
changed  their  character  temporarily,  and  not  only  the  character  of  regiments, 
but  even  of  brigades  and  divisions.  The  large  bounties  paid  volunteers  and  sub¬ 
stitutes,  amounting,  in  some  places,  to  a  thousand  dollars  or  more,  had  a  very  in¬ 
jurious  effect  upon  the  army,  for  it  brought  to  its  ranks  many  men  who  were  ac¬ 
tuated  by  very  different  motives  from  those  that  had  influenced  the  men  who  had 
voluntarily  filled  the  ranks  before,  and  the  veterans  that  now  re-enlisted. 

All  recruits  were  sent  to  the  army  without  instruction  or  discipline.  A  good 
many  enlisted,  intending  to  escape  from  the  service,  and  deserted  to  the  enemy. 
Some  of  these  attempted  to  enter  our  lines  at  the  West, -in  the  guise  of  Confed¬ 
erate  deserters,  but  were  detected,  brought  back  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  tried 
and  executed. 


I 


CHAPTER  XI. 

MOVEMENT  AGAINST  RICHMOND  ON  THE  NORTH  BANK 
OF  THE  JAMES— CAPTURE  OF  FORT  HARRISON— CO¬ 
OPERATIVE  MOVEMENT  ON  THE  LEFT,  BY  WHICH 
THAT  FLANK  IS  EXTENDED  TO  PEEBLES’S  FARM- 
MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  OUR  RIGHT  ON  THE  NORTH 
BANK  OF  THE  JAMES— MOVEMENT  TO  TURN  LEE’S 
RIGHT  FLANK  AND  OCCUPY  THE  SOUTH  SIDE  RAIL¬ 
ROAD  —  CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  LEE’S 
LEFT  FLANK. 

The  two  brigades  of  Field’s  division,  Anderson’s  and  Brat¬ 
ton’s,  sent  to  Petersburg  in  the  latter  part  of  August,  still 
remained  there  in  the  latter  part  of  September,  and  the  only 
troops  in  the  Confederate  intrenchments  on  the  north  side  of 
the  James  besides  the  heavy  artillery,  the  two  brigades  of 
the  local  defence,  and  Garey’s  cavalry  brigade,  were  Field’s 
three  brigades,  commanded  by  Benning,  Law,  and  Gregg, 
and  Colonel  Fulton’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division. 

On  the  28tli  of  September  General  Ord,  commanding  the 
Eighteenth,  and  General  Bimey,  commanding  the  Tenth 
Corps,  were  directed  to  cross  the  James  in  the  night  and  ad¬ 
vance  upon  Richmond,  the  former  by  the  Varina  road,  near 
the  river,  the  latter  by  the  New  Market  and  Darby  roads, 
Kautz  with  his  cavalry  on  the  Darby  road.  General  Ord  was 
to  engage  the  enemy  in  his  works  at  and  near  the  river  at 
Chapin’s  Bluff,  and  prevent  reinforcements  being  sent  from 
the  south  side  against  Birnev’s  column.  He  was  to  cross  the 
James  by  a  ponton  bridge  to  be  established  during  the  early 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


285 


part  of  the  niglit  at  Aiken’s,  two  miles  below  Dutch  Gap, 
where  the  Yarina  road  abutted  on  the  river.  General  Birney 
was  to  cross  at  Deep  Bottom  by  the  upper  ponton  bridge  ; 
General  Kautz  was  to  follow  him. 

General  Ord  selected  for  the  purpose  2,000  men  from  each 
of  his  First  and  Second  divisions,  one  commanded  by  Briga¬ 
dier-General  Stannard,  the  other  by  Brigadier-General  Heck¬ 
man.  His  Third  Division  (colored),  commanded  by  Briga¬ 
dier-General  Paine,  reported  to  Major-General  Birney,  whose 
column,  composed  of  his  First  and  Second  divisions,  under 
Generals  Terry  and  Ames  and, General  William  Birney ’s  bri¬ 
gade  of  colored  troops,  was,  with  Paine’s  addition,  about 
10,000  strong.  General  Ord  from  the  Bermuda  front,  and 
General  Birney  from  the  Petersburg  front,  each  left  sufficient 
force  in  the  intrencliments  to  maintain  them. 

Both  columns  were  over  the  river  and  moving  on  the 
routes  designated  by  daylight,  driving  before  them  the 
enemy’s  skirmishers  and  advance  troops.  Every  precaution 
had  been  taken  to  keep  the  knowledge  of  the  movement  from 
the  enemy  and  make  the  attack  a  surprise. 

By  half-past  seven  General  Ord  had  reached  the  open 
ground  around  Fort  Harrison  on  Chapin’s  farm,  the  strong¬ 
est  work  on  the  main  line  of  intrencliments,  about  a  mile 
and  a  quarter  from  the  works  on  the  river  at  Chapin’s  Bluff, 
with  which  it  was  connected  by  more  than  one  line  of  in- 
trencliments.  While  one  line  of  advanced  intrencliments 
held  by  the  Confederate  pickets  or  skirmishers  ran  from 
Fort  Harrison  in  a  northeast  direction,  the  main  line,  soon 
after  leaving  the  fort  ran  north  about  tliree-fourtlis  of  a  mile 
to  Fort  Gilmer,  which  was  also  connected  with  the  works  on 
the  river  at  Chapin’s  Bluff  by  two  intrenched  lines.  The 
main  advanced  line  of  Richmond  intrencliments  continued 
north  from  Fort  Gilmer  about  tliree-fourths  of  a  mile,  then 
ran  northeast  to  the  Chickahominy  at  New  Bridge.  The  pos- 


286  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


session  of  Fort  Harrison  did  not  give  possession  of  the  de¬ 
fences  at  Chapin’s  Bluff,  but  the  possession  of  Fort  Gilmer 
would  give  it. 

Ord  having  arrived  upon  the  ground,  the  artillery  of  the  fort 
and  adjacent  works  opened  upon  him.  The  disposition  for 
attack  was  quickly  made  by  him.  Stannard’s  division,  Gen¬ 
eral  Burnham’s  brigade  leading,  was  to  push  forward  on  the 
left  of  the  Yarina  road,  in  column  of  divisions,  over  the  open 
ground  in  front  of  the  works,  preceded  by  skirmishers.  The 
distance  it  had  to  traverse  was  about  fourteen  hundred  yards. 
General  Heckman  was  to  move  his  division,  as  soon  as  it 
came  up,  along  the  edge  of  the  wood  that  skirted  the  Yarina 
road  on  the  right,  until  opposite  Fort  Harrison,  and  then  to 
attack  it  on  the  front  toward  the  wood — the  east  front.  This 
would  envelop  the  work  on  the  south  and  east.  Reinforce¬ 
ments  were  now  seen  entering  Fort  Harrison  from  the 
enemy’s  left.  Stannard’s  division  advanced  in  quick  time, 
and  when  they  reached  the  foot  of  the  hill  which  the  work 
crowned,  Burnham’s  brigade  ran  up  it  under  a  severe  fire  of 
artillery  and  musketry,  and  after  a  very  sharp  encounter  cap¬ 
tured  the  work  with  sixteen  guns  and  a  number  of  prisoners, 
including  the  Lieutenant-Colonel  in  command  of  it.  Gen¬ 
eral  Burnham  was  killed  in  the  assault.  Colonel  Stevens, 
the  officer  who  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  brigade, 
was  severely  wounded,  and  his  successor  also.  The  division 
lost  594  killed  and  wounded  during  the  day. 

The  enemy  was  next  driven  from  the  intrenchments  on  the 
right  and  left  of  the  Fort,  including  two  lunettes  six  hundred 
yards  apart,  which  were  captured  with  their  artillery,  six  guns. 
General  Ord  now  endeavored  to  sweep  down  the  captured 
intrenchments  to  the  remaining  redan,  which  was  on  the  river 
bank,  so  as  to  secure  the  enemy’s  ponton  bridge,  but  this 
redan  was  covered  by  the  Confederate  gunboats,  and  by  a 
battery  in  the  rear,  and  the  attempt  was  unsuccessful.  In 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


287 


making  it  General  Ord  was  so  severely  wounded  in  the  leg 
as  to  completely  disable  him,  and  the  command  devolved 
upon  General  Heckman.  He,  General  Ord  says,  in  advancing 
went  too  far  into  the  woods  ;  his  brigades  became  scattered, 
and  were  not  available  at  the  right  time.  While  the  fighting 
for  the  possession  of  the  intrenchments  adjoining  Fort  Har¬ 
rison  was  going  on,  General  Ord  says  he  saw  through  the 
smoke  what  he  thought  was  General  Heckman’s  division  en¬ 
tering  Fort  Gilmer,  but  they  soon  proved  to  be  reinforce¬ 
ments  of  the  enemy,  and  that  work  and  the  adjacent  fines 
were  now  defended  by  Gregg’s  and  Benning’s  brigades  of 
Field’s  division,  and  Fulton’s  brigade  of  Johnson’s  division. 
Soon  after  he  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  corps, 
General  Heckman  attacked  Fort  Gilmer  with  his  division  but 
was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  In  the  afternoon  General 
Field  arrived  at  the  fort  with  Law’s  brigade  to  aid  in  its  de¬ 
fence. 

In  the  meantime  Major-General  Birney,  driving  the  ad¬ 
vance  troops  of  the  enemy  before  him,  advanced  upon  the 
New  Market  road,  and  with  sharp  encounters  captured  the 
skirmish  or  picket  fine  of  intrenchments  of  the  enemy, 
which  has  been  mentioned  as  running  from  Fort  Harrison 
in  a  northeast  direction,  and  crossing  the  New  Market  and 
Darby  roads.  The  main  fine  was  from  one-half  to  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  in  rear  of  this.  Communication  was  es¬ 
tablished  between  the  two  columns,  the  Varina  and  New 
Market  roads  being  about  a  mile  apart  here. 

General  Grant,  who  had  arrived  at  Fort  Harrison,  now  in¬ 
formed  Major-General  Birney  of  Ord’s  success,  and  that  the 
Eighteenth  Corps  was  ready  to  advance  in  conjunction  with 
his  (Birney’s)  and  directed  him  to  push  forward.  Kautz 
had  advanced  along  the  Darby  road,  abreast  of  Birney,  and 
Terry’s  division  was  sent  to  his  support. 

About  three  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  Major-General  Bir- 


288  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


ney  with  Ames’s  division,  and  Brigadier-General  Birney’s 
colored  brigade,  made  a  determined,  but  unsuccessful  attack 
upon  Fort  Gilmer,  the  adjacent  works,  and  the  main  line  of 
intrenchments  as  far  as  the  New  Market  road.  The  troops 
advanced  half  a  mile  or  more  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s 
artillery,  the  greater  part  of  Ames’s  division  crossing  three 
ravines  filled  with  fallen  trees,  but  upon  emerging  from  the 
third  ravine,  which  was  close  upon  the  works,  the  fire  of 
canister  and  musketry  broke  the  line  and  forced  it  to  fall 
back,  part  of  it  in  some  confusion.  The  leading  troops  of 
Birney’s  colored  brigade  went  forward  to  the  attack  on  Fort 
Gilmer  with  great  gallantry,  jumped  into  the  ditch  of  the 
fort,  and  endeavored  to  climb  up  on  each  other’s  shoulders 
to  the  parapet,  but  nearly  all  that  reached  the  ditch  were 
killed. 

The  assaults  of  to-day  were  made  with  great  gallantry. 

As  the  left  and  rear  of  our  forces  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  James  were  open  to  the  enemy,  Birney’s  command  was 
drawn  into  the  New  Market  road,  and  slight  intrenchments 
(afterward  strengthened)  were  extended  around  them,  and  a 
line  was  run  from  Fort  Harrison  to  the  river,  just  above 
Dutch  Gap.  General  Weitzel  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  Eighteenth  Corps. 

General  Ewell  was  in  command  of  the  Confederate  troops 
on  the  north  side,  where  he  was  joined  by  General  Lee 
during  the  day.  Bratton’s  and  Anderson’s  brigades  were 
brought  from  the  Confederate  extreme  right  by  railroad, 
getting  into  position  on  the  north  side  in  the  evening.  Col¬ 
onel  Montague,  with  four  regiments  of  Pickett’s  troops  was 
also  brought  to  the  north  side,  and  during  the  night  of  the 
29th,  Hoke,  with  Kirkland’s,  Clingman’s,  and  Colquitt’s 
brigades,  and  Scales’s  brigade  of  Wilcox’s  division  were 
brought  over.  Ten  brigades  in  all  were  concentrated  at  and 
near  Fort  Gilmer,  to  assault  Fort  Harrison  and  its  dependent 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


289 


works  on  tlie  following  day.  During  the  night  and  the  next 
morning  large  parties  were  at  work  to  make  Fort  Harrison 
an  enclosed  work. 

At  two  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  30th  General  An¬ 
derson,  commanding  Longstreet’s  corps,  assaulted  with  Law, 
Anderson,  Bratton,  Clingman,  and  Colquitt.  General  Stan- 
nard,  who  held  the  fort,  says  of  the  attack,  that  twelve  guns 
opened  on  his  centre  and  left,  the  enemy’s  infantry  advanc¬ 
ing  on  his  right;  that  he  reserved  his  musketry  fire  until 
their  lines  emerged  from  the  thick  underbrush  in  front,  and 
that  he  repulsed  them  with  musketry  alone.  Quickly  re¬ 
forming,  they  attacked  a  second,  and  a  third  time,  but  were 
repulsed  each  time,  and  with  heavy  loss,  leaving  a  large 
number  of  killed  and  wounded  on  the  ground. 

I  can  find  no  report  from  General  Heckman  or  from  Gen¬ 
eral  Weitzel,  who  now  commanded  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  of 
the  part  taken  by  General  Heckman’s  division  in  repulsing 
this  assault.  It  undoubtedly  took  part  in  it,  as  did  Birney’s 
colored  brigade,  the  loss  of  which  in  the  engagements  of  the 
29th  and  30th  amounted  to  434.  General  Stannard  lost  his 
arm  in  the  second  assault.  He  had  four  staff  officers  wounded 
in  the  two  days,  and  mentions  many  of  the  officers  of  his 
command  who  were  conspicuous  for  their  gallantry. 

Tne  losses  of  the  enemy  in  this  assault  must  have  been 
severe.  General  Bratton  says  he  had  377  killed  and 
wounded  out  of  his  brigade  of  1,165  enlisted  men  and  129 
officers.  The  Tabular  Statement  of  the  ‘  ‘  Medical  and 
Surgical  History  of  the  War  ”  puts  the  Confederate  loss  at 
2,000. 

According  to  the  Tabular  Statement  prepared  in  the  Adju¬ 
tant-General’s  Office,  which  I  have  heretofore  referred  to,  our 
casualties  in  the  two  days  were  394  killed,  1,554  wounded, 
and  324  missing — total,  2,272. 

In  co-operation  with  the  movement  against  the  Bichmond 
XII.— 13 


290  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


defences  on  the  north  side  of  the  James,  just  described, 
General  Meade,  under  instructions  from  General  Grant, 
made  such  semi-concealed  changes  of  position  of  part  of 
his  troops  on  the  28th  as  to  give  the  enemy  the  impres¬ 
sion,  when  they  should  discover  the  absence  of  much  of 
the  Tenth  and  Eighteenth  Corps,  on  the  morning  of  the 
29tli,  that  we  were  concentrating  on  our  left,  and,  in  that 
way,  would  lead  General  Lee  to  delay  reinforcing  the  real 
point  of  attack  north  of  the  James.  In  addition,  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  got  under  arms  at  four  o’clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  29th,  General  Warren  and  General  Parke, 
each  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps  ready  to  move.  All  the 
corps  commanders  made  dispositions  to  withdraw  from  the 
intrencliments,  leaving  garrisons  in  the  redoubts  and  en¬ 
closed  batteries,  and  arranged  for  the  further  contingency 
of  withdrawing  entirely  from  the  intrencliments.1  These 
dispositions  undoubtedly  had  the  effect  of  delaying  the 
transfer  of  Confederate  troops  to  meet  the  attack  of  Ord  and 
Birney.  But  there  was  another  object  that  General  Grant 
had  in  view,  which  was,  should  the  enemy  draw  off  such  a 
force  from  the  defences  of  Petersburg  as,  in  General  Meade’s 
opinion,  would  justify  his  moving  against  the  South  Side 
Railroad  or  Petersburg,  he  was  to  do  so.  If  he  got  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  road  he  was  to  maintain  it  at  all  hazards,  reinforc¬ 
ing  from  the  troops  left  in  the  intrencliments. 

It  was  not  deemed  advisable  by  General  Grant  that  Gen¬ 
eral  Meade  should  move  on  the  29tli,  the  reduction  of  the 


-  1  Gregg  was  sent  to  the  crossing  of  Hatcher's  Run,  by  the  Vaughn  road,  and 
tip  that  road  and  the  Squirrel  Level  road  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Peebles  and  Peg- 
ram  farms.  At  the  former  point  the  enemy  had  a  redoubt  at  the  termination  of 
the  intrenchments  they  had  constructed  and  were  still  going  on  with.  This  in- 
trenchment  was  nearly  parallel  with  the  Weldon  Railroad,  and  joined  the  Peters¬ 
burg  intrenchments.  Peebles’s  farm  was  two  miles  west  of  our  intrenchments  on 
pie  Weldon  Railroad.  The  enemy  was  found  in  position  at  all  these  points,  and 
General  Gregg  was  attacked  by  General  Hampton  upon  his  return  march. 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


291 


enemy’s  force  around  Petersburg  not  seeming  to  justify  it 
that  day,  nor  until  eight  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  30th. 
The  object  then  in  view  was  to  secure  the  junction  of  two 
roads  coming  from  the  southwest,  the  Squirrel  Level,  and 
the  Poplar  Spring  Church  roads.  This  junction  was  at  the 
Peebles  farm,  where  a  redoubt  terminated,  the  Confederate 
intrenchment  covering  the  roads.  From  that  point  an  ad¬ 
vance  was  to  be  made  in  a  northwest  direction  toward  the 
Boydton  plank-road  and  South  Side  Railroad,  if  the  condi¬ 
tions  would  justify  it. 

General  Warren,  with  Griffin’s  and  Ayres’s  divisions,  was 
directed  against  the  junction  of  the  roads ;  General  Parke, 
with  Willcox’s  and  Potter’s  divisions,  was  to  follow  him,  form 
on  his  left,  and  both  were  then  to  advance  toward  the  Boyd¬ 
ton  road.  General  Gregg  was  to  move  on  the  Vaughan  and 
other  roads  on  our  left. 

Griffin’s  troops  advanced  against  the  Peebles  intrench- 
men  ts,  passing  over  six  hundred  yards  of  open  ground,  and 
carried  them,  the  infantry  parapets  being  held  by  infantry 
and  Dealing’s  dismounted  cavalry,  and  flanked  by  artillery 
in  the  redoubt.  Colonel  Welch,  commanding  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan,  wras  killed  on  the  parapet  of  the  work.  The  loss 
otherwise  was  small.  A  gun  and  some  prisoners  were  taken. 

General  Ayres  carried  the  redoubt  on  the  right  of  Griffin. 
These  two  captures  gave  us  the  whole  of  the  line  of  intrencli- 
ment.  General  Parke  advanced  Potter’s  division  to  support 
Griffin  on  his  left,  and  as  soon  as  Willcox  got  up,  moved  for¬ 
ward  with  his  two  divisions  through  the  Pegram  farm  in  a 
northwest  direction  toward  the  Boydton  road,  Willcox  on 
Potter’s  left  in  support,  as  General  Parke  expected  Griffin’s 
division  to  support  liis  right. 

The  force  holding  the  Petersburg  intrenchments  was  Hill’s 
corps  and  Johnson’s  division,  with  Hampton’s  two  cavalry 
divisions  and  Hearing’s  brigade,  all  under  the  command  of 


292  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


General  Hill,  General  Beauregard  having  been  sent  south  to 
take  charge  of  affairs  in  that  direction.  The  main  line  of 
Petersburg  intrenchments  had  been  extended  in  a  southwest 
direction  to,  or  nearly  to,  Hatcher’s  Run,  covering  the  Boyd- 
ton  plank  road  and  the  South  Side  Railroad. 

To  meet  the  advance  of  Meade,  General  Hill  threw  out 
Heth’s  and  Wilcox’s  divisions  as  far  as  the  Jones  house,  on 
the  road  leading  to  the  Pegram  farm.  Potter,  passing 
through  a  wood,  found  himself  within  eight  hundred  yards 
of  the  enemy’s  main  line  of  intrenchments,  and  quite  near 
Heth’s  and  Wilcox’s  troops,  which  he  advanced  to  attack. 
He  was  met  by  an  advance  on  their  part,  attacked  vigor¬ 
ously,  his  right  outflanked,  and  his  division  driven  back  in 
some  confusion,  as  well  as  one  of  Willcox’s  brigades.  But  a 
new  line  was  at  once  established  by  General  Parke  with 
Willcox’s  troops,  which,  with  Griffin’s  line  on  the  right,  put 
a  stop  to  the  enemy’s  advance.  General  Parke  lost  485 
killed  and  wounded,  and  heavily  in  prisoners.  Hampton, 
on  the  Confederate  right,  shared  in  the  captures. 

Mott’s  division  arrived  on  Parke’s  left  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  1st  of  October,  and  on  the  next  day  General  Parke  ad¬ 
vanced,  with  artillery  and  musketry  firing,  and  established  a 
line  of  intrenchments  about  a  mile  from  the  enemy’s.  This 
was  connected  with  the  Weldon  Railroad  works,  and  was 
extended  to  the  rear  on  the  left,  having  its  proper  number 
of  redoubts  and  batteries. 

The  casualties  in  this  operation  were,  according  to  the 
Table  of  the  Adjutant-General’s  Office,  661  killed  and 
wounded,  1,348  missing  ;  total,  2,009. 1 


1  General  Parke,  in  his  report  of  this  affair,  remarks:  “  The  large  amount  of 
raw  material  in  the  ranks  has  diminished  greatly  the  efficiency  of  the  corps.  All 
the  new  material,  good  as  well  as  bad,  requires  instruction  and  disciplining.  The 
drafted  and  substitute  recruits  are  entirely  different  from  those  formerly  ob¬ 
tained. 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


293 


The  Table  of  the  Medical  Department  is  evidently  errone¬ 
ous.  The  Confederate  loss  I  have  never  seen  stated  except 
in  that  Table,  which  puts  it  down  at  800  wounded.  Appar¬ 
ently  this  is  as  erroneous  as  the  numbers  it  gives  for  our 
loss. 

Kautz,  with  1,700  men  and  two  batteries,  looking  out  from 
the  right  of  the  force  on  the  north  side  of  the  James,  held 
the  Darby  road  at  the  old  Confederate  line  of  intrenchments, 
which  had  been  captured  on  the  29th  of  September.  There 
was  a  swamp  on  his  right,  which  ran  around  his  rear,  cross¬ 
ing  the  Darby  road.  To  drive  him  from  this  threatening 
position,  Field  and  Hoke,  with  the  larger  part  of  their  divi¬ 
sions,  were  brought  over  to  the  Darby  road  on  the  night  of 
the  6th  of  October,  and  at  sunrise  of  the  7th  Field  ad¬ 
vanced  upon  him,  with  Anderson’s  and  Bratton’s  brigades, 
while  Gary’s  cavalry,  supported  by.  Lane,  moved  by  the 
Charles  City  road  around  his  right.  He  could  not  stand  up 
against  the  attack  of  the  two  infantry  brigades  in  his  front, 
and  in  falling  back  on  the  narrow  road,  through  the  swamp 
in  his  rear,  found  Gary’s  cavalry,  or  part  of  it,  there,  and 
thus  lost  eight  of  his  guns.  Kautz  succeeded  in  crossing 
over  to  the  New  Market  road  and  getting  under  cover  of  the 
Tenth  Corps,  which  was  moving  out  to  his  assistance,  but 
losing,  besides  the  guns,  72  killed  and  wounded,  and  202 
missing. 

Field,  following  Kautz  passed  over  to  the  New  Market 
road,  through  the  dense  swamps  of  one  of  the  chief  affluents 
of  the  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  attacked  the  right  of  the 
Tenth  Corps,  which  had  moved  out  to  Kautz’s  assistance, 
but  was  repulsed,  and  fell  back  to  his  intrenchments.  In 
this  attack,  General  Gregg,  commanding  the  Texan  brigade, 
a  gallant  commander  of  a  gallant  brigade,  was  killed,  and 
General  Bratton  was  wounded. 

On  the  13th  of  October,  General  Butler  made  a  re- 


294  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


connoissance  in  force  of  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  on  the 
Darby  road,  and  found  them  to  be  of  a  formidable  character, 
with  slashing  in  front  of  the  greater  part.  Colonel  Pond’s 
brigade  of  Ames’s  division,  Tenth  Corps,  assaulted  them  at  a 
point  where  there  was  no  slashing,  but  was  repulsed. 

On  the  24th  of  October  General  Grant  wrote  General 
Meade : 

“  Make  your  preparations  to  march  out  at  an  early  hour  on  the  27th  to 
gain  possession  of  the  South  Side  Railroad,  and  to  hold  it,  and  fortify 
back  to  your  present  left.  In  commencing  your  advance,  move  in  three 
columns,  exactly  as  proposed  by  yourself  in  our  conversation  of  last 
evening,  and  with  the  same  force  you  proposed  to  take.  Parke,  who 
starts  out  nearest  to  the  enemy,  should  be  instructed  that,  if  he  finds  the 
enemy  intrenched,  and  their  works  well  manned,  he  is  not  to  attack, 
but  confront  him  and  be  prepared  to  advance  promptly  when  he  finds 
that  by  the  movement  of  the  other  two  columns  to  the  right  and  rear 
of  them  they  begin  to  give  way,”  etc. 

According  to  the  information  we  had,  the  Petersburg  in¬ 
trenchments  had  been  extended  to  Hatcher’s  Run  at  a  point 
two  miles  above  the  Vaughan  road  crossing  of  that  stream 
and  about  a  mile  above  Armstrong’s  mill,  but  were  in  a  very 
incomplete  condition.  They  did  not  cross  or  extend  up  the 
run.  At  Burgess’s  mill,  where  the  Boydton  plank-road 
crossed  Hatcher’s  Run,  there  were  emplacements  for  artillery 
and  some  infantry  parapets,  but  no  line  of  intrenchments, 
nor  were  there  any  further  up  the  run. 

The  Confederate  Petersburg  lines  from  the  Appomattox  to 
Battery  31  (west  of  the  Jerusalem  plank-road)  were  held  by 
Johnson’s  division.  General  Hill  held  the  remainder  of  the 
line,  Heth  on  the  right,  Wilcox  on  the  left,  Malione  in 
reserve.  Hampton’s  two  divisions  of  cavalry  (Lee’s  and 
Butler’s)  with  Dealing’s  brigade  were  on  the  right  flank. 

The  general  plan  of  the  contemplated  movement  was  to 
leave  sufficient  force  in  the  redoubts  to  hold  them,  and  with 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE'S  FLANKS. 


295 


from  30,000  to  35,000  effective  force  of  infantry,  a  due  pro¬ 
portion  of  artillery,  and  Gregg’s  division  of  cavalry,  about 
3,000  strong,  to  move  to  our  left.  Hancock,  with  Gregg  on 
liis  left,  to  cross  Hatcher’s  Run  by  the  Vaughan  road,  move 
to  the  Boydton  plank-road  past  Dabney’s  mill,  thence  by  the 
White  Oak  road  to  its  intersection  with  the  Claiborne  road, 
recross  Hatcher’s  Run,  near  there  (two  miles  above  Bur¬ 
gess’s  mill),  and  then  march  to  the  South  Side  Railroad, 
striking  it  at  a  point  about  three  miles  east  of  Sutherland 
Station.  General  Parke,  with  the  Ninth  Corps,  was  first  to 
endeavor  to  surprise  the  incomplete  intrenchments  near 
Hatcher’s  Run  at  daylight  (it  was  thought  they  were  thinly 
held),  but  failing  in  that,  to  remain  confronting  them  while 
the  Second  and  Fifth  Corps  moved  to  turn  their  right. 

General  Warren,  with  the  Fifth  Corps,  was  to  move  to  the 
vicinity  of  Armstrong’s  mill,  support  General  Parke,  and  if 
his  attack  was  successful,  to  follow  it  up,  moving  on  the  left 
of  the  Ninth  Corps.  If  General  Parke  did  not  break  the 
enemy’s  line,  General  Warren  was  to  cross  Hatcher’s  Run, 
and  endeavor  to  turn  the  enemy’s  right  by  recrossing  the  run 
above  the  Boydton  plank-road  bridge  (Burgess’s  mill  bridge), 
keeping  on  the  right  of  Hancock,  and,  being  over  the 
stream,  to  open  the  Burgess’s  mill  bridge.1 

On  the  25th  General  Hancock  withdrew  Mott’s  and  Gib¬ 
bon’s  divisions  from  the  intrenchments  and  massed  them 
in  a  concealed  position  in  rear  of  the  lines  (General  Egan 
commanding  Gibbon’s  division  in  the  absence  of  that 
officer).  Miles’s  division  held  the  Petersburg  line  from  the 
Appomattox  River  to  Battery  24,  half  way  between  the 
Jerusalem  plank-road  and  the  Weldon  Railroad.  General 


1  The  troops  were  to  take  four  days’  rations.  The  supply  and  quartermaster’s 
trains  were  to  be  sent  to  City  Point.  Pack  animals  were  to  be  used  instead  of 
light  wagons.  The  ammunition  and  other  wagons  that  were  to  be  taken  with 
the  troops  were  not  to  accompany  them  on  the  morning  of  the  27th. 


296  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Hancock  took  witli  him  an  effective  infantry  force  of  about 

10,000. 

On  the  26tli  Mott  and  Egan  were  moved  along  the  rear 
line  of  intrenchments  to  the  vicinity  of  the  "Weldon  Railroad. 
General  Parke  assigned  1,500  men  to  hold  his  intrench¬ 
ments  ;  General  Warren  2,500  under  the  command  of 
General  Baxter,  to  hold  his.  Each  had  about  11,000  effec¬ 
tive  infantry.1 

The  columns  were  to  move  at  half-past  three  o’clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  27th.  It  was  a  dark,  rainy  morning,  and  the 
movement  in  the  wooded  ground  was  necessarily  delayed, 
so  that  the  enemy  were  not  taken  by  surprise.  General 
Parke  and  General  Warren,  driving  in  their  pickets,  found 
their  intrenchments  to  consist  of  breastworks,  with  abatis 
and  slashing,  and  held  with  such  force  as  not  to  justify  an 
attempt  to  carry  them.  Griffin  was  in  front  of  the  extreme 
right  of  the  enemy’s  intrenchments,  his  skirmishers  extend¬ 
ing  to  Hatcher’s  Bun.  This  was  about  nine  o’clock. 

Being  on  the  ground  and  satisfied  that  an  assault  here 
should  not  be  made,  and  having  learnt  by  a  despatch  from 
General  Hancock  that  he  had  crossed  Hatcher’s  Bun,  and 
consequently  that  the  Dabney  mill  road  was  clear  for  Gen¬ 
eral  Warren’s  troops  to  follow,  and  considering  it  important 
that  a  portion,  at  least,  of  his  command  should  cross,  and 
communicate  with  Hancock  as  soon  as  possible,  I  directed 
him  at  nine  o’clock  to  cross  some  of  them  at  once  at  Arm¬ 
strong’s  mill,  and  communicate  with  General  Hancock.  I 
then  rode  to  meet  General  Meade  and  General  Grant,  who 
were  coming  out,  and  inform  them  of  the  condition  of  affairs, 
and  of  the  directions  I  had  given  General  Warren. 

After  some  consultation  when  General  Grant  and  General 
Meade  got  upon  the  ground,  General  Warren  was  directed 

1  General  Warren  says  that  -3,913  of  his  men  had  never  fired  a  musket,  and  that 
1,649  of  them  were  ignorant  of  the  manual. 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


297 


to  send  a  division  across  Hatcher’s  Kun,  place  its  right  flank 
on  the  stream,  move  up  it  supporting  Hancock  (the  Dabney 
mill  road  was  but  a  mile  distant  from  the  run),  and  upon 
arriving  opposite  the  right  of  the  enemy’s  intrenchments, 
which  Griffin  was  fronting,  to  attack  it  in  flank,  and  endeavor 
to  drive  the  enemy  from  the  line,  and  open  the  way  for  the 
rest  of  the  Fifth  Corps  and  for  the  Ninth  Corps.  Crawford’s 
division  was  assigned  to  this  duty  as  it  was  nearest  at  hand. 
Griffin,  with  Ayres  supporting,  was  left  on  the  north  side  of 
the  run,  Ayres  sending  his  Maryland  brigade  to  join  Craw¬ 
ford.  General  Parke’s  corps  set  about  intrenching  in  their 
front  and  back  to  our  works. 

It  was  a  quarter  of  twelve  o’clock  when  the  head  of  Craw¬ 
ford’s  division  crossed  the  run,  General  Warren  accom¬ 
panying  it.  His  line  was  formed  with  the  right  of  Bragg’s 
brigade  on  the  run,  Hoffman’s  brigade  covering  the  left, 
and  the  Maryland  brigade  in  reserve.  At  half-past  twelve 
Crawford  began  to  advance,  but  the  dense  low  growth  of 
wood,  and  the  crookedness  of  the  stream  caused  serious 
delay.  A  large  tributary  was  mistaken  for  the  main  stream 
and  caused  still  further  embarrassment,  the  trees  in  and 
along  it  having  been  slashed  by  the  enemy,  making  it  very 
difficult  to  cross.  As  a  guide  for  the  movement  General 
Griffin  was  ordered  at  one  o’clock  to  set  his  skirmish  line  at 
’work,  and  be  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  effect  Craw¬ 
ford’s  oj)erations  might  have.  After  getting  over  the  tribu¬ 
tary  stream,  General  Crawford  began  skirmishing.  At  four 
o’clock  he  was  at  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy’s  works  that 
Griffin  was  fronting,  and  the  firing  became  sharp.  It  had 
taken  all  that  time  to  move  a  mile  and  a  half  up  the  stream. 
The  crossing  of  the  run  was  naturally  difficult ;  the  enemy 
had  dammed  it,  and  had  slashed  timber  in  it  and  on  its 
banks,  and  were  very  active  in  opposing  Crawford’s  prog¬ 
ress.  It  was  difficult  to  communicate  with  him.  The  forest 
13* 


298  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’G4  AND  ’65. 


was  dense  and  of  great  extent,  and  the  troops  were  get¬ 
ting  separated  and  lost,  and  to  enable  him  to  get  his  divi¬ 
sion  in  order  General  Warren  directed  General  Crawford  to 
halt  it  and  reform,  but,  at  the  same  time,  to  press  forward 
with  his  skirmishers.  Between  General  Crawford  and  the 
open  ground  of  the  Boydton  plank-road  there  was  a  thicket 
forest  of  more  than  a  mile,  and  there  was  no  road  or  path 
leading  to  it  known  to  any  one,  or  that  had  been  come 
across.  The  Dabney’s  mill  road  was  a  mile  distant  on  Craw¬ 
ford’s  left. 

The  head  of  General  Hancock’s  infantry  column  was  at 
the  Vaughan  road  crossing  of  Hatcher’s  Run  by  daylight. 
The  ford  had  been  obstructed  by  fallen  trees.  Smyth’s 
brigade  of  Egan’s  division  crossed  the  stream  waist-deep, 
and  carried  the  rifle-pits  on  the  opposite  bank  in  a  gallant 
manner.  Egan,  followed  by  Mott,  moved  past  Dabney’s 
mill  (the  road  being  only  a  narrow  track  used  for  carting 
lumber),  and  entered  the  Boydton  road  about  a  mile  south  of 
Burgess’s  mill.  Gregg,  in  the  meantime,  crossed  Hatcher’s 
Run  below  the  infantry,  moved  along  the  Vaughan,  and  then 
the  Quaker  road,  encountering  part  of  Hampton’s  troops,  and 
united  with  the  infantry  on  the  Boydton  road  soon  after 
they  entered  it. 

When  Hancock  emerged  from  the  thicket  forest  into  the 
open  ground  of  the  plank-road  he  was  met' by  the  enemy’s 
artillery  fire  from  Burgess’s  tavern  and  from  the  White  Oak 
road  on  his  left.  But  Beck’s  artillery  soon  silenced  that  of 
the  enemy  at  the  tavern.  Egan  was  sent  along  the  Boydton 
road  toward  the  Burgess’s  mill  bridge  to  drive  the  enemy 
across  the  run,  and  Mott’s  division  was  set  in  motion  for  the 
White  Oak  road,  Egan  to  follow  him  as  soon  as  he  was  re¬ 
lieved  by  the  cavalry.  At  this  time,  about  one  o’clock,  Gen¬ 
eral  Hancock  received  instructions  from  General  Meade  to 
halt  at  the  plank -road,  and  in  compliance  with  this  instruc- 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


299 


tion  General  Mott  formed  De  Trobriand’s  brigade  looking 
toward  tlie  Claiborne  road  bridge,  while  General  Egan  with 
Smyth’s  brigade  drove  the  enemy’s  troops  opposing  them 
here  (some  of  Hampton’s  dismounted  cavalry)  over  the  run. 
A  despatch  to  General  Hancock  now  notified  him  that  Craw¬ 
ford’s  division  was  feeling  its  way  up  along  the  south  bank 
of  the  run,  and  cautioned  him  against  the  vacant  space  be¬ 
tween  his  right  and  the  Fifth  Corps  which  he  was  requested 
to  assist  in  closing  by  extending  his  right.  General  Meade 
and  General  Grant  now  came  upon  the  ground. 

General  Egan,  by  Hancock’s  order,  deployed  his  division 
across  the  plank-road  at  the  intersection  of  the  White  Oak 
road,  having  two  of  his  brigades  on  the  right  of  it,  one  on 
the  left,  and  sent  two  regiments  to  his  right  as  far  as  they 
could  reach  to  connect  with  Crawford,  whom  Major  Bingham, 
of  Hancock’s  staff,  reported  to  be  three-quarters  of  a  mile  on 
the  right.  In  the  meantime  the  enemy  placed  nine  guns  in 
position  on  the  north  bank  in  front  of  Egan,  and  five  on  the 
White  Oak  road,  from  which  an  annoying  fire  was  opened, 
but  replied  to  effectively  by  four  guns  of  Beck’s  Battery, 
Fifth  Artillery. 

Upon  the  return  of  Major  Bingham  from  General  Craw¬ 
ford,  General  Grant  and  General  Meade  left  the  field,  direct¬ 
ing  General  Hancock  to  hold  his  position  until  morning,  and 
then  fall  back  by  the  route  he  had  come.  The  South  Side 
Railroad  was  still  six  miles  distant  from  the  leading  corps. 
It  was  essential  to  the  success  of  the  operation  that  the  ob¬ 
jective  points  should  have  been  reached  during  the  first  day. 
That  had  not  been  done.  In  view  of  the  character  of  the 
country  our  starting-points  were  too  distant  from  our  points 
of  destination  ;  we  were  ignorant  of  the  topography  of  the 
country  to  be  passed  over.  It  was  evident  that  we  must  ex¬ 
tend  our  intrenchments  more  to  the  left  before  advancing  to 
the  South  Side  Railroad,  so  as  to  give  us  more  and  better 


300  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’61  AND  ’(35. 


roads  to  move  tlie  infantry  columns  on.  In  our  present 
movement  we  had  had  but  a  narrow  cart  track  on  wThich  to 
pass  two  corps  from  the  Vaughan  to  the  Boydton  road,  a 
distance  of  three  or  four  miles.  Had  the  Fifth  Corps  fol¬ 
lowed  Hancock  closely  over  to  the  Boydton  road  by  the  Dab¬ 
ney  saw-mill  road,  as  originally  intended,  the  result  might 
have  been  more  favorable.  We  could  have  carried  the  high 
ground  on  the  north  bank  of  Hatcher’s  Bun  at  Burgess’s 
mill  easily  and  thus  have  turned  Lee’s  right,  and  most  prob¬ 
ably  have  secured  a  footing  on  the  South  Side  Bailroad. 
But  the  attempted  movement  up  Hatcher’s  Bun  failed  of 
any  favorable  result.  It  kept  two-thirds  of  our  force  at  the 
right  of  Lee’s  intrenchments  substantially  doing  nothing, 
when  the  two-tliirds  should  have  been  at  the  movable  end  of 
the  column.  Only  Wilcox’s  division  was  retained  in  the 
Confederate  intrenchments  by  the  presence  of  the  Ninth  and 
Fifth  Corps  in  front  of  them. 

As  the  character  of  our  movement  developed  itself  the 
enemy  concentrated  Hampton’s  cavalry  and  Hetli’s  and  Ma- 
lione’s  divisions  about  the  Boydton  crossing  of  Hatcher’s 
Bun ;  Hampton  was  so  placed  as  to  attack  Hancock’s  left 
flank  and  rear,  while  Ketli,  whose  most  distant  troops  had 
been  but  four  miles  from  the  bridge,  opposed  his  advance 
toward  Petersburg  on  the  Boydton  road,  and  Mahone  was 
sent  to  cross  Hatcher’s  Bun  about  a  mile  below  Burgess’s 
mill,  and  following  a  narrow  wood-road,  make  a  sudden  at¬ 
tack  from  the  edge  of  the  thick  wood  upon  Hancock’s  right 
flank.1  At  the  time  the  attack  was  made  reinforcements  of 
infantry  were  seen  moving  down  the  Boydton  plank-road  to 
Hetli’s  support. 

General  Hancock,  knowing  the  views  of  General  Meade 

and  General  Grant,  determined  to  gain  possession  of  the 

« 

1  According  to  the  Return  of  October  20, 1S64,  the  effective  force  of  Hill’s  three 
infantry  divisions  was  13,638;  of  Hampton's  cavalry,  5,453. 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


301 


high  ground  north  of  Hatcher’s  Run  in  the  vicinity  of  Bur¬ 
gess’s  mill,  with  Egan’s  division,  supported  by  McAllister’s 
brigade  of  Mott’s  division.  De  Trobriand’s  brigade  was  on 
the  left  of  the  plank-road,  near  the  intersection  of  the  Dab¬ 
ney’s  mill  road,  and  looking  toward  the  upper  bridge,  Ker- 
win’s  brigade  of  dismounted  cavalry  on  his  left.  Pierce’s 
brigade  of  Mott’s  division  was  supporting  Metcalf’s  section 
of  Beck’s  battery  on  the  east  side  of  the  Boydton  road, 
posted  on  a  ridge  half  way  between  Egan  and  De  Trobriand  ; 
these  two  guns  and  Pierce’s  brigade  looked  north  toward  the 
run.  Constant  firing,  General  Hancock  says,  had  been  heard 
on  his  right,  which  was  attributed  to  Crawford’s  advance. 
Becoming  uneasy  at  this  firing,  General  Hancock  sent  two 
regiments  of  Pierce’s  brigade  well  into  the  wood  to  ascertain 
what  was  there,  and  despatched  Lieutenant  Stacey  of  his 
staff  to  inform  General  Crawford  that  he  was  about  to  as¬ 
sault  the  bridge.  In  fact  at  that  time  his  artillery  near  the 
bridge  had  opened,  and  the  advance  of  the  storming  party 
had  pushed  across  it,  secured  the  bridge,  and  captured  a 
gun.  But  at  that  moment,  about  four  o’clock,  a  volley  of 
musketry  immediately  on  his  right,  followed  by  a  continuous 
fire,  left  no  doubt  that  the  enemy  was  advancing  on  his  right. 
Pierce’s  small  force  in  the  woods  was  soon  overrun,  and  the 
enemy,  Mahone’s  division,  broke  out  of  the  woods  just  where 
Metcalf’s  section  was  placed.  Changing  front,  Metcalf  fired 
a  few  rounds ;  Pierce’s  brigade  endeavored  to  change  front, 
but  was  driven  back  in  confusion  to  the  plank-road  where  it 
rallied ;  the  section  of  artillery  (two  guns)  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy. 

At  the  first  sound  of  this  attack  General  Hancock  sent 
Major  Mitchell  of  his  staff  to  General  Egan  with  orders  for 


1  General  Warren  says  that  he  must  have  been  with  General  Crawford  when 
this  attack  was  made  on  Hancock,  but  that  the  wood  was  so  dense  that  no  sound 
of  the  musketry  reached  him. 


302  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


him  to  desist  from  the  assault  of  the  bridge,  face  to  the  rear, 
and  attack  the  enemy  with  his  whole  command.  When 
Major  Mitchell  reached  General  Egan,  he  found  him,  “  with 
the  instinct  of  the  true  soldier,”  General  Hancock  says, 
already  in  motion  to  attack  the  force  in  his  rear.  Malione 
pushed  rapidly  across  the  ridge  on  which  Metcalfs  section 
and  Pierce’s  brigade  had  been  posted,  rested  his  right  across 
the  Boydton  road,  faced  south  and  began  firing  upon  De 
Trobriand  and  Kerwin.  They  had  been  quickly  formed 
across  the  Boydton  road  just  in  front  of  the  Dabney’s  mill 
road,  and  with  Roder’s  and  Beck’s  batteries  opened  on  Ma- 
lione.  General  Egan  swept  down  upon  his  flank  with 
Smyth’s,  Willet’s,  and  McAllister’s  brigades,  De  Trobriand 
and  Kerwin  advancing  against  him  at  the  same  time.  Ma- 
lione  was  swept  from  the  field,  and  driven  into  the  woods  in 
complete  confusion,  losing  two  colors  and  several  hundred 
prisoners.  Metcalf’s  two  captured  guns  were  retaken.  Almost 
simultaneously  with  Malione’s  attack  Hampton  commenced 
pressing  Hancock’s  left  and  rear,  and  Mott’s  skirmishers  in 
the  direction  of  the  Claiborne  bridge,  and  Gregg’s  cavalry 
were  sharply  engaged.  The  enemy  in  front  had  scarcely 
been  driven  from  the  ground  when  the  firing  in  the  rear  be¬ 
came  so  brisk  that  General  Hancock  was  obliged  to  send 
Gregg  all  his  cavalry.  The  attack  on  Gregg,  General  Han¬ 
cock  says,  was  made  by  five  brigades  of  Hampton’s  cavalry, 
and  was  pressed  vigorously  until  after  dark,  but  that  Gregg 
held  his  own. 

Upon  learning  what  had  occurred,  General  Meade  directed 
General  Warren  to  send  a  division  to  Hancock’s  support, 
but  it  was  dark  by  the  time  it  (Ayres’s  division)  reached  the 
Armstrong  mill  crossing.  As  reserve  ammunition  could  not 
be  got  forward  to  Hancock  by  daylight  the  next  morning, 
together  with  the  troops  with  which  it  was  deemed  desirable 
to  reinforce  him,  it  was  concluded  that  he  should  withdraw 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


303 


that  night,  which  was  done,  the  infantry  marching  by  the 
Dabney’s  mill  road,  the  cavalry  by  the  Quaker  and  Vaughan 
roads.  Having  an  insufficient  number  of  ambulances,  250 
wounded  were  left  in  charge  of  surgeons  at  the  Rainey 
house,  and  on  the  field.  It  rained  heavily  all  night. 

On  the  28th,  the  troops  were  withdrawn  to  their  former 
positions.1 

Hancock’s  loss,  according  to  his  report,  was  123  killed, 
734  wounded  ;  total,  killed  and  wounded,  857.  His  missing 
were  625.  General  Hancock  mentions  in  high  terms  the 
conduct  of  General  Egan,  General  Mott,  General  Gregg,  and 
several  other  officers.2 

General  Warren’s  loss  was  211  killed  and  wounded,  and  48 
missing.3 

I  have  not  been  able  to  find  any  Confederate  report  or  ac¬ 
count  of  this  day’s  operations  on  our  left,  except  two  tele¬ 
graphic  despatches  of  General  Lee  from  Chapin’s  Bluff,  which 
are  on  the  files  of  the  War  Department.  (See  foot  note 4  for 

1  In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  of  the  27th,  some  of  the  enemy  got  on  the  Dab¬ 
ney’s  mill  road,  and  captured  some  ambulances,  but  were  themselves  subsequently 
captured  with  the  ambulances.  Staff  officers  on  that  road  and  in  the  forest  sud¬ 
denly  found  themselves  prisoners  within  the  enemy’s  lines,  but  most,  if  not  all, 
escaped.  Parties  of  the  enemy  became  so  bewildered  in  the  woods  that  200  of 
them  strayed  into  Crawford’s  lines  and  were  captured. 

2  By  some  neglect  seventy  men  of  the  First  Minnesota  under  Captain  Farwell 
were  left  on  the  field,  and  remained  there  until  nine  o’clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  28th,  when  they  withdrew  safely,  though  followed  by  the  enemy’s  cavalry. 

3  One  of  Warren’s  staff,  with  a  few  men,  went  to  the  Boydton  plank-road  at 
eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  finding  only  cavalry  pickets  there. 

4  “  October  27 th. — General  Hill  reports  that  the  enemy  crossed  Bowanty  Creek 
below  Burgess's  mill,  and  forced  back  the  cavalry.  In  the  afternoon  General 
Heth  attacked,  and  at  first  drove  them,  but  found  them  in  too  strong  force. 
Afterward  the  enemy  attacked  and  was  repulsed.  They  still  hold  the  plank-road 
at  Burgess’s  mill.  Heth  took  colors  and  some  prisoners.” 

“  October  28 th. — General  Hill  reports  that  the  attack  of  General  Heth  upon  the 
enemy  on  the  Boydton  plank-road,  mentioned  in  my  despatch  last  evening,  was 
made  by  three  brigades  under  General  Mahone  in  front,  and  by  General  Hamp¬ 
ton  in  rear.  Mahone  captured  400  prisoners,  three  stands  of  colors,  and  six 
pieces  of  artillery.  The  latter  could  not  be  brought  off,  the  enemy  having  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  bridge.  In  the  attack  subsequently  made  by  the  enemy,  General  Ma- 


304  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


these  despatches.)  The  Confederate  losses  must  have  at  least 
equalled  ours. 

In  support  of  the  movement  to  the  left,  General  Butler, 
having  been  directed  to  make  a  demonstration  on  the  north 
side  of  the  James,  sent  part  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  under 
General  Weitzel,  to  make  a  demonstration  on  the  Williams¬ 
burg  road  north  of  the  White  Oak  swamp,  and  part  of  the 
Tenth  Corps,  under  General  Terry,  to  demonstrate  on  the 
Charles  City  and  Darby  roads.  Under  cover  of  General 
Terry’s  demonstration,  General  Weitzel  was  to  push  through 
the  White  Oak  swamp  at  Hobson’s  crossing,  and  move  up 
the  Williamsburg  road  to  the  Confederate  line  of  intrench- 
ments. 

The  plan  vTas  carried  out  successfully,  General  Weitzel 
arriving  at  the  road  near  the  Seven  Pines  battlefield  at  one 
o’clock  in  the  afternoon.  Moving  up  the  road  toward  Bicli- 
mond,  at  the  end  of  a  mile  and  a  half  he  found  himself  in 
front  of  the  Confederate  intrencliments,  which,  upon  exam¬ 
ination,  he  found  to  be  thinly  held  by  a  small  body  of  dis¬ 
mounted  cavalry  with  three  guns,  and  determined  to  attack, 
believing  he  could  easily  carry  them.  At  the  same  time  he 
sent  Colonel  Holman,  commanding  the  First  Brigade,  Third 
Division,  colored  troops,  across  the  York  Biver  Bailroad  to 
find  the  enemy’s  left  and  turn  it. 

In  the  meantime  the  enemy  were  not  idle.  On  the  19th 
of  October  General  Longstreet  returned  to  his  corps  and 
took  command  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  and  on  the 
Bermuda  Hundred  front.  North  of  the  James  he  had  the 


hone  broke  three  lines  of  battle,  and  during  the  night  the  enemy  retreated,  leav¬ 
ing  his  wounded  and  more  than  250  dead  on  the  field.  Later. — The  total  number 
of  prisoners,  according  to  General  Hill’s  report,  is  700.” 

According  to  the  Table  of  the  Adjutant- General’s  Office,  our  casualties  were  143 
killed,  653  wounded,  and  488  missing.  The  errorB  of  this  table,  as  heretofore  ex¬ 
plained,  are  in  the  numbers  of  the  wounded.  Its  numbers  of  killed  and  missing 
are,  undoubtedly  correct. 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


305 


troops  known  as  the  Local  Defences,  under  General  Ewell, 
Hoke’s  division,  Field’s  division,  and  Gary’s  cavalry  brigade. 
These  troops,  in  the  order  mentioned,  held  from  the  river  to 
the  White  Oak  swamp.  Pickett’s  division  still  held  the 
Bermuda  Hundred  front. 

Longstreet  perceived  on  the  morning  of  the  27tli  that 
General  Butler  was  moving  against  his  left,  and  anticipated 
that  the  heavy  skirmishing  from  the  New  Market  to  the 
Charles  City  road  was  designed,  because  of  its  long  continu¬ 
ance,  not  to  precede  an  assault,  but  to  cover  an  attempt  to 
turn  his  left  flank  by  pushing  a  column  through  the  White 
Oak  swamp,  taking  possession  of  the  unoccupied  works  on 
the  Williamsburg  and  Nine  Mile  or  New  Bridge  roads,  and 
moving  down  them.  He  accordingly  directed  Field  and 
Hoke  to  move  to  the  left  along  the  works,  leaving  only 
skirmishers  in  them,  and  sent  General  Gary  to  the  Nine 
Mile  road  to  hold  the  works  there.  Moving  rapidly,  the  left 
of  Field  had  just  crossed  the  Williamsburg  road,  when 
Weitzel’s  skirmishers,  preceding  his  line  of  battle,  were  ad¬ 
vancing  to  attack. 

General  Weitzel  had  for  his  attacking  force,  Colonel 
Cullen’s  brigade  of  his  First  Division,  which  was  formed  in 
line  of  battle  on  the  right  of  the  Williamsburg  road,  sup¬ 
ported  by  the  First  and  Third  brigades,  General  Marston 
commanding  the  division.  On  the  left  of  the  road  the  at¬ 
tacking  force  was  Colonel  H.  S.  Fairchild’s  brigade  of  the 
Second  Division  in  line  of  battle,  the  division  commanded 
by  General  Heckman.  This  force,  preceded  by  skirmishers, 
advanced  to  the  attack  over  open  ground,  at  half  past  three 
o’clock,  ]  mt  instead  of  the  fire  of  a  thin  line,  were  met  with 
a  heavy  musketry  fire,  together  with  that  of  some  guns. 
They  got  close  to  the  works,  but  were  repulsed  with  con¬ 
siderable  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  each  brigade 
losing  three  colors. 


306  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 

Colonel  Holman  crossed  the  railroad  and  upon  the  New 
Bridge  road  came  upon  a  salient  held  by  some  of  Gary’s 
men,  dismounted,  the  last  occupied  part  of  the  intrencli- 
ments.  This  a  part  of  the  brigade  charged  upon  and  cap¬ 
tured,  taking  two  guns,  but  Gary  then  came  upon  the  field, 
and  charging  along  the  line  of  works,  took  Holman’s  men  in 
Hank,  recaptured  the  guns,  and  forced  Holman  to  fall  back. 
As  they  fell  back,  Colonel  Holman  received  General  Weitzel’s 
order  to  return  to  his  command. 

Colonel  Kiddoo  was  severely  wounded  in  this  affair  while 
leading  his  regiment. 

Shortly  after  dark  General  Weitzel  began  to  withdraw  to 
the  Charles  City  road,  the  rain,  darkness,  mud,  and  narrow 
road  making  it  very  fatiguing  for  the  troops,  who  were 
marching  all  night. 

At  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  General  Terry  was 
ordered  to  press  his  demonstration,  and,  if  the  chance  oc¬ 
curred,  to  cany  the  enemy’s  intrencliments.  This  was  at¬ 
tempted,  but  the  whole  attack  was  repulsed. 

The  loss  in  the  two  commands  is  not  given  in  the  reports. 
By  the  Table  of  the  Adjutant  General’s  Office  it  was  516 
killed  and  wounded,  and  587  missing. 

Being  covered  by  intrencliments,  the  casualties  of  General 
Longstreet’s  command  must  have  been  much  less.  On  the 
Williamsburg  road  he  reports  his  loss  (Field’s  division  and 
Gary’s  brigade)  to  have  been  64  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing. 

It  may  be  in  place  here,  at  the  close  of  active  operations 
in  1864,  to  mention  that  on  the  7tli  of  November,  Surgeon 
McParlin,  Medical  Director  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
reported  to  General  Meade,  “  that  the  number  of  wounded 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  May  3  to  October  31, 
1864,  may  be  considered  as  amounting  to  57,495.  This  was 
exclusive  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  while  it  served  with  the 


MOVEMENTS  AGAINST  LEE’S  FLANKS. 


307 


Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  does  not  include  the  Ninth  Corps 
at  the  Wilderness  and  Spottsylvania  Court  House.  Accord¬ 
ing  to  a  memorandum  of  General  Warren,  the  killed  and 
wounded  of  the  Fifth  Corps  during  the  period  stated  by 
Surgeon  McParlin  exceeded  11,000. 

In  the  latter  part  of  November,  the  season  for  active  opera¬ 
tions  having  ceased,  General  Hancock  was  called  to  Washing¬ 
ton  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  organize  the  new  First  Army 
Corps,  which,  it  was  expected,  would  be  ready  to  take  the 
field  in  the  spring,  when  the  roads  and  country  would  admit 
of  the  resumption  of  active  operations. 

He  had  served  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  with  the 
greatest  distinction  from  its  earliest  operations  at  Williams¬ 
burg  down  to  the  time  of  his  leaving  it,  being  conspicuous  in 
all  its  battles  and  operations. 


CHAPTEK  XII. 


THE  WINTER  OF  1864-65— MOVEMENT  TO  BREAK  UP 
THE  WAGON-TRAIN  ROUTE  OF  SUPPLY  FROM  HICKS- 
FORD,  ON  THE  WELDON  RAILROAD,  TO  PETERS¬ 
BURG,  AND  EXTENSION  OF  OUR  INTRENCHMENTS  TO 
HATCHER’S  RUN— THE  CAPTURE  AND  RECAPTURE 
OF  FORT  STEDMAN  —  PREPARATIONS  TO  MOVE 
AGAINST  LEE’S  RIGHT  FLANK  AND  THE  DANVILLE 
AND  SOUTH  SIDE  RAILROADS. 

The  defeat  of  General  Early  at  Cedar  Creek  on  the  19tli  of 
October  by  General  Sheridan  substantially  closed  the  cam¬ 
paign  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia. 

The  Sixth  Corps  was  returned  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
arriving  before  Petersburg  by  divisions  between  the  4th  and 
16th  of  December,  and  Brig.-General  T.  M.  Harris’s  division 
of  the  Army  of  West  Virginia  was  also  detached  from  General 
Sheridan’s  command,  and  was  sent  to  the  Army  of  the  James. 

About  the  same  time  General  Early’s  corps,  now  com¬ 
manded  by  General  Gordon,  rejoined  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  Kershaw’s  division  had  returned  to  it  in  the  lat¬ 
ter  part  of  November.  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  now 
had  an  effective  force  of  infantry  amounting  to  50, 000. 1 


1  Return  of  December  20,  1864  : 

Officers.  Enlisted  men. 


Longstreet’s,  First  Corps  (including  Hoke’s  division).  1,503  20,010 

Gordon’s,  Second  Corps .  505  8,179 

Hill’s.  Third  Corps .  1,097  15,274 

Anderson  (Johnson’s  division  only) .  504  6,692 


Total .  3,609  50,155 


Wise’s  brigade  is  not  included  in  the  above  numbers.  Wise’s  brigade  in  the  Re¬ 
turn  of  December  20th,  and  that  of  November  30th,  and  in  Returns  preceding  it,  is 


THE  WINTER  OF  1864-65. 


309 


In  December  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  was  organized  from 
the  white  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  James,  and  the  Twenty- 
fifth  Corps  from  the  colored  troops  of  that  army,  to  which 
Ferrero’s  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps  was  added.  General 
Ord  was  in  command  of  the  Twenty-fonrth  Corps  ;  General 
Weitzel  of  the  Twenty-fifth.  The  Tenth  and  Eighteenth 
Corps  were  discontinued. 

In  January  General  Terry  was  detached  from  the  Army  of 
the  James,  having  with  him  General  Ames’s  division  and  Col¬ 
onel  J.  C.  Abbott’s  brigade  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  and 
General  Chas.  J.  Paine’s  division  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Corps, 
in  all  a  force  of  8,000  infantry,  to  take  part  with  the  Navy  in 
the  attack  on  Fort  Fisher  at  the  northern  entrance  to  the 
Cape  Fear  Biver.  When  that  was  accomplished,  he  was  to 
unite  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps  under  Major-General  Scho¬ 
field.  This  corps  was  to  be  brought  from  the  West,  and  after 
taking  Wilmington  on  the  Cape  Fear  Biver,  was  to  join  Gen¬ 
eral  Sherman  when  he  should  advance  northward  from  Sa¬ 
vannah. 

In  the  same  month  General  Hoke  with  his  division 
(wliosa  effective  strength  was  5,517)  was  sent  to  aid  in  the 
defence  of  Fort  Fisher  and  Wilmington. 

During  the  winter  General  Butler’s  cavalry  division  (for¬ 
merly  Hampton’s)  was  allowed  to  return  to  South  Carolina  to 
obtain  fresh  horses,  and  fill  up  the  ranks.  General  Hampton 
at  the  same  time  was  placed  on  duty  in  the  South. 


not  included  in  Johnson’s  division,  but  is  reported  separately  as  the  First  Military 
District.  November  10th,  the  effective  force  of  Johnson  was  6,494,  the  effective 
force  of  Wise  2,271.  November  30th,  Johnson  6,504 ;  Wise,  2,345.  December  20th, 
Johnson,  6,692  ;  Wise,  520.  It  is  not  stated  where  the  other  three-fourths  of  Wise's 
brigade  were  on  December  20th.  Evidently  they  are  not  included  in  Johnson’s 
division. 

Wise’s  brigade  was  present  at  the  closing  operations  around  Petersburg,  but 
does  not  appear  in  the  Return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  of  February  20th, 
1865,  the  last  Return  of  that  army  to  be  found  among  the  Confederate  archives  in 
the  possession  of  the  War  Department. 


310  the  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


During  December  General  Warren,  having  Mott’s  division 
of  the  Second  Corps  and  Gregg’s  cavalry  added  to  his  own 
corps,  destroyed  the  Weldon  Railroad,  as  far  as  Hicksford  on 
the  Meherrin  River,  about  forty  miles  from  Petersburg. 
General  A.  P.  Hill  was  sent  to  interrupt  him,  but  not  in 
time.  The  work  was  completed  and  the  troops  returned  to 
their  camps  without  his  encountering  them. 

During  the  winter  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was 
posted  in  its  intrenchments  in  the  following  manner  :  Gen¬ 
eral  Hill,  on  the  Confederate  right,  held  from  Hatcher’s  Run 
to  Fort  Gregg  ;  Generals  Gordon  and  Anderson  held  from 
his  left  to  the  Appomattox,  and  General  Longstreet  from  the 
Appomattox  to  the  Confederate  left  at  White  Oak  Swamp. 

In  the  course  of  the  winter  the  imperfect  intrenchments 
at  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Hatcher’s  Run  were  very  much 
strengthened,  and  new  and  strong  intrenchments  were  thrown 
up  on  the  south  side  of  Hatcher’s  Run  at  the  Crow  house,  a 
mile  and  a  half  above  Armstrong’s  mill,  and  at  Burgess’s 
mill,  where  the  Boydton  plank-road  crosses  the  run,  and 
along  the  south  side  of  the  run  covering  the  White  Oak  road 
as  far  as  its  intersection  by  the  Claiborne  road,  then*  north¬ 
ward  covering  that  road  also  as  far  as  Hatcher’s  Run,  upon 
which  the  works  terminated.  Heavy  slashing  covered  the 
front  of  these  new  works.  They  were  not  occupied  in 
strength  but  watched. 1 


1  In  the  spring  of  18(55,  when  these  works  were  completed,  the  Confederate  in¬ 
trenchments  were  thirty-seven  miles  in  length  from  the  White  Oak  Swamp  on 
their  left  to  the  Claiborne  road  crossing  of  Hatcher’s  Run  on  their  right.  This 
length  is  not  measured  along  the  irregularities  of  the  general  line  of  intrench¬ 
ments,  mi’ch  less  along  those  of  the  parapet  line.  Eight  miles  of  these  intrench¬ 
ments  were  north  of  James  River,  five  were  on  the  Bermuda  Hundred  front,  and 
sixteen  on  the  Petersburg  line.  The  space  along  James  River  between  Chapin’s 
Bluff  and  Bermuda  Hundred,  which  was  held  by  heavy  artillery  was  four  miles  in 
length.  The  space  along  the  Appomattox  River  from  the  Bermuda  Hundred  in¬ 
trenchments  to  the  left  of  their  Petersburg  intrenchments,  which  space  was  held 
by  batteries  of  artillery,  was  also  four  miles  in  length. 


THE  WINTER  OF  1864-65. 


311 


The  winter  of  1864-65  was  one  of  nnusual  severity,  mak- 

*/  * 

ing  the  picket  duty  in  front  of  the  intrenchments  very  se¬ 
vere.  It  was  especially  so  to  the  Confederate  troops  with 
their  threadbare,  insufficient  clothing,  and  meagre  food, 
chiefly  corn  bread  made  of  the  coarsest  meal.  Meat  they 
had  but  little  of,  and  their  Subsistence  Department  was  ac¬ 
tually  importing  it  from  abroad.  Of  coffee  or  tea  and  sugar, 
they  had  none  except  in  the  hospitals. 

It  is  stated  that  in  a  secret  session  of  the  Confederate 
Congress  the  condition  of  the  Confederacy  as  to  subsistence 
was  declared  to  be  : 

That  there  was  not  meat  enough  in  the  Southern  Confederacy  for  the 
armies  it  had  in  the  field. 

That  there  was  not  in  Virginia  either  meat  or  bread  enough  for  the 
armies  within  her  limits, 

That  the  supply  of  bread  for  those  armies  to  be  obtained  from  other 
places  depended  absolutely  upon  keeping  open  the  railroad  connections 
of  the  South. 

That  the  meat  must  be  obtained  from  abroad  through  a  seaport. 

That  the  transportation  was  not  now  adequate,  from  whatever  cause, 
to  meet  the  necessary  demands  of  the  service. 

Thai  the  supply  of  fresh  meat  to  General  Lee’s  army  was  precarious, 
and  if  the  army  fell  back  from  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  that  there 
was  every  probability  that  it  would  cease  altogether. 

Tlie  condition  of  the  deserters  who  constantly  came  into 
our  lines  during  the  winter  appeared  to  prove  that  there  was 
no  exaggeration  in  this  statement. 

Some  time  in  February  the  Confederate  commissariat  was 
got  into  better  condition,  and  Lee’s  army  was  better  rationed 
from  that  time  until  the  fall  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg, 
and  reserve  depots  were  maintained  at  Richmond,  Lynch¬ 
burg,  Danville,  and  Greensboro’,  containing  three  and  a  half 
millions  rations  of  meat  and  two  and  a  half  millions  rations 
of  bread.  But  the  rolling  stock  of  the  railroads  was  so  worn 
that  it  could  no  longer  bring  the  necessary  number  of  rations 


312  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


to  Lee’s  army  in  addition  to  the  other  requirements  made 
upon  it.  Wagon  trains  were  resorted  to  wherever  prac¬ 
ticable. 

It  was  reported  that  supplies  were  brought  to  Petersburg 
by  wagon  trains  from  Hicksford  on  the  Weldon  Railroad, 
the  route  of  the  trains  being  up  the  Meherrin  River  to  the 
Boydton  plank  road,  and  thence  on  that  road  through  Din- 
widdie  Court  House  to  Petersburg.  To  intercept  those 
trains,  and  break  up  this  route  of  supply,  General  Gregg 
was  directed  to  march  at  three  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the 
fifth  of  February,  by  way  of  Reams’s  Station  to  Dinwiddie 
Court  House,  move  up  and  down  the  Boydton  plank  road, 
and  endeavor  to  intercept  the  trains  said  to  be  on  it,  and  do 
such  other  injury  as  he  was  able  to  the  enemy  in  that  direc¬ 
tion.  General  Warren  was  directed  to  cross  Hatcher’s  Run 
below  the  Vaughan  road,  and  take  position  on  that  road, 
half  way  between  Hatcher’s  Run  and  Dinwiddie  Court  House, 
and  support  General  Gregg.  General  Humphreys,  com¬ 
manding  the  Second  Corps  since  the  retirement  of  General 
Hancock  from  it,  was  directed  to  take  his  two  reserve  divi¬ 
sions  to  the  crossing  of  the  Vaughan  road  over  Hatcher’s 
Run,  and  to  Armstrong’s  mill,  hold  those  two  points,  keep 
up  communication  with  General  Warren  (four  miles  distant) 
and  support  him ;  and  also  keep  up  communication  with  our 
intrencliments,  between  three  and  four  miles  off.1 

At  the  Vaughan  road  crossing  the  run  was  found  to  be 
dammed  and  obstructed  by  fallen  trees  and  held  by  a  few 
infantry  who  were  merely  on  the  lookout,  and  were  soon  dis¬ 
persed,  and  Mott’s  division  put  in  position  on  the  south  side 
of  the  run.  General  Smyth’s  division  was  established  on  the 
north  side  of  the  run  at  Armstrong’s  mill.  They  both  in¬ 
trenched  sufficiently.  Communication  was  opened  with 

1  The  Second  Corps  held  the  left  of  these  intrenchments.  The  First  Division, 
General  Miles,  remained  in  them. 


THE  WINTER  OF  18G4-65. 


313 


General  Warren.  Opposite  Smyth’s  centre  tlie  enemy’s  new 
intrenchments  were  in  full  view,  about  one  thousand  yards 
distant.  Opposite  his  left  they  were  hidden  by  woods.  His 
right  rested  on  a  small,  wooded  swamp.  On  the  right  of 
this  swamp  was  the  open  ground  of  the  Thompson  house, 
in  front  of  which  was  a  wood  extending  to  the  enemy’s  in¬ 
trenchments.  A  road  led  from  those  intrenchments  through 
this  wood  to  the  open  ground  at  Thompson’s.  Further  to 
the  right  was  another  swamp.  To  sit  down  in  this  way  all 
day  close  to  the  enemy’s  intrenchments  was  to  invite  an  at¬ 
tempt  on  one’s  flanks,  and  I  anticipated  that  one  would  be 
made  on  Smyth’s  right,  expecting  the  enemy  to  come  along 
the  wood  road  into  the  open  ground  at  Thompson’s.  I 
therefore  brought  over  McAllister’s  brigade  of  Mott’s  divi¬ 
sion  and  put  it  along  the  edge  of  the  wood,  though  it  did 
not  cover  half  the  space  that  should  have  been  occupied. 
Subsequently,  with  General  Meade’s  authority,  I  sent  to 
General  Miles  for  a  brigade,  which  arrived  in  due  time. 
McAllister  intrenched  the  whole  line. 

A  little  after  five  o’clock  the  enemy’s  artillery  opened  upon 
Smyth,  and  his  infantry,  moving  along  the  edge  of  the  wood 
in  front  of  Smyth’s  right,  made  a  determined  attack.  At  the 
same  time  a  column  of  infantry  emerged  from  the  woods 
into  the  open  ground  of  the  Thompson  house  by  the  road 
already  mentioned,  evidently  expecting  to  find  it  unoccupied, 
and  that  they  would  take  Smyth  in  flank  and  rear.  But 
McAllister  had  been  in  his  intrenchments  on  the  right  of 
this  road,  and  had  just  drawn  his  brigade  out  and  formed 
part  of  it  perpendicular  to  them.  He  promptly  opened  a 
heavy  and  unexpected  fire  upon  the  enemy’s  column,  which 
fell  back  at  once  through  the  woods  to  their  intrenchments. 
Smyth  had  by  this  time  repulsed  the  attack  on  his  front,  but 
the  enemy’s  artillery  kept  up  a  fire  upon  both  Smyth  and 
McAllister  for  some  time  after. 

XII.— 14 


314  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


General  Lee,  advised  of  our  appearance  on  his  right  flank, 
and  being  with  good  reason  sensitive  to  any  movement  upon 
it,  had  concentrated  parts  of  Hill’s  and  Gordon’s  corps  to 
meet  it.  It  was  this  force  that  made  the  attack  just  de¬ 
scribed.  General  Lee  says  of  it :  “In  the  afternoon,  parts 
of  Hill’s  and  Gordon’s  troops  demonstrated  against  the 
enemy  on  the  left  of  Hatcher’s  Run,  near  Armstrong’s  mill. 
Finding  him  intrenched  they  were  withdrawn  after  dark.” 

Upon  ascertaining  what  force  of  the  enemy  was  here, 
General  Meade  ordered  Hartranft’s  division  of  the  Ninth 
Corps  and  Wheaton’s  of  the  Sixth  to  join  me,  and  when 
they  arrived  in  the  night  they  were  placed  on  my  right. 

General  Gregg  upon  reaching  the  Boydton  road  captured 
some  wagons  and  prisoners,  but  found  that  the  road  was 
but  little  used,  and  returned  in  the  evening  to  Malone’s 
bridge  on  Rowanty  Creek.  From  this  place  he  was  ordered 
up  to  the  Vaughan  road  crossing,  where  he  arrived  early  in 
the  morning  of  the  6th  with  General  WTarren,  who  had  also 
been  ordered  to  the  same  point. 

A  reconnoissance  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  showed  that 
the  enemy  was  not  outside  his  intrenchments  north  of  the 
run.  Warren,  with  Gregg,  was  in  position  on  the  south 
bank.  Wheaton’s  division  and  De  Trobriand’s  brigade  were 
held  ready  to  support  him,  Mott’s  division  having  been 
brought  to  the  north  bank  of  the  run. 

About  1  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  General  Warren  made  a 
reconnoissance  with  Crawford’s  division  along  the  Vaughan 
and  Dabney’s  mill  roads,  Ayres  following  on  his  left,  Gregg 
being  sent  down  the  Vaughan  road  to  Gravelly  Run  to  watch 
the  left.  Griffin  remained  in  reserve  and  with  part  of  his 
division  supported  Gregg,  who  was  heavily  attacked  by  a 
part  of  Pegram’s  division  of  Gordon’s  corps,  which,  however, 
with  the  support  Griffin  gave  him  he  pressed  back.  Craw¬ 
ford  also  encountered  a  part  of  Pegram’s  division,  which  he 


THE  WINTER  OF  1864-65. 


315 


forced  back  to  Dabney’s  mill,  where  Evans’s  division  of 
Gordon’s  corps  came  to  his  support,  and  Crawford  in  turn 
had  his  left  flank  forced  back.  Two  brigades  of  Ayres  were 
now  brought  up  to  Crawford’s  support,  and  one  brigade  of 
Griffin’s  division,  and  at  the  same  time  Mahone’s  division 
arrived  and  formed  between  Evans  and  Pegram.  The 
enemy’s  whole  line  then  advanced  to  the  attack,  and  spite  of 
the  exertions  of  the  leading  officers  and  the  good  conduct  of 
many  of  the  men,  Warren’s  line  gave  way  and  fell  back 
rapidly,  but  with  little  loss.  General  Wheaton’s  leading  bri¬ 
gade  came  upon  the  scene  of  action  at  this  time  and  got  into 
line  ;  others  reformed  with  it,  and  the  enemy  was  checked. 

A  large  part  of  one  of  General  Warren’s  divisions  was  com¬ 
posed  of  new  troops. 

General  Warren  made  a  reconnoissance  on  the  7th,  meeting 
the  enemy,  but  not  in  force. 

He  states  that  the  enemy  in  his  encounters  with  them  met 
with  losses  nearly  equal  to  his  own.  General  Pegram  was 
killed  when  his  division  was  forced  back  to  Dabney’s  mill. 

General  Warren’s  total  loss,  including  the  cavalry,  was 
1,165  killed  and  wounded  and  154  missing. 

The  loss  of  the  Second  Corps  was  138  killed  and  wounded, 
among  them,  Colonel  Murphy,  Sixty-ninth  New  York, 
commanding  Second  Brigade,  Second  Division,  mortally 
wounded.  Wheaton’s  division  lost  17  killed  and  wounded. 

Our  intrenchments  were  now  extended  to  Hatcher’s  Run 
at  the  Vaughan  road  crossing,  and  the  Second  Corps  held  the 
left  of  the  army,  the  Sixth  Corps  taking  the  intrenchments 
at  Fort  Fisher  and  the  Signal  Tower.  The  Fifth  Corps 
was  massed  in  rear  of  the  left. 

During  the  whole  period  of  our  partial  investment  of 
Petersburg  and  Richmond,  there  were  frequent  affairs  on 
the  picket  lines,  especially  in  front  of  the  Petersburg  in¬ 
trenchments,  where  the  affair  sometimes  became  of  a  serious 


316  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


character,  drawing  into  it  brigades,  sometimes  a  division. 
Borne  of  these  encounters  occurred  at  points  where  the  lines 
were  so  close  as  to  cause  apprehension  of  a  successful  night 
attack,  and  hence  the  effort  to  force  back  the  pickets.  These 
attacks  gave  occasion  for  the  exhibition  of  dexterity  and 
daring  on  both  sides,  but  did  not  result  in  any  appreciable 
modification  of  the  lines.  The  loss  they  entailed  in  killed 
and  wounded  was  by  no  means  trifling. 

On  the  27th  of  February  General  Sheridan,  with  two  di¬ 
visions  of  cavalry,  moved  from  Winchester  up  the  valley  of 
the  Shenandoah  to  Staunton,  thence  to  Charlottesville,  de¬ 
stroying  the  railroad  between  those  towns,  and  from  Char¬ 
lottesville  toward  Gordonsville,  and  also  to  within  a  short 
distance  of  Lynchburg.  The  James  Liver  Canal  was  also 
destroyed  from  New  Market  to  near  Goochland  Court  House, 
completely  obliterating  it  as  a  line  of  supply.  On  the  27th 
of  March  he  formed  a  junction  with  the  Armies  of  the 
Potomac  and  the  James. 

There  had  been  indications  for  some  time  past  that 
General  Lee  would  abandon  his  Petersburg  and  Richmond 
intrenchments  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  with  General 
Johnston,  then  in  front  of  Sherman,  and  General  Grant  was 
apprehensive  this  might  be  done  before  he  was  prepared  for 
an  effective  pursuit.  Accordingly  on  the  24th  of  March  he 
issued  the  order  for  the  movement  to  the  left  on  the  29tli 
by  the  armies  operating  against  Richmond,  with  a  view  to 
destroy  the  Danville  and  the  South  Side  (Lynchburg)  rail¬ 
roads,  turn  Lee’s  right,  and  force  him  to  abandon  his  in¬ 
trenchments.  Indeed  as  early  as  the  14th  of  March  instruc¬ 
tions  had  been  issued  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  for  its 
guidance,  in  anticipation  of  a  general  movement. 

Early  in  March,  it  was  determined  in  a  conference  between 
Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  and  General  Lee,  that  as  soon  as  the 
roads  would  admit  of  movement,  the  Richmond  and  Peters- 


THE  WINTER  OF  1864-65. 


317 


burg  lines  should  be  abandoned,  and  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  move  to  Danville,  unite  with  General  Johnston  and 
attack  General  Sherman.  Preparations  were  made  accord¬ 
ingly.  General  Lee  proposed  in  the  meantime  to  make  a 
sortie  in  order  to  gain  some  of  the  works  on  the  right  of  the 
line  held  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  near  the  Appomattox 
River,  and  the  ridge  in  their  rear,  with  the  expectation  that 
this  would  oblige  General  Grant  to  concentrate  there  by 
drawing  in  his  left,  and  thus  postpone  the  threatened  neces¬ 
sity  for  abandoning  Richmond  and  Petersburg  until  the 
weather  was  favorable  for  falling  back  to  Danville.  This 
being  assented  to,  General  Gordon  wras  selected  for  the  ser¬ 
vice,  and  his  corps  was  brought  to  the  intrenchments  nearest 
Petersburg,  with  its  left  on  the  Appomattox.  The  point  of 
attack  was  Fort  Stedman,  where  the  opposing  lines  were  only 
one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  apart ;  the  pickets  fifty  yards 
apart.  General  Gordon  was  sanguine  that  this  redoubt  could 
be  taken  by  a  night  assault,  and  that  through  the  breach 
thus  made  a  sufficient  force  could  be  thrown  to  disorganize 
and  destroy  Grant’s  left  wing  before  he  could  recover  and 
concentrate  his  forces  from  the  right. 

General  Gordon  says  General  Lee  placed  at  his  disposal,  in 
addition  to  his  own  corps,  a  portion  of  A.  P.  Hill’s  and  a  por¬ 
tion  of  Longstreet’s,  and  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  in  all 
about  one-lialf  of  the  Army. 

The  attack  was  well  arranged ;  picked  men  preceded  the 
storming  party  to  cut  away  the  fraise  and  abatis  in  front  of 
the  intrenchments ;  the  storming  party  was  followed  by  three 
columns,  which  were  to  push  through  the  gap  made  by  the 
capture  of  Fort  Stedman  and  seize  three  forts  on  the  high 
ground  that  commanded  Fort  Stedman,  and  the  lines  on  the 
right  and  left  of  it.  These  forts  were  supposed  to  be  open 
at  the  gorge.  But,  in  point  of  fact,  there  were  no  such  forts. 
The  redoubts  that  had  a  commanding  fire  upon  Fort  Sted- 


318  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  *65. 


man  and  the  lines  and  open  batteries  on  its  right  and  left, 
were  on  the  main  line.  In  front  of  them  was  the  line  of  in- 
trenchments  erected  by  onr  troops  on  the  18th  of  June,  which 
probably  led  to  the  misapprehension  of  General  Gordon. 

A  division  of  infantry,  moving  by  its  left  flank,  was  to 
follow  the  three  detachments,  and  when  halted  and  fronted 
was  to  move  down  our  intrenchments  to  our  left,  being 
joined  by  the  other  troops  as  their  fronts  were  cleared. 
Next  were  the  cavalry,  who  were  to  cut  our  telegraphic  lines 
and  destroy  the  ponton  bridges  over  the  Appomattox.  Next 
all  the  remaining  force  was  to  unite  in  the  attack. 

The  Ninth  Corps  was  on  our  right,  holding  from  the  Ap¬ 
pomattox  to  Fort  Howard,  a  line  about  seven  miles  in  length, 
General  Willcox  on  the  right,  General  Potter  on  the  left, 
General  Hartranft  in  reserve,  his  right  at  the  Dunn  house, 
his  left  near  Fort  Howard.  Taking  advantage,  General 
Parke  says,  of  the  order  allowing  deserters  to  bring  their 
arms  with  them,  the  enemy  at  half-past  four  in  the  morning 
of  the  25tli  quietly  gained  possession  of  several  picket  posts, 
the  storming  party  instantly  followed,  and  with  a  rush  over¬ 
powered  the  trench  guard,  broke  the  main  line  between  Bat¬ 
teries  9  and  10,  turned  to  the  right  and  left,  gained  Battery 
10,  overpowered  the  garrison  of  Fort  Stedman  after  a  spir¬ 
ited  resistance,  capturing  the  greater  part  of  it,  and  then 
turned  its  artillery,  four  12-pounders,  and  the  guns  of  Bat¬ 
tery  10  against  Willcox’s  troops  ;  but  not  until  they  had  been 
used  effectively  by  the  garrison.  Batteries  11  and  12,  open 
works,  were  also  captured.  It  was  so  dark,  General  Parke 
says,  that  friends  could  not  be  distinguished  from  foes,  and 
artillery  could  not  therefore  at  first  be  used,  but  Brigadier- 
General  McLaughlin,  whose  brigade  occupied  this  part  of 
the  line,  opened  a  mortar  fire  on  Battery  11,  and  recaptured 
it  with  the  bayonet,  but  entering  Fort  Stedman  in  ignorance 
of  its  capture,  was  himself  taken  prisoner. 


THE  WINTER  OF  1864-65. 


319 


As  soon  as  General  Parke  leamt  what  had  occurred  he  or¬ 
dered  General  Willcox  to  recapture  the  works,  General  Hart- 
ranft  to  concentrate  and  support  him,  and  General  Tidball 
to  post  his  artillery  on  the  high  ground  in  rear  of  the  main 
line,  and  open  at  once,  together  with  the  artillery  in  the  forts 
on  the  right  and  left  of  Fort  Stedman.  General  Hartranft 
promptly  concentrated  his  division,  and  while  doing  so,  with 
one  of  his  regiments  and  some  of  Willcoz’s  troops,  attacked 
the  enemy’s  skirmishers,  who  were  moving  in  the  direction 
of  City  Point  and  were  already  at  our  military  railroad  and 
telegraph  line,  and  drove  them  back  to  their  own  troops  in 
our  works. 1  The  enemy  now  moved  from  Fort  Stedman  and 
assaulted  the  forts  on  the  right  and  left  of  it,  but  were  re¬ 
pulsed.  By  half-past  seven  General  Parke  had  regained  Bat¬ 
teries  11  and  12,  had  drawn  a  cordon  of  troops  around  Fort 
Stedman  and  Battery  10,  had  forced  the  enemy  back  into 
them,  and  had  concentrated  a  fire  upon  them  from  all  the 
artillery  in  the  works  and  on  the  high  ground  in  rear  that 
bore  upon  them.  General  Hartranft  was  assigned  to  the  re¬ 
capture  of  Fort  Stedman  and  Battery  10.  At  a  quarter  of 
eight  o’clock  he  advanced  to  the  attack  and  carried  the  fort 
with  comparatively  small  loss.  The  cross-fire  of  artillery  and 
infantry  on  the  space  between  the  lines  prevented  the  enemy 
who  were  in  our  works  from  escaping,  and  reinforcements 
from  coming  to  them.  Many  were  killed  and  wounded  try¬ 
ing  to  get  back  to  their  own  lines  ;  1,949  prisoners,  including 
71  officers  and  nine  stands  of  colors,  fell  into  General 
Parke’s  hands.  His  loss  was  494  killed  and  wounded  and 
523  missing  ;  a  total  of  1,017. 

General  Gordon  says  that  guides  were  sent  with  the  com¬ 
manders  of  the  detachments  that  were  to  seize  the  forts  in 
rear  of  Stedman,  but  that  the  guides  were  lost  or  had  de- 

1  Those  whom  General  Parte  calls  skirmishers  were  probably  the  three  detach¬ 
ments  of  Gordon’s  troops  sent  to  capture  the  rear  forts. 


320  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


serted,  and  that  the  commanders  conld  not  find  the  forts’ 
which,  as  I  have  already  explained,  were  in  fact  on  the  main 
line.  Nearly  all  of  the  troops  composing  these  detachments 
were  killed  or  captured. 

General  Gordon  says  that  “  a  large  body  of  the  troops 
sent  by  General  Lee  from  General  Longstreet’s  corps  were 
delayed  by  the  breaking  down  of  trains,  or  by  some  other 
cause,  and  did  not  arrive  at  the  appointed  hour,  which 
caused  so  great  a  delay  that  we  did  not  get  in  the  fort  and 
upon  the  enemy’s  flank  at  as  early  an  hour  as  was  expected, 
and  daylight  found  us  with  the  plan  only  half  executed.” 

General  Meade  had  passed  the  night  of  the  24th  at  City 
Point,  the  telegraph  to  which  place  was  cut  by  the  enemy. 
At  half-past  five  General  Parke  telegraphed  General  Webb, 
Chief  of  Staff,  what  had  occurred,  and  at  a  quarter-past  six 
learnt  in  reply  that  General  Meade  was  at  City  Point,  and 
that  he,  General  Parke,  was  in  command  (being  the  senior 
in  rank).  He  then  directed  General  Wright  to  send  him  a 
division,  which  got  to  the  ground  just  as  our  works  were  re¬ 
taken,  and  General  Warren,  who  had  the  Fifth  Corps  under 
arms  ready  to  move  toward  General  Parke’s  right,  to  move 
up  with  his  corps.  By  the  time  the  works  were  retaken  tele¬ 
graphic  communication  with  General  Meade  at  City  Point 
w7as  opened. 

At  a  quarter  before  six  I  received  a  telegram  from  General 
Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery,  informing  me  that  the  enemy  had 
broken  through  our  right,  captured  Fort  Stedman  and  were 
moving  toward  City  Point.  I  at  once  got  the  Second  Corps 
under  arms  ready  to  move,  ordered  the  division  commanders 
to  make  strong  reconnoissances  and  ascertain  the  condition 
of  the  enemy  in  my  front,  and  to  attack  their  intrenched 
picket  line  with  a  view  to  assaulting  their  main  works,  if  the 
force  holding  them  had  been  materially  weakened.  This 
was  duly  communicated  to  General  Parke  and  General 


THE  WINTER  OF  1864-65. 


321 


Meade,  and  approved  by  them.  The  intrenched  picket  line 
of  the  enemy  was  captured,  and  our  line  was  advanced  be¬ 
yond  it  under  the  close  fire  of  the  artillery  and  musketry  of 
their  main  works,  which  proved  to  be  held  by  a  force  suffi¬ 
cient  to  maintain  them  against  assault.  In  fact,  General 
Hill’s  force  here  had  not  been  reduced,  probably  in  expecta¬ 
tion  of  a  counter-attack.  Under  cover  of  the  artillery  and 
musketry  fire  of  their  works  the  enemy  moved  out  repeat¬ 
edly  with  strong  force  at  several  points  to  recapture  their 
picket  intrenchments,  but  were  always  driven  back. 

The  loss  of  the  Second  Corps  was  513  killed  and  wounded 
and  177  missing  ;  total,  690. 

The  enemy’s  number  of  killed  and  wounded  was  probably 
about  the  same  as  that  of  the  Second  Corps  ;  358  officers  and 
enlisted  men  were  captured  from  them. 

General  Wright  also  attacked  and  captured  the  enemy’s 
intrenched  picket  line,  losing  about  400  in  the  encounters, 
and  capturing  547  prisoners. 

It  was  this  capture  of  the  intrenched  picket  line  of  the 
enemy  that  made  it  practicable  for  General  Wright  to  carry 
the  enemy’s  main  line  of  intrenchments  by  assault  on  the 
morning  of  the  2d  of  April. 

The  total  loss  of  the  enemy  in  the  operations  of  the  25th 
of  March  must  have  been  nearly  4,000  ;  ours,  about  2,000. 

14* 


CHAPTER  Xm. 


MOVEMENT  TO  TURN  LEE’S  RIGHT— ACTIONS  OF  WHITE 
OAK  RIDGE  AND  DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE— THE 
BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS— LEE’S  INTRENCHMENTS 
WEST  OF  PETERSBURG  CARRIED— HE  ABANDONS  THE 
RICHMOND  AND  PETERSBURG  LINES,  AND  RETREATS 
TOWARD  DANVILLE. 

Having  established  liis  army  at  Goldsboro’,  North  Caro¬ 
lina,  about  145  miles  south  of  Petersburg,  General  Sherman 
visited  General  Grant  at  City  Point  on  the  27th  of  March, 
and  stated,  as  he  had  done  before  by  letter,  that  he  would  be 
ready  to  move  by  the  10th  of  April,  if  it  should  be  necessary 
to  bring  his  army  in  co-operation  with  the  forces  in  front  of 
Richmond  and  Petersburg.  He  proposed,  in  the  event  of 
such  a  movement,  to  threaten  Raleigh,  and  then,  turning 
suddenly  to  the  right,  reach  the  Roanoke  River  near  Weldon 
(60  miles  south  of  Petersburg),  from  which  point  he  could 
move  to  the  Richmond  and  Danville  Railroad  at  its  junction 
with  the  Petersburg  and  Lynchburg  Railroad,  Burke’s  junc¬ 
tion,  which  would  cut  off  Lee’s  retreat  to  Danville  and  to 
Lynchburg,  or  could  join  the  armies  operating  against  Rich¬ 
mond,  as  might  be  deemed  best.  This  plan,  General  Grant 
says,  he  was  directed  to  carry  out,  if,  in  the  meantime,  he 
received  no  further  directions.  The  movement  ordered  for 
the  29th  of  March  was  explained  to  him. 

Apprehensive  that  General  Lee  might  any  night  abandon 
his  intrenchments,  and  being  satisfied  that  he  would  do  so 
as  soon  as  he  heard  that  General  Sherman  had  crossed  the 


MOVEMENT  TO  TURN  LEE’S  RIGHT. 


323 


Roanoke,  General  Grant  determined  not  to  delay  the  move¬ 
ment  ordered  for  the  29th,  but  to  take  the  initiative. 

On  the  night  of  the  27th,  General  Ord,  commanding  the 
Army  of  the  James,  taking  with  him  General  Gibbon,  with 
Turner’s  and  Foster’s  divisions  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps, 
Brigadier-General  Birney’s  division  (colored)  of  the  Twenty-* 
fifth  Corps,  and  General  Mackenzie’s  cavalry  (formerly 
Kautz’s)  made  a  secret  march  of  36  miles  to  the  left  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  taking  post  in  rear  of  the  Second 
Corps  on  the  evening  of  the  28th.  He  managed  this  move¬ 
ment  so  well  that  the  enemy  remained  in  ignorance  of  it  un¬ 
til  the  2d  of  April. 

General  Devens’s  division  of  Gibbon’s  corps  remained  in 
the  intrencliments  on  the  north  side  of  the  James ;  General 
Weitzel’s  two  divisions  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Corps  in  the 
Bermuda  Hundred  intrenchments,  he  having  command  there 
and  on  the  north  side  of  the  James. 

Upon  the  resumption  of  active  operations  in  the  spring  of 
1865,  the  effective  force  of  the  two  contending  armies,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  latest  returns  of  each,  was  as  follows  : 

The  effective  force  of  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  69,000  ;  of  field  artillery,  6,000,  with  243  guns. 

The  effective  force  of  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  James  was 
32,000 ;  of  field  artillery,  3,000,  with  126  guns  ;  and  of  caval¬ 
ry,  1,700.  General  Ord  took  with  him,  on  the  27th  of  March, 
about  one-half  the  infantry  and  all  the  cavalry  of  his  army. 

The  present  for  duty  of  the  enlisted  men  of  cavalry  under 
General  Sheridan  was  13,000. 

Total  of  all  arms  of  the  three  independent  commands 
124,700. 

The  effective  force  of  Lee’s  infantry  was  not  less  than 
46,000 ;  of  his  field  artillery,  not  less  than  5,000;  and  of  his 
cavalry,  6,000  ;  making  a  total  of  not  less  than  57,000. ! 


1  See  Appendix  L. 


324  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


On  the  28tli  of  March  General  Grant  instructed  General 
Sheridan  to  move  at  an  early  hour  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th,  cross  Hatcher’s  Run  below  where  it  would  be  crossed 
by  the  Fifth  Corps  (at  Monk’s  Neck  bridge),  pass  near  to  or 
through  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  and  reach  the  right  and 
rear  of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  practicable.  He  was  informed 
that  the  Second  and  Fifth  Corps  would  be  in  position  on  the 
Vaughan  road,  south  of  Hatcher’s  Run,  extending  to,  or  near 
to  Dinwiddie  Court  House.  It  was  not  the  intention,  he 
said,  to  attack  the  enemy  in  his  intrenched  position,  but  to 
force  him  out,  if  possible,  with  a  view  to  attacking  him. 
Should  the  enemy  remain  within  his  main  intrenched  line, 
then  General  Sheridan  might  “  cut  loose  and  push  for  the 
Danville  Road.”  If  practicable,  he  was  to  cross  the  South 
Side  Railroad  between  Petersburg  and  Burkesville,  destroy 
it  as  much  as  practicable  without  interfering  with  the  com¬ 
plete  destruction  of  the  Danville  Railroad,  which  he  was  to 
strike  as  near  the  Appomattox  as  possible.  That  being  done, 
the  South  Side  Railroad  west  of  Burkesville  was  to  be  simi¬ 
larly  destroyed. 

Having  accomplished  the  destruction  of  these  two  roads, 
he  might  return  to  the  two  armies,  or  join  General  Sherman. 
These  instructions  were  preliminary,  and  might  be  changed 
on  the  following  day. 

General  Humphreys  was  directed  to  cross  Hatcher’s  Run 
by  the  Vaughan  road  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  as  soon 
as  General  Ord’s  troops  occupied  the  intrenchments  held 
by  the  Second  Corps,  and  take  position  with  his  right  near 
Hatcher’s  Run,  and  his  left  in  communication  or  connection 
with  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  advance  toward  the  enemy’s  po¬ 
sition. 

General  Warren  was  directed  to  cross  Hatcher’s  Run  at 
Monk’s  Neck  bridge  early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  but 
not  to  proceed  beyond  the  junction  of  the  Vaughan  and 


MOVEMENT  TO  TURN  LEE’S  RIGHT. 


325 


Quaker  roads  until  the  Second  Corps  was  in  position,  when 
he  would  advance  toward  the  enemy  by  the  Boydton  road, 
his  right  connecting  with  the  Second  Corps  ;  but  at  mid¬ 
day  on  the  29th  he  was  directed  to  move  up  the  Quaker 
road.  * 

General  Wright  was  directed  to  hold  himself  ready  to  with¬ 
draw  the  Sixth  Corps  from  the  intrenchments  it  was  hold¬ 
ing  ;  General  Parks  to  remain  in  the  intrenchments  manned 
by  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  be  prepared  to  take  up  the  return- 
works  from  his  left  at  Fort  Sedgwick,  when  the  Sixth  Corps 
should  be  withdrawn. 

In  accordance  with  these  instructions,  General  Sheridan 
marched  to  Dinwiddie  Court  House  on  the  29th,  by  way  of 
Reams’s  Station  and  Malone’s  crossing  of  Rowanty  Creek, 
encountering  only  small  pickets  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  ;  but 
learning  that  a  strong  force  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  was  on  the 
south  side  of  Stony  Creek,  near  the  railroad  depot,  Custer’s 
division  was  directed  to  remain  near  Malone’s  crossing  to 
protect  the  trains.  This  Confederate  cavalry  force  consisted 
of  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  and  Rosser’s  divisions. 

General  Warren,  moving  as  directed,  after  advancing  Grif¬ 
fin’s  division  to  within  two  miles  of  Dinwiddie  Court  House, 
withdrew  it  to  the  Quaker  road,  under  his  modified  instruc¬ 
tions,  and  in  the  afternoon  moved  up  that  road,  Griffin  in 
advance.  About  a  mile  from  its  junction  with  the  Boydton 
plank-road,  in  the  vicinity  of  the  steam  sawmill,  his  leading 
brigade,  General  Chamberlain’s,  came  in  contact  with  Wise’s 
and  Wallace’s  brigades  of  Anderson’s  command,  when  a 
sharp  engagement  took  place,  in  which  the  enemy  wTas  forced 
to  fall  back  into  their  intrenchments  on  the  White  Oak  road, 
after  suffering  severely,  losing  some  200  prisoners,  besides 
the  wounded  left  on  the  field.  A  portion  of  Bartlett’s  bri¬ 
gade  took  part  in  the  action  toward  its  close.  The  loss  in 
Griffin’s  division  was  367  killed  and  wounded,  Brigadier- 


326  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

General  Sickle  among  tlie  latter.  The  loss  of  the  enemy 
was  evidently  greater. 

General  Humphreys,  taking  position  as  directed,  moved 
forward,  meeting  with  little  opposition  until  darkness  put  a 
stop  to  further  progress. 

As  soon  as  the  movement  of  our  troops  was  perceived  by 
the  enemy  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  General  Lee  sent 
General  Anderson,  with  Bushrod  Johnson’s  division  and 
Wise’s  brigade,  to  the  extreme  right  of  his  intrenchments 
along  the  White  Oak  road.  A  part  of  this  force,  as  we  have 
seen,  encountered  Griffin’s  division  in  the  afternoon  of  that 
day.  Pickett’s  division,  which  had  been  relieved  from  the 
charge  of  the  Bermuda  Hundred  intrenchments  by  Mahone’s 
division  early  in  March,  was  likewise  transferred  to  the  ex¬ 
treme  right  of  the  intrenchments,  reaching  there  at  daylight 
on  the  30th. 

General  Fitz  Lee’s  division  was  on  the  extreme  left  of  the 
Confederate  army,  when,  on  March  28th,  General  Lee,  learn¬ 
ing  that  Sheridan’s  cavalry  was  held  on  the  left  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  surmising  that  it  was  to  move  against 
the  South  Side  Railroad  and  his  right  rear,  directed  General 
Fitz  Lee  to  move  at  once  to  Five  Forks,  assume  the  com- 
mand  of  all  the  cavalry,  and- with  the  infantry  supports  he 
would  send,  attack  General  Sheridan  in  that  vicinity.  Gen¬ 
eral  Fitz  Lee  arrived  at  Sutherland  Station  with  his  division 
on  the  night  of  the  29tli. 

General  Hill  extended  to  his  right  in  the  course  of  the 
night  of  the  29tli,  and  early  in  the  morning  of  the  30th,  Mc¬ 
Gowan’s  and  McRae’s  brigades,  moving  into  the  intrench¬ 
ments  on  the  White  Oak  road  on  Johnson’s  left,  Scales’s  and 
Cooke’s  brigades  into  the  intrenchments  in  front  of  Burgess’s 
mill  and  along  the  south  side  of  Hatcher’s  Run,  probably 
including  the  Crow  house  intrenchments,  while  Lane’s,  Da¬ 
vis’s,  McComb’s,  and  Thomas’s  brigades  held  those  main- 


MOVEMENT  TO  TURN  LEE’S  RIGHT. 


327 


tained  by  Hill  north  of  Hatcher’s  Run.  General  Heth  com¬ 
manded  the  brigades  south  of  the  run,  General  Wilcox  those 
north  of  it.1 

In  the  course  of  the  29th,  General  Grant  instructed  Gen¬ 
eral  Sheridan  not  to  move  against  the  enemy’s  railroads  for 
the  present,  but  to  endeavor,  on  the  following  morning,  to 
push  around  the  enemy  and  get  on  his  right  rear. 

The  rain  fell  heavily  all  the  night  of  the  29th,  and  all  the 
next  day,  rendering  the  roads  impassable  for  artillery  and 
wagons  until  corduroyed.  The  country  was  flat,  covered 
generally  with  dense  forest  and  tangled  undergrowth,  with 
numerous  small,  swampy  streams,  that,  owing  to  the  flatness 
of  the  country,  did  not  drain  the  downfall  quickly.  The 
soil  was  a  mixture  of  clay  and  sand,  partaking  in  some  places 
of  the  nature  of  quicksand. 

On  the  30th  General  Humphreys  continued  his  advance, 
driving  the  enemy  inside  his  intrenchments  along  Hatcher’s 
Run  from  the  Crow  house  to  the  Boydton  road,  pressing 
close  up  against  them,  but  not  assaulting. 

General  Warren  moved  up  the  Quaker  and  Boydton  roads 
as  far  as  the  Dabney  Mill  road,  and  occupied  a  line  covering 
the  Boydton  road  as  far  as  Gravelly  Run.  A  reconnoissance 
was  made  by  General  Ayres’s  division  northwestward  to  the 
vicinity  of  the  point  where  the  White  Oak  road  intrench¬ 
ments  turned  north  to  cover  the  Claiborne  road,  and  a  picket 
line  was  established  in  that  vicinity,  supported  by  a  part  of 
his  division,  the  other  part  remaining  on  Griffin’s  left  in  ad¬ 
vance  of  the  Boydton  road. 

General  Sheridan  directed  General  Merritt  to  gain  posses¬ 
sion  of  Five  Forks  with  Devin’s  division,  supported  by 
Davies’s  brigade  of  Crook’s  division,  while  General  Crook 
guarded  the  Boydton  road  crossing  of  Stony  Creek.  Gen- 

1  For  the  space  of  a  mile  above  the  Crow  house  intrenchments  the  run  was 
dammed  so  as  to  be  impassable,  and  required  only  a  picket  line  to  watch  it. 


328  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


eral  Merritt  advanced  to  the  forks  of  the  road,  near  J.  Bois¬ 
seau’s,  from  which  point  reconnoissances  were  sent  on  the 
left  hand  or  Five  Forks  road,  and  on  the  right  hand  road 
leading  past  Dr.  Boisseau’s  to  the  White  Oak  road.  On 
both  these  roads  the  enemy’s  cavalry  was  encountered  and 
heavy  skirmishing  ensued.  Devin  halted  for  the  night  at 
the  forks  near  J.  Boisseau’s. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  General  Fitz  Lee 
marched  to  Five  Forks  by  the  most  direct  road,  and  advan¬ 
cing  toward  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  encountered  Sheridan’s 
cavalry,  when  sharp  skirmishing  ensued,  in  which  Lee  lost  a 
general  officer  wounded.  At  dark  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee 
and  General  Bosser  joined  him.  At  sunset  General  Pickett 
arrived  at  Five  Forks,  by  way  of  the  White  Oak  road,  with 
Corse’s,  Terry’s,  and  Steuart’s  brigades  of  his  own  division, 
and  Ransom’s  and  Wallace’s  brigades  of  Johnson’s  division. 
General  Sheridan  was  soon  made  aware  of  Pickett’s  arrival 
there,  and  reported  it  to  General  Grant. 

According  to  the  Return  of  February  20th,  the  cavalry  di¬ 
visions  of  the  two  Lees  numbered  5,760  enlisted  men,  in¬ 
cluding  Roberts’s  brigade,  which,  under  the  orders  of  General 
Anderson,  picketed  the  White  Oak  road  from  the  right  of 
the  Confederate  intrencliments  to  Five  Forks.  The  infantry 
under  Pickett,  by  the  same  return,  numbered  about  3,600  en¬ 
listed  men  of  his  own  division  and  3,000  of  Johnson’s,  mak¬ 
ing  a  total  of  6,600.  Hunton’s  brigade,  of  Pickett’s  division, 
and  Fulton’s  and  Moody’s  brigades,  of  Johnson’s  division,  to¬ 
gether  with  Wise’s  brigade,  remained  in  the  intrenchments 
along  the  White  Oak  road. 

Upon  arriving  at  Five  Forks,  General  Pickett  assumed 
command  of  the  operation  to  be  undertaken  the  following 
morning  against  General  Sheridan.  In  connection  with 
Pickett’s  attack,  General  Lee  intended  to  get  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  Fifth  Corps,  with  part  of  Hill’s  and  Anderson’s  troops, 


MOVEMENT  TO  TURN  LEE’S  RIGHT. 


329 


and  roll  it  up,  the  troops  that  remained  in  the  intrenchments 
to  join  successively  this  flank  attacking  force  as  it  arrived  in 
front  of  the  intrenchments  held  by  them.  In  this  way  he 
hoped  to  defeat  the  attempt  upon  the  South  Side  Railroad 
and  his  right  rear. 

General  Lee’s  line  was  now  so  extended  on  his  right  that 
it  was  apparent  that  some  part  of  it  must  be  very  thinly  held, 
and  Generals  Ord,  Wright,  and  Parke  were  directed  on  the 
30th  to  ascertain  the  feasibility  of  carrying  the  intrenchments 
in  their  fronts  by  assault.  Both  Generals  Wright  and  Parke 
reported  that  it  was  practicable  to  carry  them  in  that  way. 

It  was  now  General  Grant’s  intention  to  reinforce  General 
Sheridan  with  an  infantry  corps  to  enable  him  to  turn  Lee’s 
right,  and  while  he  was  accomplishing  this  to  assault  the 
Petersburg  lines  with  the  other  infantry  corps  ;  but  the  con¬ 
dition  of  the  roads  prevented  immediate  movement. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  General  Warren,  in  reporting  the 
result  of  General  Ayres’s  reconn  oissance,  suggested  that  a 
division  of  the  Second  Corps  should  take  Griflin’s  place  dur¬ 
ing  the  night,  and  that  the  Fifth  Corps  should  occupy  the 
White  Oak  road  early  the  next  morning,  an  important  object, 
since  it  would  cut  Lee’s  direct  communication  with  Pickett 
at  Five  Forks.  This  was  so  far  approved  that  General 
Humphreys  was  directed  to  relieve  General  Griffin’s  division 
during  the  night  (which  was  done  with  Miles’s  division  be¬ 
fore  daylight  of  the  31st),  and  General  Warren  was  directed 
to  place  Crawford’s  and  Griffin’s  divisions  within  supporting 
distance  of  Ayres.  General  Ayres  was  directed  by  General 
Warren  to  reinforce  his  advance  by  daylight  of  the  31st  with 
his  whole  division,  General  Crawford  to  hold  his  command 
ready  to  follow  General  Ayres,  and  General  Griffin  to  take 
up  the  position  Ayres  had  held  at  Mrs.  Butler’s,  as  soon  as 
his  division  was  relieved  by  troops  of  the  Second  Corps.  The 
position  taken  by  General  Ayres  was  in  the  open  ground  on 


330  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


the  south  side  of  the  White  Oak  road,  near  W.  Dabney’s, 
and  about  600  yards  from  that  road. 

At  7  a.m.  of  the  31st  General  Crawford  was  ordered  to 
move  out  to  the  Holliday  house,  about  500  yards  in  rear  of 
Ayres,  and  support  him.  General  Griffin  was  about  1,000 
yards  in  rear  of  Crawford  on  the  south  or  east  side  of  a 
branch  of  Gravelly  Run,  which  had  become  very  much 
swollen  during  the  night,  and  was  on  that  account  difficult 
to  cross. 

At  8  o’clock  General  Ayres  was  informed  of  Pickett’s 
presence  at  Five  Forks,  about  four  miles  from  his  left,  and 
was  cautioned  to  be  prepared  for  an  attack  against  his  left 
flank  as  well  as  on  his  front.  General  Ayres  formed  his 
division,  with  General  Winthrop’s  brigade  looking  north 
fronting  the  White  Oak  road,  General  Denison’s  Maryland 
brigade  along  a  ravine  on  Winthrop’s  left  looking  west,  his 
third  brigade  somewhat  to  Winthrop’s  right,  and  a  brigade 
Which  Crawford  sent  him  in  rear  of  his  centre. 

At  half-past  eight  o’clock  corps  commanders  were  notified 
that  there  would  be  no  movement  of  troops  that  day,  owing 
to  the  almost  impassable  condition  of  the  roads  and  country, 
caused  by  the  continuous  heavy  rain  that  had  fallen.  But 
at  9.40  a.m.  General  Warren  telegraphed  General  Meade  that 
the  enemy’s  pickets  covered  the  White  Oak  road,  and  that 
he  had  sent  word  to  General  Ayres  to  drive  them  off  or  ascer¬ 
tain  with  what  force  the  enemy  held  the  road.  General 
Meade  replied  to  this,  that  if  his  reconnoissance  should  show 
that  he  could  get  possession  of  and  hold  the  White  Oak 
road,  he  was  to  do  so,  notwithstanding  the  order  to  suspend 
operations  during  the  day. 

General  Lee,  in  furtherance  of  his  plan  of  attacking  the 
left  flank  of  the  Fifth  Corps  on  the  morning  of  the  31st, 
directed  General  McGowan  to  take  his  own  brigade  and 
Gracie’s  (commanded  by  Colonel  Sanford)  and  move  out  of 


ACTION  OF  WHITE  OAK  RIDGE. 


331 


tlie  intrenchments  by  the  White  Oak  road,  get  across  the 
flank  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  attack.  General  Hunton’s 
brigade  was  drawn  np  on  the  edge  of  the  wood  along  the 
north  side  of  the  White  Oak  road,  fronting  the  open  ground 
of  W.  Dabney.  General  Wise’s  brigade  was  formed  on  his 
left,  but  at  precisely  what  hour  does  not  appear.  General 
Lee  was  on  the  ground,  directing  the  movement  in  person. 

General  McGowan  had  not  quite  got  into  the  position  he 
intended  to  take,  and  General  Hunton  had  just  formed  his 
brigade,  when,  at  eleven  o’clock,  General  Winthrop’s  brigade 
moved  forward,  supported  on  the  right  by  the  Third  Bri¬ 
gade,  commanded  by  General  James  Gwyn.  When  within 
50  yards  of  the  White  Oak  road  the  enemy’s  line  of  battle 
moved  forward  out  of  the  wood  across  the  road  into  the 
open  field  to  meet  them,  and  the  firing  began.  Seeing  that 
he  had  a  much  superior  force  to  encounter,  General  Win- 
throp  faced  his  brigade  about,  General  Ayres  says,  and 
marched  back  across  the  field  in  good  order.  It  was  now 
General  Ayres’s  intention  to  form  his  line  of  battle  along  the 
edge  of  the  wood  on  the  south  side  of  the  field,  but  the  sup¬ 
ports  could  not  be  held,  due,  in  part,  he  says,  to  the  enemy’s 
attack  on  his  left  flank  at  the  same  time  that  the  front  at¬ 
tack  was  made.  Again  he  endeavored  to  form  his  troops 
along  a  ravine,  but  in  this  he  also  failed,  and  they  fell  back 
to  the  ground  they  had  occupied  the  day  before,  behind  a 
branch  of  Gravelly  Bun,  where  Griffin  was  in  position,  and 
to  the  intrenchments  along  the  Boydton  road,  along  the 
left  of  Miles’s  division.  Brigadier-General  Denison  was 
among  the  wounded.  Crawford’s  division  fell  back  in  con¬ 
fusion,  Colonel  Kellogg  attempting  with  his  brigade  to  make 
a  stand,  but  uselessly. 

General  Hunton,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Warren  Court 
of  Inquiry,  says  of  this  affair  that  he  had  scarcely  formed 
line  of  battle  when  a  large  force  of  infantry  marched  out  upon 


332  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


them ;  that  he  had  no  orders  to  attack  or  charge,  but  that  a 
lieutenant  in  his  brigade,  promoted  for  gallantry,  rushed  out 
from  his  company,  waved  his  sword,  and  said,  “  Follow  me, 
boys,”  and  from  that  the  three  brigades,  McGowan’s,  Gracie’s, 
and  his  own,  made  the  charge.  General  McGowan  says  of 
it,  that  he  had  not  completed  his  movement  to  the  right 
across  the  left  flank  of  Ayres  when  the  firing  in  front  began, 
and  he  at  once  ordered  the  charge  to  be  made ;  that  it  was 
successful ;  and  although  the  enemy  attempted  to  rally  two 
or  three  times,  yet  they  were  driven  from  the  ground  and 
across  a  branch  of  Gravelly  Run,  on  the  other  side  of  which 
was  a  strong  force  with  artillery.  General  Hunton  mentions 
the  successive  attempts  to  reform  made  by  Warren’s  troops 
when  they  wTere  falling  back.  His  brigade,  he  says,  did  not 
advance  to  the  run,  but  about  two-thirds  of  the  way  to  it  from 
the  White  Oak  Road,  that  is,  not  much  beyond  the  Holliday 
fields. 

The  sudden  burst  of  heavy  musketry  firing,  coming  from 
the  position  of  Warren’s  advance  troops,  followed  soon  by  a 
large  and  increasing  number  of  stragglers  coming  to  the  rear, 
satisfied  General  Humphreys  that  Warren’s  advance  needed 
support,  and  he  at  once  ordered  General  Miles  to  go  forward 
quickly  with  two  of  his  brigades  and  attack  the  enemy’s  left 
flank.  This  was  done  in  a  prompt  and  spirited  manner.  The 
other  two  brigades  of  his  division  followed  soon  after.  Mott 
was  ordered  to  attack  in  his  front,  and  Hays  the  Crow  house 
intrenchments.  These  directions  were  in  conformity  to  those 
subsequently  received  from  General  Meade. 

Wise’s  brigade  had  advanced  on  the  left  of  Hunton’s,  and 
being  struck  in  front  and  flank  by  Miles,  fell  back  rapidly 
into  the  intrenchments  with  severe  loss  of  killed,  wounded, 
and  prisoners.  The  prisoners  taken  numbered  more  than 
300,  some  of  whom  belonged  to  Hunton’s  brigade.  The  flag 
of  an  Alabama  regiment  was  also  captured. 


ACTION  OF  WHITE  OAK  RIDGE. 


333 


Wise  being  driven  from  the  ground,  Hunton  was  forced  to 
fall  back  also,  and  General  Warren  having  by  that  time  got 
some  part  of  Griffin’s  division  across  the  run,  with  which  he 
threatened  McGowan’s  right  flank,  the  whole  force  fell  back 
to  the  position  occupied  by  Ayres  in  the  morning  near  the 
W.  Dabney  house. 

The  enemy’s  intrenchments  covering  the  White  Oak  road 
were  on  the  crest  of  a  long  slope,  with  wide  slashings  in  front, 
and  abatis  along  the  ditch,  with  artillery  at  short  intervals. 
The  works  were  unused  and  in  good  order. 

General  Mott  attempted  to  carry  the  redoubts  and  intrench¬ 
ments  covering  the  Boydton  road  crossing  of  Hatcher’s  Run, 
but  without  success.  General  Hays  attempted  to  carry  the 
Crow  house  redoubt,  but  although  he  kept  down  the  fire  of 
their  artillery,  the  heavy  slashing  in  front  of  the  works  was 
absolutely  impassable  to  even  a  small  body  of  troops.1 

By  half-past  two  o’clock  General  Warren  had  formed  his 
corps  on  the  north  side  of  the  branch  of  Gravelly  Run  ready 
to  move  forward  to  the  White  Oak  road  where  the  morning’s 
engagement  had  begun,  Griffin  in  the  centre  (Chamberlain’s 
brigade  leading),  Ayres’s  division  on  Griffin’s  left,  Crawford’s 
on  his  right,  both  in  echelon.  General  Chamberlain,  driving 
in  some  skirmishers  as  he  went  forward,  came  in  front  of 
Hunton’s  brigade,  in  slight  breastworks,  from  which  he  re¬ 
ceived  a  sharp  fire.  General  Gregory  came  to  his  support, 
moving  into  the  wood  on  his  right.  Chamberlain  then 
charged  the  breastworks  in  his  front,  General  Hunton  says, 


1  General  Wilcox  says  of  these  attempts  of  Mott  and  Hays,  and  of  the  pressing 
of  General  Ord’s  troops  close  up  against  the  intrenchments  north  of  Hatcher’s 
Run,  that  during  most  of  the  day,  while  the  fighting  was  severe  further  to  the 
right  there  was  a  very  heavy  skirmish  going  on  about  Burgess’s  mill,  and  on 
Cooke’s  brigade  below  the  mill  and  on  Lane’s  brigade.  It  was  so  heavy  and  threat¬ 
ening  about  the  mill  (Mott’s  attack)  that  General  Heth  sent  to  him  for  a  brigade, 
but  that  the  firing  was  increasing  so  on  his  own  front  (Hays's  and  Ord’s  troops) 
■  that  he  could  not  send  any  assistance  to  Heth. 


334  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


in  the  most  gallant  manner,  carried  them,  capturing  some 
prisoners  and  a  battle-flag,  while  Gregory  turned  their  left. 
Hunton  was  driven  into  the  White  Oak  road  intrenchments, 
and  McGowan,  seeing  Hunton’s  line  give  way,  fell  back  at 
once  with  his  two  brigades  into  their  main  works. 

The  killed  and  wounded  in  General  Warren’s  corps  to-day 
were  173  in  the  First  Division,  325  in  the  Second,  and  431  in 
the  Third,  and  7  in  the  artillery  and  escort.  Total,  936. 
The  missing  were  470,  making  an  aggregate  of  1,406. 

The  casualties  in  General  Humphreys’s  corps  were  374 
killed  and  wounded,  officers  and  enlisted  men. 

General  Ord  pushed  up  close  to  the  enemy’s  works,  losing 
sharply  in  doing  so,  and  capturing  many  prisoners. 

In  the  morning  of  the  31st  General  Fitz  Lee  moved  with 
his  cavalry  toward  Dinwiddie  Court  House  on  the  direct  road 
to  it  from  Five  Forks,  encountering  Devin’s  division,  which 
was  moving  toward  Five  Forks.  Pickett’s  infantry  had  not 
yet  moved.  Leaving  Munford  (Fitz  Lee’s  division)  in  con¬ 
tact  with  Devin,  near  the  fork  of  the  Gravelly  Bun  Church 
road,  Pickett  moved  with  his  infantry,  Fitz  Lee  with  W. 
H.  F.  Lee’s  and  Bosser’s  cavalry  divisions  leading,  by  way 
of  Little  Five  Forks,  wTest  of  Chamberlain’s  Creek  or  bed, 
intending  to  cross  that  stream  at  Fitzgerald’s  and  Danse’s 
and  attack  General  Sheridan’s  left  flank,  while  Munford  at¬ 
tacked  his  front. 

General  Crook  was  holding  Fitzgerald’s  crossing  with 
General  Smith’s  brigade,  Danse’s  crossing,  a  mile  above, 
with  Davies’s  brigade,  keeping  Gregg  in  reserve.  Fitzger¬ 
ald’s  crossing  was  two  and  one-half  miles  from  Dinwiddie 
Court  House,  measured  by  the  road,  and  in  a  direct  line  a 
mile  and  three-quarters  from  it  in  a  northwest  direction. 
As  soon  as  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee  arrived  upon  the  ground 
he  attempted  to  force  the  passage  of  Chamberlain’s  bed  at 
Fitzgerald’s  crossing,  and  succeeded  in  getting  over,  but 


ACTION  OF  DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. 


335 


was  driven  back  with  heavy  loss.  No  better  success  was 
met  with  at  Danse’s  crossing  at  first,  but  about  one  o’clock 
the  infantry,  Corse’s  brigade  leading,  succeeded  in  carrying 
it  after  sharp  fighting,  in  which  it  met  with  severe  loss.' 
Gregg  attacking  held  them  here  for  a  time.  Munford  mean¬ 
while  had  forced  Devin  back,  and  Pickett’s  infantry  driving 
Davies  upon  Devin’s  left,  passed  between  Devin  and  Crook. 
Being  thus  isolated,  and  unable  to  withdraw  to  Dinwiddie 
Court  House  by  the  direct  road,  Devin  and  Davies  were 
ordered  to  retire,  fighting,  toward  the  Boydton  road,  and  by 
that  road  to  reach  the  Court  House.  Gibbs  (of  Devin’s 
division)  withdrew  his  brigade  toward  the  Court  House  and 
joined  Crook’s  command.  W.  H.  F.  Lee  had  now  forced  the 
crossing  of  Chamberlain's  Bun,  and  moving  up  the  road 
through  the  Adams  farms,  united  with  and  formed  the  right 
of  Pickett’s  troops — Munford  his  left.  Crook’s  two  brigades, 
Smith’s  and  Gregg’s,  had  been  forced  to  fall  back. 

Pickett  having  exposed  his  rear  in  following  Devin  and 
Davies  toward  the  Boydton  road,  General  Sheridan  ordered 
Gibbs  and  Gregg  to  attack  him,  and  directed  Custer  to  bring 
up  two  of  his  brigades,  Pennington’s  and  Capehart’s,  to  join 
in  the  attack.  This  attack  freed  Devin  and  Davies  from 
further  molestation,  and  forced  Pickett  to  face  about  and 
meet  Sheridan’s  line  of  battle  in  front  of  the  Court  House. 
A  spirited,  obstinate  contest  ensued,  which  lasted  until 
night,  Smith’s  brigade,  General  Sheridan  says,  bearing  the 
brunt  of  the  cavalry  attack. 

Devin  and  Davies  reached  the  Court  House  by  way  of  the 
Boydton  road,  but  not  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  closing 
action. 

The  ground  over  which  the  greater  part  of  the  fighting 
took  place  during  the  day  was  very  heavy ;  a  large  part  of  it 
was  densely  wooded. 

The  two  contending  lines  of  battle  lay  very  close  to  each 


336  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


other  that  night,  Pickett’s  infantry  across  the  road  from  Din- 
widdie  Court  House  to  Five  Forks,  with  cavalry  on  each 
flank,  whose  pickets  extended  on  his  left  to  the  vicinity  of 
the  Boydton  road  near  G.  U.  Brooks’s,  and  on  his  right  to 
Fitzgerald’s  crossing  of  Chamberlain’s  Bun.  Custer  held 
Sheridan’s  front,  supported  by  Devin. 

About  five  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  General  Warren,  then  at 
W.  Dabney’s  on  the  White  Oak  road,  heard  the  sound  of 
General  Sheridan’s  engagement  coming  from  a  southwest 
direction.  It  seemed  to  him  to  have  receded  and  to  be  still 
receding.  He  at  once  sent  General  Bartlett  with  his  brigade 
of  Griffin’s  division  across  the  country  to  General  Sheridan’s 
support,  with  directions  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank.  He 
sent  his  topographer,  Major  Cope,  with  him.  A  little  later 
he  received  directions  from  General  Meade  to  push  a  brigade 
down  the  White  Oak  road  so  as  to  open  it  for  General  Sheri¬ 
dan,  and  to  support  the  brigade  if  necessary.  At  half-past 
six  he  was  directed  to  send  the  force  which  had  been  ordered 
to  move  out  the  White  Oak  road  down  the  Boydton  plank- 
road  as  promptly  as  possible,  as  a  staff-officer  of  General 
Merritt  had  reported  to  General  Meade  that  the  enemy  had 
penetrated  between  General  Sheridan’s  main  command  and 
Warren’s  position. 

But  as  General  Bartlett  was  at  that  time  too  distant  to  be 
recalled  for  the  prompt  execution  of  this  order,  General 
Warren  directed  General  Pearson,  who  was  then  on  the  Boyd¬ 
ton  road  with  three  regiments,  to  move  at  once  toward  Din- 
widdie  Court  House.  But  the  bridge  at  the  Boydton  road 
crossing  of  Gravelly  Bun  had  been  destroyed  by  the  enemy 
on  the  29th,  and  the  stream,  swollen  by  the  rains,  had  be¬ 
come  unfordable  for  infantry,  and  General  Pearson  was  com¬ 
pelled  to  stop  there.  At  eight  o’clock  General  Warren  was 
advised  by  General  Meade  that  General  Sheridan  had  been 
forced  back  to  Dinwiddie  Court  House  by  a  strong  force  of 


ACTION  OF  DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. 


337 


cavalry  supported  by  infantry,  and  as  this  left  the  rear  of  the 
Fifth  and  Second  Corps  open  on  the  Boydton  road,  it  would 
require  great  vigilance  on  their  paft ;  that  the  brigade  sent 
down  the  Boydton  road  should  not  go  farther  than  Gravelly 
Run.  But  about  half-past  nine  General  Warren  received  or¬ 
ders  to  withdraw  his  command  from  the  White  Oak  road  to 
the  Boydton  road,  and  send  Griffin’s  division  at  once  to  Gen¬ 
eral  Sheridan  by  the  Boydton  road. 

General  Humphreys  was  directed  to  throw  back  the  left 
of  the  Second  Corps. 

General  Warren  at  once  sent  a  staff  officer,  and  afterward 
Captain  Benyaurd,  of  the  Engineers,  to  examine  and  repair, 
or  rebuild  the  bridge,  which,  it  was  found,  required  the 
building  of  a  span  forty  feet  in  length,  and  prepared  to  with¬ 
draw  to  the  plank-road,  and  send  Griffin  to  General  Sheridan, 
advising  General  Meade  of  the  position  and  condition  of  his 
several  divisions.  Somewhat  later  General  Warren  was  noti¬ 
fied  that  the  division  to  be  sent  to  General  Sheridan  must 
start  at  once.  In  replying  to  this,  General  Warren  stated 
that  the  bridge  was  broken,  and  that  it  would  take  he  did 
not  know  how  long  to  repair  or  rebuild  it ;  that  he  would 
make  every  effort  to  render  it  passable  by  the  time  General 
Griffin  reached  it. 

At  8.40  General  Warren  telegraphed  General  Meade,1  sug¬ 
gesting  that  he  should  move  with  his  corps,  and  attack  the 
enemy  near  Dinwiddie  Court  House  on  one  side,  while  Gen¬ 
eral  Sheridan  attacked  on  the  other,  provided  the  enemy  did 
not  threaten  us  south  of  Gravelly  Run ,  east  of  the planjc-road. 


1  General  Meade’s  headquarters  were  at  the  Vaughan  road  crossing  of  Hatcher’s 
Run,  about  five  miles  from  General  Warren’s,  which  were  on  the  Boydton  road. 
General  Grant’s  headquarters  were  near  Dabney’s  mill,  about  two  miles  from 
General  Meade’s.  It  is  evident,  from  the  great  length  of  time  that  was  required 
to  communicate  between  these  headquarters,  that  the  telegraph  was  working 
badly.  General  Grant’s  headquarters  were  about  eight  miles  from  Dinwiddie 
Court  House. 

XII.— 15 


338  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 


At  9.45  General  Meade  submitted  this  proposition  (which, 
under  the  circumstances,  was  the  best  thing  on  all  accounts 
to  do)  to  General  Grant,  and  at  the  same  time  stated  that 
Bartlett’s  brigade  was  at  or  near  Gravelly  Run,  on  the  road 
running  north  from  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  past  J.  Bois- 
seau’s,  to  the  White  Oak  road ;  that  Warren  could  move  at 
once  that  way  and  take  the  force  threatening  Sheridan  in 
rear,  or  he  could  send  one  division  to  support  Sheridan  near 
Dinwiddie  Court  House,  and  move  on  the  enemy’s  rear  with 
the  two  other  divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  To  this  General 
Grant  replied,  “  Let  Warren  move  in  the  way  you  propose, 
and  urge  him  not  to  stop  for  anything.  Let  Griffin  go  on  as 
he  was  first  directed.” 

At  10.50  General  Warren  received  General  Meade’s  reply 
to  his  suggestion  of  8.40,  which,  conforming  to  General 
Grant’s  despatch  just  quoted,  directed  General  Warren  to 
send  Griffin  promptly,  as  ordered,  by  the  Boydton  road,  and 
to  move  the  rest  of  his  corps  by  the  road  Bartlett  was  on, 
and  strike  the  enemy  in  rear.  He  was  informed  that  Gene¬ 
ral  Sheridan  reported  his  own  position  to  be  north  of  Dinwid¬ 
die  Court  House,  near  Dr.  Smith’s,  and  that  the  enemy  held 
the  cross-roads  at  that  point.  He  was  directed  to  be  very 
prompt  in  this  movement,  and  get  the  forks  of  the  Brooks 
cross-road,  so  as  to  open  communication  by  it  with  the  Boyd¬ 
ton  road,  and  cautioned  not  to  encumber  himself  with  any¬ 
thing  that  would  impede  his  progress  or  prevent  his  moving 
in  any  direction. 

General  Meade  informed  General  Sheridan  of  the  orders 
given  General  Warren,  and  what  had  been  done  to  get  troops 
to  him,  and  by  what  routes  part  of  them  would  unite  with 
him,  and  part  co-operate  with  him.  General  Grant  also  in¬ 
formed  him  of  the  orders  given  for  the  same  object,  and  that 
he  had  also  sent  Mackenzie’s  cavalry  to  him. 

Upon  receiving  the  above  order  at  10.50,  General  Warren 


ACTION  OP  DINWIDDLE  COURT  HOUSE. 


339 


replied  that  he  would  send  Ayres  instead  of  Griffin  to  Gen¬ 
eral  Sheridan  by  the  Boydton  road,  as  in  withdrawing  his 
troops  to  that  road  in  accordance  with  previous  orders, 
Ayres’s  division  was  necessarily  the  first  to  reach  it ;  and  that 
he  would  move  with  Griffin’s  and  Crawford’s  divisions  against 
the  enemy,  as  the  last  despatch  from  General  Meade  di¬ 
rected.  At  the  same  time  he  gave  the  preliminary  orders  for 
the  movement  of  these  two  divisions. 

His  despatches  do  not  clearly  explain  why  he  did  not  move 
with  these  two  divisions  as  quickly  as  the  troops  could  be 
got  in  motion,  though  it  is  to  be  inferred  from  the  subse¬ 
quent  despatches  that  it  was  because  he  apprehended  that 
Ayres  might  not  get  to  General  Sheridan  in  time  to  pre¬ 
vent  him  from  being  forced  back  to  the  Vaughan  road,  and 
that  in  that  case  the  best  route  for  the  whole  corps  would 
be  by  the  Boydton  road.  The  tenor  of  General  Meade’s 
instructions  to  him  before  and  after  11  p.m.,  was,  that  the 
first  and  most  important  object  for  him  to  accomplish  was 
to  get  a  division  to  General  Sheridan  by  the  Boydton, 
or  any  other  road  not  closed  by  the  enemy,  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment,  and  in  time  to  go  into  action  at  day¬ 
light. 

It  was  not  until  one  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  1st  of 
April  that  General  Warren  had  a  reply  from  General  Meade, 
concerning  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  over  Gravelly  Run, 
which  neither  General  Meade  nor  General  Grant  had  been 
aware  of,  and  in  which  it  was  suggested  that  the  troops  for 
General  Sheridan  should  go  by  the  Quaker  road  ;  and  stat¬ 
ing  that  time  was  of  the  utmost  importance ;  that  General 
Sheridan  could  not  maintain  himself  at  Dinwiddie  Court 
House  without  reinforcements ;  that  he,  General  Warren, 
must  use  every  exertion  to  get  troops  to  him  as  soon  as  possi¬ 
ble.  If  necessary  to  insure  that,  he  could  send  troops  by  both 
roads,  and  give  up  the  rear  attack.  If  General  Sheridan  was 


340  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


not  reinforced  and  was  compelled  to  fall  back,  lie  would  re¬ 
tire  by  the  Vanglian  road.  But  the  distance  from  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  General  Warren’s  troops  to  Dinwiddie  Court  House, 
by  the  Quaker  road,  was  from  9  to  10  miles,  and  by  that 
route  they  could  scarcely  reach  General  Sheridan  before 
eight  o’clock  in  the  morning — too  late  an  hour  to  accomplish 
the  object  of  their  going.  Of  this  General  Meade  was  ad¬ 
vised,  but  General  Warren  added  that  if  he  failed  to  send 
reinforcements  by  the  Vaughan  road,  he  would  send  them 
by  the  Quaker  road. 

In  case  General  Sheridan  should  be  obliged  to  retire  by 
the  Vaughan  road,  the  best  route,  in  General  Warren’s  opin¬ 
ion,  by  which  the  rear  of  the  enemy  could  be  attacked  would 
be  by  the  Boydton  road.  As  it  appeared  to  General  Warren 
that  this  despatch  left  it  discretionary  with  him  as  to  how 
he  could  best  reinforce  General  Sheridan,  he  determined  to 
abide  by  the  movement  already  in  progress. 

At  two  o’clock  in  the  morning  the  bridge  over  Gravelly 
Bun  was  practicable  for  the  passage  of  infantry,  and  General 
Ayres  was  crossing  it,  in  his  advance  toward  Dinwiddie 
Court  House.  Of  this  General  Warren  at  once  advised  Gen¬ 
eral  Meade. 

An  hour  before  daybreak,  when  about  two  miles  from  the 
Court  House,  General  Ayres  v^ts  met  by  an  officer  of  General 
Sheridan’s  staff,  who  led  him  back  about  a  mile  to  the 
Brooks  road,  and  along  it  to  the  road  leading  north  from  the 
Court  House  to  the  White  Oak  road,  where,  by  direction  of 
General  Sheridan,  the  division  was  massed  to  await  further 
orders.  General  Ayres  says  that  about  the  dawn  of  day, 
soon  after  entering  the  Brooks  Boad,  one  of  Munford’s  ve¬ 
dettes  was  seen  moving  off. 

At  half-past  four  o’clock  General  Warren  learnt  that  Ayres 
had  communicated  with  General  Sheridan,  and  he  was  about 
joining  Generals  Griffin  and  Crawford  to  move  across  the 


ACTION  OF  DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. 


341 


country  against  Pickett’s  rear,  when  lie  received  General 
Sheridan’s  despatch  sent  at  3  a.m.1 

But  General  Warren  should  have  moved  with  Griffin  and 
Crawford  as  soon  as  practicable  after  receiving  Meade’s  order 
at  10.50  p.m.,  though  it  will  be  observed  that  subsequent  to 
that  hour  General  Meade  subordinated  all  General  Warren’s 
efforts  to  ensuring  the  presence  of  one  of  his  divisions  with 
General  Sheridan  by  daylight.2 


1  This  despatch  said:  “  I  am  holding  in  front  of  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  on 
the  road  leading  to  Five  Forks,  for  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  with  General  Cus¬ 
ter’s  division.  The  enemy  are  in  his  immediate  front,  lying  so  as  to  cover  the 
road  just  this  side  of  the  Adams  House,  which  leads  out  across  Chamberlain’s 
Bed  or  Run.  I  understand  you  have  a  division  at  J.  Boiseau’s  [Dr.  Boisseau’s 
was  meant]  ;  if  so  you  are  in  rear  of  the  enemy’s  line,  and  almost  on  his  flank.  I 
will  hold  oil  here.  Possibly  they  may  attack  Custer  at  daylight ;  if  so,  have  this 
division  attack  instantly  and  in  full  force.  Attack  at  daylight  anyway,  and  I  will 
make  an  effort  to  get  the  road  this  side  of  Adams’  house,  and  if  I  do,  you  can  cap¬ 
ture  the  whole  of  them.  Any  force  moving  down  the  road  I  am  holding,  or  on 
the  White  Oak  road,  will  be  in  the  enemy’s  rear,  and  in  all  probability  get  any 
force  that  may  escape  you  by  a  flank  attack.  Do  not  fear  my  leaving  here.  If 
the  enemy  remain  I  shall  fight  at  daylight.” 

2  The  Court  of  Inquiry  which  was  appointed  by  the  President,  at  the  request  of 
General  Warren,  to  investigate  this  and  other  matters,  say  of  this  : 

“Notwithstanding  that  dispositions  suitable  for  the  contingency  of  Sheridan’s 
falling  back  from  Dinwiddie  might  well  have  occupied  and  perplexed  General 
Warren’s  mind  during  the  night,  the  court  is  of  the  opinion  that  he  should  have 
moved  the  two  divisions  by  the  Crump  road  in  obedience  to  the  orders  and  expec¬ 
tations  of  his  commander,  upon  whom  alone  rested  the  responsibility  of  the  con¬ 
sequences. 

“  It  appears  from  the  despatches  and  General  Warren’s  testimony,  that  neither 
Generals  Meade,  Sheridan,  nor  Warren  expressed  an  intention  of  having  this  col¬ 
umn  attack  before  daylight. 

“  The  court  is  further  of  the  opinion  that  General  Warren  should  have  started 
with  two  divisions,  as  directed  by  General  Meade’s  despatch  (civ.,  heretofore 
quoted),  as  early  after  its  receipt  at  10.50  p.m.,  as  he  could  be  assured  of  the 
prospect  of  Ayres’s  departure  down  the  Boydton  plank-road,  and  should  have  ad¬ 
vanced  on  the  Crump  road  as  far  as  directed  in  that  despatch,  or  as  far  as  might 
be  practicable  or  necessary'  to  fulfil  General  Meade’s  intentions  ;  whereas  the  evi¬ 
dence  shows  that  he  did  not  start  until  between  five  and  six  o’clock  on  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  1st  of  April,  and  did  not  reach  J.  Boisseau’s  with  the  head  of  the  col¬ 
umn  till  about  seven  o’clock  in  the  morning. 

“  The  despatches  show  that  Generals  Meade  and  Warren  anticipated  a  with¬ 
drawal  during  the  night  of  the  enemy’s  forces  fronting  General  Sheridan,  which 
was  rendered  highly  probable  from  the  known  position  in  their  rear  of  a  portion 


342  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 


General  Bartlett  had  moved  with  his  brigade  from  the  vi¬ 
cinity  of  W.  Dabney’s  on  the  White  Oak  road,  at  five  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  31st,  by  a  wood-road  toward  the  sound 
of  firing  near  Dinwiddie  Court  House.  This  brought  him  to 
Dr.  Boisseau’s,  on  the  most  direct  road  from  the  White  Oak 
road  to  the  Court  House,  where  his  skirmishers  met  those  of 
the  enemy,  and  drove  them  across  Gravelly  Bun  on  that  road 
and  at  Crump’s.  A  picket  line  was  then  established  by  Bartlett 
along  the  run.  It  was  dark  before  this  was  accomplished. 

The  presence  of  General  Bartlett’s  brigade  along  the  main 
branch  of  Gravelly  Bun,  at  the  crossing  of  these  roads, 
became  known  to  General  Pickett  about  ten  o’clock  at  night. 
Its  subsequent  withdrawal,  near  midnight,  was  not  known  to 
the  enemy.  General  Fitz  Lee  says  that  General  Pickett 
believing  it  to  be  the  advance  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  determined 
to  withdraw  to  Five  Forks  during  the  night.  Accordingly 
the  ambulance  and  ammunition  trains  and  the  artillery  began 
to  move  back  about  midnight,  followed  by  the  infantry, 
which  took  the  most  direct  road  to  Five  Forks,  the  last 
brigade,  Corse’s,  getting  off  just  before,  or  about,  daylight. 
Munford’s  division  followed  on  the  route  of  the  infantry 
about  daylight.  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  and  Bosser’s  divisions  at 
the  same  time  crossed  Chamberlain’s  Bed,  and  returned  to 
Five  Forks  by  way  of  Little  Five  Forks.* 1  Having  reported 


of  the  Fifth  Corps  (Bartlett’s  brigade)  at  G.  Boisseau’s,  [Dr.  Boisseau’s  is  meant. 
— A.  A.  H.J  and  the  event  justified  the  anticipation.” — Proceedings ,  Findings ,  cnid 
Opinions  of  Court  of  Inquiry  in  Case  of  Gen.  G.  K.  Warren ,  pp.  1558-9. 

1  General  Fitz  Lee  says,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry, 
that  in  consultation  with  General  Pickett,  when  they  learnt,  about  ten  o’clock  at 
night,  that  our  infantry  was  moving  against  them,  it  was  decided  to  withdraw, 
and  that  nearly  all  the  artillery,  ammunition,  and  ambulance  trains  which  pre¬ 
ceded  the  troops  got  off  by  midnight. 

He  further  says  that  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  and  Rosser’s  divisions  were  ordered  by  him 
to  withdraw  at  four  o’clock  in  the  morning,  and  that  Munford's  division  with¬ 
drew  at  daylight,  following  the  infantry. 

General  W.  H.  F.  Lee  states  in  his  testimony  that  he  began  his  withdrawal  a 
little  before  day ;  that  his  impression  was  that  the  infantry  withdrew  about  mid- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


343 


this  action  by  telegraph  to  General  Lee,  General  Pickett 
was  directed  to  maintain  the  position  of  Five  Forks,  in  order 
to  cover  the  South  Side  Railroad  and  the  wagon-roads  south 
of  the  Appomattox,  which  Lee  intended  to  use  in  abandoning 
Petersburg  and  Richmond,  and  moving  toward  Danville  or 
Lynchburg.  He  at  once  intrenched  as  much  as  practicable. 

At  5  a.m.  General  Griffin  moved  from  the  White  Oak  road 
across  the  country  to  Crump’s,  and  thence  to  the  forks  of  the 
road  at  J.  Boisseau’s,  where,  about  seven  o’clock  in  the  morn¬ 
ing,  he  met  General  Devin  with  his  cavalry  division,  and  re¬ 
ported  to  General  Sheridan.  General  Crawford  followed  him. 
General  Warren  was  directed  by  General  Sheridan  to  remain 
at  J.  Boisseau’s,  refresh  his  men,  and  be  ready  to  move  to  the 
front  when  required ;  and  General  Mackenzie,  who  had  re¬ 
ported  with  his  cavalry,  was  directed  to  rest  at  Dinwiddie 
Court  House  until  further  orders. 

At  daylight  General  Merritt,  with  the  First  and  Third  Cav¬ 
alry  Divisions  moved  forward  toward  Five  Forks,  pressing 
the  rear  of  the  enemy  ;  Custer’s  division,  dismounted,  on  the 
left  (the  country  being  impracticable  for  mounted  men), 


night  or  after  midnight ;  that  the  news  came  to  him  about  midnight  that  the 
infantry  would  retire. 

The  despatch  of  his  Adjutant-General  to  General  Beale  was  shown  to  him, 
dated  2  a.m.,  April  1,  1865,  saying,  “  General  Lee  wishes  you  to  withdraw  your 
command  to  this  side  of  the  creek  when  General  Pickett’s  infantry  has  withdrawn, 
at  4  a.m.  You  will  bivouac  on  this  side.” 

This  despatch  shows  that  it  was  expected  that  the  infantry  would  have  been  out 
of  the  way  by  four  o’clock,  which  conforms  to  General  Corse’s  statement  that  his 
brigade,  the  rear  of  the  infantry,  withdrew  or  started  to  retire  about  daylight, 
perhaps  a  little  before ;  it  was  very  early  dawn,  just  about  the  dawn  of  day. 

Colonel  Walter  Harrison,  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General  of  Pickett’s  division, 
says  Pickett’s  command  started  back  toward  Five  Forks  about  two  o’clock  in  the 
morning  of  April  1st. 

Colonel  Mayo,  commanding  Terry’s  brigade,  says  he  began  to  withdraw  at  2 
A.M.,  as  had  been  agreed  upon  by  the  brigade  commander  to  whom  General  Pickett 
left  the  arrangements  for  the  withdrawal. 

General  Pickett  states  in  his  report  that,  ascertaining  that  General  Sheridan 
was  being  reinforced  with  infantry,  he  was  “induced  to  fall  back,  at  daylight  in 
the  morning,  to  the  Five  Forks.” 


344  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 


Devin  on  tlie  right.  Custer’s  left  moved  along  Chamberlain’s 
Run.  General  Crook  was  held  in  support. 

General  Pickett  had,  in  the  meanwhile,  intrenched  his  in¬ 
fantry  along  the  White  Oak  road,  extending  about  a  mile 
west  of  Five  Forks,  and  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  east 
of  it,  with  a  short  return  about  one  hundred  yards  long  at  his 
left.  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  cavalry  division  was  on  his 
right,  along  the  west  line  of  the  Gilliam  field,  then  followed 
in  succession  Corse’s  brigade  (whose  line  lay  along  the  north 
edge  of  the  Gilliam  field),  Terry’s,  Steuart’s,  Ransom’s,  and 
Wallace’s  brigades,  with  Pegram’s  battalion  of  artillery  on  the 
line,  three  guns  on  Corse’s  right,  and  three  at  the  Five  Forks, 
with  McGregor’s  battery  of  four  guns  on  the  left.  Munford’s 
cavalry  division,  dismounted,  was  posted  on  the  left  so  as  to 
cover  the  ground  between  Wallace’s  left  and  Hatcher’s  Eun. 
It  connected  with  Roberts’s  brigade,  which  picketed  toward 
the  right  of  their  main  line  of  intrenchments,  covering  the 
Claiborne  road.  General  Rosser  guarded  the  trains  on  the 
north  side  of  Hatcher’s  Run,  near  the  Ford  road. 

General  Merritt  pressed  close  up  to  Pickett’s  intrench¬ 
ments. 

General  Sheridan’s  plan  of  attack  was  to  make  a  feint  of 
turning  the  enemy’s  right  flank  with  Merritt’s  cavalry,  while 
he  assaulted  their  left  flank  with  the  Fifth  Corps,  Merritt’s 
cavalry  to  attack  the  intrenchments  in  his  front  as  soon  as 
he  heard  the  firing  of  the  Fifth  Corps  attack. 

If  this  attack  proved  to  be  successful  Pickett’s  troops  would 
be  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  Lee’s  forces  and  driven  westward. 

At  one  o’clock  General  Sheridan  directed  General  Warren 
to  bring  up  the  Fifth  Corps  and  form  it  on  the  right  of 
Devin,  between  600  and  800  yards  south  of  the  White  Oak 
road.  The  ground  where  the  Fifth  Corps  formed  had  been 
previously  examined  by  Captain  Gillespie,  an  Engineer  of¬ 
ficer  on  General  Sheridan’s  staff,  and  is  known  in  this  opera- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


345 


tion  as  the  ground  about  Gravelly  Run  Church.  General 
Warren’s  statement  as  to  the  information  and  instructions 
he  received  from  General  Sheridan,  besides  the  general  plan 
of  the  battle,  was  “that  the  enemy  was  in  line  of  battle 
along  the  White  Oak  road,  their  left  resting  about  where 
the  road  that  I  wTas  to  turn  off  on  crossed  the  White  Oak 
road ; 1  and  that  he  wanted  me  to  form  my  line  so  that  I 
should  strike  with  the  right  centre  on  the  angle  of  the  works 
and  let  the  left  engage  the  front,  and  place  one  division  be¬ 
hind  the  right  to  support  the  attack  on  the  angle  where  we 
thought  the  fight  would  be  the  heaviest ;  and  to  so  place  the 
men  oblique  to  the  road  as  to  bring  this  heaviest  force  of 
mine  on  the  angle  of  the  works — give  it  a  direction  whose 
obliquity  to  the  road  would  correspond  with  that  supposed 
position  of  the  enemy  and  his  works.  We  talked  that  over 
until  I  understood  it,  I  think  ;  and  he  was  convinced  that  I 
understood  him.” 

See  General  Warren’s  diagram  and  instructions  herewith 
(taken  from  Record  of  Court  of  Inquiry)  : 

April  1,  3  p.m. 

The  following  is  the  movement  now  about  to  be  executed  ; 


i  The  road  General  Warren  turned  off  from  was  the  Dinwiddie  Court  House 
and  Five  Forks  road,  The  road  he  got  on  by  turning  off  was  the  Gravelly  llun 
Church  road. 

15* 


346  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


The  line  will  move  forward  as  formed  till  it  reaches  the  White  Oak 
road,  when  it  will  swing  round  to  the  left,  perpendicular  to  the  White 
Oak  road.  General  Merritt’s  and  General  Custer’s  cavalry  will  charge 
the  enemy’s  line  as  soon  as  the  infantry  get  engaged.  The  cavalry  is 
on  the  left  of  the  infantry,  except  Mackenzie’s,  which  is  moving  up 
the  White  Oak  road  from  the  right. 

The  divisions  came  upon  the  ground  in  the  order  of  Craw¬ 
ford,  Griffin,  and  Ayres.  General  Crawford’s  division  was 
placed  on  the  right  of  the  Gravelly  Run  Church  road,  so  that 
his  centre  would  strike  the  angle  and  be  the  first  to  en¬ 
counter  the  works  ;  General  Griffin’s  division  was  placed 
behind  Crawford’s.  These  were  the  largest  divisions.  Gen¬ 
eral  Ayres’s  division,  the  smallest,  was  placed  on  the  left  of 
the  road,  as  General  Warren  supposed,  from  the  position  of 
the  enemy  as  stated  to  him,  that  General  Crawford’s  centre 
would  fall  right  on  the  angle  of  their  line,  and  that  if  he  was 
not  able  to  carry  it,  General  Griffin  would  be  there  to  sus¬ 
tain  him  and  to  take  advantage  of  any  success.  General 
Ayres  was  to  engage  the  enemy’s  front  and  prevent  reinforce¬ 
ments  being  sent  to  the  angle. 

A  copy  of  the  diagram  with  the  instructions  on  it  was  given 
to  each  division  commander,  and  the  jfian  was  explained  to 
them  verbally  besides.  The  line  was  to  move  forward  until 
it  reached  the  White  Oak  road,  when  it  was  to  swing  round 
to  the  left,  perpendicular  to  the  White  Oak  road. 

General  Sheridan  states  that  he  gave  General  Warren  in¬ 
structions  about  engaging  the  enemy  after  he  had  ordered  him 
to  bring  up  his  corps  ;  that  he  gave  him  orders  for  the  for¬ 
mation  of  his  troops  and  method  of  attack  while  his  troops 
were  coming  up  and  forming ;  that  he  talked  several  times 
with  General  Warren  as  to  what  was  to  be  done  ;  that  the 
order  of  General  Warren  (referring  to  the  diagram  and 
directions  on  it)  conformed  substantially  to  the  orders  he 
gave  him ;  that  ‘  ‘  there  was  a  good  deal  of  conversation 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


347 


explanatory  of  that,  "but  that  embodies  about  it  gener¬ 
ally.” 

General  Mackenzie  had  been  sent  from  Dinwiddie  Court 
House  to  get  possession  of  the  "White  Oak  road  at  a  point 
about  three  miles  east  of  Five  Forks,  which  he  accomplished, 
having  a  sharp  skirmish  with  some  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
there,  and  moved  down  to  the  right  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  He 
was  directed  to  move  in  conjunction  with  that  corps  on  its 
right,  and  come  in  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy  and 
hold  the  Ford  road  crossing  of  Gravelly  Hun  to  intercept 
the  enemy’s  retreat. 

As  soon  as  Ayres’s  division  was  formed  (which  was  about 
four  o’clock)  the  order  was  given  to  the  Fifth  Corps  to  attack. 
Advancing  and  receiving  only  a  skirmish  fire  in  its  front  on 
crossing  the  White  Oak  road,  his  right  crossing  the  road 
sooner  than  his  left,  General  Warren  thought  it  probable  that 
the  enemy’s  line  of  battle  was  in  the  edge  of  the  wood,  about 
300  yards  north  of  the  road,  and  continued  to  advance  in  the 
direction  in  which  his  line  had  started,  until  very  soon  after 
crossing  that  road  General  Ayres  received  a  musketry  and 
artillery  fire  on  his  left,  which  evidently  came  from  the  en¬ 
emy’s  intrenchment  at  the  return,  showing  that  their  retrench¬ 
ment  did  not  extend  to  the  near  vicinity  of  the  Gravelly  Run 
Church  road.  The  return  was,  in  fact,  according  to  the  map 
before  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry,  seven  or  eight  hundred 
yards  west  of  that  road.1  General  Ayres  understanding  the 

1  In  his  testimony  before  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry,  Colonel  Gillespie  stated 
that  he  had  made  no  reeonnoissance  of  the  enemy’s  works  before  the  attack ;  that 
the  cavalry  had  moved  directly  up  the  road  and  gradually  pressed  the  enemy  be¬ 
hind  his  works  ;  that  he  did  not  know  that  there  was  a  return,  nor  did  he  know 
its  direction  from  the  position  where  the  Fifth  Corps  was  formed  ;  that  he  was 
instructed  by  General  Sheridan  to  select  ground  which  would  hold  General  War¬ 
ren’s  corps  close  under  the  right  flank  of  Devin’s  command  and  beyond  the  obser¬ 
vation  of  the  enemy,  as  he  wanted  to  put  General  Warren  in  as  a  turning  column. 

Apparently  no  attempt  was  made  to  ascertain  with  precision  the  position  of  the 
enemy’s  left,  lest  the  attempt  might  put  them  on  their  guard  and  betray  the  plan 
of  attack. 


348  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


meaning  of  this  fire  immediately  changed  front  and  faced 
the  return,  bringing  up  Winthrop’s  brigade  (which  was  in 
reserve)  in  double-quick  on  the  left  of  the  new  line,  and  then 
advanced  against  the  return  under  a  heavy  fire,  his  right 
overlapping  it,  and  finally  carried  the  works,  the  key  to  the 
position,  capturing  a  large  number  of  prisoners  and  many 
battle-flags. 

When  the  fire  on  General  Ayres’s  left  opened,  General 
Warren,  perceiving  that  the  fight  at  the  angle  of  the  return 
would  fall  on  Ayres  and  not  on  Crawford,  as  planned,  at  once 
directed  General  Winthrop  to  form  on  Ayres’s  left  so  as  to 
connect  with  Devin,  sent  orders  to  General  Griffin  to  come 
in  as  quickly  as  he  could  to  support  Ayres  on  the  right,  and 
to  General  Crawford  to  change  direction  to  the  left,  at  right 
angles  to  the  line  he  was  following.  A  large  part  of  Craw¬ 
ford’s  and  Griffin’s  divisions  had  already  entered  the  woods 
north  of  the  open  space  along  the  White  Oak  road. 

General  Sheridan,  who  accompanied  General  Ayres’s  divi¬ 
sion  throughout  the  greater  part  of  the  battle,  immediately 
upon  its  receiving  the  flank  fire,  sent  orders  to  General 
Griffin  and  General  Crawford  to  come  in  on  Ayres’s  right. 

After  sending  the  orders  mentioned,  General  Warren  di¬ 
rected  Colonel  Kellogg  to  form  his  brigade  (Crawford’s  left) 
at  right  angles  to  its  former  direction,  and  to  hold  it  there 
for  the  division  to  form  on  ;  then  he  directed  Coulter’s  bri¬ 
gade  (following  in  reserve)  to  form  on  Kellogg.  Not  finding 
General  Crawford,  for  the  wood  was  dense,  General  Warren 
sent  renewed  orders  to  him  to  change  direction  to  the  left, 
and  keep  closed  on  Kellogg  in  advancing  against  the  rear  of 
the  enemy.  Returning  to  Kellogg’s  position,  General  War¬ 
ren  found  it  vacant,  for  a  staff  officer  of  General  Sheridan 
had  endeavored  to  take  it  against  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 
Every  staff  officer  of  General  Warren  had  now  been  sent  to 
bring  Griffin  and  Crawford  against  the  rear  of  Pickett’s  in- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


349 


trencliments.  Many  of  General  Sheridan’s  had  been  sent  for 
the  same  purpose.  The  country  was  thickly  wooded,  and 
troops  moving  rapidly  through  it  could  not  be  readily  over¬ 
taken,  but  the  direction  of  both  Griffin’s  and  Crawford’s  di¬ 
visions  had  soon  been  changed  to  the  left,  for  both  entered 
the  open  ground  of  the  Sydnor  farm  at  its  northern  end  about 
800  yards  from  the  enemy’s  intrencliments  near  the  return. 
There  General  Warren  found  General  Griffin  with  his  divi¬ 
sion,  moving  southwest  against  the  rear  of  the  enemy’s  in- 
trenchments,  and  directed  him  to  attack  a  body  of  the 
enemy’s  infantry,  composed  of  Ransom’s  brigade  and  some  of 
Wallace’s,  that  had  formed  a  new  line,  with  slight  intrench- 
rnent  connected  with  and  at  right  angles  to  their  main  line 
of  intrenchment,  in  order  to  oppose  the  further  progress  of 
the  Fifth  Corps,  for  General  Ayres  had  by  this  time  carried 
the  return.  Griffin  at  once  set  about  doing  what  General 
Warren  directed,  but  found  the  resistance  stubborn ;  the 
enemy’s  fire  was  quick,  sharp,  decisive,  and  lasted  about  half 
an  hour,1  though  Griffin  was  finally  successful.  General 
Gwyn’s  brigade  of  Ayres’s  division,  and  Coulter’s  of  Craw¬ 
ford’s,  joined  him  in  the  latter  part  of  the  encounter. 

While  this  was  going  on,  General  Warren  rode  to  General 
Ayres,  and  found  that  he  had  carried  the  return  and  was  re¬ 
forming  his  troops  at  right  angles  to  the  enemy’s  intrench- 
ments. 

He  now  endeavored  to  find  General  Crawford,  who  had 
entered  the  Sydnor  field  before  General  Griffin,  and  had 
passed  through  it,  driving  General  Munford’s  division  of 


1  A  singular  circumstance  connected  with  this  battle  is  the  fact  that  General 
Pickett  was  all  this  time,  and  until  near  the  close  of  the  action,  on  the  north  side 
of  Hatcher’s  Run,  where  he  had  heard  no  sound  of  the  engagement,  nor  had  he 
received  any  information  concerning  it.  There  was  no  Confederate  commander  on 
the  field  ;  otherwise  Terry’s  (Mayo’s)  brigade  would  probably  have  been  brought 
into  action  with  Ransom’s  and  Wallace’s  brigades  when  General  Ransom  formed 
his  new  line,  or  earlier  still,  when  Ayres  was  moving  to  attack  the  return. 


350  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’61  AND  ’65. 


dismounted  cavalry  westward  before  him  Following  in 
Crawford’s  track  from  the  Sydnor  field,  marked  by  his  killed 
and  wounded,  General  Warren  found  him  in  the  Young- 
Boisseau  farm  (through  which  the  Ford  road  runs)  with  his 
division  in  good  order,  facing  west.  Kellogg’s  brigade  had 
now  joined  its  division.  Changing  the  direction  of  the  di¬ 
vision  to  the  south,  General  Warren  led  it  along  the  Ford 
road  toward  the  rear  of  the  enemy’s  intrenchments,  meeting 
at  the  edge  of  the  wood,  on  the  south  side  of  the  farm,  a 
sharp  fire  from  the  enemy,  who  had  formed  a  line  across  the 
Ford  road. 

General  Pickett  finding  his  left  had  been  captured,  and 
that  the  Fifth  Corps  was  moving  westward  along  the  line  of 
his  intrenchments,  and  coming  in  on  his  rear,  had  drawn 
Terry’s  brigade  (Colonel  Mayo  commanding)  out  of  the  in¬ 
trenchments  between  Corse  and  Steuart,  and  had  brought 
them  to  this  point  to  make  head,  if  he  could,  against  the 
rear  attack.  Some  of  Ransom’s  force,  just  dislodged  by 
Griffin  from  the  southwest  comer  of  the  Sydnor  field,  joined 
Mayo.  McGregor’s  battery  of  four  guns,  that  had  been  at 
the  return  with  Ransom’s  and  Wallace’s  brigades,  was  also 
here ;  but  the  resistance  was  brief,  and  the  four  guns  were 
captured.  Part  of  Bartlett’s  brigade  joined  Crawford  in  this 
field,  but  neither  Griffin  nor  Ayres  had  yet  reached  this 
point.  Colonel  Mayo,  finding  that  he  could  not  withstand 
Crawford’s  attack,  fell  back  with  a  part  of  his  brigade  to¬ 
ward  Corse,  moving  along  the  Fork  road  to  the  Five  Forks 
battery,  and  along  the  intrenchments  to  Corse,  when  he  was 
ordered  by  General  Pickett  to  get  across  the  country  to  the 
South  Side  Railroad,  which  he  succeeded  in  doing,  though 
in  great  disorder.  The  guns  at  the  Five  Forks  battery  were 
still  in  position,  and  part  of  Steuart’s  brigade  still  held  on 
when  Mayo  passed  there. 

General  Devin’s  division,  as  previously  stated,  was  formed 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


351 


in  front  of  the  enemy’s  intrenchments,  with  its  left  on  the 
road  from  Dinwiddie  Court  House  to  Five  Forks,  and  when 
the  Fifth  Corps  moved  to  attack,  it  dismounted  and  advanced 
against  the  intrenchments,  keeping  up  a  constant  fire  upon 
them,  and  receiving  in  reply  the  fire  of  the  infantry  and  of 
the  three  guns  at  the  Five  Forks  battery. 

Custer’s  division,  on  our  left  of  the  Five  Forks  battery,  had 
but  one  brigade,  Pennington’s,  dismounted,  which  in  open 
order  kept  up  a  constant  fire  upon  the  intrenchments  held 
by  Corse’s  and  Terry’s  brigades.  With  his  two  other  brigades 
General  Custer  made  a  charge  upon  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s 
right.  One  of  Lee’s  brigades  was  with  Corse,  dismounted. 
With  the  other  General  Lee  advanced  to  meet  Custer’s 
charge,  when  a  brilliant  encounter  took  place.  Lee,  how¬ 
ever,  maintained  his  position  on  the  right. 

When  General  Pickett  saw  that  Mayo  could  not  maintain 
himself  upon  the  Ford  road,  he  directed  General  Corse  to 
form  a  line  running  along  the  west  side  of  the  Gilliam  field 
at  right  angles  to  the  main  intrenchments,  and  extending  into 
the  woods  north  of  it,  so  that  the  escape  of  the  other  infantry, 
the  greater  part  of  which  was  now  pouring  through  the  woods 
in  complete  disorder,  could  be  in  some  measure  covered. 
This  was  quickly  effected,  and  a  line  of  partial  intrenchment 
prepared. 

Soon  after  Colonel  Mayo  passed  the  Five  Forks  battery, 
falling  back  upon  Corse  from  the  Young-Boisseau  field, 
Colonel  Fitzliugh’s  brigade  of  Devin’s  division  charged  the 
intrenchments  and  carried  them,  capturing  the  three  guns, 
two  battle -flags,  and  over  a  thousand  of  the  enemy. 

General  Warren,  with  Crawford’s  division,  pursuing  the 
troops  falling  back  toward  Corse,  came  upon  the  Gilliam 
field,  along  the  east  side  of  which,  in  the  edge  of  the  woods, 
Crawford’s  troops  were  formed,  the  right  being  north  of  the 
White  Oak  road  in  woods.  There  was  some  little  hesitation 


352  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


in  Crawford’s  line  about  advancing  against  the  enemy’s  in- 
trenchments  on  the  west  side  of  the  field,  from  which  a 
sharp  fire  was  kept  up,  until  Warren,  riding  forward  with  the 
Corps  flag  in  his  hands,  led  his  troops  across  the  field.  Cus¬ 
ter,  south  of  him,  advanced  at  the  same  time,  having  sent  him 
word  by  a  staff-officer  that  he  would  do  so.  The  fire  close  up 
was  severe,  but  in  a  few  minutes  the  intrencliment  was  carried 
and  a  large  part  of  the  force  captured.  It  was  now  in  the 
dusk  of  evening.  General  Warren  says  he  continued  the  pur¬ 
suit  west  for  half  a  mile,  when  no  enemy  being  in  sight,  the 
command  was  halted.  Some  little  skirmishing  was  still  go¬ 
ing  on  in  the  woods  north  of  the  road,  apparently  with  the 
enemy’s  rear  guard.  General  Custer  passed  General  Warren 
at  this  time  on  his  left  hand. 

When  General  Pickett  ordered  General  Corse  to  form  his 
new  line,  he  directed  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee  to  withdraw  from 
the  field  toward  the  South  Side  Railroad  covering  his  dis¬ 
mounted  brigade,  which  he  effected  along  the  W.  Dabney 
Road,  pressed  close  by  Custer.  The  routed  infantry  moved 
in  confusion  through  the  woods. 

The  pursuit  by  Griffin  and  Ayres  was  continued  along  the 
White  Oak  road  until  after  dark,  by  which  time  the  cavalry 
was  out  of  sight  and  hearing  of  the  infantry. 

When  upon  the  Young-Boisseau  farm,  General  Warren  sent 
Colonel  Spear  to  hold  the  Ford  road  crossing  of  Hatcher’s 
Run,  where  he  became  sharply  engaged  with  Rosser’s  cav¬ 
alry  on  the  north  side. 

General  Mackenzie,  moving  on  Crawford’s  right,  was  pushed 
by  his  infantry  to  the  right  against  Hatcher’s  Run,  which  he 
crossed  at  one  point,  but  the  heavy  firing  being  in  a  south 
or  southwest  direction  from  him  he  recrossed,  and  moving 
west  came  upon  the  Ford  road  north  of  the  Young-Boisseau 
farm,  which  he  had  been  directed  to  hold,  and  where  his 
command  remained. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


353 


When  the  battle  began  General  Pickett  and  General  Fitz 
Lee  were  on  the  north  side  of  Hatcher’s  Run.  Owing  to  the 
density  of  the  woods  no  sound  of  firing  reached  them,  and 
when  General  Pickett  was  notified  of  the  engagement  going 
on  he  had  barely  time  to  ride  rapidly  down  the  Ford  road  to 
Five  Forks,  under  the  fire  of  General  Crawford’s  troops  that 
were  then  close  on  the  road  approaching  it.  As  soon  as  he 
got  to  his  troops  he  ordered  up  Mayo’s  brigade,  as  hereto¬ 
fore  mentioned.  Munford,  after  being  driven  across  the 
Ford  road,  mounted  his  division  and  rode  to  the  Confederate 
right,  where  he  was  ordered  by  General  Pickett  to  witlidaw 
at  once  to  the  north  side  of  Hatcher’s  Run  and  join  General 
Fitz  Lee,  who  had  been  notified  of  the  battle  too  late  to 
cross  to  the  south  side  of  the  run,  Crawford’s  troops  having 
possession  of  the  Ford  road. 

General  Sheridan’s  success  was  complete.  Pickett  had 
been  routed  with  a  loss,  according  to  the  reports  of  the  Fifth 
Corps  and  Cavalry,  of  not  less  than  4,500  prisoners,  13  colors, 
and  6  guns.1  His  killed  and  wounded  did  not  probably  ex¬ 
ceed  those  of  General  Sheridan.  The  casualties  of  his  cav¬ 
alry  were  not  large. 

General  Warren  states  that  the  Fifth  Corps  in  this  battle 
captured  3,244  men  with  their  arms,  11  regimental  colors, 
and  1  four-gun  battery.  The  larger  part  of  the  prisoners 
were  captured  by  Ayres’s  and  Griffin’s  divisions.  The  corps 

1  According  to  the  statement  furnished  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry  from  the 
Adjutant-General’s  Office,  showing  the  number  of  Confederate  prisoners  captured 
at  Five  Forks,  and  as  appeared  from  the  records  of  military  prisons  on  file  in  the 


Adjutant-General’s  Office,  the  number  was  : 

Five  Forks,  April  1,  1865  .  2,063 

Dinwiddie  Court  House,  April  1,  1865  .  223 

Hatcher’s  Run,  April  1,  1865 .  116 

Five  Forks,  April  2,  1865  .  164 

Dinwiddie  Court  House,  April  2,  1865 .  33 

Total . .  2,599 


854  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


“lost  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  634,  of  which  300 
were  in  General  Crawford’s  division,  205  in  General  Ayres’s 
division,  and  125  in  General  Griffin’s  division.”  Among  the 
killed  was  General  Fred.  Wintlirop,  commanding  the  First 
Brigade  of  Ayres’s  division,  who  “was  mortally  wounded  at 
the  head  of  his  command  while  making  a  successful  as¬ 
sault.” 

The  number  of  casualties  in  the  cavalry  was  not  large.  I 
do  not  find  it  stated  for  this  battle  separate  from  the  whole 
number  in  the  campaign.  The  proportion  of  cavalry  officers 
killed  and  wounded  was  large. 

Two  divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  jmsted  for  the  night 
across  the  White  Oak  road  near  Gravelly  Run  Church,  and 
one  on  the  Ford  road.  The  cavalry  were  at  and  near  Five 
Forks,  except  Mackenzie’s  division,  which  remained  at  the 
Ford  road  crossing  of  Hatcher’s  Run. 

General  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  and  General  Munford’s  divisions 
after  crossing  Hatcher’s  Run  united  with  General  Fitz  Lee 
at  the  Ford  road  crossing  of  that  stream,  and  their  cavalry 
w7as  then  withdrawn  to  the  South  Side  Railroad,  where  the 
Ford  road  crosses  it.  There  they  ’were  joined  during  the 
night,  first  by  Hunton’s  brigade  of  Pickett’s  division,  then, 
later,  by  General  Johnson  writh  Wise’s,  Gracie’s,  and  Fulton’s 
brigades,  all  under  the  command  of  General  R.  H.  Anderson. 
They  marched  by  routes  north  of  Hatcher’s  Run. 

These  troops  were  sent  by  General  R.  E.  Lee  to  cover  the 
collection  of  Pickett’s  disorganized  command,  and  wTitli  it 
to  take  up  a  position  at  Sutherland  Station,  to  close,  if 
possible,  that  avenue  of  approach  to  Petersburg.  With 
intrenchments,  and  some  assistance  from  Longstreet,  this 
might  have  been  possible,  but  it  was  not  possible  for  Lee  to 
send  sufficient  troops  to  overmatch  the  force  with  General 
Sheridan,  and  at  the  same  time  maintain  the  Petersburg  and 
Richmond  lines.  He  had  lost  possession  of  the  South  Side 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


355 


Railroad,  but  the  Danville  Railroad  and  its  connections  with 
the  Lynchburg  (or  South  Side)  Railroad  still  remained,  with 
the  rolling  stock  of  both  roads,  and  it  was  rolling  stock  they 
most  needed.  So  long  as  his  intrencliments  remained  intact 
he  might  still  defer  his  movement  to  Danville  until  the 
wagon-roads  were  passable. 

These  troops  sent  to  cover  the  reassembling  of  Pickett’s 
scattered  forces  were  drawn  from  General  Lee’s  right  at  the 
Claiborne  road  crossing  of  Hatcher’s  Run,  where  they  had 
been  concentrated  on  the  30th  of  March.  Their  withdrawal 
left  in  their  intrenchments  from  the  Claiborne  road  to 
Burgess’s  mill  on  the  south  side  of  Hatcher’s  Run,  McGow¬ 
an’s,  McRae’s,  Scales’s,  and  Cook’s  brigades  of  Hill’s  corps. 

Pickett’s  infantry,  after  wading  across  Hatcher’s  Run,  got 
into  the  W.  Dabney  road,  and  assembled  in  some  shape 
near  the  South  Side  Railroad,  when  General  Pickett  moved 
them  in  the  direction  of  Exeter  mills  at  the  mouth  of  Whip- 
ponock  Creek,  as  he  intended  to  cross  the  Appomattox  there 
and  rejoin  the  army,  but  early  next  morning  he  received 
orders  to  unite  with  General  R.  H.  Anderson  at  Sutherland 
Station. 

It  has  always  seemed  to  me  to  have  been  a  grave  mistake 
to  require  General  Pickett  to  fight  at  Five  Forks.  There  he 
was  isolated.  Had  he  moved  at  once  with  his  infantry  to 
Sutherland  Station,  when  he  fell  back  from  Dinwiddie  Court 
House,  leaving  his  cavalry  to  maintain  the  crossings  of  Hat¬ 
cher’s  Run  as  long  as  practicable,  he  could  have  been  rein¬ 
forced  from  Lee’s  right  with  the  infantry  sent  to  him  in  the 
night  of  the  1st  of  April,  and  with  some  of  Longstreet’s  force, 
and  slight  intrenchments  extending  on  his  right  to  the  Ap¬ 
pomattox,  and  on  his  left  to  the  Claiborne  road  crossing  of 
Hatcher’s  Run,  he  would  have  fought  under  conditions  much 
more  favorable  to  him. 

General  Warren  states  that  after  the  last  of  the  enemy  had 


356  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 


been  captured  at  Five  Forks,  lie  received  at  7  p.m.  an  order 
from  Major-General  Sheridan  relieving  him  from  duty,  and 
directing  him  to  report  for  orders  to  Lieutenant-General 
Grant.  This  action  of  General  Sheridan  was  taken  under  an 
authority  sent  him  by  General  Grant  some  time  in  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  1st  of  April,  “  to  relieve  General  Warren  if,  in  his 
judgment,  it  was  for  the  best  interests  of  the  service  for  him 
to  do  so.”  1 

In  his  report  of  this  battle,  dated  May  16,  1865,  General 
Sheridan  states  that  in  bringing  up  and  forming  his  corps  at 
Gravelly  Run  Church,  “  General  Warren  did  not  exert  him¬ 
self  to  get  up  his  corps  as  rapidly  as  he  might  have  done, 
and  his  manner  gave  me  the  impression  that  he  wished 
the  sun  to  go  down  before  dispositions  for  the  attack 


1  The  circumstances  under  which  this  authority  was  sent  are  narrated  by  Capt. 
E.  R.  Warner,  3d  U.  S.  Artillery,  at  the  time  of  the  battle  on  the  staff  of  General 
Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery.  He  was  sent  by  General  Hunt  on  some  artillery  duty  to 
the  old  headquarters  camp  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  April, 
where  General  Warren  had,  early  in  the  morning,  left  several  of  his  staff  officers 
sleeping,  among  them  Colonel  Locke,  Adjutant-General.  Captain  Warner  was 
directed  by  General  Rawlins  to  ascertain  where  the  Fifth  Corps  was.  Captain 
Warner  saw  Colonel  Locke,  and  some  other  Fifth  Corps  staff  officers,  about  nine 
o’clock,  and  in  reply  to  his  inquiry  Colonel  Locke  told  him  that  a  portion  of  the 
Fifth  Corps,  when  he  last  heard  from  them,  had  halted  to  bridge  a  stream  (Gen¬ 
eral  Warren  had  insisted  upon  his  staff  getting  some  sleep  during  the  night,  and 
this  statement  of  Colonel  Locke  merely  means  that  he  went  to  sleep  before  the 
bridge  was  built,  and  slept  until  after  General  Warren  and  the  staff  officers,  who 
had  been  up  during  the  latter  part  of  the  night,  had  left  the  camp). 

Upon  returning  to  Headquarters  about  ten  o’clock,  Captain  Warner  stated  to 
General  Rawlins  that  the  Fifth  Corps,  or  a  portion  of  it,  when  last  heard  from, 
was  delayed  building  a  bridge,  and  that  they  were  then  still  delayed. 

At  times,  during  the  campaign  beginning  in  May,  there  had  been  misunder¬ 
standings  between  General  Meade  and  General  Warren,  the  latter  sometimes 
modifying  the  plan  of  operations  prescribed  by  the  orders  of  the  day  for  the  Fifth 
Corps,  so  as  to  make  them  accord  with  his  own  judgment,  as  the  day  went  on, 
modifications  which  General  Meade  sometimes  did  not  approve,  and  hence  some¬ 
thing  like  controversy  grew  up  occasionally  in  the  despatches  that  passed  between 
them.  It  appears  to  be  probable  that  General  Grant  apprehended  that  something 
of  this  kind  might  occur  between -General  Sheridan  and  General  Warren,  and 
considering  the  time  to  be  a  critical  one,  sent  the  message  mentioned  to  General 
Sheridan. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


357 


could  be  completed.”  Further  he  states:  ‘‘During  this 
attack  [that  of  the  Fifth  Corps  and  the  Cavalry  upon 
Pickett’s  intrenched  position]  I  again  became  dissatisfied 
with  General  Warren.  During  the  engagement  portions  of 
his  lines  gave  way  when  not  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire,  and 
simply  for  want  of  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  troops,  which 
General  Warren  did  not  exert  himself  to  inspire.  I  there¬ 
fore  relieved  him  from  the  command  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  au¬ 
thority  for  the  action  having  been  sent  to  me,  before  the 
battle,  unsolicited.” 

These  are  very  grave  accusations  or  imputations,  and  of 
such  serious  character  that  no  officer  could  rest  under  them. 
Any  officer  against  whom  they  were  made  would  be  entitled, 
whatever  his  rank  might  be,  to  an  investigation  of  them  be¬ 
fore  a  proper  court. 

A  Court  of  Inquiry  was  finally  appointed  by  the  President, 
after  General  Warren  had  repeatedly  requested  it.  Before 
that  court,  which  entered  into  an  extended  and  minute  in¬ 
vestigation  of  the  circumstances  attending  the  battle  of  Five 
Forks,  many  Confederate  as  well  as  United  States  officers  en¬ 
gaged  in  the  battle  appeared.  General  Sheridan  explained 
further  to  that  court  that,  though  his  troops  were  victorious 
at  Five  Forks,  they  were  isolated  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  that  the  extreme  left  of  that  army  had  been 
thrown  back  to  the  Boydton  road,  while  the  enemy  held 
strongly  at  the  intersection  of  the  White  Oak  and  Claiborne 
roads,  and  directly  in  his  rear,  and  distant  from  Five  Forks 
only  three  and  a  half  miles,  and  might  march  down  the  White 
Oak  road  that  night  or  early  the  next  morning,  and  take  his 
command  in  rear  ;  that  General  Warren  having  disappointed 
him  in  the  movement  of  his  corps,  and  in  its  management  in 
the  battle,  he  deemed  it  to  be  for  the  best  interests  of  the 
service  to  relieve  him,  and  did  so.  (In  point  of  fact,  how¬ 
ever,  the  White  Oak  road,  close  to  the  enemy’s  intrench- 


358  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


ments  at  the  intersection  of  the  Claiborne  road,  was,  by 
direction  of  Generals  Grant  and  Meade,  held  strongly  by  the 
Second  Corps  at  the  time  of  the  close  of  the  battle  of  Five 
Forks.  Still,  General  Sheridan’s  force  would  have  been  ex¬ 
posed  to  attack  if  General  Lee  had  had  a  sufficient  number 
of  troops  to  admit  of  it  without  abandoning  his  intrench- 
ments,  which  he  had  not.) 

Respecting  the  giving  way  of  portions  of  General  Warren’s 
troops,  it  appears  from  the  testimony  that  the  skirmish  line 
of  Ayres’s  division,  when  it  entered  the  woods  north  of  the 
open  ground  on  the  north  side  of  the  White  Oak  road,  fell 
back,  lay  down,  and  began  to  fire  in  the  air,  and  that  they 
were  made  to  go  forward  by  General  Sheridan  and  General 
Ayres  and  their  staff ;  and  it  further  appears  that  when  Gen¬ 
eral  Ayres  changed  front,  General  Gwyn’s  brigade  on  his 
right,  or  part  of  it,  fell  into  some  disorder  and  confusion, 
which  made  General  Sheridan  doubt  if  he  would  be  success¬ 
ful,  and  that  this  confusion  was  remedied  by  General  Sheri¬ 
dan  and  General  Ayres  and  their  staff.  But  General  Ayres 
in  his  testimony  does  not  appear  to  have  considered  this 
disorder  as  serious.  General  Warren  was  at  that  time  en¬ 
deavoring  to  rectify  the  position  and  direction  of  movement 
of  Griffin’s  and  Crawford’s  divisions.  In  such  cases  of  dis¬ 
order  or  confusion,  or  want  of  steadiness  and  ardor,  com¬ 
manders  of  very  high  rank  usually  act  in  accordance  with 
their  temperaments,  whatever  their  command  may  be. 

The  report  and  opinion  of  the  court  upon  the  first  quoted 
imputation  or  accusation  are  as  follows : 

Third  Imputation. 

The  third  imputation  is  found  in  an  extract  from  General  Sheri¬ 
dan’s  report  of  May  16,  1865  (see  Record,  pp.  21  and  48),  as  follows  *. 

“  ...  General  Warren  did  not  exert  himself  to  get  up  his 

corps  as  rapidly  as  he  might  have  done,  and  his  manner  gave  me  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


359 


impression  that  he  wished  the  sun  to  go  down  before  dispositions  for 
the  attack  could  he  completed.” 

On  the  afternoon  of  April  1st  the  Fifth  Corps  was  massed  as  fol¬ 
lows  :  Crawford’s  and  Griffin’s  divisions  at  the  forks  of  the  Crump 
road  and  the  main  road  from  Dinwiddie  Court  House  to  Five  Forks, 
and  Ayres’s  division  on  the  Brooke’s  road,  about  one-fourth  of  a  mile 
east  from  the  forks  of  that  road  and  the  road  to  Five  Forks. 

The  distance  from  the  position  of  Griffin  and  Crawford  to  the  place 
of  formation  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  near  Gravelly  Run  Church,  was  about 
two  and  a  half  miles,  and  the  length  of  the  corps,  when  spread  out  in 
column  of  route,  would  be  about  two  and  three-eighths  miles.  The  last 
file  of  the  column  required  as  much  time  to  reach  the  place  of  forma¬ 
tion  as  it  would  have  taken  to  march  about  five  miles. 

General  Warren  received  his  orders  near  Gravelly  Run  Church  to 
move  up  his  corps  at  1  P.M.,  and  it  took  some  time  to  communicate 
those  orders  to  the  divisions  and  for  the  movement  to  begin. 

The  route  to  the  place  of  formation  was  along  a  narrow  road,  very 
muddy  and  slippery,  somewhat  encumbered  with  wagons  and  led 
horses  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  and  the  men  were  fatigued.  The  testi¬ 
mony  of  the  brigade  and  division  commanders  is  to  the  effect  that  the 
corps  in  line  of  march  was  well  closed  up,  and  that  no  unnecessary  de¬ 
lay  was  incurred. 

The  corps  reached  its  destination,  and  was  formed  ready  to  advance 
against  the  enemy  at  4  p.m. 

It  is  in  evidence  that  General  Warren  remained  near  Gravelly  Run 
Church,  directing  the  formation,  explaining  the  mode  of  attack  to  the 
division  and  brigade  commanders,  with  sketches  prepared  for  the  pur¬ 
pose. 

General  Warren  also  repeatedly  sent  out  staff  officers  to  the  division 
commanders  in  order  to  expedite  the  march. 

Opinion. 

The  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  there  was  no  unnecessary  delay  in 
this  march  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  that  General  Warren  took  the 
usual  methods  of  a  corps  commander  to  prevent  delay. 

The  question  regarding  General  Warren’s  manner  appears  to  be  too 
intangible  and  the  evidence  on  it  too  contradictory  for  the  Court  to  de¬ 
cide,  separate  from  the  context,  that  he  appeared  to  wish  “the  sun  to 
go  down  before  dispositions  for  the  attack  could  be  completed  ;  ”  but 


360  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


his  actions,  as  shown  by  the  evidence,  do  not  appear  to  have  corre¬ 
sponded  with  such  wish,  if  ever  he  entertained  it.1 

Respecting  the  second  quoted  imputation,  the  report  and  opinion 
of  the  Court  are  : 

Fourth  Imputation. 

The  fourth  imputation  is  found  in  an  extract  from  General  Sheri¬ 
dan’s  report  of  May  16,  1865  (see  Record,  pp.  22  and  48),  as  follows  : 

“During this  attack  I  again  became  dissatisfied  with  General  Warren. 
During  the  engagement  portions  of  his  line  gave  way  when  not  exposed 
to  a  heavy  fire,  and  simply  from  want  of  confidence  on  the  part  of  the 
troops,  which  General  Warren  did  not  exert  himself  to  inspire.” 

When  the  Fifth  Corps  moved  up  to  the  attack,  General  Sheridan 
said  to  General  Ayres,  “I  will  ride  with  you.”  General  Warren  was 
on  the  left  of  Crawford’s  division,  between  Crawford  and  Ayres. 

When  General  Ayres’s  command  struck  the  White  Oak  road  it  re¬ 
ceived  a  fire  in  flank  from  the  enemy’s  “  return  ”  nearly  at  right  angles 
to  the  road.  He  changed  front  immediately  at  right  angles  and  faced 
the  “return,”  his  right  receiving  a  fire  from  Munford’s  Confederate 
division  of  dismounted  cavalry  distributed  along  the  edge  of  the  woods 
to  the  north  of  the  White  Oak  road.  There  was  some  confusion, 
which  was  immediately  checked  by  the  exertions  of  General  Sheridan, 
General  Ayres,  and  other  officers. 

The  evidence  shows  that  General  Warren  was  observant  of  Ayres,  be¬ 
cause  he  sent  orders  to  Winthrop’s  reserve  brigade  to  form  on  the  left 
of  Ayres’s  new  line. 


1  Respecting  the  impression  that  General  Warren’s  manner  made  upon  General 
Sheridan,  it  is  to  be  said  that  General  Sheridan  knew  but  little  of  him.  General 
Chamberlain,  after  the  war  Governor  of  Maine,  who  served  in  the  Fifth  Corps 
during  all  the  time  General  Warren  commanded  it,  says,  in  his  evidence  before 
the  Court,  that  he  noticed  no  apathy  or  indifference  of  manner  in  General  Warren 
at  the  battle  of  Five  Forks ;  that  he  was  not  apathetic  that  morning,  but  ener¬ 
getic.  He  said  further,  that  those  who  did  not  know  General  Warren’s  tempera¬ 
ment  might  think  him  to  be  negative  when  he  was  deeply  intent.  Instead  of 
showing  excitement  he  generally  showed  an  intense  concentration,  and  those 
who  did  not  know  him  might  take  his  deep  concentrated  thought  and  purpose  for 
apathy.  A  stranger  looking  at  him  and  not  seeing  indications  of  excitement  and 
resolution  on  his  face,  might  judge  him  to  be  apathetic,  when  in  fact  that  con¬ 
clusion  might  be  far  from  the  truth. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. 


361 


This  necessary  change  of  front  of  Ayres  increased  the  interval  be¬ 
tween  him  and  Crawford  on  his  right ;  the  latter  was  marching  without 
change  of  direction  until,  as  he  expressed  it,  he  would  clear  the  right  of 
Ayres,  when  he  was  also  to  change  front  to  the  left. 

At  this  moment  Warren,  who  saw  that  Crawford,  with  Griffin  fol¬ 
lowing,  was  disappearing  in  the  woods  to  the  north  of  the  White  Oak 
road,  sent  a  staff-officer  to  Griffin  to  come  as  quickly  as  he  could  to 
sustain  Ayres ;  went  himself  to  the  left  brigade  of  Crawford  and 
caused  a  line  to  be  marked  out,  facing  to  the  west,  directing  the  brigade 
commander  to  form  on  it ;  then  went  into  the  woods  and  gave  orders  to 
the  right  brigade  of  Crawford  to  form  on  the  same  line.  When  he  re¬ 
turned  to  the  open  ground  the  brigade  he  had  directed  to  change  front 
had  disappeared,  as  appears  by  the  evidence,  in  consequence  of  orders 
given  by  an  officer  of  General  Sheridan’s  staff.  General  Warren  sent 
repeated  orders  by  staff-officers  to  both  Griffin  and  Crawford  to  change 
direction,  and  went  himself  to  both ;  and  finally  by  these  means  cor¬ 
rected,  as  far  as  was  possible  under  the  circumstances,  the  divergence 
of  these  two  divisions. 

It  appears  from  evidence  that  these  two  divisions  were  operating  in 
the  woods  and  over  a  difficult  country,  and  received  a  fire  in  their  front 
from  the  dismounted  cavalry  of  Munford  posted  in  the  woods  to  the 
north  of  the  White  Oak  road,  which  led  to  the  belief,  for  some  time, 
that  the  enemy  had  a  line  of  battle  in  front ;  and  this  may  furnish  one 
reason  why  it  was  so  difficult  at  first  to  change  their  direction  to  the 
proper  one. 

Opinion. 

General  Warren’s  attention  appears  to  have  been  drawn,  almost  im¬ 
mediately  after  Ayres  received  the  flank  fire  from  the  “return”  and 
his  consequent  change  of  front,  to  the  probability  of  Crawford  with 
Griffin  diverging  too  much  from  and  being  separated  from  Ayres,  ar.d 
by  continuous  exertions  of  himself  and  staff  substantially  remedied 
matters ;  and  the  Court  thinks  that  this  was  for  him  the  essential  point 
to  be  attended  to,  which  also  exacted  his  whole  efforts  to  accomplish.1 

These  are  the  reports  and  opinions  of  a  court  composed  of 
officers  of  high  character  and  great  exjierience,  formed  under 
the  sanctity  of  an  oath  to  examine  and  inquire  into  the  mat- 

1  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry,  Part  II.,  pp.  1559-1561. 

XII.— 16 


362  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


ter  according  to  the  evidence,  without  partiality,  favor,  affec¬ 
tion,  prejudice,  or  hope  of  reward.  • 

At  half-past  five  in  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  of  April,  Gen¬ 
eral  Grant  having  learnt  that  General  Sheridan  was  about  to 
assault  at  Five  Forks  (at  the  time  the  staff  officer  carrying 
the  information  left  General  Sheridan’s  command),  directed 
that  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps  should  be  thrown  forward, 
so  as  to  hold  the  White  Oak  road  and  prevent  the  enemy 
from  sending  any  force  against  General  Sheridan  by  that 
road.  This  was  done  at  once,  and  the  road  was  held  strongly 
by  Miles’s  division.  By  nine  o’clock  General  Grant  had  re¬ 
ceived  intelligence  of  the  defeat  and  rout  of  Pickett  at  Five 
Forks,  and  apprehending  that  General  Lee  might  hastily 
abandon  his  lines  and  fall  upon  General  Sheridan,  ordered 
that.  General  Humphreys  should  at  once  feel  for  a  vulnerable 
point  in  the  enemy’s  intrencliments,  and,  if  one  was  found, 
to  assault  immediately,  and  if  successful  to  push  on  at  once 
after  the  enemy.  If  he  could  not  carry  their  lines  by  mid¬ 
night,  then  he  must  send  General  Miles’s  division  to  General 
Sheridan.  The  artillery  of  the  corps  was  opened,  and  both 
Miles  and  Mott  attacked  at  once,  drove  in  the  enemy’s  pick¬ 
ets  and  got  up  close  to  the  slashings  of  the  intrencliments, 
but  could  not  carry  them.  The  enemy  was  vigilant  and  ac¬ 
tive,  and  opened  heavily  with  his  artillery.  As  the  lines 
were  not  vulnerable,  General  Miles  was  sent  down  the  White 
Oak  road  to  General  Sheridan  shortly  after  midnight,  com¬ 
munication  with  his  cavalry  along  the  road  having  been  pre¬ 
viously  opened.  The  left  of  Mott  was  then  thrown  back,  but 
he  kept  up  constant  attacks  throughout  the  night,  both  he 
and  General  Hays  feeling  the  enemy  closely  and  holding 
their  divisions  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  weakening  on 
liis  part  and  assault.  A  general  bombardment  of  the  Con¬ 
federate  lines  was  earned  on  throughout  the  night. 

General  Ord,  General  Wright,  and  General  Parke  had, 


LEE’S  INTRENCHMENTS  CARRIED. 


363 


during  the  three  days  of  their  quiet,  been  carefully  examin¬ 
ing  the  enemy’s  works  and  ground  in  their  front,  and  plan¬ 
ning  and  arranging  for  the  assault  which  they  were  now  or¬ 
dered  to  make  at  four  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  2d  of 
April.  Upon  carrying  the  works  they  were  to  move  toward 
Petersburg.  The  Second  Corps  was  to  be  thrown  forward  in 
the  same  direction.  General  Sheridan  was  to  start  at  day¬ 
light  and  sweep  up  the  White  Oak  road  and  all  north  of  it  to 
Petersburg. 

The  Confederate  intrenchments  in  front  of  General  Ord’s 
and  General  Wright’s  commands  were  held  by  four  brigades 
of  Hill’s  corps,  under  the  command  of  General  Wilcox,  Da¬ 
vis’s,  McComb’s,  Lane’s,  and  Thomas’s,  numbering,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  return  of  February  20tli,  about  4,000  enlisted  men. 
The  intrenchments  in  front  of  General  Parke’s  command 
were  held  by  General  Gordon’s  corps,  numbering,  according 
to  the  same  return,  about  7,600  enlisted  men. 

The  account  that  General  Wright  gives  of  his  assault  on 
the  morning  of  the  2d  of  April,  by  which  the  enemy’s  in¬ 
trenchments  were  carried  and  General  Lee  forced  to  abandon 

t 

his  lines,  is  so  clear  and  so  instructive  that  I  shall  use  his 
own  language  in  the  narrative  as  far  as  I  can.  He  says  : 

As  early  as  the  evening  of  the  30th  of  March  he  was  in¬ 
structed  to  be  prepared  to  assault  the  enemy’s  works  in  his 
front.  On  the  evening  of  the  1st  of  April  he  was  directed  to 
make  the  attack  at  4  a.m.  next  day.  The  works  to  be  at¬ 
tacked  were  those  extending  from  the  Jones  house  to  a  point 
opposite  the  left  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 

The  point  chosen  for  assault  was  selected  after  the  most 
careful  consideration,  based  upon  personal  examination  and 
the  reports  of  a  large  number  of  officers  who  had  scanned 
the  works  for  a  long  time.  It  was  in  front  of  Forts  Fisher 
and  Welch.  The  ground  to  be  passed  over  was  perfectly 
cleared  of  trees,  and  offered  few  natural  obstacles  except  the 


364  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


marshes  with  which  the  front  of  the  enemy’s  line  was  inter¬ 
sected.  The  point  was  near  the  left  of  the  corps  line  ;  on  its 
right  was  an  inundation  which  was  impracticable,  while  still 
further  to  the  right,  before  reaching  the  Ninth  Corps,  were 
the  strong  original  defensive  works,  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Lead  Works  ;  after-observation  showed  that  the  selection  was 
the  best  that  could  have  been  made.  The  parapets  had  high 
relief  and  deep  ditches,  preceded  (it  wTas  found)  by  two  lines 
of  abatis,  well  constructed,  with  a  fraise  between  them. 
Every  few  hundred  yards  were  batteries  well  supplied  with 
artillery.  But  for  the  capture  of  the  enemy’s  intrenched 
picket  line  on  the  25th  of  March,  the  attack  of  the  2d  of 
April  could  not  have  succeeded.  The  position  then  gained 
was  indispensable  to  the  operations  on  the  main  lines,  by  af¬ 
fording  a  place  for  assembling  the  assaulting  columns  within 
striking  distance  of  the  enemy’s  main  intrenchments. 

The  troops  were  drawn  out  of  the  intrenchments,  leaving 
the  smallest  garrison  possible  in  the  forts  and  very  few  men 
in  the  connecting  lines.  The  three  divisions  were  formed  for 
the  assault  just  in  rear  of  the  picket  line ;  the  First  Division 
on  the  right ;  the  Second  in  the  centre  ;  the  Third  on  the 
left ;  the  centre  division  being  in  advance  of  the  others.  All 
were  formed  by  brigade  with  regiment-front.  Every  pre¬ 
caution  was  taken  to  ensure  success.  There  were  pioneers 
in  front,  and  artillerymen  provided  with  implements  so  that 
captured  guns  might  be  turned  on  the  enemy  were  with  the 
columns. 

Careful  instructions  were  given  to  guide  the  movement  of 
the  troops  when  they  captured  the  works.  There  wras  not 
light  enough  to  see  until  4.40  a.m.;  then  the  men  could  see  to 
step,  though  nothing  could  be  distinguished  at  the  distance 
of  a  few  yards.  Then  the  signal,  the  firing  of  a  gun  at  Fort 
Fisher,  was  given.  The  columns  moved  promjfily  at  the  sig¬ 
nal,  broke  over  the  enemy’s  picket  line,  meeting  little  resist- 


LEE’S  RETRENCHMENTS  CARRIED. 


365 


ance,  and  poured  in  masses  over  the  main  defenses,  under  a 
musketry  fire  from  the  parapets  and  a  heavy  artillery  fire  from 
the  batteries.  Abatis  were  cut  away,  and  through  the  open¬ 
ings  thus  made,  and  through  those  made  by  the  enemy  for  his 
convenience  of  access  to  the  front ,  the  works  were  gained.  A 
brief  but  sharp  conflict  occurred,  which  soon  resulted  in  giv¬ 
ing  us  possession  of  the  whole  front  of  attack.1  In  the  ardor 
of  the  attack  some  troops  from  each  division  crossed  the 
Boydton  road  and  reached  the  South  Side  Railroad.2  Re¬ 
forming  the  lines,  the  troops  moved  down  the  works  to 
Hatcher’s  Run,  capturing  all  the  artillery  and  a  very  large 
number  of  prisoners.  A  brigade  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  left 
to  hold  the  captured  works  and  gain  more  to  the  right,  which 
it  did,  but  it  was  temporarily  unable  to  hold  a  part  of  those 
gained  against  an  attempt  to  recover  them  made  by  General 
Wilcox,  until  reinforced  by  Foster’s  division  and  two  brigades 
of  Turner’s  division  of  General  Gibbon’s  corps.  About  7  a.m. 
Harris’s  brigade  of  Turner’s  division  carried  the  enemy’s  line 
near  Hatcher’s  Run,  and  met  the  Sixth  Corps  there  sweeping 
everything  before  it. 

On  reaching  Hatcher’s  Run  the  Sixth  Corps  faced  about 
and  moved  toward  Petersburg.  At  the  request  of  General 
Gibbon,  commanding  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  he  was 
allowed  to  pass  the  Sixth,  which  followed  on  his  right  and 
left,  and  halted  in  front  of  the  enemy’s  lines,  closing  on  the 
Appomattox  near  the  Whitworth  house. 

General  Wright’s  troops  were  so  exhausted,  having  been 
eighteen  hours  under  arms,  that  it  was  considered  unad- 
visable  to  attack  until  the  next  morning. 

1  General  Wright  told  me  that  this  was  the  weakest  part  of  all  the  line  he  saw, 
and  the  only  point  where  it  could  have  been  carried.  His  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  1,100,  all  of  which  occurred  in  the  space  of  fifteen  minutes. — A.  A.  H. 

2  It  is  probable  that  General  A.  P.  Hill  was  killed  by  one  of  these  parties.  He 
was  shot  west  of  the  Boydton  Road  early  in  the  action  of  the  day.  He  had  served 
with  distinction  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  from  the  beginning  of  the  war. 


366  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

General  Parke  kept  np  the  fire  of  all  his  artillery  until  I 
a.m.  of  the  2d  of  April,  reopening  it  at  four  o’clock,  when 
General  Willcox  made  a  demonstration  against  the  enemy’s 
works  opposite  Fort  Stedman. 

For  the  assault  General  Parke  concentrated  Hartranft’s 
division  on  the  right  of  Fort  Sedgwick,  and  massed  Potter’s 
on  its  left.  The  columns  of  assault  (columns  of  regiments) 
were  formed  between  his  intrenchments  and  his  picket  line 
at  3  a.m.,  storming  pioneer  parties,  carrying  axes,  being 
placed  in  front.  At  half-past  four  o’clock  the  assaulting 
columns  went  forward ;  the  pioneers  cut  awTay  abatis  and 
chevaux-de-frise,  and  under  a  heavy  musketry,  gun,  and 
mortar  fire  the  enemy’s  works  were  captured,  with  12  guns, 
some  colors,  and  800  prisoners.  Turning  to  the  right,  Mil¬ 
ler’s  salient  was  captured  ;  turning  to  the  left,  the  intrench- 
ment  was  found  to  be  heavily  traversed,  and  the  fighting 
went  on  from  traverse  to  traverse. 

But  a  rear  line  of  works  remained  in  possession  of  the 
enemy,  which  General  Parke  endeavored  to  carry,  but  unsuc¬ 
cessfully.  His  loss  in  officers  was  severe.  Among  the 
wounded  was  General  Potter. 

The  position  gained  by  General  Parke  extended  400  yards 
on  each  side  of  the  Jerusalem  plank-road,  and  included 
several  forts  and  redans.  Frequent  attempts  were  made  by 
General  Gordon  during  the  day  to  retake  the  works,  but 
without  success.  The  firing  continued  all  day  and  into  the 
night. 

During  the  night  of  the  1st  and  2d  of  April,  General 
Humphreys  was  directed  not  to  attack  the  Crow  house  re¬ 
doubts  in  consequence  of  the  absence  of  one  of  his  divisions, 
but  about  6  a.m.,  being  informed  by  General  Meade  that  both 
Generals  Parke  and  Wright  had  carried  and  held  positions 
of  the  enemy’s  lines,  General  Humphreys  directed  General 
Hays  to  assault  the  redoubts,  preparations  for  which  had 


LEE’S  INTRENCHMENT8  CARRIED. 


367 


been  made  in  the  night.  The  attack  was  successful,  the 
works,  their  artillery,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  garrison 
being  captured.  About  half-past  seven  General  Mott  cap¬ 
tured  the  intrenched  picket  line  at  the  Burgess’s  mill  works 
under  severe  artillery  and  musketry  fire,  and  about}  half-past 
eight  the  enemy  were  moving  rapidly  out  of  their  intrench- 
ments  by  their  right  flank,  attacked  sharply  by  Mott. 

At  nine  o’clock,  receiving  intelligence  from  General  Miles 
that  he  was  on  his  return,  being,  when  he  sent  word,  on  the 
White  Oak  road  about  two  miles  west  of  the  enemy’s' intrencli- 
ments  at  the  Claiborne  road  junction,  General  Humphreys 
directed  General  Miles,  General  Mott,  and  General  Hays  to 
pursue  the  enemy  by  the  Claiborne  road  toward  Sutherland 
Station.  He  expected  by  this  movement  to  close  in  on  the 
rear  of  all  the  enemy’s  force,  which  General  Wright,  by 
penetrating  their  works,  had  cut  off  from  Petersburg,  while 
General  Sheridan  would  probably  strike  their  flank  and  front. 
This  force  consisted  of  McGowan’s,  McRae’s,  Scales’s,  and 
Cook’s  brigades  of  Hill’s  corps  under  General  Heth,  and  An¬ 
derson’s  command,  consisting  of  Johnson’s  and  Pickett’s  di¬ 
visions  and  Fitz  Lee’s  cavalrv.  General  Meade  was  at  once 
advised  of  this,  as  it  was  not  in  accordance  with  his  orders, 
and  as  he  did  not  approve  of  this  movement  the  orders  to  the 
division  commanders  were  changed.  Mott  and  Hays  were 
ordered  to  move  on  the  Boydton  road  toward  Petersburg 
and  connect  on  the  right  with  General  Wright,  and  Miles  to 
move  toward  Petersburg  by  the  first  road  met  after  crossing 
Hatcher’s  Run. 

Overtaking  Miles’s  division  near  Sutherland  Station  on  the 
South  Side  Railroad,  General  Humphreys  found  that  it  had 
just  come  up  with  the  brigades  under  General  Heth,  which 
were  forced  to  halt  and  give  battle.  General  Heth  selected 
a  position  foy  them  on  the  summit  of  a  smooth  open  ridge, 
at  the  foot  of  which,  some  six  or  eight  hundred  yards  in  front 


368  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


of  the  crest,  was  a  small  stream.  The  ground  then  rose  again 
to  the  same  height,  the  slope  being  covered  with  oak  and 
pine  wood.  The  Confederate  position  was  intrenched  hastily 
as  well  as  time  admitted.  Finding  that  General  Miles  was 
satisfied  that  he  could  defeat  the  force  before  him,  General 
Humphreys  left  him  to  accomplish  it  and  rejoined  his  two 
other  divisions,  that  in  the  meantime  were  moving  toward 
Petersburg,  in  front  of  which  they  were  formed  on  the  left 
of  Wright. 

As  soon ’as  General  Miles  examined  the  position  of  General 
Cook,  who  now  commanded  the  force  opposed  to  him  (Gen¬ 
eral  Hetli  having  been  called  to  Petersburg  to  take  command 
of  Hill’s  corps),  he  attacked  impetuously  with  the  brigades  of 
Nugent  and  Madill,  and  was  repulsed,  Madill  being  severely 
wounded. 

About  half-past  twelve  General  Miles  attacked  the  Con¬ 
federate  left  with  Madill’s  brigade,  General  McDougall  com¬ 
manding,  but  notwithstanding  the  gallant  manner  in  which 
the  attack  was  made,  aided  by  the  artillery  of  the  division,  it 
was  repulsed,  General  McDougall  being  among  the  wounded. 

About  three  o’clock  General  Miles,  having  enveloped  the 
enemy’s  right  with  a  strong  skirmish  line,  attacked  his  left 
with  Ramsey’s  brigade  with  complete  success,  sweeping  down 
inside  the  breastworks,  capturing  600 .  prisoners,  one  battle- 
flag,  and  two  guns.  The  enemy  retreated  in  confusion  toward 
the  Appomattox,  some  crossing  to  the  north  side  at  Exeter 
mills ;  but  the  body  of  them  moved  up  the  river  in  disorder 
toward  Amelia  Court  House,  where  they  arrived  at  noon  of 
the  4th. 

About  half-past  two  General  Meade,  having  learned  that 
General  Miles  needed  support,  directed  General  Humphreys 
to  take  one  of  his  divisions  toward  Sutherland  Station  for  that 
purpose.  Arriving  there  by  the  Coxe  road,  General  Hum- 

•d 

phreys  found  that  General  Miles’s  last  attack  had  been  com- 


LEE’S  ENTRENCHMENTS  CARRIED. 


369 


pletely  successful.  Probably  the  whole  force  would  have 
been  captured  in  the  morning  had  the  Second  Corps  con¬ 
tinued  its  march  toward  Sutherland  Station. 

The  main  line  of  the  Confederate  intrenchments  closing 
upon  the  Appomattox  west  of  Petersburg  ran  along  the  east 
bank  of  Old  Town  or  Indian  Town  Creek.  In  front  of  this 
line  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  creek,  about  1,000  yards  dis¬ 
tant,  were  some  advanced  works,  the  most  important  of  which 
were  F orts  Gregg  and  Whitworth,  the  former  enclosed  at  the 
rear  with  a  ditch  eight  or  ten  feet  deep,  of  about  the  same 
width,  and  the  parapet  of  corresponding  height  and  thick¬ 
ness.  Fort  Whitworth  was  of  similar  dimensions,  but  open 
at  the  gorge. 

Field’s  division  of  Longstreet’s  corps,  two  brigades  of  Gor¬ 
don’s,  and  some  of  Wilcox’s  troops  were  placed  in  the  main 
line  of  works.  General  Wilcox  says,  the  200  infantry  in  Fort 
Gregg  was  composed  of  detachments  from  Thomas’s  and 
Lane’s  brigades  of  Hill’s  corps,  and  Harris’s  of  Gordon’s  corps. 
There  were  two  guns  in  Gregg,  three  in  Whitworth ;  General 
Harris’s  brigade  formed  the  garrison  of  the  latter  work. 

As  soon  as  General  Ord’s  and  General  Wright’s  commands 
arrived  before  these  works,  Foster’s  division  of  Gibbon’s 
Corps  was  ordered  to  charge  them,  and  moved  forward 
steadily  under  artillery  and  musketry  fire,  to  find  Fort  Gregg 
surrounded  by  a  deep,  wide  ditch  partially  filled  with  water, 
and  flanked  by  fire  on  the  right  and  left.  Turner’s  First  and 
Second  brigades  were  now  pushed  up  as  supports,  while  his 
Third  Brigade,  General  Harris’s,  assailed  Fort  Whitworth. 
The  enemy,  General  Gibbon  says,  made  a  desperate  resis¬ 
tance,  and  it  was  not  until  Fort  Gregg  was  nearly  surrounded, 
and  his  men  had  succeeded  in  climbing  upon  the  parapet 
under  a  murderous  fire,  that  the  place  was  finally  taken  by 
the  last  of  several  determined  dashes  with  the  bayonet. 
General  Harris  and  a  portion  of  the  First  Division,  he  says, 
16* 


370  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  '65. 

carried  Fort  Whitworth  at  the  same  time.  General  Wilcox 
says  the  troops  were  ordered  to  retire  from  this  work  to  pre¬ 
vent  further  sacrifice. 

General  Gibbon  says,  of  the  assault  upon  Fort  Gregg,  that 
it  was  one  of  the  most  desperate  of  the  war,  that  fifty-five  of 
the  enemy  were  found  dead  inside  the  fort,  whilst  his  own 
loss  during  the  day,  most  of  which  occurred  around  these 
two  works,  was  10  officers  and  112  enlisted  men  killed,  and 
27  officers  and  565  enlisted  men  wounded,  making  a  total 
loss  of  714.  Two  guns  (in  Fort  Gregg),  several  colors,  and 
about  300  officers  and  men  were  captured. 

When  the  Confederate  lines  were  carried,  General  Ander¬ 
son  was  directed  to  move  up  along  the  Appomattox  River 
toward  Amelia  Court  House,  on  the  road  to  which  he  was 
joined  by  such  force  as  General  Pickett  had,  and  by  the 
troops  of  Hill’s  corps  under  General  Cook.  His  rear  was 
covered  by  General  Fitz  Lee. 

General  Sheridan’s  cavalry,  General  Merrit  leading,  moved 
northward,  crossing  the  South  Side  Railroad  midway  between 
Ford’s  and  Sutherland’s  depots,  near  Ford’s  Meeting  House, 
pushing  the  enemy’s  cavalry,  who  resisted  their  advance  up 
to  the  crossing  of  Namozine  Creek,  where,  General  Merritt 
says,  a  spirited  fight  took  place  with  the  enemy’s  infantry. 

General  Sheridan  moved  the  Fifth  Corps  up  the  White 
Oak  road  two  miles  toward  the  Claiborne  road,  when  it  re¬ 
turned  to  Five  Forks  and  moved  across  Hatcher’s  Run  on 
the  Ford  road,  and  across  the  South  Side  Railroad  to  the 
Coxe  road,  driving  out  of  the  way  some  dismounted  cavalry, 
then  moved  eastward  along  the  Coxe  road  toward  Suther¬ 
land  Station,  but  turned  off  on  the  Namozine  road,  and 
halted  for  the  night  near  Williamson’s,  at  the  intersection  of 
the  Namozine  by  the  River  road.  General  Crawford’s  divi¬ 
sion  was  sent  forward  to  General  Merritt  at  the  crossing  of 
Namozine  Creek. 


LEE  RETREATS  TOWARD  DANVILLE. 


371 


"When  the  Confederate  intrencliments  were  carried  by  the 
Sixth  Corps  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  General  Lee  at  once 
notified  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  that  he  would  be  compelled  to 
abandon  his  lines  during  the  following  night,  and  that  he 
would  endeavor  to  reach  Danville.  Mr.  Davis  at  once  took 
measures  to  withdraw  the  personnel  and  the  archives  of  the 
Confederate  Government  from  Richmond  by  the  Danville 
Railroad. 1 

At  three  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  General  Lee  gave  the  final 
orders  for  the  retreat,  which  commenced  at  eight  o’clock,  at 
night,  the  artillery  preceding  the  infantry,  the  wagon  trains 
keeping  as  much  as  possible  upon  roads  where  there  were  to 
be  no  troops.  The  trains  and  troops  crossed  to  the  north 
side  of  the  Appomattox  by  the  ponton,  Pocahontas  and  rail¬ 
road  bridges.  The  point  of  assemblage  was  Amelia  Court 
House.  General  Longstreet,  with  Field’s  division,  and 
Heth’s  and  Wilcox’s  divisions  of  Hill’s  corps,  led  the  column, 
moving  on  the  River  road,  intending  to  recross  the  river  at 
Bevil’s  bridge,  but  that  being  out  of  order,  used  the  ponton 
bridge  laid  at  Goode’s  bridge. 

General  Gordon,  taking  the  Hickory  road,  recrossed  the 
Appomattox  at  Goode’s  bridge,  following  Longstreet,  and 
Mahone’s  division,  passing  through  Chesterfield  Court 
House,  also  crossed  at  Goode’s  bridge,  following  Gordon. 
General  Ewell’s  command,  composed  of  General  Kershaw’s 
and  General  Custis  Lee’s  divisions,  crossed  the  James  River 
at  and  below  Richmond,  and  taking  the  Genito  road,  fol¬ 
lowed  by  Gary’s  cavalry,  crossed  the  Appomattox  by  the 
Danville  Railroad  bridge.  The  larger  part  of  General  An¬ 
derson’s  command,  composed  of  Pickett’s  and  Bushrod  John¬ 
son’s  divisions,  moved  up  along  the  south  bank  of  the 

1  Had  General  Lee  abandoned  his  lines  on  the  night  of  the  1st  of  April  to  at¬ 
tack  General  Sheridan,  there  would  have  been  only  six  or  seven  hours  of  night 
for  this  withdrawal,  too  short  a  time  to  effect  it.  They  now  had  twenty  hours. 


372  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 

• 

Appomattox,  General  Fitz  Lee,  with  his  cavalry,  bringing  np 
the  rear. 

Orders  were  given  by  General  Grant  for  the  assault  of  the 
Petersburg  and  Richmond  lines  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
3d,  but  at  three  o’clock  in  the  morning  it  was  discovered  that 
General  Lee  had  abandoned  all  his  intrenchments.  Peters¬ 
burg  was  taken  possession  of  by  General  Willcox  with  his 
division,  his  troops  and  those  at  City  Point  being  placed 
under  the  command  of  General  "Warren. 

The  formal  surrender  of  Richmond  was  made  to  General 
Weitzel  at  the  City  Hall,  at  8.15  a.m.1 


1  The  United  States  flag  was  raised  on  the  Capitol  at  Richmond  by  Lieutenant 
Johnston  L.  de  Peyster,  and  Captain  Loomis  L.  Langdon,  U.  S.  Artillery,  Chief 
of  Artillery,  both  of  General  Weitzel’s  staff.  The  former,  the  son  cf  Major- 
General  J.  Watts  de  Peyster,  a  youth  of  eighteen,  had  carried  the  flag  upon  the 
pommel  of  his  saddle,  with  this  object  in  view,  for  several  days,  expecting  to 
assault. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


LEE’S  ARMY  ASSEMBLED  AT  AMELIA  COURT  HOUSE- 
NIGHT  MARCH  PAST  MEADE’S  AND  SHERIDAN’S  LEFT 
FLANK— ATTACKED  WHILE  RETREATING— BATTLES 
OF  SAILOR’S  CREEK— RETREAT  CONTINUED  DURING 
THE  NIGHT  — HALTS  NEAR  FARMYILLE  —  CORRE¬ 
SPONDENCE  BETWEEN  GRANT  AND  LEE— SURREN¬ 
DER  OF  LEE  AT  APPOMATTOX  —  SURRENDER  OF 
ALL  OTHER  CONFEDERATE  ARMIES— ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC  DISBANDED. 

It  was  well  understood  that  General  Lee  would  move  either 
to  Danville  or  to  Lynchburg,  and  General  Grant’s  directions 
for  the  march  of  the  armies  were  such  as  to  intercept  his  re¬ 
treat,  whichever  route  he  might  take.  General  Sheridan, 
with  his  cavalry  and  the  Fifth  Corps  were  to  move  in  a  west¬ 
erly  direction,  south  of  and  near  to  the  Appomattox  River, 
so  as  to  feel  Lee’s  army  constantly,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
strike  the  Danville  Railroad  between  its  crossing  of  the  Appo¬ 
mattox  and  its  crossing  of  the  Lynchburg  Railroad  at  Burke’s 
Junction.  General  Meade,  with  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps, 
was  to  follow  General  Sheridan,  moving  westward  in  the  gen¬ 
eral  direction  of  Amelia  Old  Court  House,  with  similar  gen¬ 
eral  objects  in  view.  General  Ord,  with  the  Twenty-fourth 
Corps  and  Birney’s  colored  troops,  followed  by  the  Ninth 
Corps,  was  to  move  along  the  South  Side  Railroad  to  Burke’s 
Junction. 


374  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


The  pursuit  of  Lee  was  taken  up  early  on  the  3d,  the  lead¬ 
ing  brigade  of  Custer’s  division,  commanded  by  Colonel 
Welles,  overtaking  near  Namozine  Church  the  rear  of  Fitz 
Lee’s  cavalry,  Barringer’s  brigade,  which  suffered  severely 
in  the  contest,  the  commander  and  many  others  being  cap¬ 
tured.  At  Deep  Creek  General  Fitz  Lee  placed  his  com¬ 
mand  in  a  strong  defensive  position,  Wise’s  and  Hunton’s 
brigades  forming  part  of  the  rear  guard.  A  sharp  engage¬ 
ment  took  place  about  dark,  Merritt’s  troops  attacking.  The 
cavalry  halted  here  for  the  night,  the  Fifth,  Second,  and 
Sixth  Corps  well  closed  up. 

General  Sheridan  having  ascertained  that  General  Lee  was 
probably  concentrating  at  Amelia  Court  House,  ordered  Gen¬ 
eral  Crook,  on  the  4th,  to  strike  the  Danville  Railroad  be¬ 
tween  Burke’s  Junction  and  Jetersville,  and  then  move  to¬ 
ward  the  latter  place,  and  General  Griffin  to  march  direct  to 
Jetersville.  Both  commands  reached  there  late  in  the  after¬ 
noon,  when  General  Sheridan  learnt  that  General  Lee’s  army 
was  at  Amelia  Court  House,  about  eight  miles  northeast  from 
Jetersville.  General  Mackenzie’s  division  at  the  same  time 
had  got  to  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Court  House,  on  the 
south  approach  to  it.  The  Fifth  Corps  intrenched  so  as  to 
hold  the  position  until  Meade’s  troops  could  be  got  up.  Gen¬ 
eral  Sheridan  at  once  sent  the  information  he  had  obtained 
to  General  Meade  and  General  Grant. 

The  Second  and  Sixth  Corps  had  followed  the  Fifth  Corps 
closely  until  about  eleven  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  4th, 
when  Merritt’s  cavalry,  coming  in  from  the  right,  and  having 
precedence  necessarily  delayed  the  progress  of  the  infantry, 
so  that  it  was  night  by  the  time  it  reached  Deep  Creek. 

General  Meade,  upon  receiving  the  information  sent  him 
by  General  Sheridan,  directed  the  Second  Corps  to  march 
for  Jetersville  at  one  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  5th 
and  the  Sixth  Corps  to  follow  ;  but  a  short  distance  beyond 


LEE  AT  AMELIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


375 


Deep  Creek,  General  Merritt's  cavalry,  which  had  been  to 
the  vicinity  of  Bevil’s  bridge,  on  the  Appomattox,  again 
came  into  the  road  from  the  right  on  its  way  to  Jetersville, 
so  that  it  was  lialf-past  two  in  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  when 
the  Second  Corps  began  to  arrive  at  Jetersville,  followed  by 
the  Sixth  Corps.  Both  went  into  position,  the  Second  Corps 
on  the  left,  the  Sixth  on  the  right  of  the  Fifth  Corps.1 

But,  in  fact,  Lee’s  army  was  not  concentrated  at  Amelia 
Court  House  by  the  night  of  the  4th.  Longstreet’s  com¬ 
mand  was  there  on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  ;  Gordon’s,  if  not 
there,  was  not  more  than  four  or  five  miles  distant.  Ma- 
hone’s  division  was  near  Goode’s  bridge,  ten  or  twelve  miles 
off.  Ewell’s  command  did  not  arrive  at  the  Court  House  be¬ 
fore  midday  of  the  5th.2  Anderson’s  command,  the  rear 
brought  up  by  Fitz  Lee’s  cavalry,  arrived  on  the  morning  of 
the  5th.  General  Mahone’s  division  was  now  assigned  to 
General  Longstreet’s  command.  General  Ewell  retained  the 
troops  that  had  marched  with  him,  the  Navy  battalion  com¬ 
manded  by  Commodore  Tucker  being  attached  to  General 
Custis  Lee’s  division.  General  Anderson  retained  Pickett’s 
and  Bushrod  Johnson’s  divisions,  and  General  Gordon  his 
own  corps. 

Rations  were  obtained  here  by  a  part  of  Lee’s  army,  but 
some  of  his  troops  were  already  suffering  for  the  want  of 
food,  want  of  sleep,  and  from  excessive  fatigue.  The  roads 
were  very  heavy  owing  to  the  copious  rains,  *and  in  fact 
were  nearly  impassable  for  wagon  trains. 

On  the  5th  General  Lee  sent  forward  his  spare  artillery 
(under  General  Lindsey  Walker)  and  his  trains  by  roads  on 


1  Large  working  parties  from  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps  were  at  work  on  th& 
*  roads  during  the  3d,  4th,  and  5th,  for  they  were  nearly  impassable  for  wagon 

trains. 

2  Custis  Lee’s  division  had  its  subsistence  and  baggage  wagons  destroyed  by 
Mackenzie. 


376  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


tlie  right  flank  of  those  his  troops  would  take  in  moving 
toward  Danville,  or  Lynchburg,  and  in  the  afternoon  ad¬ 
vanced  toward  Jetersville,  with  a  view  to  attacking  if  no 
heavy  force  of  infantry  had  reinforced  Sheridan’s  command ; 
but  his  cavalry,  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  division,  advising 
him  that  Sheridan  had  been  heavily  reinforced,  he  turned 
his  column  northward  toward  a  bridge  across  Flat  Creek, 
some  five  miles  from  the  position  now  held  by  Sheridan  and 
Meade  in  force.  Flat  Creek,  a  tributary  of  the  Appomattox, 
is  eighty  or  one  hundred  feet  wide,  and  so  deep  (in  its  shal¬ 
lowest  places  coming  up  to  the  armpits  of  infantry)  that 
bridges  are  essential  to  its  passage  by  an  army.  Just  after 
sunset  the  head  of  Lee’s  column,  Longstreet’s  corps,  had 
crossed  the  creek,  and  had  arrived  at  Amelia  Sulphur 
Springs,  which  is  on  the  creek  near  the  bridge  over  that 
stream  on  the  road  from  the  springs  to  Jetersville.  General 
Lee  still  hoped,  by  a  well-conducted  night  march  westward, 
to  get  so  far  in  advance  that  he  might  certainly  reach  Lynch¬ 
burg  by  passing  through  Deatonsville,  Lice’s  Station,  and 
Farmville,  and  possibly  might  reach  Danville. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th  General  Sheridan  sent  General 
Davies’s  brigade  of  Crook’s  division  to  make  a  reconnoissance 
to  Paine’s  Cross-Roads  (Paineville),  about  five  miles  north 
of  Amelia  Springs,  to  ascertain  if  the  enemy  were  making 
any  movement  toward  that  flank  to  escape.  At  Paineville 
Davies  found  a  wagon  train  moving  westward,  escorted  by 
Gary’s  cavalry  brigade ;  it  attacked,  drove  off  the  escort 
(taking  some  prisoners),  burned  the  wagons,  and  captured 
five  pieces  of  artillery,  probably  part  of  those  in  General 
Walker’s  charge.  It  is  said  that  the  papers  of  General 
Robert  L.  Lee’s  Headquarters,  containing  many  valuable 
reports,  copies  of  but  few  of  which  are  now  to  be  found, 
were  destroyed  by  the  burning  of  these  'wagons.  General 
Fitz  Lee  says  that  his  own  Headquarters’  wagons  were 


LEE  CONTINUES  TO  RETREAT. 


377 


among  those  destroyed.  General  Fitz  Lee,  with  Mnnford’s 
and  Rosser’s  divisions,  was  sent  against  Davies,  whom  he 
followed  closely,  attacking  him  at  Amelia  Springs  about 
sunset,  just  before  he  recrossed  Flat  Creek,  by  which  time 
he  was  supported  by  General  Crook,  with  Gregg’s  and 
Smith’s  brigades. 

The  march  of  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  continued 
throughout  the  night,  the  head  of  Longstreet’s  column  ar¬ 
riving  at  Rice’s  Station,  on  the  Lynchburg  Railroad,  about 
sunrise  of  the  6th,  where  it  was  joined  by  General  Lee  in  the 
course  of  the  morning.  There  Longstreet  was  to  wait  the 
coming  up  of  the  rest  of  Lee’s  army.  Anderson  followed 
Longstreet,  Ewell,  Anderson.  Ewell  was  at  Amelia  Springs 
about  eight  o’clock  in  the  morning.  Gordon  formed  the  rear 
guard.  At  daylight  of  the  6th,  Fitz  Lee  with  his  cavalry, 
which  had  halted  for  the  night  at  Amelia  Springs,  marched 
toward  Rice’s  Station,  where  he  joined  Longstreet. 

The  trains,  which  were  long,  kept  on  the  roads  on  the 
right  flank  of  the  troops  and  were  to  cross  Sailor’s  Creek  at 
Perkinson’s  mill,  near  its  mouth  in  the  Appomattox.  The 
troops  were  to  cross  it  two  or  three  miles  higher  up,  on  the 
road  to  Rice’s  Station.  The  bridges  over  Flat  Creek,  by 
which  Lee’s  troops  and  trains  crossed,  as  well  as  that  at 
Amelia  Springs,  were  destroyed. 

At  eight  o’clock  on  the  night  of  the  5th,  General  Meade, 
in  his  despatch  to  General  Grant,  who  had  not  yet  arrived  at 
Jeters ville,  informed  him  that  as  the  Sixth  Corps  could  not 
get  up  until  about  six  o’clock,  he  was  unable  to  attack  that 
night,  but  that  he  would  attack  Lee  at  six  o’clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th  with  the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Corps, 
in  conjunction  with  General  Sheridan.  In  accordance  with 
that  despatch,  he  directed  those  corps  to  advance  the  next 
morning  at  that  hour  on  the  enemy  at  Amelia  Court  House, 
and  attack  him,  the  Fifth  Corps  to  move  along  the  rail- 


378  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


road,  the  Second  Corps  on  its  left,  the  Sixth  Corps  on  its 
right. 

General  Ord,  with  Gibbon’s  Twenty-fourth  Corps  troops, 
arrived  at  Burke’s  Junction  late  at  night  on  the  5th,  having 
marched  fifty-two  miles  since  the  morning  of  the  3d.  Bir- 
ney’s  colored  troops  were  left  at  Blacks  and  Whites  Station. 
On  the  evening  of  the  5th,  General  Ord  learned  from  General 
Sheridan  that  he  was  at  Jetersville  with  his  cavalry  and  the 
Fifth  Corps,  and  that  Lee’s  army  was  at  Amelia  Court  House. 
Before  arriving  at  Burke’s  Junction,  General  Ord  received 
directions  from  General  Grant  to  destroy  High  Bridge  and 
the  other  bridges  in  Lee’s  front,  in  order  to  interrupt  his 
movement  toward  Danville  or  Lynchburg.  Before  daylight 
of  the  6th,  General  Ord  sent  two  small  regiments  of  infantry, 
together  only  500  strong,  and  his  Headquarters  cavalry,  80 
in  number,  under  Colonel  Washburn,  of  the  Fifth  Massachu¬ 
setts,  General  Theodore  Read  of  his  staff  conducting  the 
party,  to  burn  High  Bridge  and  the  bridges  at  Farmville,  if 
not  too  well  guarded. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  General  Meade  began  to  ad¬ 
vance  toward  Amelia  Court  House,  but  at  half-past  eight, 
when  the  troops  were  about  four  miles  out,  General  Hum¬ 
phreys  discovered  a  strong  column  of  the  enemy’s  infantry 
on  the  north  bank  of  Flat  Creek,  moving  westward  (a  part  of 
the  column  had  already  entered  the  woods  in  their  front),  and 
directing  General  Mott  to  send  a  brigade  across  the  creek, 
to  attack  and  develop  the  force,  halted  the  rest  of  his  com¬ 
mand,  communicated  the  information  to  General  Meade,  and 
began  preparations  to  cross  the  creek.  General  Miles  mean¬ 
while  brought  some  guns  to  the  bank  of  the  creek  and  opened 
upon  the  column.  This,  even  if  not  effective  (which  it  was), 
would  give  notice  that  the  enemy  had  been  come  up  with. 
Axrparently  it  was  the  rear  of  Lee’s  army. 

A  short  time  before  this  took  x>lace,  Meade’s  signal  officers 


LEE  ATTACKED  OK  THE  MARCH. 


379 


had  discovered  trains  several  miles  distant  in  a  northwest 
direction  near  Deatonsville,  with  cavalry  escorting  them, 
moving  west.  General  Griffin,  at  Hill’s  Shop,  received  un¬ 
doubted  information  that  Lee  had  left  Amelia  Court  House 
and  had  moved  west.  At  half-past  nine  General  Meade’s 
signal  officers  discovered  an  infantry  column  three  or  four 
miles  distant  in  a  straight  line,  in  a  northwest  direction,  and 
another  six  or  seven  miles  distant,  both  moving  quickly. 
All  this  information  left  no  doubt  that  General  Lee  had  been 
passing  our  left  during  the  night,  and  General  Meade  at  once 
faced  his  army  about,  and  directed  the  Second  Corps  to  move 
on  Deatonsville,  the  Fifth  Corps  through  Paineville  on  the 
right  of  the  Second,  and  the  Sixth  Corps  to  move  through 
Jetersville  and  take  position  on  the  left  of  the  Second. 

The  Second  Corps  at  once  began  crossing  Flat  Creek,  some 
of  the  troops  wading  across  with  the  water  up  to  their  arm- 
pits,  while  bridges  were  built  in  an  incredibly  short  space  of 
time  for  the  passage  of  the  rest  of  the  infantry  and  of  the 
artillery  and  ambulances. 

A  sharp  running  fight  commenced  at  once  with  Gordon’s 
corps,  which  was  continued  over  a  distance  of  fourteen  miles, 
during  wThich  several  partially  intrenched  positions  were  car¬ 
ried.  The  country  was  broken,  consisting  of  woods  with 
dense  undergrowth  and  swamps,  alternating  with  open  fields, 
through  and  over  which  the  lines  of  battle  followed  closely 
on  the  skirmish  line,  with  a  rapidity  and  good  order  that 
is  believed  to  be  unexampled.  Artillery  moved  with  our 
skirmish  line. 

General  Anderson  halted  some  time  in  the  morning  at  a 
poidt  about  three  miles  west  of  Deatonsville,  at  J.  Hott’s 
house,  where  the  road  from  Deatonsville  forks,  one  branch 
turning  abruptly  to  the  right  and  running  down  Sailor’s 
Creek  at  about  a  mile’s  distance  from  it ;  the  other  branch  of 
the  fork  is  the  road  to  Bice’s  Station,  and  does  not  change 


380  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


its  direction.  The  ground  at  this  fork  is  high,  declining  in 
an  even  slope  of  clear  ground  to  Sailor’s  Creek,  about  a  mile 
off. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  General  Sheridan  directed 
General  Crook  to  move  to  Deatonsville,  and  General  Merritt 
to  follow  him.  Moving  on  the  Pride’s  Church  road,  General 
Crook  ascertained  that  the  enemy  were  passing  through 
Deatonsville,  their  trains  on  the  Jamestown  road.  These  he 
endeavored,  about  midday,  to  cut  off  at  the  forks  of  the  road 
near  Hott’s,  but  found  them  strongly  guarded  by  Anderson, 
who  repelled  the  attempt.  The  head  of  Ewell’s  troops  was 
about  a  mile  in  rear  of  Anderson  at  this  time,  coming  up,  and 
after  its  arrival  took  part  in  repulsing  a  second  attempt  of 
Crook,  aided  by  Merritt,  upon  the  trains  at  this  point. 
Pickett  had  crossed  Sailor’s  Creek,  and  when  the  head  of 
Gordon’s  corps  began  to  arrive  at  the  forks  of  the  road,  An¬ 
derson  crossed  the  creek  with  Johnson’s  division,  and,  with 
Pickett,  formed  across  the  road  to  Rice’s  Station  on  high 
ground,  where  they  made  some  temporary  breastworks. 
Ewell  followed  Anderson  across  the  creek,  halting  upon  it. 

General  Merritt  and  General  Crook  moved  parallel  with 
the  enemy’s  line  of  march,  on  its  left  flank,  impeding  the 
movement  of  the  column  wherever  practicable,  and  crossing 
Sailor’s  Creek.  General  Custer,  when  south  of  the  creek, 
succeeded  in  striking  the  column  at  a  weak  point,  destroying 
a  large  number  of  wagons  and  capturing  Huger’s  part  of 
three  batteries  (12  guns).  Stagg’s  brigade  of  Devin’s  division 
remained  near  the  forks  of  the  road  and  subsequently  united 
with  the  Sixth  Corps  in  its  attack  on  Ewell.  Gordon,  after 
the  passage  of  the  main  trains  of  Lee’s  army,  took  the  right- 
hand  fork,  covering  them,  the  Second  Corps  close  upon  him. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  forks  near  Hott’s  at  about  half-past 
four  o’clock,  General  Humphreys  perceived  Ewell’s  troops, 
or  part  of  them,  apparently  forming  line  of  battle  along  the 


BATTLES  OF  SAILOR’S  CREEK. 


381 


north  side  of  Sailor’s  Creek.  They  appeared  to  be  about  two 
brigades  strong.  Knowing  that  General  Sheridan’s  cavalry 
were  close  upon  the  enemy  on  the  Rice’s  Station  road,  though 
not  aware  that  Anderson’s  command  was  across  that  road  on 
the  crest  beyond  Ewell,  and  seeing  the  whole  of  the  Sixth 
Corps  near  at  hand  (a  brigade  of  Seymour’s  division  was  tem¬ 
porarily  mixed  with  the  Second  Corps  near  Hott’s),  General 
Humphreys  continued  his  pursuit  of  Gordon’s  corps,  which 
had  turned  down  the  creek  on  the  right-hand  fork  of  the 
road.  The  running  contest  with  Gordon’s  corps  continued 
for  three  miles  further,  the  road  for  many  miles  being  strewn 
with  tents,  camp  equipage,  baggage,  battery-forges,  limbers, 
and  wagons.  Its  last  attempted  stand  was  near  Perkinson’s 
mills  on  Sailor’s  Creek,  where  just  before  dark  a  short,  sharp 
contest  gave  us  13  flags,  3  guns,  several  hundred  prisoners, 
and  a  large  part  of  the  main  trains  of  Lee’s  army,  which  were 
huddled  together  in  a  confused  mass  at  the  crossing  of  the 
creek.  Gordon  attempted  to  form  on  the  high  ground  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  creek,  but  fell  back  quickly  from  it  as 
our  troops  crossed.  Night  put  a  stop  to  the  pursuit  until 
daylight  of  the  7th,  for  the  country  and  roads  were  unknown 
to  us.  General  Gordon  reached  High  Bridge  that  night. 

The  captures  of  the  corps  were  13  flags,  4  guns,  and 
1,700  prisoners.  The  enemy’s  killed  and  wounded  prob¬ 
ably  exceeded  our  own,  and  their  total  loss  could  not  have 
been  less  than  2,000.  The  destruction  of  the  wagon  trains 
must  have  caused  much  additional  suffering  in  Lee’s  army. 

Our  own  killed  and  wounded  were  311  of  the  First  and 
Second  divisions,  General  Mott  being  among  the  wounded. 

When  at  the  Amelia  Springs  in  the  morning  General 
Humphreys  was  informed  that  there  was  a  column  of  the 
enemy  moving  along  the  Paineville  road,  and  therefore 
directed  General  Barlow,  who  commanded  the  Second  Div¬ 
ision  (having  just  reported  for  duty  in  the  morning),  to 


382  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  *64  AND  ’65. 


move  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  corps  ;  hut  the  informa¬ 
tion  having  been  altogether  erroneous,  that  division  did  not 
become  engaged. 

The  Fifth  Corps,  forming  the  right  of  the  army,  moved 
on  the  Paineville  road  to  Ligontown  Ferry,  a  distance  of 
thirty-two  miles,  but  encountered  none  of  the  enemy. 

General  Crook  moving  to  the  left  found  General  Andersbn 
strongly  posted  on  high  ground  with  temporary  breastworks 
running  across  the  Rice’s  Station  road,  and  sent  Gregg, 
dismounted,  to  take  possession  of  and  form  across  the  road. 
General  Smith,  his  brigade  dismounted,  formed  on  Gregg’s 
right ;  Davies,  mounted,  was  formed  in  front  of  Anderson’s 
works.  General  Merritt  formed  Devin  and  Custer  on  the 
right  of  Crook. 

As  soon  as  Seymour’s  and  Wheaton’s  divisions  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  arrived,  General  Wright  formed  them  for  attack 
on  the  north  side  of  Sailor’s  Creek,  on  the  open  slope  de¬ 
scending  from  Hott’s  to  the  creek,  Seymour’s  division  on 
the  right  of  the  road,  his  left  resting  on  it,  Wheaton’s  divi¬ 
sion  on  Seymour’s  left.  Wright’s  artillery  at  short  distance 
opened  with  a  destructive  tire  without  receiving  any  response 
from  Ewell,  showing  that  he  had  no  artillery  with  him, 
which  in  fact  neither  he  nor  Anderson  had. 

General  Ewell  had  formed  his  troops  in  a  good  position 
some  little  distance  from  the  creek  on  a  crest,  in  front  of 
which  was  a  thicket  of  young  pines,  beyond*  or  in  front  of 
which  was  the  creek.  Facing  north  to  meet  the  Sixth  Corps, 
General  Kershaw  was  on  the  right  of  the  road,  General  Cus- 
tis  Lee  on  the  left.  The  Navy  battalion  was  in  rear  of  his 
right  as  a  reserve. 

When  General  Ewell  learnt  from  General  Anderson  that 
the  cavalry  held  the  road  in  his  front,  he  proposed  that  they 
should  strike  through  the  woods  to  their  right  and  reach  a 
road  further  west  that  led  to  Farmville,  or  unite  and  attack 


BATTLES  OF  SAILOR’S  CREEK. 


383 


tlie  cavalry  in  Anderson’s  front ;  but  before  they  could  ar¬ 
range  for  either  attempt  the  Sixth  Corps  was  forming  close 
to  them.  Seymour’s  and  Wheaton’s  divisions  now  charged 
Ewell’s  position  and  carried  it  handsomely,  except,  General 
Wright  says,  at  a  point  on  the  right  of  the  road,  where  the 
Navy  battalion  made  a  countercharge  upon  that  part  of  his 
line.  These  troops,  he  says,  were  surrounded  by  Seymour’s 
and  Wheaton’s  divisions  on  their  flanks,  the  artillery,  sup¬ 
ported  by  Getty’s  division,  in  their  front,  and  the  cavalry 
in  their  rear ;  he  had  ceased  firing  supposing  them  to  be 
prisoners,  but  at  once  opened  again  the  artillery  and  infantry 
fire  upon  them,  when  they  surrendered.  General  Stagg  with 
his  brigade  of  cavalry,  directed  by  General  Sheridan,  struck 
Ewell’s  right  flank. 

As  soon  as  General  Wright’s  artillery  was  in  position,  Gen¬ 
eral  Sheridan  ordered  General  Crook  and  General  Merritt  to 
attack,  when  a  general  assault  was  made  by  them,  Crook’s 
two  dismounted  brigades  on  the  left  turning  and  going  over 
Anderson’s  works,  while  Davies,  General  Crook  says,  ‘  ‘  made 
one  of  the  finest  charges  of  the  wTar,  riding  over  and  captur¬ 
ing  the  works  and  their  defenders.  The  enemy  on  the  right 
who  were  thus  cut  off  from  retreat  surrendered,  and  were 
taken  by  different  parties.” 

General  Ewell  says  that  he  held  on  until  Anderson  was 
broken,  and  until  the  Sixth  Corps  line  came  round  his  left 
and  indeed  was  already  in  his  rear,  his  right  also  completely 
enveloped,  when  he  surrendered.  The  whole  of  Ewell’s  com¬ 
mand  was  either  killed,  wounded,  or  captured,  except  250  of 
Kershaw’s  division. 

According  to  the  most  reliable  information  I  have  been 
able  to  obtain,  General  Ewell  had  about  3,600  men  on  the 
ground,  General  Anderson  about  6,300,  making  a  total  force 
of  about  10,000.  General  Ewell  lost  about  3,400,  General 
Anderson  about  2,600,  making  the  total  loss  of  both  com- 


384  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


mands  about  6,000  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  Among 
tlie  prisoners  were  Generals  Ewell,  Kershaw,  Custis  Lee,  and 
Dubose,  of  Ewell’s  command,  and  Generals  Hunton  and 
Corse,  of  Pickett’s  division.1 

The  total  loss  to  Lee’s  army  to-day  in  its  actions  with  the 
Cavalry  and  Sixth  Corps  and  with  the  Second  Corps  was  not 
less  than  8,000. 

I  have  no  means  of  stating  the  number  of  the  killed  and 
wounded  in  the  Cavalry.  The  loss  of  the  Sixth  Corps  in 
killed  and  wounded  was  442. 

General  Devin  advanced  with  his  cavalry  as  far  as  one  of 
the  main  branches  of  Sailor’s  Creek,  where  he  halted  for  the 
night.  Malione’s  division  was  on  the  opposite  bank,  having 
been  sent  back  by  General  Longstreet  from  Rice’s  Station  to 
cover  the  escape  of  the  fugitives. 


1  General  Ewell  states  that  his  command  numbered  only  about  3.000,  having 
lost  half  its  numbers  since  leaving  Richmond  by  the  fatigue  of  four  days’  and 
nights’  almost  constant  marching,  the  last  two  days  with  nothing  to  eat. 

General  Kershaw  states  that  he  had  2,000  men  on  the  ground.  General  Custis 
Lee's  troops  being  unaccustomed  to  marching  or  the  hardships  of  the  field,  un¬ 
doubtedly  suffered  much  more  than  General  Kershaw’s. 

It  appears  probable,  according  to  a  paper  of  Captain  McHenry  Howard,  of  Gen¬ 
eral  Custis  Lee’s  staff,  published  in  the  Southern  Historical  Society  Transactions, 
1874-75,  that  he  had  about  1,000  men  on  the  ground ;  250  of  Kershaw’s  escaped 
capture  and  formed  a  battalion.  The  loss  of  Ewell  according  to  these  figures  was 
about  3,400.  General  Bushrod  Johnson,  whose  division  numbered  about  3,800, 
says  that  his  loss  was  small;  that  Wise’s  and  Wallace’s  brigades  remained  to  him, 
25J  of  Moody’s,  but  only  80  of  Ransom’s.  He  probably  lost  some  1,100.  Of  Pick¬ 
ett’s  division,  that  numbered  about  2,500,  about  1,000  escaped  capture,  making  the 
loss  of  Anderson’s  command  2,600  ;  the  loss  of  both  commands,  Ewell's  and  Ander¬ 
son’s,  6,000. 

The  disorder  in  which  those  brigades  of  Johnson’s  and  Pickett's  divisions  that 
were  engaged  at  Five  Forks  got  away  from  the  field  on  the  night  of  the  1st  of 
April,  and  the  disorder  with  which  the  four  brigades  of  Hill’s  troops  retreated 
from  Miles  at  Sunderland  Station  on  the  2d,  as  well  as  the  disorder  of  those  bri¬ 
gades  along  the  lines  carried  by  General  Wright,  doubtless  scattered  them  to  such 
an  extent  that  many  being  without  rations  did  not  rejoin  their  commands. 

In  the  movement  to  Amelia  Court  House,  and- from  that  point  to  Sailor’s  Creek, 
Farmville,  and  Appomattox  Court  House,  having  but  scanty  supplies  and  being 
exhausted  by  want  of  sleep  and  food  and  overcome  with  fatigue,  many  men  fell 
out  or  wandered  in  search  of  food. 


BATTLES  OF  SAILOR’S  CREEK. 


385 


General  Getty  advanced  two  miles  beyond  the  battlefield, 
the  two  other  divisions  of  the  Sixth  Corps  closing  up  on  him. 

General  Ord,  having  been  notified  by  General  Sheridan, 
on  the  6th,  that  General  Lee  was  apparently  moving  toward 
Burke’s  Junction,  at  first  prepared  to  meet  him  there,  but 
subsequently,  with  a  view  to  intercept  him,  moved  along  the 
Lynchburg  Railroad  with  Gibbon’s  two  divisions  (orders  to 
that  effect  also  having  been  sent  him  by  General  Grant),  and 
after  marching  eight  or  ten  miles  came  upon  Longstreet, 
intrenched  at  Rice’s  Station ;  it  was  night,  however,  before 
his  troops  got  into  position.  General  Ord  endeavored  to 
warn  General  Read  of  the  movement  of  Lee’s  army,  but  un¬ 
successfully,  and  that  officer  passing  through  Farmville  was 
within  two  miles  of  High  Bridge  when  he  was  encountered 
about  midday  by  General  Rosser  with  his  own  and  Munford’s 
division  of  cavalry.  Read’s  force,  General  Ord  says,  con¬ 
sisted  of  80  cavalry  and  500  infantry.  A  most  gallant  fight 
ensued,  in  which  General  Read,  Colonel  Washburn,  and  all 
the  cavalry  officers  were  killed.  After  heavy  loss  the  rest  of 
the  force  surrendered.  General  Dearing,  Colonel  Boston, 
and  Major  Thompson  of  Rosser’s  command  were  among  the 
killed. 

It  has  been  seen  that  General  Longstreet  remained  halted 
at  Rice’s  Station  all  day  waiting  for  Anderson,  Ewell,  and 
Gordon  to  unite  with  him.  They  were  covering  the  trains, 
but  notwithstanding  their  efforts  the  greater  part  of  them 
were  destroyed.  Ewell’s  whole  force  was  lost,  together  with 
nearly  half  of  Anderson’s  and  a  large  part  of  Gordon’s,  all  in 
a  useless  effort  to  save  the  trains. 

When  Mr.  Davis  and  General  Lee  determined  to  abandon 
the  Richmond  intrenchments  as  soon  as  the  roads  ceased  to 
be  impassable,  had  preparations  then  been  made  for  aban¬ 
doning  all  surplus  artillery  and  discarding  all  camp  equi¬ 
page,  baggage,  etc.,  except  that  which  could  be  earned  with- 
XII.— 17 


386  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


out  encumbrance  on  pack-animals,  retaining  heavy  wagons 
only  for  ammunition  and  hospital  supplies  (with  ambulances) 
and  establishing  temporary  depots  of  supplies  at  railroad 
stations,  Lee  thus  lightly  equipped  might  have  united  with 
Johnston  at  Danville,  or  at  least  have  reached  the  mountains 
near  Lynchburg.  But  that  would  only  have  protracted  the 
war  for  a  brief  period. 

As  soon  as  night  set  in  General  Longstreet,  with  Field, 
Hetli,  and  Wilcox,  marched  for  Farmville,  crossed  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  Appomattox  there,  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  7tli  began  to  move  out  on  the  road  passing  through  Ap¬ 
pomattox  Court  House  to  Lynchburg.  He  retained  some 
force  on  the  river  to  delay  our  crossing.  General  Fitz  Lee, 
with  all  his  cavalry,  followed  Longstreet,  crossing  the  river 
by  a  ford  above  the  bridges,  leaving  some  force  in  the  vicinity 
of  Farmville. 

At  Farmville  rations  were  distributed  to  Lee’s  army,  80, 000 
having  been  placed  there  to  await  its  arrival.  Many  of  the 
officers  and  men  had  had  little  else  than  parched  or  raw 
Indian  corn  on  the  5tli  and  6th. 

General  Gordon,  to  whose  command  General  Buslirod 
Johnson’s  division  had  been  attached,  crossed  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  Appomattox  at  High  Bridge,  where  there  is  a 
wagon-road  bridge  as  well  as  a  railroad  bridge.  General 
Malione’s  division  followed  Gordon’s  troops  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  7tli. 

Early  on  the  same  morning  General  Ord,  finding  that 
General  Longstreet  had  moved  in  the  night  toward  Farm¬ 
ville,  followed  to  that  town.  Birney's  colored  division  had 
now  joined  him. 

General  Sheridan  sent  Merritt’s  cavalry  toward  Prince  Ed¬ 
ward  Court  House  to  intercept  any  movement  of  the  enemy 
toward  Danville,  and  Crook’s  to  Farmville. 

General  Meade  directed  Griffin  to  move  to  Prince  Edward 


LEE  NEAR  FARMVILLE,  APRIL  7th. 


387 


Court  House,  General  Humphreys  and  General  Wright  to 
continue  the  direct  pursuit  as  long  as  it  promised  success. 
General  Wright  moved  to  Farmville,  following  General  Ord. 
By  the  time  the  head  of  Crook’s  cavalry  reached  Farmville 
the  enemy  had  crossed  there  and  burnt  the  bridges.  The 
cavalry  ford  was  too  deep  for  infantry. 

The  Second  Corps  resumed  the  pursuit  at  half -past  five  in 
the  morning  of  the  7th,  keeping  near  to  the  river  and  taking 
routes  which  appeared  to  have  been  marched  on  by  the 
largest  bodies  of  infantry,  and  came  upon  High  Bridge  just 
as  the  enemy  had  blown  up  the  redoubt  that  formed  the 
bridge-head  and  had  set  fire  to  the  railroad  bridge 1  and 
were  trying  to  burn  the  wagon-road  bridge.  But  General 
Barlow,  whose  division  wras  in  advance,  promptly  sent  his 
leading  men  in  double-quick  to  secure  the  wagon-road 
bridge,  a  matter  of  importance  since  the  river  was  not  ford¬ 
able  for  infantrv. 

There  were  but  few  of  the  enemy  at  the  bridge,  and  those 
Barlow’s  men  drove  off.  Seeing  their  mistake,  the  enemy 
sent  back  a  cloud  of  skirmishers  to  drive  off  the  few  men  of 
the  Second  Corps  that  had  as  yet  come  up,  but  they  being 
reinforced  secured  the  bridge,  and  the  Second  Corps  began 
crossing  the  river  at  once.  Mahone’s  division  was  drawn  up 
on  the  high  ground  of  the  north  bank,  apparently  to  oppose 
the  passage,  his  position  being  strengthened  by  two  re¬ 
doubts,  but  moved  off  in  a  northwest  direction,  Gordon’s 
corps  moving  up  the  river  along  the  railroad  bed  in  the  di¬ 
rection  of  Farmville. 


1  The  railroad  bridge  is  called  High  Bridge  because  built  upon  piers  about  60 
feet  high  across  the  narrow  river  and  the  wide  marshy  low  ground  on  the  north 
bank. 

This  railroad  bridge  was  saved,  with  the  loss  of  four  spans  at  the  north  end, 
chiefly  by  the  exertions  of  Colonel  Livermore,  of  General  Humphreys’s  6taff,  whose 
party  put  out  the  fire  while  the  enemy’s  skirmishers  were  fighting  under  their 
feet.  It  was  an  open  deck  bridge. 


388  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’6£L 

Believing  that  General  Lee  was  moving  toward  Lynch¬ 
burg  by  the  old  stage-road  north  of  the  Appomattox  River, 
General  Humphreys  moved  with  Miles  and  De  Trobriand 
(the  latter  now  commanding  the  Third  Division)  on  a  road 
running  northwest,  which  intersects  the  stage-road  about 
four  miles  north  of  Farmville,  but  lest  he  might  be  mistaken 
in  the  route  Lee  intended  to  pursue,  he  sent  General  Barlow 
to  follow  General  Gordon  along  the  railroad  bed  toward 
Farmville.  Artillery  could  not  accompany  him. 

General  Barlow  found  Farmville  still  in  possession  of  a 
strong  force  of  the  enemy,  who  had  set  the  bridges  on  fire 
and  were  covering  a  wagon-train  on  the  north  bank  that  was 
moving  toward  Lynchburg. 

The  bridges  were  burnt  and  our  troops  concentrated  about 
Farmville  during  the  day,  were,  with  the  exception  of  Crook’s 
cavalry,  prevented  from  crossing,  as  the  river  was  not  fordable 
for  infantry,  and  barely  for  cavalry. 

General  Barlow  overtaking  part  of  Gordon’s  corps,  at  once 
attacked  and  cut  off  a  large  number  of  wagons,  which  were 
burnt.  In  this  attack,  Brigadier-General  Smyth,  command¬ 
ing  the  Third  Brigade,  a  gallant  and  highly  meritorious  offi¬ 
cer,  was  mortally  wounded.  His  fall  led  to  the  loss  of  some 
part  of  the  skirmish  line. 

General  Humphreys,  with  Miles  and  De  Trobriand,  arrived 
near  the  Lynchburg  stage-road  about  one  o’clock,  when  he 
suddenly  came  in  contact  with  the  enemy,  who  opened  on 
him  with  Poague’s  sixteen  guns ;  dispositions  were  at  once 
made  for  attack,  and  a  heavy  skirmish  line  was  pressed  close 
up  against  the  enemy  to  develop  his  position.  It  was  soon 
found,  from  the  prisoners  taken,  that  Lee’s  whole  army  was 
present  in  a  strong  position  covering  the  stage  and  plank 
roads  to  Lynchburg,  which  had  been  intrenched  sufficiently 
for  cover,  and  had  artillery  in  place.  It  was  on  the  crest  of  a 
long  slope  of  open  ground.  Fitz  Lee’s  cavalry  was  covering 


LEE  NEAR  FARMVILLE,  APRIL  7th. 


389 


their  rear  toward  Farmville,  supported  by  Heth’s  infantry.  A 
heavy  skirmish  line  was  pressed  against  the  enemy,  and  an 
attack  threatened  with  the  two  divisions,  both  of  which  were 
now  up,  and  an  unsuccessful  attempt  was  made  to  take  them 
in  flank.  Barlow  was  now  sent  for,1  and  General  Meade  in¬ 
formed  that  Lee’s  whole  remaining  force,  probably  about 
18,000  infantry,  had  been  come  up  with,  and  suggesting  that 
a  corps  should  attack  Lee  from  the  direction  of  Farmville  at 
the  same  time  that  the  Second  Corps  attacked  from  the  oppo¬ 
site  direction.  Upon  this  General  Meade  sent  directions  for 
General  Gibbon,  with  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  and  General 
"Wright,  with  the  Sixth  Corps,  both  of  which  were  then 
at  or  near  Farmville,  to  cross  the  river  there  and  attack 
jointly  with  the  Second  Corps.  But  neither  General 
Meade  nor  General  Humphreys  was  aware  that  the  river  at 
Farmville  was  impassable,  and  that  there  was  no  ponton 
bridge  available,  and  that  it  would  be  night  before  the  Sixth 
Corps,  which  had  arrived  at  Farmville  by  two  o’clock,  could 
get  across  after  building  a  foot  bridge  and  a  ponton  bridge. 

While  General  Humpheys,  fully  expecting  that  an  attack 
from  the  direction  of  Farmville  would  be  made,  was  waiting 
the  arrival  of  Barlow,  the  enemy  was  observed,  at  half-past 
four,  to  shorten  his  right  flank,  and  some  firing  being  heard 
in  the  direction  of  Farmville,  which  was  supposed  to  be  the 
Sixth  Corps  advancing,  General  Humphreys  contracted  his 
left,  and  extended  his  right  to  envelop  the  enemy’s  left  flank. 
While  this  was  being  done  General  Miles  thought  he  saw  an 
opportunity  for  attack,  and  at  once  made  it  with  a  part  of  his 
First  Brigade,  which  was,  however,  repulsed  with  consider¬ 
able  loss.  The  ground  was  rough  and  the  position  and  the 
intrenchments  strong.  The  attack  fell  on  Mahone’s  division, 

1  The  information  received  from  Headquarters  in  the  morning  was  that  Lee  was 
probably  moving  toward  Danville,  and  for  that  reason  Barlow  had  been  sent  to¬ 
ward  Farmville. 


390  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


which  was  on  the  Confederate  left,  supported  by  Anderson’s 
brigade  of  Field’s  division.  Poague’s  artillery  was  on  Ma- 
lione’s  right,  then  Gordon’s  corps,  with  Longstreet’s  troops 
on  its  right.  The  firing  in  the  direction  of  Farmville,  which 
was  light  and  ceased  very  soon,  came  from  an  encounter 
with  Crook’s  cavalry  division,  which  had  crossed  the  river 
with  great  difficulty,  by  wading,  at  Farmville.  Moving  for¬ 
ward  by  the  Plank-road,  General  Gregg’s  brigade,  which  was 
leading,  was  attacked  by  General  Fitz  Lee,  General  Munford 
in  front,  General  Rosser  in  flank,  General  Heth  supporting. 
General  Gregg  was  captured  with  other  prisoners,  and  his 
brigade  driven  back.  General  Crook  was  now  recalled  to 
Farmville,  and  directed  to  move  to  Prospect  Station  on  the 
Lynchburg  Railroad,  10  or  12  miles  from  Farmville,  which 
station  he  reached  about  midnight. 

General  Barlow  rejoined  his  corps  about  sunset,  but  it  was 
dark  before  he  could  be  put  in  position. 1 

The  loss  of  the  Second  Corps  to-day  was  five  hundred  and 
seventy-one  officers  and  men  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 
Nothing  could  have  been  finer  than  the  spirit  and  prompt¬ 
ness  of  the  officers  and  men.2  "Without  it  the  wagon-road 
bridge  at  High  Bridge  could  not  have  been  secured,  and  no 
infantry  could  have  crossed  and  detained  Lee  from  midday 
to  night  at  Farmville  heights. 

Among  the  enemy’s  loss  was  Brigadier-General  Lewis  of 

1  The  following  quotation  from  “  McGowan’s  South  Carolina  Brigade,”  upon 
what  took  place  where  two  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  overtook  Lee’s  force  on 
the  7th,  may  serve  as  an  example  of  what  is  meant  by  pressing  up  against  an 
enemy  without  serious  fighting. 

“The  enemy  seemed  ubiquitous.  We  were  instructed  to  be  prepared  to  fight 
on  either  flank.  On  our  right  flank  firing  was  pretty  steadily  kept  up ;  in  our 
front  a  regular  battle  was  going  on.  Mahone’s  division  was  engaged,  and  a  por¬ 
tion  of  Field’s.  .  .  .  The  firing  increased  in  rapidity  and  extent  until  three 
sides  were  at  once  set  upon  by  the  enemy.  ...  I  never  was  so  bewildered  as 
on  this  occasion.  .  .  .” 

2  All  commanding  officers  were  at  the  head  of  their  commands,  literally  leading 
them,  as  they  should  in  a  pursuit. 


LEE  NEAR  FARMYILLE,  APRIL  7th. 


391 


Walker’s  division,  Gordon’s  Corps,  who  was  severely  wound¬ 
ed,  and  fell  into  our  hands  with  other  wounded  officers. 

It  was  anticipated  that  General  Lee  would  move  off  in  the 
night,  which  he  did,  General  Fitz  Lee,  who  brought  up  the 
rear,  leaving  the  ground  about  midnight. 

By  the  detention  until  night  at  this  place,  General  Lee 
lost  invaluable  time,  which  he  could  not  regain  by  night¬ 
marching,  lost  the  supplies  awaiting  him  at  Appomattox 
Station,  and  gave  time  to  Sheridan  with  his  cavalry,  and 
Ord  with  the  Fifth  and  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  to  post  them¬ 
selves  across  his  path  at  Appomattox  Court  House.  If  no 
infantry  had  crossed  the  Appomattox  on  the  7th  he  could 
have  reached  New  Store  that  night,  Appomattox  Station  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  8th,  obtained  the  rations  there,  and 
moved  that  evening  toward  Lynchburg.  A  march  the  next 
day,  the  9th,  would  have  brought  him  to  Lynchburg.  Ord’s 
two  infantry  corps  did  not  reach  Appomattox  Court  House 
until  ten  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  April. 

About  half-past  eight  o’clock  in  the  evening,  when  still  in 
contact  with  Lee  as  described,  General  Seth  Williams, 
Adjutant-General,  brought  General  Humphreys  General 
Grant’s  first  letter  to  General  Lee,  asking  the  surrender  of 
his  army,  which  letter  General  Humphreys  was  requested  to 
have  delivered  to  General  Lee.  He  sent  it  at  once  through 
his  picket-line,  at  the  same  time  authorizing  a  truce  for  an 
hour  at  that  point  to  enable  the  enemy  to  gather  up  their 
wounded,  that  were  lying  between  the  lines,  an  authority 
which  they  had  informally  asked  for.  The  opposing  troops 
were  only  a  few  hundred  yards  apart.  General  Lee’s  answer 
was  brought  back  within  an  hour,  and  General  Williams  set 
out  at  once  to  return  to  General  Grant  at  Farmville,  by  the 
circuitous  route  of  High  Bridge. 

The  letter  of  General  Grant  and  the  reply  of  General  Lee 
are  marked  Nos.  1  and  2  in  Appendix  M. 


392  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 


Tlie  pursuit  was  resumed  by  tlie  Second  Corps,  followed 
by  the  Sixth  Corps,  at  half -past  five  on  the  morning  of  the 
8th,  on  the  road  to  Lynchburg.  In  the  morning,  while  on 
the  march,  General  Williams  brought  to  General  Humphreys 
General  Grant’s  second  letter  to  General  Lee,  which  was  sent 
to  him  through  Fitz  Lee’s  cavalry  rear  guard  close  in  General 
Humphreys’s  front.  General  Lee’s  answer  to  this  second 
letter  of  General  Grant  was  received  by  General  Humphreys 
at  dusk,  when  he  had  halted  for  two  or  three  hours  to  rest 
his  troops  some  two  miles  beyond  New  Store,  after  a  march 
of  twenty  miles.  See  Letters  Nos.  2  and  3  in  Appendix  M. 

General  Humphreys  at  once  sent  the  reply  of  General  Lee 
by  his  Adjutant-General,  Colonel  Whittier,  to  General  Grant, 
who  received  it  about  midnight,  he  and  General  Meade  hav¬ 
ing  halted  for  the  night  at  Curdsville,  about  ten  miles  back. 

After  some  two  or  three  hours’  rest,  in  view  of  despatches 
received  from  Headquarters,  though  somewhat  against  Gen¬ 
eral  Humphreys’  judgment,  he  resumed  the  march  with  the 
object  of  coming  up  with  the  main  force  of  the  enemy,  but 
finding  the  men  dropping  out  of  the  ranks  from  exhaustion, 
owing  to  want  of  food,  and  to  fatigue,  halted  the  head  of  his 
column  at  midnight,  after  a  march  of  twenty-six  miles,  Long- 
street’s  troops  about  three  miles  in  front.  The  supply-train 
with  two  days’  rations  was  just  in  rear,  and  got  up  in  the 
morning  of  the  9th. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  General  Humphreys  received 
from  General  Grant  his  third  letter  to  General  Lee,  written 
that  morning  at  Curdsville  [see  No.  5,  Appendix  M],  which 
letter  General  Humphreys  sent  forward  by  Colonel  Whittier, 
who,  after  riding  a  few  miles,  met,  first,  one  of  Lee’s  cou¬ 
riers,  and  immediately  afterward,  Colonel  Marshall  of  Gen¬ 
eral  Lee’s  staff.  The  latter  conducted  him  to  General  Lee, 
to  whom  General  Grant’s  letter  was  delivered. 

General  Lee  dictated  his  answer  to  General  Grant  Colonel, 


PURSUIT— SURRENDER  CORRESPONDENCE.  393 


Marshall  writing  it.  (While  doing  so  artillery  firing  in  the 
direction  of  Appomattox  Court  House  was  heard,  and  a  Con¬ 
federate  officer  rode  up  with  some  apparently  important  com¬ 
munication  to  General  Lee.)  The  letter  was  signed  by  Lee, 
and  delivered  to  Colonel  Whittier  by  Colonel  Marshall,  with 
verbal  messages  to  General  Grant  from  General  Lee  expres¬ 
sive  of  regret  at  not  having  met  him.  This  letter  was  written 
about  nine  o’clock  in  the  morning. 

Mr.  Jefferson  Davis,  in  his  “  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confed¬ 
erate  Government,”  mentions  as  a  matter  of  some  interest 
the  following  incident  in  connection  with  the  surrender-cor¬ 
respondence  : 

“  On  the  next  morning  [the  morning  of  the  9th  of  April], 
before  daylight,  Lee  sent  Colonel  Venable,  one  of  his  staff,  to 
Gordon,  commanding  the  advance,  to  learn  his  opinion  as  to 
the  chances  of  a  successful  attack,  to  which  Gordon  replied, 
‘  My  old  corps  is  reduced  to  a  frazzle,  and  unless  I  am  sup¬ 
ported  by  Longstreet  heavily,  I  do  not  think  we  can  do  any¬ 
thing  more.’  When  Colonel  Venable  returned  with  this 
answer  to  General  Lee,  he  said,  ‘  Then  there  is  nothing  left 
me  but  to  go  and  see  General  Grant.’  ”  1 

This  interview  General  Lee  sought  after  a  consultation 
with  his  principal  and  most  highly  esteemed  officers — a  con¬ 
sultation  necessarily  of  a  very  painful  kind,  but,  controlled 
by  motives  of  an  exalted  character,  General  Lee  submitted 
with  dignity  to  a  necessity  that  was  inevitable. 

Passing  through  General  Longstreet’s  lines,  General  Lee 
was  met  by  Colonel  Whittier,  received  General  Grant’s  letter 
and  replied  to  it  as  already  described.  See  No.  6,  of  Ap¬ 
pendix  M. 

This  letter  was  sent  to  General  Grant  by  the  hands  of  Col- 


1  Colonel  Venable  stated  substantially  the  same  thing  at  the  Lee  Memorial  meet¬ 
ing  in  Richmond,  on  the  3d  of  November,  1870. 


394  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  '64  AND  ’65. 


onel  Whittier,  who  delivered  it  to  General  Meade  at  about 
ten  o’clock. 

It  was  forwarded  by  him  to  General  Grant,  who,  near  New 
Store,  had  left  the  route  followed  by  the  Second  and  Sixth 
Corps,  and  had  taken  a  cross-road  to  get  into  the  road  south 
of  the  Appomattox  River,  which  also  led  to  the  Court  House 
and  along  or  near  the  routes  of  Sheridan  and  Ord. 

Lieutenant  Pease  carried  this  letter,  as  well  as  one  from 
General  Meade,  to  General  Grant,  and  after  a  ride  of  twelve 
or  fourteen  miles  from  the  vicinity  of  New  Store,  delivered 
it  to  him  at  11.50  a.m.,  at  which  time  General  Grant  was 
about  eight  miles  from  Appomattox  Court  House.  General 
Grant’s  letter  to  General  Lee,  acknowledging  the  receipt  of 
his  letter  of  the  morning  of  the  9th,  was  undoubtedly  sent  to 
General  Lee  through  General  Sheridan’s  and  General  Ord’s 
lines.  For  the  letter  see  No.  7,  Appendix  M. 

Had  General  Grant  remained  on  the  route  of  the  Second 
and  Sixth  Corps,  the  surrender  would  have  taken  place  be¬ 
fore  mid-day.  About  half-past  ten  the  troops  of  the  Second 
Corps,  closely  followed  by  the  Sixth  Corps,  began  to  over¬ 
take  General  Longstreet’s,  when  General  Humphreys  re¬ 
ceived  two  earnest  verbal  requests  from  General  Lee  by  a 
staff  officer  (Colonel  Marshall  or  Colonel  Taylor)  with  a  flag 
of  truce,  not  to  press  forward  upon  him,  but  to  halt,  as 
negotiations  were  going  on  for  a  surrender.  General  Hum¬ 
phreys  did  not  feel  himself  authorized  to  comply  with  these 
requests,  since  he  had  not  received  such  information  and 
authority  from  General  Meade  or  General  Grant  as  would 
sanction  it,  and  so  replied  to  General  Lee,  and  continued  to 
press  forward. 

In  fact,  with  the  letters  from  General  Grant  for  General 
Lee,  General  Humphreys  had  been  notified  that  this  corre¬ 
spondence  was  in  no  way  to  interfere  with  his  operations  ; 
and  although  this  message  did  not  accompany  the  last  letter 


FLANK  PURSUIT. 


395 


received  from  General  Grant,  the  previous  messages  were 
evidently  designed  to  govern  General  Humphreys’  actions. 
General  Humphreys  notified  General  Meade  of  these  mes¬ 
sages  from  General  Lee  and  of  his  replies. 

When  the  request  by  General  Lee’s  staff  officer  was  made 
the  last  time  (the  Second  Corps  was  then  close  on  General 
Longstreet)  he  was  very  urgent — so  urgent  that  General 
Humphreys  had  to  send  him  word  twice  that  the  request 
could  not  be  complied  with,  and  that  he  must  withdraw  from 
the  ground  at  once.  He  was  in  full  sight  on  the  road,  not  a 
hundred  yards  distant  from  the  head  of  the  Second  Corps. 

About  half  a  mile  beyond  this,  at  eleven  o’clock,  the 
Second  Corps  had  come  up  with  Longstreet’s  command,  in¬ 
trenched  in  the  vicinity  of  Appomattox  Court  House.  It 
was  at  once  formed  for  attack,  the  Sixth  Corps  formed  on 
the  right,  which,  at  the  moment  when  it  was  about  to  begin, 
was  suspended  by  the  arrival  of  General  Meade,  who  sent  a 
written  communication  to  General  Lee  granting  a  truce  on 
his  (Meade’s)  line  for  an  hour,  in  view  of  the  negotiations 
for  a  surrender.  General  Meade  had  read  General  Lee’s 
letter  of  nine  o’clock  before  sending  it  on  to  General  Grant. 

‘  General  Meade’s  despatch  to  General  Grant  at  ten  o’clock 
that  morning  stated  that  he  (Meade)  had  just  written  to 
General  Lee.  The  communication  just  mentioned  granting 
a  truce  is  the  letter  Meade  referred  to.  It  was  sent  through 
the  lines  by  General  Humphreys,  and  delivered  to  a  Con¬ 
federate  officer  by  Colonel  Whittier,  and  was  received  by 
General  Lee  between  eleven  and  twelve  o’clock. 

Lee  halted  for  the  night  of  the  8tli  at  and  in  the  vicinity 
of  Appomattox  Court  House. 

General  Merritt  marching  early  in  the  morning  of  the  7th 
toward  Prince  Edward  Court  House,  on  the  flank  of  the  in¬ 
fantry,  halted  for  the  night  beyond  it  on  Spring  Creek, 
and  resuming  the  march  early  the  next  morning  toward  Ap- 


396  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 


pomattox  Station,  reached  that  vicinity  during  the  early  part 
of  the  night,  Custer,  in  advance,  capturing  Walker’s  train  of 
artillery  and  wagons,  and  three  trains  of  cars  with  subsis¬ 
tence  sent  back  from  Farmville  by  Lee.  Merritt  then  moved 
np  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Court  House  and  formed  across  the 
road  the  enemy  were  moving  on. 

General  Crook,  General  Mackenzie  following  him,  reached 
Appomattox  Station  on  the  evening  of  the  8tli,  having  burned 
subsistence  trains  at  Pamphlin’s  Station  on  the  way.  From 
the  station  he  sent  Smith’s  brigade  to  the  vicinity  of  Appo¬ 
mattox  Court  House  to  hold  the  road  from  that  place  to 
Lynchburg. 

General  Griffin  halted  for  the  night  of  the  7th  at  Prince 
Edward  Court  House,  and  resuming  the  march  early  on  the 
8th,  joined  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  at  Prospect  Station, 
coming  then  under  the  command  of  General  Ord. 

Continuing  the  march  for  twenty-nine  miles  toward  Appo¬ 
mattox  Court  House,  General  Ord  halted  for  three  hours’  rest 
between  midnight  and  the  morning  of  the  9tli.  Resuming 
the  march,  he  says  he  arrived  near  the  Court  House  about 
ten  o’clock  in  the  morning  of  the  9th,  when  he  deployed  his 
two  corps  across  Lee’s  route  just  as  his  advance  was  pushing 
out  of  it. 

General  Fitz  Lee  says  that  on  the  evening  of  the  8  th  his 
cavalry,  which  had  formed  the  rear  guard,  was  moved  to  the 
front ;  that  the  corps  commanders  were  called  to  Headquar¬ 
ters,  where  General  Lee  explained  the  situation  fully,  and  sub¬ 
mitted  the  correspondence  he  had  had  with  General  Grant  to 
them.  It  was  decided  that  Fitz  Lee,  supported  by  Gordon, 
should  attack  Sheridan’s  cavalry  at  daylight,  and  in  case 
nothing  but  cavalry  was  found,  they  were  to  open  a  way  for 
the  remaining  troops  ;  but  in  case  the  cavalry  was  supported 
by  heavy  bodies  of  infantiy,  the  Commanding  General  must 
be  at  once  notified. 


APPOMATTOX  COURT  HOUSE. 


397 


At  daybreak  on  the  9th  Gordon’s  command  was  formed  in 
line  of  battle  half  a  mile  west  of  the  Court  House  on  the 
Lynchburg  road.  The  cavalry  was  posted  on  his  right,  W. 
H.  F.  Lee’s  division  next  to  the  infantry,  Rosser’s  in  the  centre, 
Munford’s  on  the  right,  making,  General  Fitz  Lee  says,  a 
mounted  force  of  about  2,400  men.  “Our  attack,”  he  con¬ 
tinues,  “was  made  about  sunrise,  and  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
quickly  driven  out  of  the  way,  with  a  loss  of  two  guns  and  a 
number  of  prisoners.  The  arrival  at  this  time  of  two  corps 
of  their  infantry  necessitated  the  retiring  of  our  lines.”  1 

General  Crook  says  :  “  At  about  9  a.m.  the  enemy  made  a 
strong  attack  on  my  front  and  flanks  with  a  large  force  of  in¬ 
fantry,  while  their  cavalry  attacked  my  rear.  Mackenzie  and 
Smith  were  forced  to  retire  by  overwhelming  numbers  until 
relieved  by  the  infantry,  when  we  reorganized  and  were  get- 
ing  ready  to  go  to  the  front  when  an  order  for  the  cessation 
of  hostilities  reached  me.” 

General  Merritt  says  the  enemy  advanced  against  Crook  in 
heavy  force.  The  cavalry  was  forced  back.  Custer  was 
brought  up  and  the  cavalry  retired  slowly,  but  of  necessity. 
Soon  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  took  up  Crook’s  line  on  the 
left  of  Devin,  and  the  Fifth  Corps  deployed  in  rear  of  him.  As 
soon  as  the  columns  of  the  enemy  discovered  we  had  infantry 
in  position,  they  retired  precipitately  toward  the  Valley.  The 
cavalry  was  thrown  out  rapidly  to  the  right,  taking  possession 
of  the  high  ground  on  the  enemy’s  left,  and  opened  artillery. 

General  Ord  states  that  he  was  barely  in  time  on  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  9th,  “for  in  spite  of  General  Sheridan’s  attempts 
the  cavalry  was  falling  back  in  confusion  before  Lee’s  infan¬ 
try  ;  but,  ”  he  says,  ‘  ‘  we  soon  deployed  and  went  in,  Gibbon 
on  the  left,  at  double-quick,  with  Foster’s  and  Turner’s 

1  General  Fitz  Lee,  seeing  that  immediate  surrender  was  inevitable,  withdrew  at 
onre  toward  Lynchburg,  that  road,  he  says,  being  clear,  where  and  in  the  vicinity 
of  which  he  and  his  command  surrendered  shortly  after. 


398  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


divisions,  in  beautiful  style,  and  the  colored  troops  also  at 
the  double-quick  under  these  commanders,  with  the  Fifth 
Corps  under  Griffin,  when  a  white  flag  met”  him  “at  the 
Fifth  Corps  front  with  a  request  for  a  cessation  of  arms  until 
General  Lee  could  meet  General  Grant  and  confer  on  the 
terms.  ”  General  Ord  continues :  ‘  ‘As  I  knew  that  a  surrender 
had  been  called  for  and  terms  asked  for  and  made  known,  I 
knew  this  second  request  meant  acceptance,  and  the  bugles 
were  sounded  to  halt.” 

General  Sheridan  says  :  “A  white  flag  was  presented  to 
General  Custer,  who  had  the  advance,  and  who  sent  the  in¬ 
formation  to  me  at  once  that  the  enemy  desired  to  surrender. 

“Riding  over  to  the  left  at  Appomattox  Court  House,1 2  I 
met  Major-General  Gordon,  of  the  rebel  service,  and  Major- 
General  Wilcox.  General  Gordon  requested  a  suspension  of 
hostilities  pending  negotiations  for  a  surrender  then  being 
held  between  Lieutenant-General  Grant  and  General  Lee.  I 
notified  him  that  I  desired  to  prevent  the  unnecessary  effu¬ 
sion  of  blood,  but  as  there  was  nothing  definitely  settled  in 
the  correspondence,  and  as  an  attack  had  been  made  on  my 
lines  with  a  view  to  escape  under  the  impression  that  our 
force  was  only  cavalry,  I  must  have  some  assurance  of  an 
intended  surrender.  This  General  Gordon  gave  by  saying 
that  there  was  no  doubt  of  the  surrender  of  General  Lee’s 
army.  I  then  separated  from  him,  with  an  agreement  to  meet 
those  officers  again  in  half  an  hour  at  Appomattox  Court 
House.  At  the  specified  time,  in  company  with  General 
Ord,  who  commanded  the  infantry,  I  again  met  this  officer, 
and  also  Lieutenant-General  Longstreet,  and  received  from 
them  the  same  assurance,  and  hostilities  ceased  until  the 
arrival  of  Lieutenant-General  Grant.”  3 


1  Appomattox  Court  House  was  between  the  picket  lines  of  the  opposing  forces. 

2  The  author  of  “  With  General  Sheridan  in  Lee’s  Last  Campaign,  by  a  Staff 

Officer,”  states  that  General  Longstreet  bore  a  despatch  from  General  Lee  to 


SURRENDER  OF  LEE’S  ARMY. 


399 


General  Grant  arrived  at  Appomattox  Court  House  about 
one  o’clock,  when  the  meeting  between  himself  and  General 
Lee  took  place.  After  a  brief  conference  the  two  letters  of 
General  Grant  and  General  Lee  [Nos.  8  and  9,  Appendix  M], 
respectively  presenting  and  accepting  the  terms  of  surrender, 
having  been  written  in  each  other’s  presence,  were  exchanged. 

At  about  four  o’clock  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  North¬ 
ern  Virginia  was  announced  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

The  surrender  of  General  Johnston’s  army  took  place  on  the 
25th  of  April,  and  that  of  the  other  Confederate  forces  soon 
followed. 

According  to  the  Records  of  the  War  Department,  the  num¬ 
ber  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir¬ 
ginia  paroled  on  the  9th  of  April,  1865,  was  : 


Officers. 

Enlisted 

men. 

Aggre¬ 

gate. 

Genei’al  Lee  and  Staff. . 

15 

15 

Longstreet’ s  Corps . 

Gordon’s  Corps . 

1,521 

13,312 

14,833 

695 

6,505 

7,200 

Ewell’s  Corps . 

19 

268 

287 

Total  Infantry . 

2,250 

20,085 

22,335 

Cavalry  Corps . 

132 

1,654 

1,786 

Artillery  Corps . 

192 

2,394 

2,586 

Total  Infantry,  Cavalry,  and  Artillery . 

2,574 

24,133 

26,707 

Detachments 1 . 

288 

1,361 

1,649 

Grand  Total . 

2,862 

25,494 

28,356 

General  Grant,  and  gives  a  copy  of  the  despatch.  It  is  a  copy  or  duplicate  of  the 
despatch  written  by  General  Lee  at  nine  o’clock  in  the  morning,  and  delivered  to 
General  Humphreys’  staff  officer,  Colonel  Whittier,  and  placed  in  General  Grant’s 
hands  by  Lieutenant  Pease,  of  General  Meade’s  staff,  at  11.55  a.m.,  when  General 
Grant  was  still  eight  miles  from  Appomattox  Court  House,  and  at  about  the  hour 
when  General  Longstreet  delivered  the  duplicate  to  General  Sheridan  and  General 
Ord. 

1  Detachments  consisted  of  some  of  the  Navy  Battalion,  the  Provost  Guard, 
Headquarters  Cavalry  escort,  some  odds  and  ends  of  troops,  and  civilian  employes. 


400  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


It  has  been  stated  that  of  the  troops  surrendered,  only 
8, 000  had  arms. 

If,  indeed,  that  is  correct,  then  the  greater  part  of  those 
men  who  had  no  arms  must  have  thrown  them  away  when 
they  found  that  they  must  surrender.  This  was  not  difficult 
to  do  unobserved  by  their  officers.  The  country  was  thickly 
wooded  and  open  to  them  on  the  west  and  northwest.  A 
walk  of  half  an  hour  would  bring  them  to  ground  that  neither 
their  officers  nor  ours  would  pass  over  during  their  brief 
stay  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Court  House. 

Our  casualties  in  these  closing  operations  from  the  29th  of 
March  to  the  9th  of  April  were  8,268  officers  and  enlisted 
men  killed  and  wounded,  and  1,676  missing,  making  a  total 
loss  of  9, 944.  They  were  distributed  as  shown  below. 1 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  marched  to  Washington,  w7as  re¬ 
viewed  by  the  President  and  his  Cabinet,  and  was  disbanded 
by  the  30th  of  June  following. 

It  has  not  seemed  to  me  necessary  to  attempt  a  eulogy 
upon  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  or  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia. 


1  Cavalry,  1,151  officers  and  enlisted  men  killed  and  wounded,  339  missing. 


2d  Corps, 

1,394 

44 

4. 

44 

44 

44 

630 

44 

5th  “ 

1,919 

a 

44 

44 

44 

44 

546 

*  4 

6th  “ 

1,542 

u 

(4 

44 

44 

44 

•  •  • 

44 

9th  “ 

1,548 

u 

44 

44 

44 

44 

161 

44 

24th  “ 

714 

44 

44 

44 

44 

44 

•  •  • 

44 

Total, 

8,268 

4  4 

44 

44 

44 

44 

1,676 

44 

Missing, 

1,676 

Total, 

9,944 

44 

44 

44 

44 

44 

and 

44 

APPENDIX  A 


Organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Commanded  by 
Major-General  George  G.  Meade,  on  May  4,  1864. 

[Compiled  from  the  records  of  the  Adjutant-General’s  Office.] 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS. 

Provost  Guard. 

Brigadier-General  Marsena  R.  Patrick. 

1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  Companies  C  3d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

and  D.  68th  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

80th  New  York  Infantry  (20th  Militia).  114th  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

Volunteer  Engineer  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  Henry  W.  Benham. 

15th  New  York  Engineers.  50th  New  York  Engineers. 

Battalion  United  States  Engineers. 

Captain  George  H.  Mendell. 

Guards  and  Orderlies. 

Captain  Daniel  P.  Mann. 

Independent  Company  Oneida  (N.  Y.)  Cavalry. 


ARTILLERY. 

Brigadier-General  HENRY  J.  HUNT. 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE. 

Colonel  HENRY  S.  BURTON. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  J.  Howard  Kitching. 

6th  New  York  Heavy  Artillery.  15th  New  York 


Second  Brigade. 

Major  John  A.  Tompkins. 

Maine  Light  Artillery,  5th  Battery. 

New  York  Light  Artillery,  5th  Battery. 
New  York  Light  Artillery,  12th  Battery. 
New  York  Light  Artillery,  15th  Battery. 
New  Jersey  Light  Artillery,  Battery  A. 
New  Jersey  Light  Artillery,  Battery  B. 


Heavy  Artillery. 
First  Brigade  Horse  Artillery A 

Captain  John  M.  Robertson. 

New  York  Light  Artillery,  6th  Battery. 
2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Batteries  B  and  L. 
2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  D. 

2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  M. 

4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  A. 

4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Batteries  C  and  E. 


1  Detached  with  Cavalry  Corps. 


402  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Second  Brigade  Horse  Artillery. 

Captain  Dunbar  R.  Ransom. 

1st  U.  S.  Artillery,  Batteries  E  and  G-. 
1st  U.  S.  Artillery,  Batteries  H  and  I. 
1st  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  K. 

2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  A. 

2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  G-. 

8d  U.  S.  Art.,  Batteries  C,  F,  and  K. 


Third  Brigade. 

Major  Robert  H.  Fitzhugh. 
Massachusetts  Light  Art’y,  9th  Battery. 
1st  New  York  Light  Art’y,  Battery  B. 
1st  New  York  Light  Art’y,  Battery  C. 
New  York  Light  Art’y,  11th  Battery. 
1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  Battery  H. 

5th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  E. 


SECOND  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-General  W.  S.  HANCOCK. 

Escort. 

Captain  John  H.  Hazelton. 

1st  Vermont  Cavalry,  Company  M. 


FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  FRANCIS  C.  BARLOW. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  Nelson  A.  Miles. 
26th  Michigan. 

61st  New  York. 

81st  Pennsylvania. 
140th  Pennsylvania. 
183d  Pennsylvania. 


Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  Paul  Frank. 
39th  New  York. 
52d  New  York. 
57th  New  York. 
111th  New  York. 
125th  New  York. 
126th  New  York. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Thomas  A.  Smyth. 
28th  Massachusetts. 

63d  New  York. 

69th  New  York. 

88tb  New  York. 

116th  Pennsylvania. 


Fourth  Brigade. 

Colonel  John  R.  Brooke. 
2d  Delaware. 

64th  New  York. 

66th  New  York. 

53d  Pennsylvania. 
145th  Pennsylvania. 
148th  Pennsylvania. 


SECOND  DIVISION.  v 

Brigadier-General  JOHN  GIBBON. 


First  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Alex.  S.  Webb. 
19th  Maine. 

1st  Co.  Andrew  (Mass.)  S.  S. 
15th  Massachusetts. 

19th  Massachusetts. 

20  th  Massachusetts. 

7th  Michigan. 

42d  New  York. 

59th  New  York. 

82d  New  York. 


Second  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Joshua  T, 
Owen. 

152d  New  York. 

69th  Pennsylvania. 
71st  Pennsylvania. 
72d  Pennsylvania. 
lUOth  Pennsylvania. 


Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Samuel  S.  Carroll. 
14th  Connecticut. 

10th  New  York. 

108th  New  York. 

12th  New  Jersey. 

1st  Delaware. 

7th  West  Virginia. 

4th  Ohio. 

8th  Ohio. 

14th  Indiana. 


Not  Brigaded. 

2d  Company  Minnesota  Sharpshooters. 


APPENDIX  A. 


403 


THIRD  DIVISION. 

Major  General  DAVID  B.  BIRNEY. 


First  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  H.  H.  Ward. 
3d  Maine. 

40th  New  York. 

8fith  New  York. 

124th  New  York. 

99th  Pennsylvania. 

110th  Pennsylvania 
141st  Pennsylvania. 

20th  Indiana. 

2d  U.  S.  Sharpshooters. 


Second  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  Hats. 
4th  Maine. 

17th  Maine. 

93d  New  York. 

57th  Pennsylvania. 

63d  Pennsylvania. 

105th  Pennsylvania. 

3d  Michigan. 

5th  Michigan. 

1st  U.  S.  Sharpshooters. 


FOURTH  DIVISION. 


Brigadier-General  GERSHOM  MOTT. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  Robert  McAllister. 
1st  Massachusetts. 

16th  Massachusetts. 

5th  New  Jersey. 

6th  New  Jersey. 

7th  New  Jersey. 

8th  New  Jersey. 

11th  New  Jersey. 

26th  Pennsylvania. 

115th  Pennsylvania. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  William  R.  Brewster. 
11th  Massachusetts. 

70th  New  York. 

71st  New  York. 

72d  New  York. 

73d  New  York. 

74th  New  York. 

120th  New  York. 

84th  Pennsylvania. 


Artillery  Brigade. 


Colonel  John  C.  Tidball. 

Maine  Light  Artillery,  6th  Battery. 

New  Hampshire  Light  Artillery,  1st  Battery. 
Massachusetts  Light  Artillery,  10th  Battery. 
1st  Rhode  Island  Light  Artillery,  Battery  A. 
1st  Rhode  Island  Light  Artillery,  Battery  B. 
1st  Rhode  Island  Light  Artillery,  Battery  G. 
4th  New  York  Heavy  Artillery,  3d  Battalion. 
1st  Pennsylvania  Light  Artillery,  Battery  F. 
4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  K. 

5th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Batteries  C  and  I. 


FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-General  G.  K.  WARREN. 

Provost  Guard. 

Major  Henrt  W.  Ryder. 

12th  New  York  Battalion. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  CHARLES  GRIFFIN. 

First  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  Romeyn  B.  Ayres. 

140th  New  York.  146th  New  York.  91st  Pennsylvania. 

155th  Pennsylvania. 

2d  United  States,  Companies  B,  C,  F,  H,  I,  and  K. 
llth  United  States,  Companies  B,  C,  D,  E,  P,  and  G,  1st  Battalion. 
12th  United  States,  Companies  A,  B,  C,  D,  and  G,  1st  Battalion. 
12th  United  States,  Companies  A,  C,  D,  F,  and  H,  2d  Battalion. 
14th  United  States,  1st  Battalion. 

17th  United  States,  Companies  A,  C,  D,  G.  and  H,  1st  Battalion. 
17th  United  States,  Companies  A,  B,  and  C,  2d  Battalion. 


404  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Jacob  B.  Sweitzeb. 
9th  Massachusetts. 

22d  Massachusetts. 

32d  Massachusetts. 

62d  Pennsylvania. 

4th  Michigan. 


Third  Brigade. 

Brig.- Gen.  Joseph  J.  Bartlett. 
20th  Maine. 

18th  Massachusetts. 

44th  New  York. 

83d  Pennsylvania. 

118th  Pennsylvania. 

1st  Michigan. 

16th  Michigan. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  JOHN  C.  ROBINSON. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  Sam'l  H.  Leonard. 
16th  Maine. 

13th  Massachusetts. 
39th  Massachusetts. 
104th  New  York. 


Second  Brigade. 

Bg.-Gen.  Henry  Baxter. 
12th  Massachusetts. 

83d  New  York. 

97th  New  York. 

11th  Pennsylvania. 
88th  Pennsylvania. 

90  th  Pennsylvania. 


Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Andrew  W.  Den¬ 
ison. 

1st  Maryland. 

4th  Maryland. 

7th  Maryland. 

8th  Maryland. 


THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier- General  SAMUEL  W.  CRAWFORD. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  William  McCandless. 

1st  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

2d  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

6th  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

7th  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

11th  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

13th  Pennsylvania  Reserves  (1st  Rifles). 


Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  Joseph  W.  Fisher. 
5th  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 
8th  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 
9th  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 
10th  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 
12th  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 


FOURTH  DIVISION. 


Brigadier-General  JAMES  S.  WADSWORTH. 


First  Brigade. 

Bg.-Gen.  Lysander  Cutler. 
1st  N.  Y.  Battalion  Sharp¬ 
shooters. 

7th  Indiana. 

19th  Indiana. 

24th  Michigan. 

2d  Wisconsin. 

6th  Wisconsin. 

7th  Wisconsin. 


Second  Brigade. 

Bg.-Gen.  Jas.  C.  Rice. 
76th  New  York. 

84th  New  York. 

95th  New  York. 

147th  New  York. 

56th  Pennsylvania. 


Artillery  Brigade. 


Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  Roy  Stone. 
121st  Pennsylvania. 
142d  Pennsylvania. 
143d  Pennsylvania. 
149th  Pennsylvania. 
150th  Pennsylvania. 


Colonel  Charles  S.  Wainwright. 
Massachusetts  Light  Artillery,  Battery  C. 
Massachusetts  Light  Artillery,  Battery  E. 

1st  New  York  Light  Artillery,  Battery  D. 

1st  New  York  Light  Artillery,  Batteries  E  and  L. 
1st  New  York  Light  Artillery,  Battery  H. 

4th  New  York  Heavy  Artillery,  2d  Battalion. 

4th  New  York  Heavy  Artillery,  Company  E. 

1st  Pennsylvania  Light  Artillery,  Battery  B. 

4th  United  States  Artillery,  Battery  B. 

5th  United  States  Artillery,  Battery  D. 


APPENDIX  A. 


405 


SIXTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-General  JOHN  SEDGWICK. 

Escort. 

Captain  Charles  E.  Fellows. 

8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Company  A. 


FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  HORATIO  G.  WRIGHT. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  Henry  W.  Brown. 
1st  New  Jersey. 

2d  New  Jersey. 

3d  New  Jersey. 

4th  New  Jersey. 

10th  New  Jersey. 

15th  New  Jersey. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  David  A.  Russell, 
6th  Maine. 

49th  Pennsylvania. 

119th  Pennsylvania. 

6th  Wisconsin. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Emory  Upton. 
6th  Maine. 

121st  New  York. 

95th  Pennsylvania. 
96th  Pennsylvania. 


Fourth.  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  Shaler. 
65th  New  York, 
filth  New  York. 

122d  New  York. 

23d  Pennsylvania. 

82d  Pennsylvania. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier  General  GEORGE  W.  GETTY. 


First  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Frank  Wheaton. 
62d  New  York. 

93d  Pennsylvania. 

98th  Pennsylvania. 

102d  Pennsylvania. 

139th  Pennsylvania. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  H.  Neill. 
7th  Maine. 

43d  New  York. 

49th  New  York. 

77th  New  York. 

61st  Pennsylvania. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Lewis  A.  Grant. 
2d  Vermont. 

3d  Vermont. 

4th  Vermont. 

6th  Vermont. 

6th  Vermont. 

Fourth  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Henry  L.  Edstis. 
7th  Massachusetts. 

10th  Massachusetts. 

37th  Massachusetts, 

2d  Rhode  Island. 


THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  JAMES  B.  RICKETTS. 


First  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  William  H.  Morris 
10  th  Vermont. 

106th  New  York. 

161st  New  York, 

14th  New  Jersey. 

87th  Pennsylvania. 


Second  Brigade, 

Colonel  Benjamin  F.  Smith.1 
67th  Pennsylvania. 

138th  Pennsylvania. 

6th  Maryland. 

110th  Ohio. 

122d  Ohio. 

126th  Ohio. 


1  Relieved  May  5th  by  Brigadier-General  Truman  Seymour. 


406 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65 


Artillery  Brigade. 

Colonel  Charles  H.  Tompkins. 

Maine  Light  Artillery,  4th  Battery  (D). 
Massachusetts  Light  Artillery,  1st  Battery  (A). 
1st  Rhode  Island  Light  Artillery,  Battery  C. 

1st  Rhode  Island  Light  Artillery,  Battery  E. 
1st  Rhode  Island  Light  Artillery,  Battery  G-. 
New  York  Light  Artillery,  1st  Battery. 

New  York  Light  Artillery,  3d  Battery. 

4th  New  York  Heavy  Artillery,  1st  Battalion, 
5th  United  States  Artillery,  Battery  M. 


CAVALRY  CORPS. 

Major-General  PHILIP  H.  SHERIDAN. 

Escort. 

Captain  Ira  W.  Claflin. 

6th  United  States. 


FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  A.  T.  A.  Torbert. 


First  Brigade. 

Bg.-Gen.  Geo.  A.  Custer. 
1st  Michigan. 

5th  Michigan. 

6th  Michigan. 

7th  Michigan. 


Second  Brigade. 

Col.  Thos.  C.  Devin. 
4th  New  York. 

6th  New  York. 

9th  New  York. 

17th  Pennsylvania. 


Reserve  Brigade. 

Bg.-Gen.  Wesley  Merritt. 
1st  New  York  (Dragoons.) 
6th  Pennsylvania. 

1st  United  States. 

2d  United  States. 

5th  United  States. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  DAVID  McM.  GREGG. 


First  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Henry  E.  Davies,  Jr. 
1st  Massachusetts. 

1st  New  Jersey. 

1st  Pennsylvania. 

6th  Ohio. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  J.  Irvin  Gregg. 
1st  Maine. 

10th  New  York. 

2d  Pennsylvania. 

4th  Pennsylvania. 

8th  Pennsylvania. 

13th  Pennsylvania. 
16th  Pennsylvania. 


THIRD  DIVISION.  ' 
Brigadier-General  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 


First  Brigade . 

Colonel  Timothy  M.  Bryan,  Jr. 
1st  Connecticut. 

2d  New  York. 

5th  New  York. 

18th  Pennsylvania. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  George  H.  Chapman. 
1st  Vermont. 

8th  New  York. 

3d  Indiana. 

8th  Illinois. 


APPENDIX  A. 


407 


Organization  of  the  Ninth  Army  Corps,  Commanded  by 
Major-General  Ambrose  E.  Burnside,  on  May  4, 1864. 1 

Provost  Guard. 

Captain  Milton  Cogswell. 

8th  United  States  Infantry. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-Genbral  THOMAS  G.  STEVENSON. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Sumner  Carruth.  Colonel  Daniel  Leasure. 

35th  Massachusetts.  21st  Massachusetts. 

56th  Massachusetts.  100th  Pennsylvania. 

57th  Massachusetts.  3d  Maryland. 

59th  Massachusetts. 

4th  United  States. 

10th  United  States. 


Artillery. 

Maine  Light  Artillery,  2d  Battery  (B). 
Massachusetts  Light  Artillery,  14th  Battery. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  ROBERT  B.  POTTER. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  Zenas  R.  Bliss. 
36th  Massachusetts. 

58th  Massachusetts. 

7th  Rhode  Island. 

51st  New  York.  « 

45th  Pennsylvania. 

48th  Pennsylvania. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Simon  G.  Griffin. 
31st  Maine. 

32d  Maine. 

6th  New  Hampshire. 

9th  New  Hampshire. 
11th  New  Hampshire. 
17th  Vermont. 


Artillery. 

Massachusetts  Light  Artillery,  11th  Battery. 
New  York  Light  Artillery,  19th  Battery. 


THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-Genebal  ORLANDO  B.  WILLCOX. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  John  F.  Hartranft. 
109th  New  York. 

51st  Pennsylvania. 

2d  Michigan. 

8th  Michigan. 

17th  Michigan. 

27th  Michigan. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Benjamin  C.  Christ. 
79th  New  York. 

50th  Pennsylvania. 

60th  Ohio. 

1st  Michigan  Sharpshooters. 
20th  Michigan. 


Artillery. 

Maine  Light  Artillery,  7th  Battery. 

New  York  Light  Artillery,  34th  Battery. 


i  This  corps  was  under  the  direct  orders  of  Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant 
until  May  24,  1864,  when  assigned  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


408  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


FOURTH  DIVISION. 


Brigadier-General  EDWARD  FERRERO. 


First  Brigade. 

Colonel  Joshua  K.  Sigfried. 
27th  United  States  Colored  Troeps. 
30th  United  States  Colored  Troops. 
89th  United  States  Colored  Troops. 
43d  United  States  Colored  Troops. 


Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Henry  G.  Thomas. 
30th  Connecticut  (colored). 

19th  United  States  Colored  Troops. 
23d  United  States  Colored  Troops. 


Artillery. 

Vermont  Light  Artillery,  3d  Battery.  Pennsylvania  Light  Art"v,  Battery  D. 

Cavalry. 

3d  New  Jersey.  13th  Pennsylvania.  2d  Ohio. 


Reserve  Artillery. 

1st  R.  I.  Light  Artillery,  Battery  D. 
1st  R.  I.  Light  Artillery,  Battery  H. 
N.  Y.  Light  Artillery,  27th  Battery. 

2d  United  States  Artillery,  Battery  E. 
3d  United  States  Artillery,  Battery  G. 
3d  U.  S.  Art.,  Batteries  L  and  M. 


Provisional  Brigade. 

Colonel  Elisha  G.  Marshall. 
24th  New  York  Cavalry  (dismounted). 
14th  New  York  Heavy  Artillery. 

2d  Pennsylvania  Prov,  Heavy  Artillery. 


APPENDIX  B. 


Extract  from  Consolidated  Morning  Report  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac ,  April  30,  1864. 


Present  for  Duty,  Equipped. 

Officers. 

• 

Enlisted 

men. 

Officers. 

Artillery 

Enlisted 

men. 

Guns. 

Provost  Guard . 

70 

1,048 

Engineers . 

50 

2,226 

Reserve  Artillery— Infantry  Guard. 

69 

2,391 

64 

2,052 

92 

Infantry — Second  Corps . 

1,276 

25,405 

50 

1,602 

54 

Infantry — Fifth  Corps . 

1,227 

22.898 

45 

1,525 

48 

Infantry — Sixth  Corps . 

1,003 

21,581 

43 

1,536 

48 

Total  of  Infantry . 

3,506 

69,884 

138 

4,663 

150 

Cavalry  Corps . 

585 

11,839 

24 

839 

32 

The  grand  aggregate  of  the  above  officers  and  enlisted  men,  99,438.  Excluding 
engineers  it  is  97,162,  which  is  111  less  than  given  by  General  Drum,  the  differ¬ 
ence  between  us  being  my  omission  of  61  guards  and  orderlies  with  General  In¬ 
galls  and  50  cavalry  with  the  Sixth  Corps.  There  were : 

Officers.  Enlisted  men. 

On  extra  or  daily  duty .  946  18,149 

In  arrest  or  confinement .  80  851 

Sick .  199  4,377 


APPENDIX  B. 


409 


All  teamsters,  ambulance  and  spring-wagon  drivers,  hospital  attendants,  men 
in  the  Quartermaster  and  Subsistence  Departments,  that  is  the  whole  personnel  of 
the  Staff  Departments  and  trains,  was  composed  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  de¬ 
tailed  for  “  extra  or  daily  duty  ”  from  the  regiments  forming  the  army.  They 
were  not  available  for  any  other  duty. 

The  artillery  consisted  of  49  batteries,  having  274  field  guns  (120  12-pounder 
Napoleons,  148  10-pounder  and  3-inch  rifles,  and  6  20-pounder  Parrotts).  There 
were  also  8  24-pounder  coehorns. 

Two  hundred  and  seventy  rounds  of  ammunition  were  carried  for  each  gun. 

There  were  657  artillery  carriages,  including  caissons,  battery- wagons,  and 
forges,  the  horses  for  which  numbered  6,239;  besides,  there  were  609  wagons 
(ordinary  army  wagons)  and  3,721  animals. for  transport  of  ammunition. 

In  the  Annual  Report  of  the  Hon.  EdwifT  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War,  dated 
November  22,  1865,  he  states,  on  page  5,  in  a  tabular  statement  of  the  numerical 
strength  of  the  several  Military  Departments  and  Armies,  that  “  The  aggregate 
available  force  present  for  duty ,  May  1,  1864,”  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
Ninth  Corps  not  included,  was  120,384. 

Upon  an  examination  of  the  original  tabular  statement  on  the  files  of  the  Adju¬ 
tant-General’s  Office,  prepared  for  Mr.  Stanton,  the  figures  of  which  are  exactly 
those  presented  by  him  in  the  Annual  Report  specified,  I  found  that  those  figures 
included  not  only  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  every  branch  of  the  service 

present  for  duty,"  but  all  those  on  “ extra  or  daily  duty"  as  well  as  all  those 
“  in  arrest  or  confinement .” 

There  is  no  column  of  “  Aggregate  available  force  present  for  duty  ”  in  any 
return  or  morning  report.  The  column  “  present  for  duty  equipped ”  is  intended 
to  give  the  number  of  enlisted  men  that  form  the  fighting  force  of  the  army,  to¬ 
gether  with  those  that  may  be  made  available  for  it,  such  as  the  Provost  Guard, 
but  does  not  include  those  on  extra  or  daily  duty,  who  form  no  part  whatever  of 
that  force,  and  are  not  available  for  it. 

The  foot-note  shows  that  on  April  30,  1864,  there  were  about  19,000  officers  and 
enlisted  men  on  extra  or  daily  duty,  and  about  900  in  arrest  or  confinement. 

The  tabular  statement  used  by  Mr.  Stanton  was  prepared  from  the  Return  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  for  April,  1864,  between  which  and  the  consolidated 
morning  report  of  April  30,  1864,  there  is  some  discrepancy.  The  morning  report 
gives  a  better  presentation  of  the  condition  of  the  army  for  that  day  than  the 
monthly  report. 

Upon  ascertaining  how  Mr.  Stanton’s  tabular  statement  was  prepared,  I  ad¬ 
dressed  a  letter  to  General  Drum,  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army,  asking  him  for 
an  official  statement  as  to  the  classes  of  officers  and  enlisted  men,  and  the  number 
of  each  that  go  to  the  making  up  the  numbers  given  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War.  My  letter  and  General  Drum’s  reply  are  herewith. 

Washington,  December  1,  1881. 

Brigadier-General  Richard  C.  Drum, 

Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army,  Washington  : 

General — In  the  Annual  Report  of  the  Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of 
War,  dated  November  22,  1865,  he  states  on  page  5  that  “  The  aggregate  availa¬ 
ble  force  present  for  duty  May  1,  1864,  was  distributed  as  follows.”  Here  follows 
a  tabular  statement  of  the  numerical  strength  of  the  several  military  departments 
and  armies,  the  second  on  the  list  being, 

“ Army  of  the  Potomac .  120, 3S4” 

It  is  chiefly  to  the  numbers  given  for  the  “available  force  present  for  duty” 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  that  I  desire  to  ask  the  attention  of  the  Honorable 
the  Secretary  of  War. 

Upon  an  examination  of  the  original  tabular  statement  on  the  files  of  the  Adju¬ 
tant-General’s  Office,  prepared  for  Mr.  Stanton,  the  figures  of  which  are  exactly 
those  presented  by  him  in  the  Annual  Report,  I  find  that  those  figures  include  not 
only  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  every  branch  of  the  service  present  for  duty, 
but  all  those  on  extra  or  daily  duty,  as  well  as  all  those  in  arrest  and  confinement. 

In  this  manner  it  appears  that  the  number,  on  1st  of  May,  1864,  of  officers  and 
enlisted  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  line  of  battle  or  available  for  it, 
that  is  present  for  duty,  according  to  the  Tabular  Statement,  is  about  twenty 
thousand  greater  than  the  actual  number ;  for  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  on 

XII.— 18 


410  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


extra  or  daily  duty  are  not  in  the  line  of  battle  nor  are  they  available  for  it.  They 
form  the  personnel  of  the  trains.  Neither  are  those  in  arrest  or  confinement  in  or 
available  for  the  line  of  battle,  though  some  of  them  may  be  temporarily  released 
for  it  on  the  eve  of  a  battle.  In  the  present  case  they  numbered  931. 

The  same  kind  of  error  will,  I  believe,  be  found  to  exist  in  all  the  numbers  of 
the  Table. 

I  understand  that  the  Tabular  Statement  was  prepared  from  the  returns  of  the 
armies  and  military  departments  for  the  month  of  April,  and  not  from  the  Morn¬ 
ing  Reports  of  the  30th  of  April,  usually  called  the  Tri-monthly  Reports,  because 
made  every  ten  days.  These  Morning  Reports  give  a  better  presentation  of  the 
condition  of  the  army  than  the  Monthly  Return.  In  the  present  case  there  is  evi¬ 
dently  a  large  error  in  the  Monthly  Re.turn  for  April  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
in  the  number  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  present  for  duty,  and  in  those  on  extra 
or  daily  duty,  especially  in  the  Second  Corps. 

On  page  14  of  the  same  Annual  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  there  is  a  tabu¬ 
lar  statement  of  “  The  aggregate  available  force  present  for  duty  on  the  1st  of 
March,”  1865,  which  contains  an  error  of  the  same  kind  as  that  just  pointed  out  in 
the  numbers  given  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  by  which  its  actual  numerical 
strength  of  present  for  duty  is  increased  by  16,000.  The  same  kind  of  error  un¬ 
doubtedly  exists  in  the  numbers  given  for  the  other  armies  and  for  the  military 
departments. 

The  object  of  this  communication  is  to  suggest  whether  the  Tabular  Statements 
of  the  Secretary  of  War’s  Report  of  November,  1865,  cannot  be  officially  examined 
and  a  statement  made  as  to  the  classes  of  officers  and  enlisted  men,  and  the  num¬ 
ber  of  each  that  go  to  making  up  the  numbers  given  in  the  Report. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

Brig.- Gen.,  etc.,  etc.,  Retired,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Adjutant-General’s  Office, 

Washington,  December  23,  1881. 
General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

General — In  reply  to  your  communication  of  December  1, 1881,  relative  to  the 
strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  1st  of  May,  1864,  and  the  1st  of 
March,  1865,  as  shown  in  the  report  of  the  Hon.  Secretary  of  War,  dated  Novem¬ 
ber  22,  1865,  I  have  the  honor  to  furnish  the  following  information  : 

The  strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  1st  of  May,  1864,  as  given  by 
the  Hon.  Secretary  of  War  in  his  report  of  November  22,  1865,  was  obtained  from 
a  tabular  statement  prepared  in  this  office.  In  his  report  Mr.  Stanton  designates 
the  strength  therein  stated  at  120,384,  as  “the  aggregate  available  force  present 
for  duty,”  while  the  tabular  statement  made  in  the  Adjutant-General’s  Office  styles 
it  the  “  present  available  for  duty.” 

In  reporting  the  available  or  effective  strength  of  the  army,  or  any  portion 
thereof,  it  is  the  common  practice  to  give  either  tlm  “present  for  duty”  or  the 
“  present  for  duty  equipped,”  preferably  the  latter  when  obtainable,  which  shows 
the  force  available  for  conflict.  But  this  custom  seems  not  to  have  been  observed 
in  the  preparation  of  the  statement  upon  which  the  Secretary  of  War  based  his 
report.  In  calculating  the  number  “  available  for  duty  ”  as  given  therein,  the 
following  classes  of  officers  and  men  were  included  : 


Present  for  duty .  103,789 

“  on  extra  duty .  15,629 

“  in  arrest,  suspension,  or  confinement .  870 

“  in  blank  column  (artillery  reserve) .  92 


In  computing  the  “available  for  duty”  only  the  sick,  numbering  4,222,  were  ex¬ 
cluded  from  the  aggregate  “  present”  (124,602),  leaving  120,380,  or  four  less  than 
given  by  Mr.  Stanton.  An  examination  of  the  records  leads  to  the  assumption  that 
this  slight  difference  is  a  typographical  error  in  the  Secretary’s  printed  report. 

The  above  figures  were  compiled  from  the  regular  monthly  return  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  for  April,  1864,  but  which  was  not  made  out  until  July  18,  1864. 


APPENDIX  C. 


411 


Turning  to  the  consolidated  morning  report,  or  tri-monthly  return  (as  it  is  more 
generally  known),  for  April  30,  1864,  the  following  figures  are  obtained,  viz. : 


Total  present  for  duty .  102,869 

On  special,  extra,  or  daily  duty .  19,095 

Sick .  4,576 

In  arrest  or  confinement .  931 


Aggregate  present .  127,471 

Of  the  total  present  for  duty  there  were  equipped .  97,273 


The  latter  is  understood  to  represent  the  “effective  force,”  or  number  of  offi¬ 
cers  and  men  “  available  for  line  of  battle,”  and  was  usually  ascertained  by  de¬ 
ducting  from  the  “present  for  duty”  all  non-combatants,  and  those  who  from 
lack  of  arms  or  other  causes  could  not  be  placed  in  lin®  of  battle. 

By  comparing  the  numbers  reported  on  the  monthly  return  and  those  borne  on 
the  tri-monthly,  both  purporting  to  be  for  the  same  date  (April  30),  it  is  found 
that  a  discrepancy  of  920  exists  in  the  “present  for  duty”  alone,  the  monthly  re¬ 
turn  showing  that  many  more  than  the  tri-monthly.  There  are  some  other  differ¬ 
ences  between  the  two  returns,  but  this  office  has  no  means  at  command  by  which 
to  furnish  any  certain  and  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  matter.  It  is  believed, 
however,  that  in  this  particular  case  the  tri-monthly  return  for  April  30, 1864,  and 
which  bears  date  of  May  2,  1864,  only  two  days  after  the  date  it  represents,  con¬ 
tains  the  most  reliable  data. 

In  reference  to  Mr.  Sfcfcnton’s  report  of  the  strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
on  the  1st  of  March,  1865,  it  may  be  stated  that  his  figures  were  obtained  from  the 
tri-monthly  return  for  February  28,  1865,  which  furnishes  the  following : 


Total  present  for  duty .  87,268 

On  special,  extra,  or  daily  duty .  15,422 

Sick .  5,361 

In  arrest  or  confinement .  583 


Aggregate  present .  ...  108,634 


Deducting  from  this  the  sick  (5,361),  gives  the  103,273  reported  by  the  Hon. 
Secretary  of  War  as  the  “  aggregate  available  force  present  for  duty.” 

This  method  of  calculating  the  “available  for  duty”  appears  to  have  been  ap¬ 
plied  to  all  the  commands  of  the  Army  mentioned  on  pages  5  and  14  of  the  Report 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  November  22,  1865. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

R.  C.  DRUM, 

•  Adjutant- General. 


APPENDIX  C. 


Organization  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Com¬ 
manded  by  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  January  31,  1864. 


SECOND  ARMY  CORPS. 
Lieutenant-General  R.  S.  EWELL  Commanding. 


EARLY’S  DIVISION. 

JUBAL  A.  EARLY. 


Major-General 

1 Taya's  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  H.  T.  Hays. 

5th  Louisiana,  Col.  Henry  Forno. 
6th  Louisiana,  Col.  Wm.  Monaghan. 
7th  Louisiana,  Col.  D.  B.  Penn. 

8th  Louisiana,  Lt.-Col.  A.  DeBlanc, 
9th  Louisiana,  Col.  W.  R.  Peck. 


Pegram's  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  John  Peg  ram. 

13th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  B.  Terrill. 

31st  Virginia,  Col.  J.  S.  Hoffman. 
49th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  C.  Gibson. 

52d  Virginia,  Col.  James  H.  Skinner. 
58th  Virginia,  Col.  F.  H.  Board. 


412  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ‘65, 


Gordon'' s  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  John  B.  Gordon. 

13th.  Georgia,  Col.  James  M.  Smith. 

36th  Georgia,  Col.  J.  D.  Matthews. 

31st  [26th]  Georgia,  Col.  E.  N.  Atkinson. 
38th  [31st]  Georgia,  Col.  C.  A.  Evans. 
60th  Georgia,  Col.  W.  H.  Stiles. 

61st  Georgia,  Col.  J.  H.  Lamar. 


Holce's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  R.  F.  Hoke. 

6th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  R.  F.  Webb. 

21st  N.  Carolina,  Lt.-Col.W.  S.  Rankin. 
54th  N.  Carolina, Col.  K.  M.  Murchison. 
57th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  A.  C.  Godwin. 
1st  N.  C.  Battalion,  Capt.  J.  A.  Cooper. 


JOHNSON’S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  EDWARD  JOHNSON. 


Stonewall  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  A.  VIklker. 

2d  Virginia,  Col.  J.  Q.  A.  Nadenbousch, 
4th  Virginia,  Col.  William  Terry. 

5th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  H.  S.  Funk. 

27th  Virginia,  Lt.-Col.  [C.  L.]  Haynes. 
33d  Virginia,  Col.  F.  W.  M.  Holliday. 


Steuart's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  George  H.  Steuart. 
10th  Virginia,  Col.  E.  T.  H.  Warren. 
23d  Virginia,  Col.  A.  G.  Taliaferro. 
37th  Virginia,  Col.  T.  V.  Williams. 
1st  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  A.  McDowell. 
3d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  S.  D.  Thruston. 


Jones's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  M.  Jones. 

21st  Virginia,  Col.  W.  A.  Witcher. 

25th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  C.  Higginbotham. 
42d  Virginia,  Colonel  R.  W.  Withers. 
44th  Virginia,  Col.  Norvell  Cobb. 

48th  Virginia,  Col.  R.  H.  Dungan. 

50th  Virginia,  Col.  A.  S.  Vanderventer. 

Stafford's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  L.  A.  Stafford. 

1st  Louisiana,  Col.  W.  R.  Shivers. 

2d  Louisiana,  Col.  J.  M.  Williams. 
10th  Louisiana,  Col.  E.  Waggaman. 
14th  Louisiana,  Col.  Z.  York. 

15th  Louisiana.  Col.  E.  Pendleton. 


RODES’S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  ROBERT  E.  RODES. 


Daniel's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Junius  Daniel. 

32d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  E.  C.  Brabble. 

43d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  Thos.  S.  Kenan. 
45th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  Sam’l  H.  Boyd. 
53d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  Wm.  A.  Owens. 

2d  N.  C.  Batt.,  Maj.  John  M.  Hancock. 

Ramseur's  Brigade. 

Brig.  Gen.  S.  D.  Ramseur. 

2d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  W.  R.  Cox. 

4th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  Bryan  Grimes. 
14th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  R.  T.  Bennett. 
30th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  F.  M.  Parker. 


Doles's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  George  Doles. 

4th  Georgia,  Col.  Philip  Cook. 

12th  Georgia,  Col.  Edward  Willis. 

21st  Georgia,  Col.  John  T.  Mercer. 
44th  Georgia,  Col.  William  H.  Peebles. 

Battle's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen-.  C.  A.  Battle. 

3d  Alabama,  Col.  C.  Forsyth. 

5th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  M.  Hall. 

6th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  N.  Lightfoot. 
12th  Alabama,  Col.  S.  B.  Pickens. 
26th  Alabama,  Col.  E.  A.  O’Neal. 


Johnston's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  R.  D.  Johnston. 

5th  N.  C  ,  Col.  Thomas  M.  Garrett.  20th  N.  C.,  [Lieut.]  Col.  Thomas  F.  Toon. 
12th  N.  C.,  Col.  H.  E.  Coleman.  23d  N.  C.,  Major  C.  C.  Blacknall. 


THIRD  ARMY  CORPS. 
Lieutenant-General  A.  P.  HILL  Commanding. 
ANDERSON’S  DIVISION. 


Major-General  R.  H.  ANDERSON. 


Wilcox' 8  {late)  Brigade. 

8th  Alabama,  Col.  Y.  L.  Royston. 

9th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  H.  King. 

10th  Alabama,  Col.  W.  H.  Forney. 
11th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  C.  C.  Sanders. 
14th  Alabama,  Col.  L.  Pinckard. 


Mahone's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  William  Mahone. 

6th  Virginia,  Col.  George  T.  Rogers. 
12th  Virginia,  Col.  D.  A.  Weisiger. 
16th  Virginia,  Col.  Joseph  [H.]  Ham. 
41st  Virginia,  Col.  W.  A.  Parham. 
61sc  Virginia,  Col.  V.  D.  Groner. 


APPENDIX  C. 


413 


Posey's  (late)  Brigade. 

12th  Mississippi,  Col.  W.  H.  Taylor. 
16th  Mississippi,  Col.  S.  E.  Baker. 
19th  Mississippi,  Col.  N.  H.  Harris. 
48th  Mississippi,  Col.  J.  M.  Jayne. 

Perry ’, 


Wright's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  Wright. 

3d  Georgia,  Col.  E.  J.  Walker. 

22d  Georgia,  Col.  [George  H.  Jones]. 
48th  Georgia,  Col.  William  Gibson. 

2d  Geoi'gia  Battalion,  Maj.  C.  J.  Moffitt. 
Brigade. 


Brigadier-General  E.  A.  Perry. 

2d  Florida,  Col.  L.  G.  Pyles.  5th  Florida,  Col.  T.  B.  Lamar. 

8th  Florida,  Col.  David  Lang. 


HETH’S  DIVISION. 

Major-General  HENRY  HETH. 

KirklancVs  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  W.  Kirkland. 

11th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  C.  Leventhorpe. 
26th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  R.  Lane. 

44th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  T.  C.  Singeltary. 
47th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  G.  H.  Faribault. 
52d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  K.  Marshall. 

Cooke's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  J.  R.  Cooke. 

15th  North  Carolina,  Colonel  William  McRae. 

27th  North  Carolina,  Colonel  John  A.  Gilmer  [Jr.]. 

46th  North  Carolina,  Colonel  E.  D.  Hall. 

48th  North  Carolina,  Colonel  [S.  H.  Walkup], 


Davis's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  R.  Davis. 

2d  Mississippi,  Col.  J.  M.  Stone. 

11th  Mississippi,  Col.  F.  M.  Green. 

42d  Mississippi,  Col.  H.  Moseley. 

55th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  K.  Connally. 


WILCOX’S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  C.  M.  WILCOX. 


Lane's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  H.  Lane. 

7th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  E.  G.  Haywood. 
18th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  D.  Barry. 
28th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  S.  D.  Lowe. 

33d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  C.  M.  Avery. 
37th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  W.  M.  Barbour. 


McGowan's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  S.  McGowan. 

1st  S.  Carolina,  Maj.  C.  W.  McCreary. 
12th  S.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  L.  Miller. 

13th  S.  Carolina,  Col.  B.  T.  Brockman. 
14th  S.  Carolina,  Col.  Jos.  N.  Brown. 
Orr’s  (1st)  S.  C.  Rifles,  Col.  F.  E.  Harrison. 


Scales's  Brigade. 


Brigadier- General  A.  M.  Scales. 

13th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  H.  Hyman.  34th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  W.  L.  J.  Low- 
16th  N.  Carolina,  Lt.-Col.  W.  A.  Stowe.  ranee. 

22d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  T.  S.  Galloway.  38th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  W.  J.  Hoke. 


CAVALRY  CORPS. 

Major-General  J.  E.  B.  STUART  Commanding. 
HAMPTON’S  DIVISION. 


Major-General  WADE 
Gordon's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  James  B.  Gordon. 

1st  N.  Carolina  Cav.,  Col.  W.  H.  Cheek. 
2d  N.  C.  Cav.,  Col.  [Wm.  G  .]  Robinson. 
4th  N.  C.  Cav.,  Col.  D.  D.  Ferebee. 

6th  N.  Carolina  Cav.,  Col.  [Lt.-Col.  S. 
B.  Evans]. 


HAMPTON  Commanding. 

Young's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  P.  M.  B.  Young. 

1st  S.  Carolina  Cav.,  Col.  J.  L.  Black. 
2d  S.  Carolina  Cav.,  Col.  T.  J.  Lipscomb. 
Cobb’s  Georgia  Legion  (Cav.),  Col.  G. 
J.  Wright. 

Phillips’  Georgia  Legion  (Cav.),  Lt.-Col. 
W.  W.  Rich. 

Jeff.  Davis  Legion  (Cav.),  Lt.-Col.  J,  F. 
Waring. 


414  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Rosser's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  T.  L.  Rosser. 

7th  Virginia  Cav.,  Col.  R.  H.  Dulany.  12th  Virginia  Cav.,  Col.  A.  W.  Harman. 
11th  Virginia  Cav.,  Col.  O.  R.  Funsten.  35th  Bat’n,  Va.  Cav.,  Lt.-Col.  E.  V.  White. 


LEE'S  DIVISION. 

Major-General  FITZHUGH  LEE. 

TF.  IT.  F.  Lee's  Brigade.  Lomax's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  R.  Chambliss  Com’d’g.  Brig.-Gen.  L.  L.  Lomax. 

9th  Virginia  Cav.,  Col.  R.  L.  T.  Beale.  5th  Virginia  Cav.,  Lt.-Col.  H.  Clay  Pate. 
10th  Va.  Cav.,  Col.  J.  Lucius  Davis.  6th  Virginia  Cav.,  Col.  Julien  Harrison. 

13th  Va.  Cav.,  Col.  [J.  C.  Phillips].  15th  Va.  Cav.,  Lt.-Col.  John  Criteher. 

Wickham's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  W.  C.  Wickham. 

1st  Virginia  Cav.,  Col.  R.  W.  Carter.  3d  Virginia  Cav.,  Col.  T.  II.  Owen. 

2d  Virginia  Cav.,  Col.  T.  T.  Munford.  4th  Virginia  Cav.,  Lt.-Col.  W.  H.  Payne. 


VALLEY  DISTRICT. 

Major-General  J.  A.  EARLY  Commanding. 
UNATTACHED  COMMANDS. 


Tmboden's  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  D.  Imboden. 

02d  Va.  Inf.  (mt'd),  Col.  Geo.  H.  Smith. 
18th  Va.  Cavalry,  Col.  G.  W.  Imboden. 
41st  Va.  Cav.  Batt.,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert 
White. 

Gilmor’s  Md.  Cav.  Batt.,  Major  H.  W. 
Gilmor. 

McClanahan’s  Battery,  Capt.  - Mc- 

Clanahan. 

Walker's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  H.  H.  Walker. 

40th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  M.  Brockenbrough. 
47th  Virginia,  Col.  R.  M.  Mayo. 

55th  Virginia,  Col.  [VVm.  S.]  Christian. 
22d  Virginia  Batt.,  Lt.-Col.  E.  P.  Tayloe. 
Provost  Guard. 

1st  Virginia  Batt.,  Major  D.  B.  Bridg- 
ford. 


Thomas's  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  E.  L.  Thomas. 

14th  Georgia,  Col.  R.  W.  Folsom. 
35th  Georgia,  Col.  B.  H.  Holt. 
45th  Georgia,  Col.  T.  J.  Simmons. 
49th  Georgia,  Col.  S.  T.  Player. 


Archer's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  J.  Archer. 

1st  Tennessee,  Col.  P.  Turney. 

7th  Tennessee,  [Col.  John  A.  Fite]. 
14th  Tennessee,  [Col.  Wm.  McComb], 
13th  Alabama, - . 

Scouts ,  Guides,  and  Couriers. 

39th  Virginia  Cav.  Batt.,  Major  J.  H, 
Richardson. 


MARYLAND  LINE. 

Colonel  BRADLEY  T.  JOHNSON  Commanding. 

1st  Md.  Cav.,  Lieut.-Col.  Ridgely  Brown.  2d  Md.  Art.,  Capt.  H.  Griffin. 

2d  Md.  Inf.,  Lieut.-Col.  Jas.  R.  Herbert.  Cooper’s  Va.  Bat.,  Capt.  [R.  L.]  Cooper. 


ARTILLERY  CORPS. 

Brig.-General  W.  N.  PENDLETON,  Chief  of  Artillery. 
ARTILLERY  WITH  SECOND  CORPS. 


Brigadier-General  A.  L. 
Braxton's  Battalion. 

Major  C.  M.  Braxton,  of  Virginia. 
Lee  Battery  (Va.),  Capt.  C.  W.  Statham. 
1st  Maryland  Art.,  Capt.  W.  F.  Dement. 
Chesapeake  Art.  (Md.),  Lieut.  W.  S. 
Chew. 

Alleghany  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  J.  C.  Car¬ 
penter. 


LONG,  Chief  of  Artillery. 

Jones's  Battalion. 

Lieut.-Col.  H.  P.  Jones,  of  Va. 

Maj.  J.  B.  Brockenbrough,  of  Va. 
Charlottesville  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  J.  MeD. 
Carrington. 

Staunton  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  A. W.  Garber. 
Courtney  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  W.  A.  Tan¬ 
ner. 


APPENDIX  C. 


415 


Carter's  Battalion. 

Lieut.- Colonel  T.  H.  Carter,  of 
Virginia. 

Morris  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  R.  C.  Page. 
Orange  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  C.  M.  Fry. 
King  William  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  W.  P. 

Jeff.  Davis  Art.(Ala.),  Capt.W.  J.  Reese. 


Nelson's  Battalion. 

Lient.-Col.  W.  Nelson  and  Major  T.  J. 
Page,  of  Virginia. 

Amherst  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  T.  J.  Kirk¬ 
patrick. 

Milledge  Art.  (Ga.),  Capt.  John  Mil- 
ledge. 

Fluvanna  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  John  L. 
Massie. 


First  Regiment  Virginia  Artillery. 

Colonel  J.  T.  Brown,  of  Virginia,  and  Major  R.  A.  Hardaway,  of  Alabama. 
Powhatan  Artillery,  Captain  Willis  J.  Dance. 

2d  Richmond  Howitzers,  Captain  David  Watson. 

3d  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  B.  H.  Smith,  Jr. 

Rockbridge  Artillery.  Captain  Archie  Graham. 

Salem  Flying  Artillery,  Captain  Charles  B.  Griffin. 


ARTILLERY  WITH  THIRD  CORPS. 
Colonel  R.  L.  WALKER,  Chief  of  Artillery. 
Cults' s  Battalion. 


Lieut. -Col.  A.  S.  CuTTsand  Major  John 
Lane,  of  Georgia. 

Ross’s  Battery  (Ga.),  Capt.  H.  M.  Ross. 
Patterson’s  Battery  (Ga.),  Capt.  G.  M. 
Patterson. 

Irvine  Artillery  (Ga.),  Capt.  J.  T.  Wing¬ 
field. 


McIntosh's  Battalion. 

Major  D.  G.  McIntosh,  of  S.  Carolina. 
Johnson’s  Artillery  (Va.),  Captain  M. 
Johnson. 

Hardaway  Art.  (Ala.),  Capt.W.  B.  Hurt. 
Danville  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  R.  S.  Rice. 

2d  Rockbridge  Artillery  (Va.),  Capt.  L. 
Donald. 

Poague's  Battalion. 

Major  W.  T.  Poague.  of  Missouri. 
Madison  Art.  (Miss.).  Capt.  Geo.  Ward. 
Albemarle  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  J.W. Wyatt. 
Brooke  Battery  (Va.),  Capt.  A.  W.  Utter- 
back. 

Graham’s  Bat.  (Ala.),  Capt.  J.  Graham. 


Garnett's  Battalion. 

Lieut.-Col.  J.  J.  Garnett  and  Major  C. 

Richardson,  of  Virginia. 

Lewis  Artillery  (Va.),  Capt.  N.  Peniclt. 
Donaldsonville  Artillery  (La.),  Capt.  V. 
Maurin. 

Norfolk  Light  Artillery  (Va.),  Capt.  C. 
R.  Grandy. 

Hugger  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  J.  D.  Moore. 
Pegram's  Battalion. 

Major  W.  J.  Pegram,  of  Virginia. 
Pedee  Art.  (S.  C.),  Capt.  E.  D.  Brunson. 
Fredericksburg  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  E.  A. 
Marye. 

Purcell  Battery  (Va.),  Capt.  J.  McGraw. 
Letcher  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  T.  A.  Brander. 
Crenshaw  Battery  (Va.),  Capt.  T.  Ellett. 
Hask  ell's  Battalion. 

Major  J.  C.  Haskell,  of  South  Carolina. 
Palmetto  Bat.  (S.C.).Capt.  H.R. Garden. 
Branch  Art.(N.  0. ),  Capt.  J.  J.  R.Potts. 
Rowan  Artillery  (N.  C.),  Capt.  John  A. 
Ramsay. 

Nelson  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  J.  N.  Lamkin. 


ARTILLERY  WITH  CAVALRY  CORPS. 
Beckham's  Battalion. 

Major  R.  F.  Beckham. 

Chew’s  Battery  (Virginia),  Captain  R.  P.  Chew. 
Moorman’s  Battery  (Virginia),  Captain  M.  N.  Moorman. 
Hart’s  Battery  (South  Carolina),  Captain  James  F.  Hart. 
Breathed’s  Battery  (Maryland),  Captain  J.  Breathed. 
McGregor’s  Battery  (Virginia),  Captain  W.  M.  McGregor. 


RESERVE  ARTILLERY. 

Cabell's  Battalion. 

Colonel  H.  C.  Cabell,  of  Virginia,  and  Major  S.  P.  Hamilton,  of  Georgia. 
Company  A,  1st  Artillery  (North  Carolina),  Captain  B.  C.  Manly. 

1st  Richmond  Howitzers  (Virginia),  Captain  E.  S.  McCarthy. 

Troup  Artillery  (Georgia),  Captain  H.  H.  Carlton. 

Savannah  Artillery  (Georgia),  Lieut.  M.  Calloway. 


416  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 


Organization  or  the  Army  op  Northern  Virginia,  Com¬ 
manded  by  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  August,  1864. 


FIRST  ARMY  CORPS. 

Lieutenant-General  R.  H.  ANDERSON  Commanding. 

PICKETT’S  DIVISION. 

Major-General  GEORGE  E.  PICKETT. 


Barton"1  a  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Seth  M.  Barton. 

9th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  J.  Phillips. 

14th  Virginia,  Col.  William  White. 
38th  Virginia,  Col.  George  K.  Griggs. 
53d  Virginia,  Col.  W.  R.  Aylett. 

57th  Virginia,  Col.  C.  R.  Fontaine. 

Hunton's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Eppa  Hunton. 

8th  Virginia,  Col.  N.  Berkeley. 

18th  Virginia,  Col.  H.  A.  Carrington. 
19th  Virginia,  Col.  Henry  Gantt. 

28th  Virginia,  Col.  William  Watts. 
56th  Virginia,  Col.  P.  P.  Slaughter. 


Corse's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  M.  D.  Corsb. 

15th  Virginia,  Col.  T.  P.  August. 
17th  Virginia,  Col.  Arthur  Herbert. 
29th  Virginia,  Col.  James  Giles. 

30th  Virginia,  Col.  A.  T.  Harrison. 
32d  Virginia,  Col.  E.  B.  Montague. 

Terry's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  William  R.  Terry. 
1st  Virginia,  Col.  F.  G.  Skinner. 

3d  Virginia,  Col.  Joseph  Mayo,  Jr. 
7th  Virginia,  Col.  C.  C.  Flowerree. 
11th  Virginia,  Col.  M.  S.  Langhorne. 
24th  Virginia,  Lt.-Col.  R.  L.  Maury. 


FIELD'S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  C.  W.  FIELD. 


Anderson's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  G.  T.  Anderson. 
7th  Georgia,  Col.  G.  H.  Carmical. 
8th  Georgia,  Col.  J.  R.  Towers. 
9th  Georgia,  Lt.-Col.  E.  F.  Hoge. 
11th  Georgia,  Col.  F.  H.  Little. 
59th  Georgia,  Col.  Jack  Brown. 


Law's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  E.  M.  Law. 

4th  Alabama,  Col.  P.  D.  Bowles. 

15th  Alabama,  Col.  A.  A.  Lowther. 

44th  Alabama,  Col.  W.  F.  Perry. 

47th  Alabama,  Col.  M.  J.  Bulger. 

48th  Alabama,  Lt.-Col.  W.  M.  Hardwick. 


Bratton's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  John  Bratton. 

1st  South  Carolina,  Col.  J.  R.  Hagood.  5th  South  Carolina,  Col.  A.  Coward. 

2d  South  Carolina  [Rifles],  Col.  R.  E.  6th  South  Carolina,  Col.  J.  M.  Steedman. 
Bowen.  Palmetto  Sharpshooters,  Col.  Jos.  Walker. 


KERSHAW’S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  J.  B.  KERSHAW, 


Wofford's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  T.  Wofford. 

16th  Georgia,  Major  James  S.  Gholston. 
18th  Georgia,  Col.  Joseph  Armstrong. 
24th  Georgia,  Col.  C.  C.  Sanders. 

3d  Georgia  Battalion  (Sharpshooters), 
Lt.-Col.  N.  L.  Hutchins. 

Phillips’  Legion.  Lt.-Col.  Jos.  Hamilton. 
Cobb’s  Legion,  Lt.-Col.  L.  J.  Glenn. 


Humphreys's  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  B.  G.  Humphreys. 

13th  Mississippi,  Lt.-Col.  A.  G.  O’Brien. 
17th  Mississippi,  Capt.  J.  C.  Cochran. 
18th  Mississippi,  Col.  T.  M.  Griffin. 

21st  Mississippi,  Col.  D.  N.  Moody. 


APPENDIX  C. 


417 


Bryan's  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  Goode  Britan. 
10th  Georgia,  Col.  W.  C.  Holt. 
60th  Georgia,  Col.  P.  McGlashan. 
61st  Georgia,  Col.  E.  Ball. 

53d  Georgia,  Col.  James  P.  Sims. 


Kershaw's  [Old]  Brigade . 

2d  South  Carolina,  Col.  J.  D.  Kennedy. 
8d  South  Carolina,  Col.  W.  D.  Rutherford. 
7th  South  Carolina,  Capt.  E.  J.  Goggans. 
8th  South  Carolina,  Col.  J.  W.  Henagan. 
15th  South  Carolina.  Col.  J.  B  Davis. 
20th  South  Carolina,  Col.  S.  M.  Boykin. 
3d  S.  C.  Batt.,  Lt.-tCol.]  W.  G.  Rice. 


SECOND  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-General  JUBAL  A.  EARLY  Commanding. 

GORDON’S  DIVISION. 

Major-General  JOHN  B.  GORDON. 


Hays's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  H.  T.  Hats. 

5th  Louisiana,  Col.  Henry  Forno. 

Oth  Louisiana,  Col.  William  Monaghan. 
7th  Louisiana,  Col.  D.  B.  Penn. 

8th  Louisiana,  Col.  A.  DeBlanc. 

9th  Louisiana,  Col.  William  R.  Peck. 

Gordoti's  Brigade . 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  B.  Gordon. 

13th  Georgia,  Lt.-Col.  J.  H.  Baker. 
26th  Georgia,  Col.  E.  N.  Atkinson. 
31st  Georgia,  Col.  C.  A.  Evans. 

38th  Georgia,  Col.  J.  D.  Matthews. 
60th  Georgia,  Col.  W.  H.  Stiles. 

61st  Georgia,  Col.  J.  H.  Lamar. 


Pegram's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  John  Pegram. 

13th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  B.  Terrill. 

31st  Virginia,  Col.  J.  S.  Hoffman. 

49th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  C.  Gibson. 

52d  Virginia,  Col.  James  H.  Skinner. 
58th  Virginia,  Col.  F.  H.  Board. 

Hoke's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  R.  F.  Hoke. 

6th  North  Carolina,  Col.  R.  P.  Webb. 

2 1st  North  Carolina,  Lt.-Col.  W.S.  Rankin. 
54th  North  Carolina,  Col.  K.  M.  Murchi¬ 
son. 

67th  North  Carolina,  Col.  A.  C.  Godwin. 
1st  N.  C.  Batt.,  Major  [R.  W.]  Wharton. 


JOHNSON’S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  EDWARD  JOHNSON. 


Stonewall  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  A.  Walker. 

2d  Virginia,  Col.  J.  Q.  A.  Nadenbousch. 
4th  Virginia,  Col.  William  Terry. 

6th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  H.  S.  Funk. 

27th  Virginia,  Lt.-Col.  Charles  [L.] 
Haynes. 

33d  Virginia,  Col.  F.  W.  M.  Holliday. 

Steuart's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  George  H.  Stetjart. 
10th  Virginia,  Col.  E.  T.  H.  Warren. 
23d  Virginia,  Col.  A.  G.  Taliaferro. 

37th  Virginia,  Col.  T.  V.  Williams. 

1st  North  Carolina,  Col.  H.  A.  Brown. 
3d  North  Carolina,  Col.  S.  D.  Thruston. 


Jones's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  M.  Jones. 

21st  Virginia,  Col.  W.  A.  Witcher. 

25th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  C.  Higginbotham. 
42d  Virginia,  Col.  R.  W.  Withers. 

44th  Virginia,  Colonel  Norvell  Cobb. 
48th  Virginia,  Col.  R.  H.  Dungan. 

50th  Virginia,  Col.  A.  S.  Vanderventer. 

Stafford's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  L.  A.  Stafford. 

1st  Louisiana,  Col.  W.  R.  Shivers. 

2d  Louisiana,  Col.  J.  M.  Williams. 
10th  Louisiana,  CoL  E.  Waggaman. 
14th  Louisiana,  Col.  Z.  York. 

15th  Louisiana,  Col.  E.  Pendleton. 


RODES’S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  R.  E.  RODES. 


Daniel's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  Daniel. 

32d  North  Carolina,  Col.  E.  C.  Brabble. 
43d  North  Carolina,  Col.  Thos.  S.  Kenan. 
45th  North  Carolina,  Col.  Samuel  H.  Boyd. 
63d  North  Carolina,  Col.  Wm.  A.  Owens. 
2d  N.  C.  Batt.,  Major  John  M.  Hancock. 

18* 


Doles's  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  George  Doles. 

4th  Georgia,  Col.  Philip  Cook. 

12th  Georgia,  Col.  Edward  Willis. 
21st  Georgia,  Col.  John  T.  Mercer. 
44th  Georgia,  Col,  W.  H.  Peebles. 


418  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’05. 


Bamseur's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  S.  P.  Ramseur. 

2d  North  Carolina,  Col.  W.  R.  CoX. 

4th  North  Carolina,  Col.  Bryan  Grimes. 
14th  North  Carolina,  Col.  R.  T.  Bennett. 
30th  North  Carolina,  Col.  F.  M.  Parker. 

Johnston 


Battle's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  C.  A.  Battle. 

3d  Alabama.  Col.  Charles  Forsyth. 

5th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  M.  Hall. 

6th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  N.  Lightfoot. 

12th  Alabama,  Col.  S.  B.  Pickens. 

61st  Alabama,  Maj.  [Lt.-Col.]  L.  H.  Hill. 
Brigade. 


Brigadier-General  R.  D.  Johnston. 

5th  North  Carolina,  Colonel  T.  M.  Garrett. 
12th  North  Carolina,  Colonel  II.  E.  Coleman. 
20th  North  Carolina,  Colonel  T.  F.  Toon. 

23d  North  Carolina,  Maj.  C.  C.  Blackwell. 


THIRD  ARMY  CORPS. 
Lieutenant-General  A.  P.  HILL  Commanding. 


MAHONE’S  DIVISION. 

Major  General  WILLIAM  MAHONE. 


Sanders's  Brigade . 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  C.  C.  Sanders. 

8th  Alabama,  Col.  Y.  L.  Royston. 
9th  Alabama,  Col.  J.  H.  King. 

10th  Alabama,  Col.  W.  H.  Forney. 
11th  Alabama,  Lt.-Col.  G.  E.  Tayloe. 
14th  Alabama,  Col.  L.  Pinckard. 

Harris's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  N.  H.  Harris. 

12th  Mississippi,  Col.  M.  B.  Harris. 
16th  Mississippi,  Col.  E.  C.  Council. 
19th  Mississippi,  Col.  R.  W.  Phipps. 
4Sth  Mississippi,  Col.  J.  M.  Jayne. 


Mahone's  Brigade. 

6th  Virginia,  Col.  G.  T.  Rogers. 
12th  Virginia,  Col.  D.  A.  Weisiger. 
16th  Virginia,  Col.  Joseph  H.  Ham. 
4lst  Virginia,  Col.  W.  A.  Parham. 
61st  Virginia,  Col.  V.  D.  Groner. 


Wright's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  Wright. 

2d  Georgia  Battalion,  Major  C.  J.  Moffitt. 
10th  Ga.  Batt.,  Capt.  J.  D.  Frederick. 

3d  Georgia,  Col.  E.  J.  Walker. 

22d  Georgia,  Col.  G.  H.  Jones. 

48th  Georgia,  Col.  William  Gibson. 

64th  Georgia,  Major  W.  H.  Weems. 


Finegan's  Brigade. 

.  Brigadier-General  Joseph  Finegan.  4 

2d  Florida,  Major  W.  [R.]  Moore.  9th  Florida,  Col.  J.  M.  Martin. 

6th  Florida,  Col.  T.  B.  Lamar.  10th  Florida,  Col.  C.  [F.]  Hopkins. 

8th  Florida,  Col.  D.  Lang.  11th  Florida,  Col.  T.  W.  Brevard. 


WILCOX’S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  C.  M.  WILCOX. 


f  Thomas's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  E.  L.  Thomas. 

14th  Georgia,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  P.  Lester. 
35th  Georgia,  Col.  B.  H.  Holt. 

45th  Georgia,  Col.  T.  J.  Simmons. 

49th  Georgia,  Col.  John  T.  Jordan. 

McGowan' 8  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  McGowan. 

1st  S.  Carolina,  Col.  C.  W.  McCreary. 
12th  S.  Carolina,  Lt.-Col.  E.  F.  Bookter. 
13th  S.  Carolina,  Col.  Isaac  F.  Hunt. 
14th  S.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  N.  Brown. 
Orr’s  Rifles,  Col.  McD.  Miller. 


Lane's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  James  H.  Lane. 

7th  North  Carolina,  Col.  E.  G.  Haywood. 
18th  North  Carolina,  Col.  J.  D.  Barry. 
28th  North  Carolina,  Major  S.  N.  Stowe. 
33d  North  Carolina,  Col.  R.  V.  Cowan. 
37th  North  Carolina,  Col.  W.  M.  Barbour. 

Scales's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  M.  Scales. 

13th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  H.  Hyman. 
16th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  W.  A.  Stowe. 

22d  N.  C.,  Col.  T.  S.  Galloway  [Jr.]. 
34th  N.  C.,  Col.  W.  L.  J.  Lowrance. 
38th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  John  Ashford. 


APPENDIX  C. 


419 


HETH’S  DIVISION. 

Major-General  H.  HETH. 

Davis's  Brigade.  Cooke's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  It.  Davis.  Brig.-Gen.  John  R.  Cooke. 

2d  Mississippi,  Gol.  J.  M.  Stone.  35th  N.  C.,  Lt.-Col.  W.  H.  Yarborough. 

11th  Mississippi,  Lt.-Col.  W.  B.  Lowry.  27th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  A.  Gilmer,  Jr. 
26th  Mississippi,  Lt.-Col.  A.  E.  Reynolds.  46th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  W.  L.  Saunders. 
42d  Mississippi,  Lt.-Col.  A.  M.  Nelson.  48th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  S.  H.  Walkup. 

1st  Confederate  Battalion, - . 

McRae's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  D.  McRae. 

11th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  W.  J.  Martin. 

26th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  J.  R.  Lane. 

44th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  T.  C.  Singeltary. 

47th  N.  Carolina,  Col.  G.  H.  Faribault. 

52d  N.  Carolina,  Col.  M.  A.  Parks. 

Walker's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  H.  H.  Walker. 

22d  Virginia  Battalion,  Lieut. -Colonel  E.  P.  Tayloe. 

40tb  Virginia,  Lieut.-Colonel  A.  S.  Cunningham. 

47th  Virginia,  Colonel  R.  M.  Mayo. 

55th  Virginia,  Colonel  W.  S.  Christian. 

2d  Maryland  Battalion,  Lieut.-Colonel  James  R.  Herbert. 


Archer's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  J.  Archer. 

1st  Tennessee,  Lieut.-Col.  N.  A.  George. 
7th  Tennessee,  Col.  J.  A.  Fite. 

14th  Tennessee,  Col.  W.  McComb. 

13th  Alabama,  Lt.-Col.  James  Aiken.1 


CAVALRY  CORPS. 

Lieutenant-General  WADE  HAMPTON  Commanding. 

LEE’S  DIVISION. 

Major-General  FITZHUGH  LEE. 

Wickham's  Brigade.  Lomax's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  C.  Wickham.  Brig.-Gen.  L.  L.  Lomax. 

1st  Virginia,  Col.  R.  W.  Carter.  5th  Virginia,  Col.  H.  Clay  Pate. 

2d  Virginia,  Col.  T.  T.  Munford.  6th  Virginia,  Col.  Julien  Harrison. 

3d  Virginia,  Col.  T.  H.  Owen.  15th  Virginia,  Col.  C.  R.  Collins. 

4th  Virginia,  Col.  W.  H.  Payne. 

BUTLER’S  DIVISION. 

Major-General  M.  C.  BUTLER. 

Dunovant' s  Brigade.  Young's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  John  Dunovant.  Brig.-Gen.  P.  M.  B.  Young. 

3d  S.  Carolina  [Col.  C.  J.  Colcock].  Cobb's  Ga.  Legion,  Col.  G.  J.  Wright. 
4th  S.  Carolina  [Col.  B.  H.  Rutledge].  Phillips’  Legion,  Lt.-Col.  W.  W.  Rich. 
5th  S.  Carolina,  Col.  [H.  K.]  Aiken.  Jeff.  Davis  Legion,  Lt.-Col.  J.F. Waring. 

Miller’s  Legion, - . 

Love’s  Legion, - . 

7th  Georgia,  Col.  [R.  H.]  Anderson. 

Rosser's  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  Thomas  L.  Rosser. 

7th  Virginia,  Col.  R.  H.  Dulany.  12th  Virginia,  Col.  A.  W.  Harman. 

11th  Virginia,  Col.  O.  R.  Funsten.  35th  Virginia  Batt.,  Lt.-Col.  E.  V.  White. 


1  James  Aiken  was  Colonel  in  October,  1864,  according  to  signature. 


420  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65, 


LEE’S  DIVISION. 
Major-General  W.  H.  F.  LEE. 


Barringer's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Rufus  Barringer. 

1st  N.  Carolina,  Col.  W.  H.  Cheek. 

2d  North  Carolina,  Col.  C.  M.  Andrews  1 
[Col.  W.  P.  Roberts], 

4th  N.  Carolina,  Lt.-Col.  D.  D.  Ferebee. 
5th  N.  Carolina,  Lt.-Col.  S.  B.  Evans. 


Chambliss's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  R.  Chambliss,  Jr. 
9th  Virginia,  Col.  R.  L.  T.  Beale. 
10th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  Lucius  Davis. 
13th  Virginia,  Col.  J.  C.  Phillips. 


ARTILLERY  RESERVE. 

Brigadier-General  W.  N.  PENDLETON  Commanding. 


Cabell's  Battalion. 

Colonel  H.  C.  Cabell. 

Manly’s  Battery,  Capt.  B.  C.  Manly. 

1st  Company  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt; 
R.  M.  Anderson. 

Carlton’s  Battery,  Capt.  H.  II.  Carlton. 
Calloway’s  Bat,,  1st  Lieut.  M.  Calloway. 


Haskell'rS  Battalion. 

Major  J.  C.  Haskell. 

Branch’s  Battery,  Captain - -  Flanner. 

Nelson’s  Battery,  Lt.  [W.  B.]  Stanfield. 
Garden’s  Battery,  Capt.  [H.  R.]  Garden. 
Rowan  Battery,  Lieut. - Myers. 


Hvger's  Battalion. 
Major  F.  Huger. 


John  B.]  Smith. 
G.]  Poindexter. 
Jas.]  Woolfolk. 


Smith’s  Battery,  Capt. 

Moody  Battery,  Lieut. 

Woolfolk  Bat’y,  Lieut. 

Parker’s  Battery,  Capt.  [W.  W.]  Parker. 
Taylor’s  Battery,  Capt.  [O.  B.]  Taylor. 
Fielding’s  Bat.,  Capt.  [W.  W.]  Fielding. 
Martin's  Battery,  Capt. - Martin. 


Gibbs's  Battalion. 

- Gibbs. 

Davidson’s  Bat.,  Lt.  [J.  H.]  Chamber- 
layne. 

Dickenson’s  Bat’y, Capt.  [C.]  Dickenson. 
Otey’s  Battery,  Capt.  [D.  N.]  Walker. 


LONG'S  DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General  A.  L.  LONG. 


Braxton's  Battalion. 

Major  Carter  M.  Braxton. 

Lee  Battery,  Lieut.  W.  W.  Hardwick. 
1st  Md.  Artillery,  Capt.  W.  F.  Dement. 
Stafford  Artillery,  Capt.  W.  T.  Cooper. 
Alleghany  Art.,  Capt.  J.  C.  Carpenter. 

Carter's  Battalion. 

Lieut.  Col.  Thomas  H.  Carter. 
Morris  Artillery,  Capt.  S.  H.  Pendleton. 
Orange  Artillery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Fry. 

King  William  Art.,  Capt.  Wm.  P.  Carter. 
Jeff.  Davis  Artillery,  Capt.  W.  J.  Reese. 


Cutshaio's  Battalion. 

Major  [W.  E.]  Cutshaw. 
Charlottesville  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  McD. 
Carrington. 

Staunton  Artillery,  Capt.  A.  W.  Garber. 
Courtney  Artillery,  Capt.  W.  A.  Tanner. 

Nelson's  Battalion. 

Lieut.-Col.  [William]  Nelson. 
Amherst  Artillery,  Capt.  T.  J.  Kirk¬ 
patrick. 

Milledge  Artille  y,  Capt.  John  Milledge. 
Fluvanna  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  L.  Massie. 


Brown's  Battalion. 

Colonel  J.  T.  Brown. 

Powhatan  Artillery,  Captain  W.  J.  Dance. 

2d  Richmond  Howitzers,  Captain  L.  F.  Jones. 

3d  Richmond  Howitzers,  Captain  B.  H.  Smith,  Jr. 
Rockbridge  Artillery,  Captain  A.  Graham. 

Salem  Flying  Artillery,  Captain  C.  B.  Griffin. 


1  On  the  original  of  this;  was  killed  June  23,  1864. 


APPENDIX  D. 


421 


WALKER’S  DIVISION. 


Colonel  R.  L.  WALKER. 


Ciitts's  Battalion. 

Lieut.- Col.  A.  S.  Cutts. 

Ross’s  Battery,  Capt.  H.  M.  Ross. 
Patterson’s  Bat’y,  Capt.  G.  M.  Patter¬ 
son. 

Irwin  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  T.  Wingfield. 


Richardson's  Battalion. 

Lieut.-Col.  C.  Richardson. 

Lewis  Artillery,  Capt.  N.  Penick. 
Donaldsonville  Art.,  Capt.  V.  Maurin, 
Norfolk  Light  Art.,  Capt.  C.  R.  Grandy. 
Huger  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  D.  Moore. 


McIntosh's  Battalion. 


Pegram's  Battalion. 


Lieut.-Col.  D.  G.  McIntosh. 
Johnson’s  Battery,  Capt.  [V.  J.  Clutter] . 
Hardaway  Artillery,  Capt.  W.  B.  Hurt. 
Danville  Artillery,  Capt.  R.  S.  Rice. 

2d  Rockbridge  Art.,  Capt.  L.  Donald. 


Lieut. -Colonel  W.  J.  Pegram. 
Peedee  Artillery  [Capt.  E.  B.  Brunson] . 
Fredericksburg  Art.,  Capt.  E.  A.  Marye. 
Letcher  Artillery,  Capt.  T.  A.  Brander. 
Purcell  Battery  [Capt.  Geo.  M.  Cayce], 
Crenshaw’s  Battery,  Capt.  T.  Ellett. 


Poague's  Battalion. 


Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  T.  Poague. 
Madison  Artillery  [Captain  T.  J.  Richards]. 
Albemarle  Artillery,  Captain  J.  W.  Wyatt. 
Brooke  Artillery,  Captain  A.  W.  U  rterback. 
Charlotte  Artillery,  Captain - Williams. 


APPENDIX  D. 


Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
May  2,  1864. 

Orders. 

1.  The  army  will  move  on  Wednesday,  the  4th  May,  1864. 

2.  On  the  day  previous,  Tuesday,  the  3d  May,  Major-General  Sheridan,  com¬ 
manding  Cavalry  Corps,  will  move  Gregg’s  cavalry  division  to  the  vicinity  of  Rich- 
ardsville.  It  will  be  accompanied  by  one-half  of  the  canvas  ponton  train,  the 
engineer  troops  with  which  will  repair  the  road  to  Ely’s  ford  as  far  as  practicable 
without  exposing  their  work  to  the  observation  of  the  enemy. 

Guards  will  be  placed  in  all  the  occupied  houses  on  or  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
route  of  the  cavalry,  and  in  advance  toward  the  Rapidan,  so  as  to  prevent  any 
communication  with  the  enemy  by  the  inhabitants.  The  same  precaution  will  bo 
taken  at  the  same  time  in  front  of  the  First  and  Third  Cavalry  Divisions,  and 
wherever  it  may  be  considered  necessary. 

At  2  o’clock  a.m.,  on  the  4th  May,  Gregg’s  division  will  move  to  Ely’s  ford, 
cross  the  Rapidan  as  soon  as  the  canvas  ponton  bridge  is  laid,  if  the  river  is  not 
fordable,  and  as  soon  as  the  infantry  of  the  Second  Corps  is  up  will  move  to  the 
vicinity  of  Piney  Branch  Church,  or  in  that  section,  throwing  reconnoissanees 
well  out  on  the  Pamunkey  road  toward  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  Hamilton’s 
crossing,  and  Fredericksburg. 

The  roads  past  Piney  Branch  Church,  Tod’s  tavern,  etc.,  will  be  kept  clear  for 
the  passage  of  the  infantry  the  following  day. 

The  cavalry  division  will  remain  in  this  position  to  cover  the  passage  of  the 
army  trains,  and  will  move  with  them  and  cover  their  left  flank. 

At  midnight  on  the  3d  May  the  Third  Cavalry  Division,  with  one-half  the  can¬ 
vas  ponton  bridge  train,  which  will  join  it  after  dark,  will  move  to  Germanna  ford, 
taking  the  planlc-road  and  cross  the  Rapidan  as  soon  as  the  bridge  is  laid,  if  the 
river  is  not  fordable,  and  hold  the  crossing  until  the  infantry  of  the  Fifth  Corps  is 
up  ;  it  will  then  move  to  Parker’s  store  on  the  Orange  Court  House  plank-road  or 
that  vicinity,  sending  out  strong  reconnoissanees  on  the  Orange  plank  and  pike 
roads,  and  the  Catharpin  and  Pamunkey  roads,  until  they  feel  the  enemy,  and  at 
least  as  far  as  Robertson’s  tavern,  the  Hope  Church,  and  Ormond’s  or  Robinson’s. 


422  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


All  intelligence  concerning  the  enemy  will  be  communicated  with  promptitude 
to  headquarters,  and  to  the  corps  and  division  commanders  of  the  nearest  infan¬ 
try  troops. 

3.  Major  General  Warren,  commanding  Fifth  Corps,  will  send  two  divisions  at 
midnight  of  the  3d  instant  by  way  of  Stevensburg  and  the  plank-road  to  the  cross¬ 
ing  of  Germanna  ford.  So  much  bridge  train  as  may  be  necessary  to  bridge  the 
Rapidan  at  Germanna  ford,  with  such  artillery  as  may  be  required,  will  accompany 
these  divisions,  which  will  be  followed  by  the  remainder  of  the  corps  at  such  hour 
that  the  column  will  cross  the  Rapidan  without  delay.  Such  disposition  of  the 
troops  and  artillery  as  may  be  found  necessary  to  cover  the  bridge  will  be  made 
by  the  corps  commander,  who,  after  crossing,  will  move  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Old 
Wilderness  tavern  on  the  Orange  Court  House  pike.  The  corps  will  move  the 
following  day  past  the  head  of  Cartharpin  Run,  crossing  the  Orange  Court  House 
plank-road  at  Parker’s  store.' 

4.  Major-General  Sedgwick,  commanding  Sixth  Corps,  will  move  at  4  a.m.  on 
the  4th  inst,  by  way  of  Stevensburg  and  the  Germanna  plank-road  to  Germanna 
ford,  following  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  after  crossing  the  Rapidan  will  bivouac  on 
the  heights  beyond.  The  canvas  ponton  train  will  be  taken  up  as  soon  as  the 
troops  of  the  Sixth  Corps  have  crossed,  and  will  follow  immediately  in  rear  of  the 
troops  of  that  corps. 

So  much  of  the  bridge  train  of  the  Sixth  Corps  as  may  be  necessary  to  bridge 
the  Rapidan  at  Culpeper  Mine  ford  will  proceed  to  Richardsville  in  rear  of  the 
reserve  artillery,  and  as  soon  as  it  is  ascertained  that  the  reserve  artillery  are 
crossing,  it  will  move  to  Culpeper  Mine  ford,  where  the  bridge  will  be  established. 

The  engineers  of  this  bridge  train  will  at  once  open  a  road  from  Culpeper  Mine 
ford  direct  to  Richardsville. 

5.  Major-General  Hancock,  commanding  Second  Corps,  will  send  two  divisions, 
with  so  much  of  the  bridge  train  as  may  be  necessary  to  bridge  the  Rapidan  at 
Ely’s  ford,  and  such  artillery  as  may  be  inquired,  at  midnight  of  the  3d  instant,  to 
Ely’s  ford.  The  remainder  of  the  corps  will  follow  at  such  hour  that  the  column 
will  cross  the  Rapidan  without  delay. 

The  canvas  ponton  train  at  this  ford  will  be  taken  up  as  soon  as  the  troops  of 
this  corps  have  passed,  and  will  move  with  it  at  the  head  of  the  trains  that  accom¬ 
pany  the  troops.  The  wooden  ponton  bridge  will  remain. 

The  Second  Corps  will  enter  the  Stevensburg  and  Richardsville  road  at  Mad¬ 
den’s,  in  order  that  the  route  from  Stevensburg  to  the  plank-road  may  be  free  for 
the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps.  After  crossing  the  Rapidan  the  Second  Corps  will 
move  to  the  vicinity  of  Chandler’s  or  Chancellorville. 

6.  It  is  expected  that  the  advance  divisions  of  the  Fifth  and  Second  Corps,  with 
the  wooden  ponton  trains,  will  be  at  the  designated  points  of  crossing  not  later 
than  6  a.m.  of  the  4th  instant. 

7.  The  reserve  artillery  will  move  at  3  a.m.  of  the  4th  instant  and  follow  the 
Second  Corps,  passing  Mountain  Run  at  Ross's  mills  or  Hamilton’s  crossing  at  Ely’s 
ford,  take  the  road  to  Chancellorville,  and  halt  for  the  night  at  Hunting  Creek. 

8.  Great  care  will  be  taken  by  the  corps  commanders  that  the  roads  are 
promptly  repaired  by  the  pioneers  wherever  needed,  not  only  for  the  temporary 
wants  of  the  division  or  corps  to  which  the  pioneers  belong,  but  for  the  passage 
of  the  troops  and  trains  that  follow  on  the  same  route. 

9.  During  the  movement  on  the  4th  and  following  days,  the  commanders  of  the 
Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  will  occupy  the  roads  on  the  right  flank  to  cover  the  pas¬ 
sage  of  their  corps,  and  will  keep  their  flankers  well  out  in  that  direction. 

The  commanders  of  the  Second  Corps  and  reserve  artillery  will  in  a  similar 
manner  look  out  for  the  left  flank. 

Wherever  practicable,  double  columns  will  be  used  to  shorten  the  columns. 
Corps  commanders  will  keep  in  communication  and  connection  with  each  other, 
and  co-operate  wherever  necessary.  Their  picket  lines  will  be  connected.  They 
will  keep  the  Commanding  General  constantly  advised  of  their  progress  and  of 
everything  important  that  occurs,  and  will  send  staff  officers  to  acquaint  him  with 
the  location  of  their  headquarters.  During  the  movement  of  the  4th  instant 
headquarters  will  be  on  the  route  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps.  It  will  be  estab¬ 
lished  at  night  between  those  corps  and  the  Germanna  plank-road. 

10.  The  infantry  troops  will  take  with  them  fifty  rounds  of  ammunition  upon 
the  person,  three  (3)  days’  full  rations  in  the  haversacks,  three  (3)  days’  bread  and 
small  rations  in  the  knapsacks,  and  three  days’  beef  on  the  hoof. 


APPENDIX  E. 


423 


Each-corps  will  take  with  it  one-half  of  its  intrenching  tools,  one  hospital  wagon, 
and  one  medium  wagon  for  each  brigade  ;  one-half  of  the  ambulance  trains  and 
the  light  spring- wagons,  and  pack  animals  allowed  at  the  various  headquarters. 

No  other  trains  or  means  of  transportation  than  those  just  specified  will  accom¬ 
pany  the  corps,  except  such  wagons  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  forage  for  imme¬ 
diate  use  for  five  (5)  days.  The  artillery  will  have  with  them  the  ammunition  of 
the  caissons  only, 

11.  The  subsistence  and  other  trains  loaded  with  the  amount  of  rations,  forage, 
infantry  and  artillery  ammunition,  etc.,  heretofore  ordered,  the  surplus  wooden 
pontons  of  the  different  corps,  etc.,  will  be  assembled  under  the  direction  of  the 
Chief  Quartermaster  of  the  army  in  the  vicinity  of  Richardsville,  with  a  view  to 
crossing  the  Rapidan  by  bridges  at  Ely’s  ford  and  Culpeper  Mine  ford. 

12.  A  detail  of  1,000  or  1,200  men  will  be  made  from  each  corps  as  guard  for  its 
subsistence  and  other  trains ;  this. detail  will  be  composed  of  entire  regiments  as  far 
as  practicable.  No  other  guards  whatever  for  regimental,  brigade,  division,  or 
corps  wagons  will  be  allowed.  Each  detail  will  be  under  the  command  of  an  officer 
selected  for  that  purpose,  and  the  whole  will  be  commanded  by  the  senior  officer 
of  the  three. 

This  guard  will  be  so  disposed  as  to  protect  the  trains  on  the  march  and  in  park. 
The  trains  are  likewise  protected  by  cavalry  on  the  flank  and  rear. 

13.  Major-General  Sheridan,  commanding  the  Cavalry  Corps,  will  direct  the  First 
Cavalry  Division  to  call  in  its  pickets  and  patrols  on  the  right  on  the  morning  of 
the  4th  instant  and  hold  itself  ready  to  move  and  cover  the  trains  of  the  army ;  it 
will  picket  and  watch  the  fords  of  the  Rapidan  from  Rapidan  Station  to  Germanna 
ford.  On  the  morning  of  the  5th  the  First  Cavalry  Division  will  cross  the  Rapidan 
at  Germanna  ford  and  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  trains  while  crossing  the  Rapi¬ 
dan  and  during  their  movement  in  rear  of  the  army. 

The  signal  stations  on  Cedar,  Poney,  and  Stoney  Mountains  will  be  maintained 
as  long  as  practicable. 

14.  The  wooden  ponton  train  at  Germanna  and  Ely’s  fords  will  remain  for  the 
passage  of  General  Burnside’s  Army.  That  at  Culpeper  Mine  ford  will  be  taken 
up  under  the  direction  of  the  Chief  Engineer  as  soon  as  the  trains  have  crossed, 
and  will  move  with  the  train  of  its  corps. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Meade, 

S.  WILLIAMS, 

Asst.  Adjutant-  General . 


APPENDIX  E. 


Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
May  4,  1864,  6  p.m. 

Orders. 

The  following  movements  are  ordered  for  the  5th  May,  1864  : 

1.  Major-General  Sheridan,  commanding  Cavalry  Corps,  will  move  with  Gregg’s 
and  Torbert’s  divisions  against  the  enemy’s  cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Hamilton’s 
crossing.  General  Wilson,  with  the  Third  Cavalry  Division,  will  move  at  5  a.m. 
to  Craig’s  Meeting  House,  on  the  Catharpin  road.  He  will  keep  out  parties  on  the 
Orange  Court  House  pike  and  plank-road,  the  Catharpin  road,  Pamunkey  road 
(road  to  Orange  Spring),  and  in  the  direction  of  Tvvyman  s  store  and  Andrew’s 
tavern,  or  Good  Hope  Church. 

2.  Major-General  Hancock,  commanding  Second  Corps,  will  move  at  5  a.m.  to 
Shady  Grove  Church,  and  extend  his  right  toward  the  Fifth  Corps  at  Parker’s 
store. 

3.  Major-General  Warren,  commanding  Fifth  Corps,  will  move  at  5  a.m.  to 
Parker’s  store,  on  the  Orange  Court  House  plank-road,  and  extend  his  right  toward 
the  Sixth  Corps,  at  the  Old  Wilderness  tavern. 

4.  Major-General  Sedgwick,  commanding  Sixth  Corps,  will  move  to  Old  Wilder¬ 
ness  tavern  on  the  Orange  Court  House  pike  as  soon  as  the  road  is  clear.  He 
will  leave  a  division  to  cover  the  bridge  at  Germanna  ford  until  informed  from 
these  headquarters  of  the  arrival  of  General  Burnside’s  troops  there. 


424  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


5.  The  Iteserve  Artillery  will  move  to  Corbin’s  bridge  as  soon  as  the  road  ia 
clear. 

6.  The  trains  will  be  parked  in  the  vicinity  of  Todd’s  tavern. 

7.  Headquarters  will  be  on  the  Orange  Court  House  plank-road,  near  the  Fifth 
Corps. 

8.  After  reaching  the  points  designated,  the  army  will  be  held  ready  to  move 
forward. 

9.  The  commanders  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  will  keep  out  detachments  on 
the  roads  on  their  right  flank.  The  commander  of  the  Second  Corps  will  do  the 
same  on  the  roads  in  his  front. 

Their  flankers  and  pickets  will  be  thrown  well  out,  and  their  troops  be  held 
ready  to  meet  the  enemy  at  any  moment. 

By  command  of  Majob-Genekal  Meade. 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
Assistant  Adjutant- General. 


APPENDIX  F. 


According  to  a  tabular  statement  of  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  the  James  from  May  5, 1864,  to  April  9, 1865,  prepared 
in  the  Office  of  the  Adjutant- General  of  the  Army  from  the  regimental  records  (the 
muster-rolls)  for  General  Badeau,  found  on  page  713,  Vol.  III.,  of  his  “  Military  Life 
of  General  Grant,”  the  casualties  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  battle  of  the 
Wilderness  were  2,261  killed,  8,785  wounded,  2,902  missing.  The  number  of  killed 
and  missing  in  a  battle  can  be  correctly  obtained  from  the  regimental  records,  but 
the  number  of  wounded  not  necessarily  so,  especially  for  the  battle  of  the  Wilder¬ 
ness,  and  probably  for  that  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House  and  other  battles.  The 
first  muster-roll  made  out  after  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  was  for  the  30th  of 
June ;  the  muster-rolls  are  made  at  the  end  of  every  two  months.  By  the  30th  of 
June  many  of  the  wounded,  even  the  severely  wounded,  had  returned  to  duty  with 
the  army,  and  there  is  no  record  on  the  muster-roll  of  their  having  been  wounded 
at  all.  In  other  cases,  men  wounded  and  mustered  out  before  the  next  muster- 
day  did  not  appear  on  that  roll  as  wounded  or  as  having  been  wounded.  In 
numerous  instances  men  were  reported  on  the  muster-rolls,  of  June  30th,  for  in¬ 
stance,  absent  in  hospital,  wounded,  without  any  statement  as  to  when  and  where 
wounded.  In  others,  men  who  were  wounded  were  reported  simply  absent  in  hos¬ 
pital.  Now  all  such  cases  as  those  mentioned  were,  necessarily,  omitted  from  the 
list  sent  to  General  Badeau,  and  the  number  of  wounded  given  by  it  falls  much  be¬ 
low  the  actual  number.  I  learn  that  thousands  of  men  have  applied  for  pensions 
for  wounds,  respecting  which  no  information  is  to  be  obtained  from  the  regimental 
muster-rolls.  The  nominal  lists  of  killed  and  wounded  afford  more  reliable  data 
than  the  muster-rolls.  They  are  made  out  carefully  as  soon  after  the  battle  or  ac¬ 
tion  as  possible,  and  contain  every  particular  concerning  each  person  killed  and 
wounded,  with  a  view  to  the  intei'ests  of  the  Government  and  of  the  individual. 
But  in  the  campaign  of  1864  the  marching  and  fighting  were  so  continuous,  and 
the  losses  in  officers  killed  and  wounded  were  so  great,  that  the  nominal  lists  are 
very  incomplete. 

The  difference  between  the  numbers  which  I  have  adopted  and  those  given  by 
General  Badeau  is  1,435  wounded.  Badeau  says,  p.  132,  Yol.  II.,  “at  least  half 
of  the  wounded  returned  to  the  ranks  without  leaving  the  army.” 

Now,  as  already  explained,  such  cases  of  wounded  as  those  are  not  included  in 
the  numbers  of  the  wounded  given  in  Badeau’s  table,  and  if  what  he  states  were 
correct  the  number  of  wounded  would  be  17,570.  But  what  he  says  is  not  correct. 

On  May  7th,  Medical  Director  McParlin,  in  a  communication  to  General  Seth 
Williams,  Adjutant-General,  says:  “Arrangements  are  made  to  send  by  railroad 
7.000  wounded  to  Washington.  Still  more  on  hand,  estimated  apparently  at  3,000.” 
These  3,000  were  also  to  go  to  Washington.  A  small  number  of  the  wounded,  being 
very  slightly  hurt,  did  return  to  their  regiments  in  a  few  days.  But  these  men  are 
not  noted  on  the  nmster-rolls  as  wounded. 

In  an  account  of  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  by  General  C.  M.  Wilcox  (com¬ 
manding  a  division  of  Hill’s  corps),  published  in  the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Times , 


APPENDIX  G. 


425 


he  states  that  by  referring  to  the  report  of  the  Surgeon-General  of  the  Army  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  “  on  the  5th  and  6th  of  May, 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  when  added,  amount  to  thirty-seven  thousand  seven 
hundred  and  thirty-seven  ;  and  if  to  this  prisoners  be  added,  the  entire  loss  to  the 
Union  side  was  over  forty  thousand.” 

In  the  Tabular  Statement  of  the  Surgeon-General  referred  to  by  General  Wil¬ 
cox,  there  are  two  alternative  statements  of  losses,  derived  from  different  sources 
and  placed  one  under  the  other,  which  have  been  added  together  by  General  Wil¬ 
cox  to  obtain  his  total  of  thirty-seven  thousand  seven  hundred  and  thirty-seven. 
Had  he  referred  to  the  Appendix,  Part  I.,  which  is  pointed  to  for  explanations  in 
the  column  of  the  Table  headed  “  Remarks  and  References,”  he  would  not  have 
fallen  into  such  an  error.  Further,  prisoners  are  always  included  under  the  head¬ 
ing  of  “  missing.”  The  same  statement  as  to  the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto¬ 
mac  in  the  Wilderness  is  made  by  General  Wilcox  in  the  “  Southern  Historical 
Society  Papers,”  August,  1878. 


APPENDIX  G. 


Headquarters,  Armies  U.  S., 
May  7,  1864,  6.30  a.m. 

Major-General  Meade,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Potomac : 

Make  all  preparations  during  the  day  for  a  night  march  to  take  position  at 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  with  one  army  corps,  at  Todd’s  tavern  with  one,  and 
another  near  the  intersection  of  Piney  Branch  and  Spottsylvania  road  with  the 
road  from  Alsop’s  to  Old  Court  House.  If  this  move  is  made  the  trains  should  be 
thrown  forward  early  in  the  morning  to  the  Ny  River. 

I  think  it  would  be  advisable,  in  making  the  change,  to  leave  Hancock  where  he 
is  until  Warren  passes  him.  He  could  then  follow  and  become  the  right  of  the 
new  line.  Burnside  will  move  to  Piney  Branch  Church.  Sedgwick  can  move 
along  the  pike  to  Chancellorville,  and  on  to  his  destination.  Burnside  will  move 
on  the  plank-road  to  the  intersection  of  it  with  the  Orange  and  Fredericksburg^ 
plank-road,  then  follow  Sedgwick  to  his  place  of  destination.  All  vehicles  should 
be  got  out  of  hearing  of  the  enemy  before  the  troops  move,  and  then  move  off 
quietly. 

It  is  more  than  probable  that  the  enemy  concentrate  for  a  heavy  attack  on 
Hancock  1  this  afternoon.  In  case  they  do  we  must  be  prepared  to  resist  them, 
and  follow  up  any  success  we  may  gain  with  our  whole  force.  Such  a  result  would 
necessarily  modify  these  instructions. 

All  the  hospitals  should  be  moved  to-day  to  Chancellorville. 

Respectfully,  etc., 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

[Copy  to  General  Burnside.]  Lieut.-General. 


Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
May  7th,  3  p.m.,  1864. 

Orders. 

The  following  movements  are  ordered  for  to-day  and  to-night : 

1.  The  trains  of  the  Sixth  Corps  authorized  to  accompany  the  troops  will  be 
moved  at  four  o’clock  p.m.  to  Chancellorville,  and  parked  on  the  left  of  the  road, 
and  held  ready  to  follow  the  Sixth  Corps  during  the  night  march. 

2.  The  trains  of  the  Fifth  Corps  authorized  to  accompany  the  troops  will  be 
moved  at  five  o’clock  p.m.  to  Chancellorville,  following  the  trains  of  the  Sixth 
Corps  and  parking  with  them,  and  held  ready  to  follow  those  trains  in  the  move¬ 
ment  to-night. 

3.  The  trains  of  the  Second  Corps  authorized  to  accompany  the  troops  will  be 
moved  at  six  o’clock  p.m.  to  Chancellorville,  and  park  on  the  right  of  the  road, 


1  The  words  “on  Hancock”  not  in  copy  furnished  to  General  Burnside. 


426  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OP  ’64  AND  ’65 


and  held  ready  to  move  at  same  hour  with  the  other  trains  by  way  of  the  Furnaces 
to  Todd's  tavern,  keeping  clear  of  the  Brock  road,  which  will  be  used  by  the  troops. 

4.  Corps  commanders  will  send  escorts  with  these  trains. 

5.  The  Beserve  Artillery  will  move  at  seven  o’clock  by  way  of  Chancellorville, 
Aldrich,  and  Piney  Branch  Church  to  the  intersection  of  the  road  from  Piney 
Branch  Church  to  Spottsyl vania  Court  House,  and  the  road  from  Alsop’s  to 
Block  House,  and  park  to  the  rear  on  the  last  named  road,  so  as  to  give  room  for 
the  Sixth  Corps. 

6.  At  half-past  eight  o’clock  p.m.  Major-General  Warren,  commanding  the  Fifth 
Corps,  will  move  to  Spottsyl  vania  Court  House  by  way  of  the  Brock  road  and 
Todd’s  tavern. 

7.  At  half-past  eight  o’clock  p.m.  Major-General  Sedgwick,  commanding  the 
Sixth  Corps,  will  move  by  the  pike  and  plank  roads  to  Chancellorville,  where  he 
will  be  joined  by  the  authorized  trains  of  his  own  corps  and  those  of  the  Fifth 
Corps;  thence  by  way  of  Aldrich’s  and  Piney  Branch  Church  to  the  intersection 
of  the  road  from  Piney  Branch  Church  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House  and  the  road 
from  Alsop's  to  Block  house.  The  trains  of  the  Fifth  Corps  will  then  join  its 
corps  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House. 

8.  Major-General  Hancock,  commanding  Second  Corps,  will  move  to  Todd’s 
tavern  by  the  Brock  road,  following  the  Fifth  Corps  closely. 

9.  Headquarters  during  the  movement  will  be  along  the  route  of  the  Fifth  and 
Second  Corps,  and  at  the  close  of  the  movement  near  the  Sixth  Corps. 

10.  The  pickets  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  will  be  withdrawn  at  one  o’clock 
a.m.,  and  those  of  the  Second  Corps  at  two  o’clock  a.m.,  and  will  follow  the  routes 
of  their  respective  corps. 

11.  The  cavalry  now  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Hammond  will  be  left  by 
General  Sedgwick  at  the  Old  Wilderness  tavern,  and  upon  being  informed  by 
General  Hancock  of  the  withdrawal  of  his  corps  and  pickets  will  follow  that  corps. 

12.  Corps  commanders  will  see  that  the  movements  are  made  with  punctuality 
and  promptitude. 

13.  Major-General  Sheridan,  commanding  Cavalry  Corps,  will  have  a  sufficient 
force  on  the  approaches  from  the  right  to  keep  the  corps  commanders  advised  in 
time  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy. 

14.  It  is  understood  that  General  Burnside’s  command  will  follow  the  Sixth 
Corps. 

By  command  of  Major-Generai.  Meade. 

S.  WILLIAMS, 

Asst.  Adjutant- General. 


APPENDIX  H. 


Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
June  11,  1864. 


Orders. 


The  following  movements  are  ordered : 

1.  At  dark  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  instant  Brigadier-General  Wilson  will 
move  the  brigade  of  cavalry  picketing  the  Chickahominy  across  the  swamp  at 
Long  bridge  or  that  vicinity,  and  out  on  the  Long  bridge  road  toward  the  cross¬ 
ing  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  toward  the  Charles  City  Central  and  New  Market 
roads. 

The  brigade  will  move  promptly  and  clear  the  road  for  the  Fifth  Corps. 

The  pickets  at  the  crossings  of  the  Chickahominy  will  remain  until  relieved  by 
infantry  pickets. 

2.  During  Saturday,  the  11th  instant,  Major-General  Warren  will  move  the  two 
divisions  of  his  corps  now  held  in  reserve  to  Moody’s,  by  way  of  Parsley’s  mill  and 
Prospect  Church,  etc.,  so  as  to  avoid  the  observation  of  the  enemjr.  At  dark  on 
the  evening  of  the  12th  instant  he  will  move  his  whole  corps  to  Long  bridge,  by 
the  shortest  route,  across  the  Chickahominy,  and  move  on  the  road  to  White  Oak 
Swamp  bridge  (called  Long  bridge  road)  and  hold  that  road,  looking  toward  the 
crossing  of  White  Oak  Swamp  and  Charles  City,  Central,  and  New  Market  roads, 


APPENDIX  II 


427 


during  the  passage  of  the  army  toward  James  River.  He  will  follow  the  Second 
Corps  toward  Charles  City  Court  House. 

General  Warren  will  picket  the  crossings  of  the  Chickahominy  on  his  flank 
while  moving  to  Long  bridge,  relieving  the  cavalry  pickets. 

3.  Major-General  W.  F.  Smith,  Eighteenth  Corps,  will  withdraw  as  soon  after 
dark  as  practicable  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  instant,  and  move  by  way  of  Pars¬ 
ley’s  mill,  Prospect  Church,  Hopeville  Church,  Tunstall’s  Station  to  White  House, 
where  he  will  embark  and  proceed  to  Bermuda  Hundred.  Upon  reaching  Tun- 
stall’s  Station  his  artillery  and  trains  will  join  the  main  trains  of  the  army. 

4.  Major-General  Burnside,  Ninth  Corps,  will  withdraw  as  soon  after  dark  as 
practicable  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  instant,  and  move  by  way  of  Allen’s  mill 
(or  by  roads  avoiding  Smith’s  route),  then  north  of  the  south  fork  of  the  Mata- 
dequin  to  Burtin’s,  thence  past  Hughes’s,  Watts’s,  Clapton’s,  Turner’s  store,  etc., 
to  Tnnstall’s  Station,  or  by  any  adjoining  route,  avoiding  Smith's,  that  may  be 
found  to  Tunstall’s  Station. 

At  Tunstall’s  Station  the  corps  of  General  Smith  has  precedence.  When  it  has 
cleared  the  way,  General  Burnside  will  move  to  Jones’s  bridge,  taking  care  not  to 
interfere  with  routes  of  other  corps,  past  Baltimore  Cross  Roads  and  Emman’s 
Church. 

Where  the  routes  of  the  Sixth  and  Ninth  Corps  unite,  about  three  miles  from 
Jones’  bridge,  the  corps  that  reaches  the  point  first  will  have  precedence. 

After  crossing  at  Jones’  bridge,  Major-General  Burnside  will  take  the  route 
passing  east  of  Charles  City  Court  House,  by  Yandorn’s,  Clapton,  and  Tyler’s  mill. 

5.  Major-General  Wright,  Sixth  Corps,  will  withdraw  as  soon  after  dark  as 
practicable  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  instant  to  the  intrenched  line  in  his  rear, 
from  Allen’s  pond  to  Elder’s  swamp,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  Second  Corps 
hold  that  line  until  the  roads  for  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps  are  well  cleared  by 
the  Fifth  Corps,  when  the  two  corps  will  withdraw. 

General  Wright  will  move  by  way  of  Cool  Arbor,  Taylor’s,  J.  P.  Parsley’s, 
Widow  Vias,  Good’s,  and  Hopkins’  mill  to  Moody's,  and  thence  by  way  of  Em¬ 
man’s  Church  to  Jones’  bridge,  preceding  or  following  the  Ninth  Corps,  as  already 
indicated,  when  the  routes  unite. 

After  crossing  the  Chickahominy  General  Wright  will  take  the  route  to  Charles 
City  Court  House  by  Yandorn’s. 

6.  Major-General  Hancock,  Second  Corps,  will  withdraw  as  soon  after  dark  as 
practicable  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  inst.  to  the  entrenched  line  in  his  rear,  from 
Allen’s  pond  to  Elder’s  swamp,  and  hold  that  line  in  conjunction  with  the  Sixth 
Corps  until  the  roads  for  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps  are  well  cleared,  when  he 
will  move  by  routes  in  his  rear  to  the  Despatch  Station  road,  avoiding  the  roads 
of  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  by  Despatch  Station  and  the  shortest  route  to  Long 
bridge.  He  will  look  out  for  the  crossings  of  the  Chickahominy  on  his  flanks 
while  passing.  After  crossing  the  Chickahominy  General  Hancock  will  move  to¬ 
ward  Charles  City  Court  House  by  way  of  St.  Mary’s  Church,  Walker’s,  etc. 

7.  Brigadier-General  Ferrero  will  move  his  division  at  dark  on  the  evening  of 
the  12th  inst.,  to  the  trains  of  the  army  near  White  House  or  Cumberland,  and 
cover  them  during  the  movement. 

8.  The  trains  will  move  to  the  Window  Shades  and  cross  the  Chickahominy  in 
that  vicinity. 

They  will  take  such  routes  as  will  not  interfere  with  the  movements  of  the  troops. 

9.  The  brigade  of  cavalry  on  the  right  will  withdraw  at  the  same  time  as  the 
Sixth  and  Second  Corps,  and  close  in  on  the  rear  of  the  army  and  cover  it  and  the 
trains  during  the  movement. 

10.  Corps  commanders  will  see  that  every  precaution  is  taken  to  ensure  the 
rapid  execution  of  this  movement,  and  that  the  troops  move  promptly  and  quickly 
on  the  march. 

11.  Headquarters  during  the  movement  will  be  at  Pollard’s  or  Cedar  Grove,  near 
Long  bridge,  and  until  established  there  will  be  on  the  route  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
as  far  as  Emman’s  Church. 

12.  Eight  canvas  and  eight  wooden  pontons  will  accompany  the  Fifth  Corps  to 
Long  bridge. 

The  engineers  will  establish  bridges  at  Jones’  bridge  with  the  remaining  eight 
canvas  pontons  and  the  wooden  pontons  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 

The  wooden  pontons  of  the  Second  Corps  will  accompany  the  main  train  of  the 
army. 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


428 


13.  The  pickets  of  the  several  corps  will  be  withdrawn  at  the  same  hour  from 
the  line  of  intrenchments  before  daylight  of  the  13th  inst.,  and  will  follow  the 
routes  of  their  respective  corps. 

14.  The  corps  will  take  with  them  on  the  march  merely  those  light  headquarters 
wagons,  ammunition  wagons,  ambulances,  etc.,  specified  for  the  march  across  the 
Rapidan.  All  others  will  be  sent  at  once  to  the  main  trains  of  the  army. 

15.  The  depot  at  White  House  will  be  continued  for  the  present,  with  its  per¬ 
manent  garrison,  but  all  supplies,  etc.,  for  this  army  will  be  moved  to  the  James 
River,  leaving  50,000  rations  subsistence  and  30,000  rations  of  forage,  in  addition 
to  supplies  for  the  garrison.  On  the  arrival  of  Major-Generals  Sheridan  and 
Hunter  the  post  at  White  House  will  be  broken  up  and  transferred  to  Yorktown, 
from  which  place  the  commanding  officer  will  report  his  arrival  to  these  head¬ 
quarters. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Meade. 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
Asst.  Adj  u  ta  nt-  Gc  tier  a  t. 


APPENDIX  I. 


General  HiMPTOn  says  :  “The  recent  publications  of  the  enemy,  together  with 
some  of  their  orders  which  have  been  captured,  show  that  Sheridan's  object  was 
to  destroy  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville  with  the  railroad  near  those  places.” 

No  order  for  the  destruction  of  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville,  or  any  towns, 
was  ever  given  by  the  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Every  care  pos¬ 
sible  was  taken  by  the  Provost-Marshal;General  of  that  army,  under  the  orders  of 
its  Commander,  to  preserve  private  property  from  injury ;  and  what  injury  was 
done  to  it  was  done  chiefly  during  night  marches,  and  was  the  work  of  the  cowardly 
skulks  that  infest,  in  some  degree,  all  large  armies. 

The  following  is  the  copy  of  the  order  to  General  Sheridan  : 

Headquarters  Army  op  the  Potomac, 
June  5,  1864,  3.30  p.m. 

Major-General  Sheridan  : 

I  am  directed  by  the  Major-General  commanding  to  furnish  the  following  in¬ 
structions  for  your  guidance  in  the  execution  of  the  duty  referred  to  in  the  order 
for  movements  and  changes  of  position  to-night,  a  copy  of  which  order  accom¬ 
panies  this  communication. 

With  two  divisions  of  your  corps  you  will  move  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  inst. 
to  Charlottesville,  and  destroy  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Rivanna  near  that  town. 
You  will  then  thoroughly  destroy  the  railroad  from  that  point  to  Gordonsville,  and 
from  Gordonsville  toward  Hanover  Junction,  and  to  the  latter  point  if  practicable. 
The  Chief  Engineer,  Major  Duane,  will  furnish  you  a  canvas  ponton  train  of  eight 
boats.  The  Chief  Quartermaster  will  supply  you  with  such  tools,  implements, 
and  materials  as  you  may  require  for  the  destruction  of  the  road.  Upon  the  com¬ 
pletion  of  this  duty  you  will  rejoin  this  army. 

A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 
Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 


APPENDIX  J. 


Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
June  21,  1864 — 9.20  A.m. 

Brigadier-General  Wilson,  commanding  Third  Cavalry  Division: 

The  Major-General  commanding  directs  that  you  move  your  command  at  2  a.m. 
to-morrow,  the  22d  instant,  in  execution  of  the  duty  assigned  you  of  destroying 
certain  railroads.  Despatches  received  from  the  White  House  state  that  Hamp¬ 
ton’s  cavalry  was  before  that  place  yesterday  evening,  and  that  General  Sheridan 


APPENDIX  K. 


429 


had  also  reached  there.  Hence  it  is  desirable  that  you  should  march  at  the  earliest 
moment.  In  passing  Petersburg  you  will  endeavor  to  avoid  the  observation  of  the 
enemy,  and  then  move  by  the  shortest  routes  to  the  intersection  of  the  Petersburg 
and  Lynchbflrg  and  the  Richmond  and  Danville  railroads,  and  destroy  both  those 
roads  to  the  greatest  extent  possible,  continuing  their  destruction  until  driven  from 
it  by  such  attack  of  the  enemy  as  you  can  no  longer  resist.  The  destruction  of 
those  roads  to  such  an  extent  that  they  cannot  be  used  by  the  enemy  in  connec¬ 
tion  with  Richmond  during  the  remainder  of  the  campaign  is  an  important  part 
of  the  plan  of  campaign  The  latest  information  from  Major-General  Hunter 
represents  him  to  be  a  few  miles  west  of  Lynchburg.  He  may  endeavor  to  form  a 
junction  with  this  army.  You  will  communicate  with  him,  if  practicable,  and 
have  delivered  to  him,  verbally,  the  contents  of  the  accompanying  copy  of  a 
communication  from  Lieutenant-General  Grant  to  the  Major-General  command¬ 
ing  this  army.  Lieutenant  Brooks,  who  will  accompany  your  expedition  part  of 
the  way,  should  be  informed  where  General  Hunter  will  probably  be  found.  The 
success  of  your  expedition  will  depend  upon  the  secrecy  with  which  it  is  com¬ 
menced,  and  the  celerity  with  which  its  movements  are  conducted. 

Your  command  will  therefore  have  with  it  the  lightest  supplies  and  smallest 
number  of  wheels  consistent  with  the  thorough  execution  of  the  duty,  the  sup¬ 
plies  of  the  section  of  country  you  will  operate  in  being  taken  into  account. 

Upon  the  completion  of  the  work  assigned  you,  you  will  rejoin  this  army. 

The  Chief  Quartermaster  was  directed  yesterday  to  supply  you  with  the  imple¬ 
ments  and  material  for  the  destruction  of  railroads  obtained  for  General  Sheridan. 

A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 
Major-  General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 


Mt.  Sinai  Church,  June  21—6  p.m. 

The  instructions  of  the  Major-General  commanding  of  this  date  are  received.  I 
shall  march  in  obedience  thereto  at  2  a.m.  to-morrow. 

Before  starting,  I  would  like  to  know  if  our  infantry  forces  cross  the  Weldon 
Road. 

I  purpose  striking  the  South  Side  Road  first  at  Sutherland  Station,  or  some  point 
in  that  vicinity,  tearing  up  the  track  sufficiently  to  delay  railroad  communication 
ten  or  twelve  hours. 

At  this  point  I  shall  detach  a  force  to  strike  the  Richmond  and  Danville  Road 
by  a  rapid  march,  at  the  nearest  point,  tearing  up  the  track  at  every  practicable 
point  between  there  and  Burkesville. 

From  Sutherland’s  I  shall  move  the  main  body  of  my  command  by  the  Great 
Road,  breaking  the  railroad  at  every  convenient  point,  directly  to  Burkesville, 
which,  if  we  succeed  in  capturing,  will  afford  us  the  opportunity  of  prosecuting 
our  work  to  great  advantage.  As  soon  as  I  have  made  dispositions  for  communi¬ 
cating  with  Hunter,  and  done  all  the  damage  possible  to  the  road  to  Lynchburg,  I 
shall  move  with  all  possible  rapidity  for  Danville  and  Greenboro. 

Circumstances  must,  however,  in  a  great  degree  control  our  movements  after 
leaving  Burkesville.  If  Sheridan  will  look  after  Hampton,  I  apprehend  no  diffi¬ 
culty.  and  hope  to  be  able  to  do  the  enemy  great  damage. 

The  ammunition  issued  to  my  command  is  very  defective.  The  implements  for 
destroying  roads  have  not  yet  arrived,  but  I  learn  from  General  Ingalls  that  they 
will  certainly  be  here  to-morrow  morning. 

J.  H.  WILSON. 


APPENDIX  K. 


Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
July  29,  1864. 

Orders. 

The  following  instructions  are  issued  for  the  guidance  of  all  concerned  : 

1.  As  soon  as  dark  Major-General  Burnside,  commanding  Ninth  Corps,  will 
withdraw  his  two  brigades  under  General  White,  occupying  the  intrenchments 
between  the  plank  and  Norfolk  roads,  and  bring  them  to  his  front.  Care  will  be 


430  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


taken  not  to  interfere  with  the  troops  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  moving  into  their 
position  in  rear  of  the  Ninth  Corps. 

General  Burnside  will  form  his  troops  for  assaulting  the  enemy’s  wTorks  at  day¬ 
light  of  the  30th,  prepare  his  parapets  and  abatis  for  the  passage  of  the  columns, 
and  have  the  pioneers  equipped  for  work  in  opening  passages  for  artillery,  destroy¬ 
ing  enemy’s  abatis,  etc.,  and  the  intrenching  tools  distributed  for  effecting  lodg¬ 
ment,  etc. 

2.  Major-General  Warren,  commanding  Fifth  Corps,  will  reduce  the  number  of 
his  troops  holding  the  intrenchments  of  his  front  to  the  minimum,  and  concen¬ 
trate  all  his  available  force  on  his  right,  and  hold  them  prepared  to  support  the 
assault  of  Major-General  Burnside.  The  preparations  in  respect  to  pioneers,  in¬ 
trenching  tools,  etc.,  enjoined  upon  the  Ninth  Corps  will  also  be  made  by  the 
Fifth  Corps. 

.3.  As  soon  as  it  is  dark  Major-General  Ord,  commanding  Eighteenth  Corps,  will 
relieve  his  troops  in  the  trenches  by  General  Mott’s  division  of  the  Second  Corps, 
and  form  his  corps  in  rear  cf  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  be  prepared  to  support  the 
assault  of  Major-General  Burnside. 

4.  Every  preparation  will  be  made  for  moving  forward  the  field  artillery  of  each 
corps. 

5.  At  dark  Major-General  Hancock,  commanding  Second  Corps,  will  move  from 
Deep  Bottom  to  the  rear  of  the  intrenchments  now  held  by  the  Eighteenth  Corps, 
resume  the  command  of  Mott’s  division,  and  be  prepared  at  daylight  to  follow  up 
the  assaulting  and  supporting  column,  or  for  such  other  operations  as  may  be 
found  necessary. 

6.  Major-General  Sheridan,  commanding  Cavalry  Corps,  will  proceed  at  dark 
from  the  vicinity  of  Deep  Bottom  to  Lee’s  mill,  and  at  daylight  will  move  with  his 
whole  corps,  including  Wilson’s  division,  against  the  enemy’s  troops  defending 
Petersburg  on  their  right,  by  the  roads  leading  from  the  southward  and  west¬ 
ward. 

7.  Major  Duane,  Acting  Chief  Engineer,  will  have  the  ponton  trains  parked  at 
convenient  points  in  the  rear,  prepared  to  move.  He  will  see  that  supplies  of 
sand-bags,  gabions,  fascines,  etc.,  are  in  ddpot,  near  the  lines,  ready  for  use.  He 
will  detail  engineer  officers  for  each  corps. 

8.  At  half-past  three  in  the  morning  of  the  30th,  Major-General  Burnside  will 
spring  his  mine,  and  his  assaulting  columns  will  immediately  move  rapidly  upon 
the  breach,  seize  the  crest  in  the  rear,  and  effect  a  lodgment  there.  He  will  be 
followed  by  Major-General  Ord,  who  will  support  him  on  the  right,  directing  his 
movement  to  the  crest  indicated,  and  by  Major-General  Warren,  who  will  support 
him  on  the  left.  Upon  the  explosion  of  the  mine  the  artillery  of  all  kinds  in  bat¬ 
tery  will  open  upon  those  points  of  the  enemy’s  works  whose  fire  covers  the  ground 
over  which  our  columns  must  move,  care  being  taken  to  avoid  impeding  the  prog¬ 
ress  of  our  troops.  Special  instructions  respecting  the  direction  of  the  fire  will  be 
issued  through  the  Chief  of  Artillery. 

9.  Corps  commanders  will  report  to  the  Commanding  General  when  their  prepa¬ 
rations  are  complete,  and  will  advise  him  of  every  step  in  the  progress  of  the 
operation  and  of  everything  important  that  occurs. 

10.  Promptitude,  rapidity  of  execution,  and  cordial  co-operation  are  essential  to 
success,  and  the  Commanding  General  is  confident  that  this  indication  of  his  ex¬ 
pectations  will  insure  the  hearty  efforts  of  the  commanders  and  troops. 

11.  Headquarters  during  the  operation  will  be  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Ninth 
Corps. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Meade. 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
Assistant  Adjutant- General. 


Opinion. 

The  Court  having  given  a  brief  narrative  of  the  assault  and  “  the  facts  and  cir¬ 
cumstances  attending  it,”  it  remains  to  report  that  the  following  named  officers 
engaged  therein  appear  from  the  evidence  to  be  “answerable  for  the  want  of  suc¬ 
cess  ”  which  should  have  resulted. 

I.  Major-General  A.  E.  Burnside ,  United  States  Volunteers,  he  having  failed  to 
obey  the  orders  of  the  Commanding  General : 


APPENDIX  K. 


431 


1.  In  not  giving  such  formation  to  his  assaulting  column  as  to  insure  a  reason¬ 
able  prospect  of  success. 

2.  In  not  preparing  his  parapets  and  abatis  for  the  passage  of  the  columns  of 
assault. 

3.  In  not  employing  engineer  officers  who  reported  to  him  to  lead  the  assaulting 
columns  with  working  parties,  and  not  causing  to  be  provided  proper  materials 
necessary  for  crowning  the  crest  when  the  assaulting  columns  should  arrive  there. 

4.  In  neglecting  to  execute  Major-General  Meade’s  orders  respecting  the  prompt 
advance  of  General  Ledlie’s  troops  from  the  crater  to  the  crest ;  or,  in  default  of 
accomplishing  that,  not  causing  those  troops  to  fall  back  and  give  place  to  other 
troops  more  willing  and  equal  to  the  task,  instead  of  delaying  until  the  opportunity 
passed  away,  thus  affording  time  for  the  enemy  to  recover  from  his  surprise,  con¬ 
centrate  his  fire,  and  bring  his  troops  to  operate  against  the  Union  troops  assem¬ 
bled  uselessly  in  the  crater. 

Notwithstanding  the  failure  to  comply  with  orders,  and  to  apply  proper  military 
principles,  ascribed  to  General  Burnside,  the  Court  is  satisfied  he  believed  that 
the  measures  taken  by  him  would  insure  success. 

II.  Brigadier-General  J.  H.  Lecllie ,  United  States  Volunteers,  he  having  failed 
to  push  forward  his  division  promptly  according  to  orders,  and  thereby  blocking 
up  the  avenue  which  was  designed  for  the  passage  of  troops  ordered  to  follow  and 
support  his  in  the  assault.  It  is  in  evidence  that  no  commander  reported  to 
General  Burnside  that  his  troops  could  not  be  got  forward,  which  the  Court  re¬ 
gard  as  a  neglect  of  duty  on  the  part  of  General  Ledlie,  inasmuch  as  a  timely 
report  of  the  misbehavior  might  have  enabled  General  Burnside,  commanding  the 
assault,  to  have  made  other  arrangements  for  prosecuting  it  before  it  became  too 
late.  Instead  of  being  with  his  division  during  this  difficulty  in  the  crater,  and  by 
his  personal  efforts  endeavoring  to  lead  his  troops  forward,  he  was  most  of  the 
time  in  a  bomb-proof,  ten  rods  in  rear  of  the  main  line  of  the  Ninth  Corps  works, 
where  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  see  anything  of  the  movements  of  troops  that 
were  going  on. 

III.  Brigadier-General  Edward  Ferrer  o,  United  States  Volunteers  : 

1.  For  not  having  all  his  troops  found  ready  for  the  attack  at  the  prescribed 
time. 

2.  Not  going  forward  with  them  to  the  attack. 

3.  Being  in  a  bomb-proof  habitually,  where  he  could  not  see  the  operations  of 
his  troops,  showing  by  his  own  order,  issued  while  there,  that  he  did  not  know 
the  position  of  two  brigades  of  his  division,  or  whether  they  had  taken  Cemetery 
Hill  or  not. 

IV.  Colonel  Z.  R.  Bliss ,  Seventh  Rhode  Island  Volunteers,  commanding  First 
Brigade,  Second  Division,  Ninth  Corps  : 

In  this,  that  he  remained  behind  with  the  only  regiment  of  his  brigade  which 
did  not  go  forward  according  to  the  orders,  and  occupied  a  position  where  he 
could  not  properly  command  a  brigade  which  formed  a  portion  of  an  assaulting 
column,  and  where  he  could  not  see  what  was  going  on. 

V.  Brigadier- General  O.  B.  Willcox ,  United  States  Volunteers : 

The  Court  are  not  satisfied  that  General  Willcox’s  division  made  efforts  com¬ 
mensurate  with  the  occasion  to  carry  out  General  Burnside’s  order  to  advance  to 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  they  think  that  more  energy  might  have  been  exercised  by 
Brigadier-General  Willcox  to  cause  his  troops  to  go  forward  to  that  point. 

Without  intending  to  convey  the  impression  that  there  was  any  disinclination  on 
the  part  of  the  commanders  of  the  supports  to  heartily  co-operate  in  the  attack  on 
the  30th  day  of  July,  the  Court  express  their  opinion  that  explicit  orders  should 
have  been  given  assigning  one  officer  to  the  command  of  all  the  troops  intended  to 
engage  in  the  assault  when  the  Commanding  General  was  not  present  in  person 
to  witness  the  operations. 

WINFIELD  S.  HANCOCK, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Volunteers , 

President  of  Court , 

Edward  Schriver, 

Inspector- General  U.  S.  A ., 

Judge  Advocate. 


APPENDIX  L 


The  Morning  Report  of  March  31,  1865,  gives  for  the  numbers  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  3,064  officers  and  68,956  enlisted  men  of  infantry,  147  officers  and 
5,715  enlisted  men  of  artillery,  with  243  guns,  present  for  duty,  equipped. 


Morning  Report ,  March  31,  1865,  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


Artillery. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 

men. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 

men. 

Guns. 

Provost  Guard . 

35 

1,568 

Engineers . 

71 

2,588 

Reserve  Artillerv . 

35 

1,127 

47  1 

Post  of  City  Point — Collis . 

88 

1,855 

Second  Corps . 

960 

18,507 

S3 

1,667 

70  2 

Fifth  Corps . 

632 

15.341 

25 

1,075 

36 

Sixth  Corp3 . 

705 

16,576 

33 

1.070 

54 

Ninth  Corps . 

679 

16,677 

21 

776 

36 

Total,  exclusive  of  Pro- 

vost  Guard  and  Engi- 

neers . 

3,064 

68,956 

147 

5,715 

243 

For  the  Army  of  the  James,  the  Morning  Report  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  of 
March  31st.  Major-General  Gibbon  commanding,  gives  for  its  numbers  841  offi¬ 
cers  and  19,772  enlisted  men  of  infantry  ;  56  officers  and  2,045  enlisted  men  of 
artillery,  with  70  guns,  present  for  duty,  equipped. 

The  Morning  Report  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Corps,  of  March  31st,  does  not  com¬ 
prise  General  William  Bimey’s  division.  That  of  February  28th  does,  and  gives 
for  the  numbers  of  the  Corps  417  officers  and  12,237  enlisted  men  of  infantry,  and 
30  officers  and  946  enlisted  men  of  artillery,  with  56  guns,  present  for  duty, 
equipped. 


1  And  some  mortars. 

2  And  four  mortars. 


APPENDIX  L. 


433 


Morning  Report ,  March  31,  18G5,  Twenty -fourth  Corps ,  General 

Gibbon  Commanding. 


Infantry. 

Artillery. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 

men. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 

men. 

Guns. 

Foster’s — First  Division. . . 
Ames’s— Second  Division.. 
Devens’s — Third  Division . 
Turner’s  Independent . 

249 

169 

275 

148 

5,488 

4.397 

6,096 

3,791 

Total . 

841 

19,772 

56 

.2,045 

70 

Morning  Report,  February  23, 

1865,  Twenty-fifth  Corps,  General 

Weitzel  Commanding. 

Twenty -fifth  Corps . 

417 

12,237 

30 

940 

56 

The  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  James,  General  Mackenzie  commanding,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  Morning  Report  of  March  31st,  had  68  officers  and  1,734  enlisted  men 
present  for  duty. 

The  Army  of  the  James,  therefore,  had  present  for  duty  1,258  officers  and  32,009 
enlisted  men  of  infantry,  with  86  officers  and  2,991  enlisted  men  of  artillery,  with 
126  guns.  Of  this  force  General  Ord  took  with  him  on  the  27th  of  March  10,000 
infantry  of  Gibbon’s  Corps,  about  4,000  of  Weitzel’s,  and  all  Mackenzie’s  cavalry, 
1,700. 

When  General  Sheridan  united  with  the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  the  James 
Gregg’s  cavalry  division  was  assigned  to  him.  The  cavalry  was  an  independent 
command,  and  consisted  of  Custer’s  and  Thomas  C.  Devin’s  divisions,  under  the 
command  of  General  Merritt,  and  General  George  Crook’s  division,  formerly 
Gregg’s. 

The  Morning  Reports  of  March  31st  give  for  the  numbers  of  these  divisions  pres¬ 
ent  for  duty  611  officers  and  13,209  enlisted  men. 


Morninq  Report,  March  31, 1865,  Cavalry  present  for  duty,  not  present 

for  duty ,  equipped. 


Officers. 

Enlisted 

men. 

Custer’s — Third  Division . 

209 

4,355 

3,439 

Thomas  C.  Devin’s — First  Division . 

192 

George  Crook’s — Second  Division  (Gregg’s  old  division)  . .. 

210 

5,415 

Total . 

611 

13,209 

The  siege  artillery  is  not  included  in  the  preceding. 

The  return  of  Lee’s  army  of  February  20,  1865,  the  last  to  be  found  among  the 
Confederate  archives  in  the  War  Department,  gives  the  following  for  the  number 
of  officers  and  enlisted  men  present  for  duty  : 

XII.— 19 


434  THE  VIRGINIA.  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


Morning  Report  of  February  30,  1865,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 


Officers. 

Enlisted 

men. 

Longstreet’s — First  ) 
Corps . f 

851 

12,164 

Gordon’s  —  Second  ( 
Corps . J 

458 

1 

7,623 

Hill’s — Third  Corps.. 

805 

13,567 

\ 

Anderson's  Corps _ 

431 

6,505 

2,605 

39,859 

Cavalry — W.  H.  F.Lee 

185 

3,935 

“  FitzLee... 

90 

1,825 

281 

5,760 

Field  Art. — Pendleton 

244 

5,155 

Officers. 

Enlisted 

men. 

f  Pickett’s  Division  .. 

304 

4,761 

Field’s  Division . . 

341 

4,436 

- 

Kershaw’s  Division. 

206 

2,  <67 

L  Total . 

851 

12,164 

f  Evans’s  Division..  . 

2,309 

Terry’s  Brigade. 

York’s  Brigade. 

Evans's  Brigade. 

Grimes’s  Division . . 

3,022 

Cox’s  Brigade. 

Grimes’s  Brigade. 

- 

Doles’s  Brigade. 

Battle's  Brigade. 

Walker’s  Division.. 

2,292 

Toon’s  Brigade. 

Lewis’s  Brigade. 

Lilly’s  Brigade. 

1  Total . 

458 

7,623 

f  Mahone’s  Division. . 

3,880 

Heth’s  Division. . . . 

4.324 

- 

Wilcox’s  Division. . . 

.... 

5,383 

Total . 

865 

13.567 

Johnson’s  Division. .  . 

431 

6,505 

This  evidently  does  not  include  Wise’s  brigade,  which  we  know  was  present  on 
the  29th  of  March,  and  was  probably  2,000  strong. 

Besides  this  force  there  was  that  of  the  Department  of  Richmond,  commanded 
by  General  Ewell,  consisting  of  General  Custis  Lee's  command,  whose  effective 
force  of  infantry  was  2,700,  according  to  the  return  of  March  20,  1805  ;  Walker's 
brigade  of  Richmond  and  Danville  Railroad  defences,  which  on  the  return  of 
February  20th  is  given  at  1,414  enlisted  men  :  the  heavy  artillery  troops,  the  naval 
forces,  and  finally  the  local  troops,  which,  although  taking  part  in  the  defence  of 
the  intrenchments,  would  form  no  part  of  the  army  in  the  field. 

Rosser’s  cavalry  division  took  part  in  the  defence  of  Petersburg,  but  does  not 
appear  to  be  included  in  the  return  of  February  20th.  Whether  Gary’s  cavalry 
brigade.  1,100  strong,  was  included  is  not  stated. 

It  appears,  then,  that  on  the  20th  of  February,  and  probably  on  the  25th  of 
March,  General  Lee  had  an  effective  force  of  infantry  of  not  less  than  44,500,  ex¬ 
clusive  of  Walker’s  brigade ;  of  field  artillery  not  less  than  5,000,  and  of  cavalry 
0,000,  a  total  of  not  less  than  55,500.  There  were,  besides,  the  heavy  artillery, 
the  local  troops,  and  the  naval  forces. 


APPENDIX  L. 


435 


Commanders  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  Major- 
General  George  G.  Meade,  on  March  31,  1865. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS  AND  UNATTACHED  COM¬ 
MANDS. 

PROVOST  GUARD. 

Colonel  GEORGE  N.  MACY. 

ENGINEER  BRIGADE. 

Brigadier-General  HENRY  W.  BENHAM. 

BATTALION  U.  S.  ENGINEERS. 

Captain  FRANKLIN  HARWOOD. 

ARTILLERY. 

Brigadier-General  HENRY  J.  HUNT. 

SIEGE  TRAIN. 

Colonel  HENRY  L.  ABBOT. 

HEADQUARTERS  GUARD. 

Captain  RICHARD  G.  LAY. 

QUARTERMASTER’S  GUARD. 

Colonel  R.  N.  BATCHELDER. 

SIGNAL  CORPS. 

Captain  CHARLES  L.  DAVIS. 

INDEPENDENT  BRIGADE. 

Colonel  CHARLES  H.  T.  COLLIS. 


SECOND  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-General  ANDREW  A.  HUMPHREYS. 
FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  NELSON  A.  MILES. 

First  Brigade.  £ econd  Brigade. 

Colonel  George  W.  Scott.  Colonel  Robert  Nugent. 


Third  Brigade. 
Colonel  Henry  J.  Mad  ill. 


Fourth  Brigade. 
Colonel  John  Ramsey. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  WILLIAM  HAYS. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Wm.  A.  Olmstead.  Col.  James  P.  McIvor.  Brig.-Gen.  Thos.  A.  Smyth. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  GERSHOM  MOTT. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen.  Regi3  de  Trobriano.  Brig.-Gen.  Byron  R.  Pierce. 

Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  Robert  McAllister. 

ARTILLERY  BRIGADE. 

Major  JOHN  G.  HAZARD. 


436  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’04  AND  ’65. 


FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

Major-General  GOUVERNEUR  K.  WARREN. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  CHARLES  GRIFFIN. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Joshua  L.  Chamberlain.  Colonel  Edgar  M.  Gregory. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  J.  Bartlett. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  ROMEYN  B.  AYRES. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Frederick  Winthrop.  Col.  Andrew  W.  Denison.  Col.  James  Gwyn. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  SAMUEL  W.  CRAWFORD. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  John  A.  Kellogg.  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  Baxter.  Col.  Richard  Coulter. 

ARTILLERY  BRIGADE. 

Colonel  CHARLES  S.  WAIN  WRIGHT. 

SIXTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

Major-General  HORATIO  G.  WRIGHT. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  FRANK  WHEATON. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Wm.  H.  Penrose.  Col.  Joseph  E.  Hamblin.  Col.  Oliver  Edwards. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  GEORGE  W.  GETTY. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  James  M.  Warner.  Brig.-Gen.  Lewis  A.  Grant.  Col.  Thomas  W.  Hyde. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier  General  TRUMAN  SEYMOUR. 

« 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Wm.  S.  Truex.  Colonel  J.  Warren  Keifer. 

ARTILLERY  BRIGADE. 

Captain  ANDREW  COWAN. 


NINTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-General  JOHN  G.  PARKE. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  ORLANDO  B.  WILLCOX. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  Samuel  Harriman.  Lieut.-Colonel  Ralph  Ely. 


APPENDIX  L. 


437 


Third  Brigade. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Gilbert  P.  Robinson. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  ROBERT  B.  POTTER. 

First  Brigade .  Second  Brigade . 

Colonel  John  I.  Curtin.  Brlg.-Gen.  Simon  G.  Griffin. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  JOHN  F.  HARTRANFT. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Wm.  H.  McCall.  '  Colonel  Joseph  A.  Mathews. 

ARTILLERY  BRIGADE. 

Colonel  JOHN  C.  TIDBALL. 

SHERIDAN’S  CAVALRY. 

Major-General  PHILIP  H.  SHERIDAN. 

ARMY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 
Brigadier-General  WESLEY  MERRITT. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  THOMAS  C.  DEVIN. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  Peter  Stagg.  Col.  Chas.  L.  Fitzhugh.  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Gibbs. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  GEORGE  A.  CUSTER. 

• 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Alex.  C.  M.  Pennington.  Col.  Wm.  Wells.  Col.  Henry  Capehart. 

SECOND  DIVISION  (Army  of  the  Potomac). 
Major-General  GEORGE  CROOK. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

B’g.-Gen.  H.  E.  Davies.  Col.  J.  Irwin  Gregg.  Col.  Chas.  H.  Smith. 


ARMY  OF  THE  JAMES. 

Major-General  Edward  O.  C.  Ord. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS  AND  UNATTACHED  COM¬ 
MANDS. 

SIGNAL  CORPS. 

Captain  L.  B.  NORTON. 

ENGINEERS 

Colonel  JAMES  F.  HALL. 

CAVALRY. 

Colonel  FRANCIS  WASHBURN.  Colonel  EDWIN  V.  SUMNER. 

Colonel  CHARLES  F.  ADAMS,  Jr. 


438  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


DEFENCES  OF  BERMUDA  HUNDRED. 
Major-General  GEORGE  L.  HARTSUFF. 

PONTONIERS. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  PETER  S.  MICHIE. 

,  SEPARATE  BRIGADE. 

Brigadier-General  JOSEPH  B.  CARR. 

k  . 

TWENTY-FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-General  JOHN  GIBBON. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  ROBERT  S.  FOSTER. 

First  Brigade.  Third  Brigade.  Fourth  Brigade. 

Col.  Thos.  O.  Osborn.  Col.  Geo.  B.  Dandy.  Col.  Harrison  S.  Fairchild. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  CHARLES  DEVENS. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  Edward  H.  Ripley.  Col.  Mic’l  T.  Donohue.  Col.  Samuel  H.  Roberts. 

INDEPENDENT  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  JOHN  W.  TURNER. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Lt.-Col.  Andrew  Potter.  Col.  William  B.  Curtis.  Colonel  Thos.  M.  Harris. 

ARTILLERY. 

Captain  JAMES  R.  ANGEL. 

TWENTY-FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
Major-General  GODFREY  WEITZEL. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  AUGUST  V.  KAUTZ. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Attached  Brigade. 

Col.  Alonzo  G.  Draper,  Bg.-Gen.  Edw’d  A.  Wild.  Col.  Chas.  S.  Russell. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General  WILLIAM  BIRNEY. 

First  Brigade.  Secotid  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  James  Shaw,  Jr.  Col.  Ulysses  Doubleday.  Col.  W.  W.  Woodward. 

ARTILLERY  BRIGADE. 

Captain  LOOMIS  L.  LANGDON. 

CAVALRY  DIVISION. 

Brigadier- General  Ranald  S.  Mackenzie. 


First  Brigade. 
Colonel  Robert  M.  West. 


Second  Brigade. 
Colonel  Samuel  P.  Spear. 


APPENDIX  M 


No.  1. 

April  7,  1865. 

General — The  result  of  the  last  week  must  convince  you  of  the  hopelessness  of 
further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  this  struggle. 
I  feel  that  it  is  so,  and  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  shift  from  myself  the  responsibility 
of  any  further  effusion  of  blood,  by  asking  of  you  the  surrender  of  that  portion 
of  the  Confederate  States  Army  known  as  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 
Lieutenant-  General. 

General  R.  E.  Lee.  _ 


No.  2. 

April  7, 1S65. 

General — I  have  received  your  note  of  this  date.  Though  not  entertaining  the 
opinion  you  express  on  the  hopelessness  of  further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  I  reciprocate  your  desire  to  avoid  useless  effusion 
of  blood,  and  therefore,  before  considering  your  proposition,  ask  the  terms  you 
will  offer  on  condition  of  its  surrender. 

R.  E.  LEE, 

General. 

Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant. 


No.  3. 

April  8,  1865. 

General — Your  note  of  last  evening  in  reply  to  mine  of  same  date,  asking  the 
condition  on  which  I  will  accept  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  is 
just  received.  In  reply.  I  would  say  that  peace  being  my  great  desire,  there  is  but 
one  condition  I  would  insist  upon,  namely,  that  the  men  and  officers  surrendered 
shall  be  disqualified  for  taking  up  arms  again  against  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  until  properly  exchanged.  I  will  meet  you,  or  will  designate  officers 
to  meet  any  officers  you  may  name  for  the  same  purpose,  at  any  point  agreeable  to 
you,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  definitely  the  terms  upon  which  the  surrender  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  will  be  received. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 
Lieutenant-  General. 

General  R.  E.  Lee. 


No.  4. 

April  8,  1865. 

General — I  received  at  a  late  hour  your  note  of  to-day.  In  mine  of  yesterday 
1  did  not  intend  to  propose  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but 
to  ask  the  terms  of  your  proposition.  To  be  frank,  I  do  not  think  the  emergency 
has  arisen  to  call  for  the  surrender  of  this  army,  but  as  the  restoration  of  peace 
should  be  the  sole  object  of  all,  I  desire  to  know  whether  your  proposals  would 
lead  to  that  end.  I  cannot,  therefore,  meet  you  with  a  view  to  surrender  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  but  as  far  as  your  proposal  may  affect  the  Confederate 
States  forces  under  my  command,  and  tend  to  the  restoration  of  peace,  I  should 
be  pleased  to  meet  you  at  10  a.m.  to-morrow  on  the  old  stage  road  to  Richmond, 
between  the  picket  lines  of  the  two  armies. 

R.  E.  LEE, 

General. 

Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant. 


No.  5. 

April  9,  1865. 

General — Yonr  note  of  yesterday  is  received.  I  have  no  authority  to  treat  on 
the  subject  of  peace ;  the  meeting  proposed  for  10  A.M.  to-day  could  lead  to  no 
good.  I  will  state  however,  General,  that  I  am  equally  anxious  for  peace  with 


440  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  ’64  AND  ’65. 


yourself,  and  the  whole  North  entertains  the  same  feeling.  The  terms  upon  whic  h 
peace  can  be  had  are  well  understood. 

By  the  South  laying  down  their  arms  they  will  hasten  that  most  desirable  event, 
save  thousands  of  human  lives,  and  hundreds  of  millions  of  property  not  yet  de¬ 
stroyed. 

Seriously  hoping  that  all  our  difficulties  may  be  settled  without  the  loss  of  an¬ 
other  life,  I  subscribe  myself,  etc., 

U.  S.  GRANT,  ' 

General  R.  E.  Lee.  Lieutenant-General. 


No.  6: 

April  9,  1865. 

General — I  received  your  note  of  this  morning,  on  the  picket  line  whither  I 
had  come  to  meet  you,  and  ascertain  definitely  what  terms  were  embraced  in  your 
proposal  of  yesterday,  with  reference  to  the  surrender  of  this  army.  I  now  ask 
an  interview  in  accordance  with  the  offer  contained  in  your  letter  of  yesterday  for 
that  purpose. 

R.  E.  LEE, 

General. 

Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant. 


No.  7. 

April  9,  1865. 

General  R.  E.  Lee,  Commanding  C.S.A.  : 

Your  note  of  this  date  is  but  this  moment,  11.50  a.m.  received.  In  consequence 
of  my  having  passed  from  the  Richmond  and  Lynchburg  road  to  the  Farmville 
and  Lynchburg  road,  I  am,  at  this  writing,  about  four  miles  west  of  Walker’s 
Church,  and  will  push  forward  to  the  front,  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  you. 

Notice  sent  to  me  on  this  road  where  you  wish  the  interview  to  take  place  will 
meet  me.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

TJ.  S.  GRANT, 

_  Lieutenant-General. 


No.  8. 

Appomattox  Court  House,  Va., 
April  9,  1865. 

General — In  accordance  with  the  substance  of  my  letter  to  you  of  the  8th  in¬ 
stant,  I  propose  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  on  the 
following  terms,  to  wit :  Rolls  of  all  the  officers  and  men  to  be  made  in  duplicate, 
one  copy  to  be  given  to  an  officer  to  be  designated  by  me,  the  other  to  be  retained 
by  such  officer  or  officers  as  you  may  designate.  The  officers  to  give  their  individ¬ 
ual  paroles  not  to  take  up  arms  against  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
until  properly  exchanged  :  and  each  company  or  regimental  commander  sign  a  like 
parole  for  the  men  of  their  commands.  The  arms,  artillery,  and  public  property 
to  be  parked  and  stacked,  and  turned  over  to  the  officers  appointed  by  me  to  re¬ 
ceive  them.  This  will  not  embrace  the  side-arms  of  the  officers  nor  the  private 
horses  or  baggage.  This  done,  each  officer  and  man  will  be  allowed  to  return  to 
his  home,  not  to  be  disturbed  by  United  States  authority  so  long  as  they  ob¬ 
serve  their  paroles,  and  the  laws  in  force  where  they  may  reside. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 
Lieutenant-  General. 

General  R.  E.  Lee. 


No.  9. 

Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
April  9,  1865. 

General — I  received  your  letter  of  this  date,  containing  the  terms  of  the  sur¬ 
render  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  as  proposed  by  you.  As  they  are  sub¬ 
stantially  the  same  as  those  expressed  in  your  letter  of  the  8th  instant,  they  are 
accepted.  I  will  proceed  to  designate  the  proper  officers  to  carry  the  stipulation 
into  effect. 

R.  E.  LEE, 

General. 


Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant. 


INDEX. 


Note. — Regiments ,  batteries ,  etc.,  are  indexed  under  the  names  of 
their  States ,  excepting  batteries  called  by  their  captain's  or  by  some 
other  special  name.  These  are  indexed  under  Batteries. 


Abbot,  Colonel  H.  L.,  246,  247 
(note),  266  (note) 

Abbott,  Colonel  J.  C.,  309 
Abbott,  Major  H.  L.,  55 
Abercrombie,  General,  234 
Aiken,  Colonel,  234 
Ames,  General,  division  of,  137, 
146,  148  et  seq.,  157  et  seq., 
173,  253,  284,  288,  294,  309 
Anderson,  G.  T.,  brigade  of,  278, 
280,  284,  288  et  seq. ,  293 
Anderson,  Colonel,  killed,  187 
Anderson,  General  R.  H. ,  division 
of,  15  (note),  22,  33,  35,  39,  41, 
43  et  seq.,  46  et  seq.,  49,  62, 
64,  66,  166,  169,  172,  179  et 
seq  ,  193,  204,  209,  214  et  seq., 
221  et  seq.,  289,  308,  310,  325 
et  seq.,  328,  354  et  seq.,  367, 
370  et  seq.,  375,  377,  379  et 
seq.,  382  et  seq.,  390 
Appomattox  Court  House,  391, 
393  et  seq.,  398  et  seq. 

Arnold,  Captain,  79 
Averill,  Colonel,  195 
Ayres,  General,  brigade  of,  26,  60 
et  seq.,  179,  261  et  seq.,  274  et 
seq.,  291,  297,  302,  314  et  seq., 
327,  329  et  seq.,  339  et  seq., 
341  (note),  346  et  seq.,  351  et 
seq.,  358  et  seq. 

Babcock,  Colonel,  173 
Badeau,  General,  5,  53,  56,  67  et 
seq.,  109  (note),  114  (note), 
115  (note),  117,  124  (note),  125 
(note),  157,  191,  272  (note). 

19* 


Barlow,  General  F.  C.,  division  of, 
13  (note),  31,  37,  40,  45  (note), 
65,  76  et  seq.,  81,  92  et  seq., 
94  (note),  96  etseq.,  108,  111, 
113,  120,  129  et  seq.,  166  et 
seq.,  169,  178,  182  et  seq.,  189, 
205,  209,  218  et  seq.,  223,  227 
et  seq.,  249,  269  et  seq.,  381, 
887  et  seq.,  389  et  seq. 
Barnard,  General,  245  (note) 
Barnes,  brigade  of,  26 
Barringer,  General,  161,  189,  202, 
374 

Bartlett,  General  W.  F.,  brigade 
of,  26,  60  et  seq.,  128,  179, 
263,  325,  336,  338,  342,  350 
Barton,  brigade  of,  136,  142,  145, 
150  (note) 

Batteries:  Beck’s,  29S  et  seq.,  301 
et  seq.  ;  Dow’s,  31,  48 ;  Mc¬ 
Gregor’s,  344,  350 ;  McKnigkt’s 
281  ;  Maynadier’s,  240 ;  Pe- 
gram’s,  275 ;  Poague’s,  38S, 
390;  Ricketts’s,  31;  Roder’s, 
302  ;  Wright’s,  256 
Battle,  General,  25  et  seq.,  85,  94, 
113 

Baxter,  General,  brigade  of,  34; 
wounded,  44,  60,  265  (note), 
296 

Beale,  General,  343  (note) 
Beauregard,  General,  125,  143  et 
seq.,  148  et  seq.,  151,  154  et 
seq.,  159,  197  et  seq.,  209  et 
seq.,  213  et  seq.,  218  (note), 
2t9,  221  et  seq.,  251,  259,  269, 
274  et  seq. 


4:4,2 


INDEX. 


Beaver,  Colonel,  217 
Beck,  artillery  of,  298  et  seq.,  801 
et  seq. 

Benham,  General,  9,  203  (note) 
Benjamin,  Colonel,  103,  189 
Benning,  brigade  of,  38  et  seq., 
284,  287 

Benyaurd,  Captain,  337 
Bingham,  Major,  299 
Birney,  General  D.  B.,  4,  13  (note), 
31  et  seq.,  37  et  seq.,  42  et 
seq.,  46  (note),  47  et  seq.,  76 
et  seq.,  80,  82,  88,  92  et  seq., 
96  et  seq.,  108  et  seq.,  Ill, 
113  et  seq.,  129  et  seq.,  166, 
178,  182,  188,  193,  209,  210, 
(note),  212,  216,  219,  222  et 
seq.,  227  et  seq.,  268  et  seq., 
284  et  seq.,  287  et  seq.,  323, 
378 

Birney,  General  William,  division 
of,  285,  373,  386 
Blaisdell,  Colonel,  265  (note) 
Boisseau,  Dr.,  328,  338,  341  (note), 
342,  343,  350  et  seq. 

Bosher,  General,  193 
Boston,  Colonel,  385 
Bragg,  General,  275,  297 
Bratton,  General,  brigade  of,  47 
(note),  62,  101  (note),  104,  127, 
(note),  284,  288  et  seq.,  293 
Breckinridge,  General,  132,  124, 
166  et  seq.,  179  et  seq.,  183, 
190,  195,  230,  233,  243 
Brewster,  Colonel  Wm.  R.,  bri¬ 
gade  of,  86,  94 

Brooke,  Colonel,  34,  77  et  seq.,  92, 
169,  183,  271 

Brooks,  General,  137,  147, 153,  154, 
158,  175  et  seq.,  185  et  seq., 
206  et  seq.,  336 

Brown,  brigade  of,  78  et  seq.,  93 
Bryan,  General  Goode,  brigade  of, 
54  (note),  63,  175 
Buckner,  division  of,  16  (note) 
Burgess’s  mill,  294  et  seq.,  298, 
300  et  seq.,  303  (note),  310, 
326,  333  (note),  355,  367 
Burham,  Captain,  85 
Burnham,  General,  187,  286 
Burns,  Colonel,  33  (note) 

Burnside,  General  A.  E.,  division 
of,  1,  13,  20  et  seq.,  24,  36,  40, 
43,  46  et  seq. ,  53,  57  et  seq. ,  72, 
76  et  seq.,  87  et  seq.,  94,  101  et 
seq.  ;  losses  of,  105,  107  et  seq. , 


110  et  seq.,  116  et  seq.,  120  et 
seq.,  125,  130  et  seq  .  167,  176 
et  seq.,  179  et  seq.,  188  et  seq., 
193,  200,  213,  218  (note),  223, 
247  et  seq.,  250  et  seq.,  255, 
257  et  seq.,  260  et  seq.,  263  et 
seq.,  292 

Butler,  General  Benj.  F.,  6,  66, 
125,  134, 137  et  seq.,  142  et  seq., 
146,  147  (note),  148  et  seq.,  151, 
153  et  seq.,  157  et  seq.,  164, 196, 
198  et  seq.,  201  et  seq.,  205  et 
seq.,  209,  211,  213  (note),  220  et 
seq.,  226, 231,  234,  239,  246,  277, 
293,  294,  304,  309  et  seq. 
Byrnes,  Colonel,  183 

Campbell,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  86 
Capehart,  brigade  of,  335 
Carroll,  General,  33,  38,  41,  48,  81 ; 
promoted  to  Brigadier-Gen¬ 
eral,  86,  93,  97,  104,  106,  265 
(note) 

Catlin,  division  of,  114  (note) 
Cesnola,  Colonel,  180  (note),  189 
Chamberlain,  Geneial,  223,  325, 
333,  360  (note) 

Chambliss,  General,  brigade  of, 
108,  238 ;  killed,  271 
Chapman,  Colonel,  35,  177,  204 
Clingman,  brigade  of  142  et  seq., 
150  (note),  155  et  seq.,  159,  171, 
175,  275  et  seq.,  288  et  seq. 
Coil,  Major,  256  (note) 

Cold  Harbor,  163,  166  et  seq.,  201, 
242 

Colquitt,  General,  brigade  of,  142, 
148,  150  et  seq.,  159,  254,  275, 
et  seq.,  288  et  seq. 

Comstock,  Colonel,  41,  90 
Connecticut,  regiment  of  :  Tenth, 
214.  Batteries  of  :  First,  246  ; 
Second,  17'5 

Cook,  General,  brigade  of,  28,  80, 
104,  189,  279  (note),  280,  326, 
333  (note),  355,  367  et  seq.,  370 
Cope,  Major,  336 
Corley,  Colonel  Jas.  L.,  15  (note) 
Corse,  General,  brigade  of,  142, 
150  (note),  155  et  seq.,  328, 
335,  342,  343  (note),  344,  350  et 
seq.,  384 

Coulter,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  60 ; 

wounded,  115,  348  et  seq. 
Craig,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  270  et 
seq. 


INDEX. 


443 


Crawford,  General  S.  W. ,  13  (note), 
23  et  seq.,  27,  30,  202,  261  et 
seq. ,  61,  66,  81  et  seq.,  102, 114 
et  seq.,  129,  131,  168,  219,  274 
et  seq.,  297  et  seq.,  301,  303 
(note),  314  et  seq.,  329  et  seq., 
333,  339  et  seq.,  343,  346,  348 
et  seq.,  351  et  seq.,  358  et  seq., 
370 

Crittenden.  General,  87  (note),  102, 
111,  131,  180 

Crook,  General,  6,  195,  327,  334  et 
seq.,  344,  374,  376  et  seq.,  380, 
382  ebseq.,  386  et  seq.,  390,  396 
et  seq. 

Cullen,  Colonel,  305 
Curtin,  Colonel,  217 
Custer,  General,  brigade  of,  51  et 
seq.,  134  et  seq.,  164,  231  et 
seq.,  325,  335  et  seq.,  341 
(note),  343  et  seq.,  346,  351 
et  seq.,  374,  380,  382,  396  et 
seq. 

Cutler,  brigade  of,  42 
Cutler  General,  division  of,  81  et 
seq.,  101  et  seq.,  114,  129,  167 
et  seq.,  174,  179,  193,  274,  278 

Dabney,  W.,  330  et  seq.,  333,  336, 
337  (note),  342,  352,  355 
Daniel,  General,  brigade  of,  26  et 
seq.,  85,  96  ;  killed,  97  et  seq., 
105,  195  (note) 

Davies,  General,  brigade  of,  134, 
327,  335,  376,  382  et  seq. 
Davies,  brigade  of,  29,  43,  80,  266 
(note),  274 et  seq.,  326,  334,  363 
Davis,  President  Jefferson,  151, 
220,  316,  371,  385,  393 
Dearing,  General,  cavalry  of,  142, 
148,  151,  156,  159, 197,  207,  215, 
269,  274,  291,  294,  385 
Denison,  General,  brigade  of,  26 
et  seq.,  60,  81  (note),  330  et  seq. 
De  Peyster,  General  J.  Watts,  372 
(note) 

De  Peyster,  Lieutenant  Johnson 
L.,  372  (note) 

De  Trobriand,  brigade  of,  299,  301 
et  seq.,  314,  388 

Devens,  General,  159,  175  et  seq., 
178,  185  et  seq.,  323 
Devin,  General,  division  of,  51, 165, 
327  et  seq.,  334  et  seq.,  343  et 
seq.,  347  (note),  348,  350  et 
seq.,  380,  382,  384,  397 


Dinwiddie  Court  House,  824  et  seq. , 
328,  334,  336  et  seq.,  359 
Doles,  General,  25  et  seq.,  83  et 
seq.,  102,  180,  195  (note) 

Dow,  battery  of,  81,  48 
Drake,  Colonel.  176 
Drury’s  Bluff,  140  et  seq.,  144  et 
seq.,  151  et  seq.,  214 
Duane,  Mai  or  James  C.,  13  (note), 
196,  203,  254 
Dubose,  General,  384 
Dunovant,  General,  164  (note) 
Dushane,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  274, 
278 

Early,  General  Jubal  A.,  15 
(note),  22  et  seq.,  26  et  seq., 
49  et  seq.,  54  (note),  55,  64,  71, 
79,  88,  95,  103,  108,  114;  at 
Hanover  Junction,  124,  165  et 
seq.,  168  et  seq.,  172,  179  et 
seq.,  188  et  seq.,  195,  243  eo 
seq.,  267  et  seq.,  308 
Egan,  General,  division  of,  130,  216, 
295  et  seq.,  298  et  seq.,  301  et 
seq. 

Elliott,  General,  brigade  of,  213 
(note),  215  (note),  248,  250  et 
seq. ,  254,  256  et  seq. ,  260,  263 
Emory,  General.  244 
Eustis,  brigade  of,  31,  42 
Evans,  General  N.  G.,  96,  124,  159, 
213  (note),  215  (note).  315 
Ewell.  General  Richard  S.,  2,  12, 
15,  16  (note),  22  et  seq.,  25,  27 
et  seq.,  36  et  seq.,  46,  54,  64, 
66,  72  et  seq.,  85,  89,  93  et  seq., 
98,  102  et  seq.,  104  et  seq.,  112 
et  seq.,  114  (note),  115  (note), 
119  et  seq. ;  at  Hanover  Junc¬ 
tion,  123,  125,  127,  131,  165, 
232  (note),  233,  288,  305,  371, 
375,  377,  380  et  seq.,  399 

Fairchild,  Colonel  H.  S.,  305 
Farmville.Va.,  382,  387,  et  seq.,  396 
Farwell,  Captain,  303  (note) 
Ferrero,  General  E.,  division  of, 
14  (note),  21,  114  (note),  115 
(note),  251  et  seq.,  258,  260, 
309 

Field,  General  C.  W.,  division  of, 
3,  15  (note),  16,  38,  43  et  seq., 
46  et  seq.,  49,  54  (note),  61. 
et  seq.,  73,  79  et  seq.,  101 
(note),  108,  169,  172,  174  et 


444 


INDEX. 


seq.,  181  et  seq.,  214,  276,  220 
et  seq.,  249,  252,  269,  277,  279 
(note),  284,  287,  293,  305  et 
seq.,  369,  371,  386,  390 
Finnegan,  General,  190,  193 
Fitzhugh,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  251 
Five  Forks,  Va.,  326  et  seq.,  334, 
342  et  seq. ,  347,  35  et  seq. ,  354 
et  seq. ,  362 

Fort  Harrison,  Va.,  285  et  seq. 
Fort  Howard,  Va.,  318 
Fort  Stedman,  Va.,  317  et  seq. 
Foster  General,  248  et  seq.,  323, 
365,  369,  397 

Frank,  General,  brigade  of,  31  et 
seq.,  40,  43,  45  (note),  46  (note) 
Fry,  Colonel,  150  (note),  152,  1S9 
Fulton,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  159, 
284,  287,  328,  354 

Garey,  cavalry  brigade  of,  284 
Gary,  General,  cavalry  brigade  of, 
293,  305  et  seq. ,  371,  376 
Geary,  General,  202 
Georgia,  regiments  of:  Seventh, 
234 ;  Twelfth,  168 
Getty,  General  G.  W.,  division  of, 
4,  13  (note),  24  et  seq.,  28  et 
seq.  ;  attacks  Heth,  32  et  seq. , 
38;  wounded,  39,  42,  91,  160, 
175  et  seq.,  185,  244,  383,  385 
Gibbon,  General  John,  4,  13  (note), 
37  et  seq.,  45,  48,  65,  76  et 
seq.,  81  et  seq.,  92  et  seq.,  104, 
108  et  seq..  Ill,  113,  129  et 
seq.,  166,  178,  180,  182  et  seq., 
189,  209,  212,  219,  228  et  seq., 
265  (note),  269  et  seq.,  279, 
281  et  seq.,  295,  323,  365,  369 
et  seq.,  385,  389,  397 
Gibbs,  General,  attacks  Pickett, 
335 

Gillespie,  Colonel,  344,  347  (note) 
Gillmore,  General  Q.  A.,  137,  139, 
141,  145  et  seq.,  153  etseq., 
157,  196  et  seq. 

Goff,  Colonel  Nathan,  Jr.,  208 
(note) 

Gordon,  General  James  B.,  brigade 
of,  26  et  seq.,  49  et  seq.,  55, 
64,  66,  74,  85,  93,  95  et  seq., 
113,  124,  134 ;  killed,  135,  161, 
179,  188  et  seq.,  195  (note), 
308,  310,  314  et  seq.,  317  et 
seq.,  363,  366,  369,  371,  375, 
377,  379  et  seq.,  385  et  seq.. 


388,  390  et  seq.,  393,  396  et 
seq. 

Gould,  Colonel,  218 
Gracie,  General,  brigade  of,  16 
(note),  136, 141,  145, 150  (note), 
152  et  seq.,  159,  214  et  seq., 
219,  254,  330,  332,  354 
Grant,  General  U.  S.,  4 ;  receives 
commission  of  Lieutenant- 
General  and  made  Comman- 
der-in-Chief,  5  ;  report  of,  6, 
19  et  seq.;  joins  Meade,  24,  31, 
32  (note),  51  (note);  movement 
of,  52,  56  et  seq.,  66,  76,  87 
(note) ;  despatch  to  Meade,  89, 
90,  91  (note),  97,  99,  109,  115 
(note;,  119,  127  et  seq.,  137, 

158,  160,  170,  173,  181,  185, 
187  et  seq.,  192,  194,  203  et 
seq.,  208  et  seq.,  212,  213 
(note),  214,  220,  224,  236,  245 
et  seq. ,  260,  264,  268,  273,  287, 

290,  294,  299  et  seq.,  316  et 
seq.,  322  et  seq.,  327  et  seq., 
337  (note),  338  et  seq.,  356, 
358,  362,  372  et  seq.,  377  et 
seq.,  385,  392  et  seq. 

Greeley,  Colonel,  214 
Gregg,  General  D.  McM.,  cavalry 
of,  13  (note),  18  et  seq.,  21,  36, 
38,  39  (note).  51  et  seq.,  62, 
67  et  seq.,  134  et  seq.,  160, 164 
et  seq.,  169,  171,  175,  177,  182, 
231,  233,  235,  268  et  seq., 
278,  282,  284,  287,  290  (note), 

291,  293,  295,  302  et  seq.,  310, 
312,  314,  334  et  seq.,  377,  382, 
390 

Gregory,  General,  333  et  seq. 
Griffin,  General  Chas.,  division  of, 
13  (note),  23,  25  et  seq.,  30, 
60  et  seq.,  102,  114  (note),  129, 
131,  167  et  seq.,  179.  188,  193, 
217,  223,  257,  274,  291  et  seq., 
296  et  seq.,  314  et  seq.,  325  et 
seq.,  329  et  seq.,  333,  336  et 
seq. ,  343,  346,  348  et  seq. ,  352 
et  seq.,  358  et  seq.,  361,  374, 
379,  386,  396,  398 
Grimes,  brigade  of,  113 
Guild,  Surgeon  Lafayette,  15  (note) 
Gwyn,  General  James,  331,  349,  358 

Hagood,  General,  47  (note),  139, 
142  et  seq.,  150  (note),  155, 

159,  210,  277 


INDEX. 


445 


Halleck,  General,  87  (note),  194 
Hammond,  Colonel,  cavalry  of,  24, 
28,  35 

Hampton,  General,  division  of,  15 
(note),  52,  62,  64,  69,  80,  122, 
164  (note),  177,  196,  230  et 
seq.,  241,  269,  277,  279,  282, 
290  (note),  291  et  seq.,  294,  298 
et  seq.,  300,  302,  303  (note),  309 
Hancock,  General  W.  S.,  4 ;  re¬ 
sumes  command  of  Second 
Corps,  13,  21  et  seq.,  25,  29  et 
seq.,  36  et  seq.,  47  et  seq.,  53, 
54  etseq.,  58,  61  et  seq.,  65, 
70  et  seq.,  76  et  seq.,  81  et 
seq.,  88,  90  et  seq.,  95  et  seq.  ; 
successful  assault  of,  97,  99  et 
seq.,  102,  105  et  seq.,  108  et 
seq.,  119  et  seq.,  126,  129  et 
seq.,  166  et  seq.,  169,  176,  178, 
182,  185,  193,  200,  204,  205 
(note),  209  et  seq.,  213,  216, 
222,  248  et  seq.,  252  et  seq., 
258,  268  et  seq.,  271  et  seq., 
278  et  seq.,  295  et  seq.,  312 
Harris,  Colonel  D.  B.,  219 
Harris,  General,  98,  308,  365,  369 
Harrison,  Colonel  Walter,  343 
(note) 

Hartranft,  General,  314,  318  et 
seq. ,  366 

Haskell,  Colonel,  184,  265  (note) 
Hawley,  Colonel,  196  et  seq. 
Haxall’s  Landing,  Va.,  136 
Hayes,  General,  brigade  of,  274, 
276 

Hays,  General  Alexander,  brigade 
of,  27 ;  killed,  33,  35 
Hays,  General  (under  Meade),  332 
et  seq.,  362,  367 

Hays,  General  (of  Johnson’s  Di¬ 
vision),  wounded,  72  (note), 
195 

Heckman,  General,  brigade  of,  147 
et  seq.,  152,  154,  157,  285  et 
seq.,  289,  305 

Heth,  General,  division  of,  15 
(note),  22,  28  et  seq.,  32,  34  et 
seq.,  38,  43,  45  et  seq.,  49,  79 
et  seq.,  88  et  seq.,  102  et  seq., 
179  et  seq.,  188  et  seq.,  249, 
252,  274  et  seq.,  279  (note),  281, 
292,  294,  300,  303  (note),  327, 
333  (note),  367  et  seq.,  371, 
386,  389,  390  et  seq. 

Hickford,  310,  312 


Hill,  General  A.  P.,  2,  12,  15,  16 
(note),  22  et  seq.,  25,  28  et 
seq.,  33  et  seq.,  36  ;  gives  way, 
38  et  seq.,  41,  43,  54,  64,  72, 
74,  79,  94,  98,  100,  102,  108, 
122  et  seq.,  127,  129,  132,  166 et 
seq.,  179,  183,  204,  209,  214, 
216,  220  et  seq.,  228,  252,  259, 
275,  277,  279  et  seq.,  283,  291 
et  seq.,  294,  303  (note)  et  seq., 
308  (note),  310,  314,  317,  321, 
3  6  et  seq.,  328,  355,  363,  365 
(note),  367  et  seq.,  370  et  seq., 
.384  (note) 

Hinks,  General,  137,  139,  146, 149, 
156,  159,  196  et  seq.,  206  et 
seq.,  210  (note),  212 
Hoffman,  brigade  of,  297 
Hoke,  General,  brigade  of,  15 
(note),  16  (note),  105,  124  et 
seq.,  142  et  seq.,  148,  150  et 
seq.,  155,  159,  171  et  seq.,  175, 
179,  181  et  seq.,  190,  209  et 
seq.,  215  et  seq.,  252,  254,  265, 
277,  288,  293,  308  (note),  309 
Holman,  Colonel,  304,  306 
Hott,  J. ,  house  of,  379  et  seq. ,  382 
Howard,  Captain  McHenry,  85 
(note),  95,  384  (note) 

Howell,  Colonel,  158 
Huger’s  batteries,  380 
Humphrey,  Colonel  William,  103 
Humphreys,  General  A.  A.,  13 
(note),  33  (note),  60,  63,  6D 
(note),  86,  101  (note),  104,  110, 
114  (note),  115  (note),  182, 
264,  311,  324,  326  et  seq.,  329, 
332,  334,  337,  362,  366  et  seq., 
378,  3S0  et  seq.,  387  et  seq., 
394  et  seq. ,  399  (note) 

Hunt,  General  Henry  J.,  9,  13 
(note),  246,  320,  356  (note) 
Hunter,  General,  6,  187  et  seq., 
194  et  seq.,  198,  201,  230,  233, 
236,  243,  245,  267 

Hunton,  brigade  of,  141,  144,  148, 
175,  182,  190,  328,  331  et  seq., 
354,  374,  384 

Imboden,  General,  124,  194 

Jackson,  brigade  of,  16  (note) 
James  River,  passage  of,  164  et 
seq.;  movement  to,  247  et  seq. 
Jenkins,  General,  brigade  of,  45, 
47  (note) 


446 


INDEX. 


Jericho  bridge,  127  et  seq.,  132 
(note) 

Johnson,  General  Bushrod  R. , 
brigade  of,  16  (note).  141,  150 
(note),  155,  159,  229,  326,  371, 
375,  384  (note),  386 
Johnson,  General  Edward,  15 
(note),  22  et  seq.,  25  et  seq.,  66, 
74,  83,  85  (note)  ;  captured,  93. 
95  et  seq.,  104  et  seq.,  124,  195 
(note),  213,  215,  221  252,  254 
et  seq.,  265,  284,  287,  291,  294, 
308  (note)  et  seq.,  328,  354, 
367,  380,  384  (note) 

Johnston,  General  R.  D.,  brigade 
of,  sent  to  Early,  22  (note),  49 
et  seq.,  96  ;  wounded,  106, 
195  (note),  317,  386,  399 
Jones,  General  J.  M.,  25 ;  killed, 
26,  74 

Jones,  General  Samuel,  142 
Jones,  General,  cavalry  brigade  of, 
16  (note),  194  et  seq. 

Kautz,  General  A.  V.,  137,  139, 
143, 145  et  seq.,  158etseq.,  196 
et  seq.,  206  et  seq.,  212,  226, 
237,  239  et  seq.,  247,  272  et 
seq.,  2S4  et  seq.,  287,  293 
Kellogg,  Colonel,  176 
Keifer,  Colonel,  35 
Keitt,  Colonel,  173 
Kellogg,  Colonel,  331,  348,  350 
Kelly,  Colonel  Patrick,  217 
Kemper,  brigade  of,  120,  150  (note) 
Kershxw,  General,  division  of,  3, 
15  (note),  16,  38,  41,  43,  45 
(note),  60,  63,  73  et  seq.,  108, 
113,  130,  169,  172  et  seq.,  179, 
182,  214,  216,  221  et  seq.,  249, 
252, 267,269,308, 371,  382  et  seq. 
Kerwin,  brigade  of,  301  et  seq. 
Kiddoo,  Colonel,  306 
King,  Colonel,  234 
Kirkland,  General,  brigade  of,  25, 
29.  193,  288 

Kirkley,  Mr.  J.  W.,  272 
Batching,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  43, 
91,  110  et  seq. 

Lane,  General,  brigade  of,  34.  54 
(note),  102  et  seq.,  193,  279 
(note),  280,  293,  326,  333 
(note),  363,  369 

Langdon,  Captain  Loomis  L.,  372 
(note) 


Law,  General,  brigade  of,  16  (note), 
46,  179,  182,  193,  284,  287,  289 

Leasure,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  45 

Ledlie,  General,  division  of,  218, 
252,  254  et  seq. ,  259,  265 

Lee,  General  Custis,  division  of, 
371,  375,  382,  384 

Lee,  General  Fitzhugh,  division  of, 
15  (note),  51  et  seq.,  59,  61,  63, 
69  et  seq.,  134  et  seq.,  164,  171 
et  seq.,  175  (note),  178  et  seq., 
196,  230  et  seq.,  249,  252,  267, 
326,  328,  334,  342,  352, 354,  367, 
370,  372,  374  et  seq.,  376  et 
seq.,  386,  388,  390  et  seq.,  396 
et  seq. 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  1 ;  at  Or¬ 
ange  Court  House,  2,  6,  8,  9,  11 
et  seq.,  15  et  seq.,  22;  meets 
commander  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  23,  28  et 
seq.,  34,  36,  39  (note),  45,  57, 
62,  64,  67,  69  et  seq.,  72,  76, 
82,  88,  94  et  seq.,  104,  106,  112, 
119  et  seq.,  121  (note),  122  et 
seq.  ;  at  Hanover  Junction, 
123  et  seq.,  127,  132  et  seq.. 
138,  159,  165  et  seq.,  170,  179 
et  seq.,  188  et  seq.,  192  et  seq., 
195  et  seq.,  198  et  seq.,  202, 
204,  209  et  seq.,  214  et  seq., 
220  et  seq.,  224  et  seq.,  252, 
259,  267  et  seq.,  273,  275  et 
seq.,  288,  290,  300,  303,  311  et 
seq.,  314,  316  et  seq.,  320,  322 
et  seq.,  326,  329  et  seq.,  343, 
344,  354  et  seq.,  358,  363,  371, 
373  et  seq.,  376  et  seq.,  384  et 
seq.,  388  et  seq. 

Lee,  General  W.  H.  F.,  cavalry 
division  of,  134,  161,  177  et 
seq.,  189,  220,  235,  237  etseq., 
249,  252,  269,  275,  277,  294, 
325,  328,  334  et  seq.,  342,  344, 
351  et  seq.,  354,  376,  397 

Lee,  Rear-Admiral  S.  P.,  138,  140 
et  seq.,  146  et  seq.,  203  et 
seq. 

Lewis,  Colonel,  124,  150  (note), 
152,  159,  390 

Lincoln,  President  Abraham,  4, 
341  (note),  357 

Livermore,  Colonel,  210  (note), 
387  (note) 

Locke,  Colonel,  356  (note) 

Lockwood,  division  of,  174 


INDEX. 


447 


Lomax,  brigade  of,  134 
Longstreet,  General  James,  at 
Gordon ville,  2  et  seq.,  15,  16 
(note),  22  et  seq.,  28,  30,  33  et 
seq.,  37  ;  arrives  at  Wilderness, 
38etseq.;  wounded,  45,  61,  64, 
65  (note),  66,  69  et  seq.,  77 
(note),  82etseq. ,  89,  92  (note), 
101, 104,  108;  at  Hanover  Junc¬ 
tion,  123,  124  (note),  125  et 
seq.,  131,  165  et  seq.,  174,  180 
et  seq.,  189,  252,  278,  289,  304 
et  seq.,  308  (note),  310,  317, 
320,  354  et  seq.,  369,  371,  375 
et  seq. ,  384  et  seq. ,  390,  392  et 
seq.,  398  et  seq. 

Loring,  Colonel,  252,  257,  261 
Lowell,  Colonel  C.  R. ,  245  (note) 
Lyle,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  45,  60, 
274 

Lyman,  Colonel  Theodore,  48 
(note),  55  (note) 

McAllister,  Colonel,  234 
McAllister,  General,  brigade  of, 
33  (note),  43 ;  wounded,  48 
(note),  86,  94,  301,  et  seq., 
313 

McCandless,  brigade  of,  27 
McClellan,  General,  138 
McComb,  brigade  of,  323,  363 
McDougall,  General,  188,  36S 
McGowan,  General,  34,  54  (note)  ; 
wounded,  99,  et  seq.,  106,  279 
(note),  280,  326,  330,  et  seq., 
355,  367,  390  (note) 

McGregor,  battery  of,  344,  350 
McIntosh,  177,  204,  240 
Mackenzie,  General,  323,  338,  343, 
346  et  seq.,  352,  354,  374,  375 
(note),  396  et  seq. 

McKeon,  brigade  of,  183  et  seq., 
265  (note) 

McKnight,  battery  of,  281 
McLaughlin,  General,  318 
McLaw,  division  of,  16  (note) 
McMahon,  Colonel,  184,  265  (note) 
McMaster,  Colonel,  256,  263 
McParlin,  Surgeon  Thomas  A., 
statement  of  killed  and  wound¬ 
ed,  53,  63  (note),  72  (note),  89, 
115  et  seq.,  133,  191,  306  etseq. 
McRae,  brigade  of,  279  (note),  280, 
326,  355,  367 

Macy,  Colonel,  265  (note),  272 
Madill,  brigade  of,  368 


Mahone,  General,  division  of,  43, 
64  et  seq.,  77  (note),  80,  82 
(note),  88  et  seq.,  98,  103,  108, 
132  (note),  179,  229,  238,  240, 
252,  255,  259  et  seq.,  262,  263 
(note),  269,  271,  275  et  seq., 
279  (note),  294,  300,  302,  303 
(note),  315,  371,  375,  384,  386 
et  seq.,  389  et  seq. 

Maine,  regiments  of :  Fifth,  100 ; 

Sixth,  48;  Twentieth,  223 
Marshall,  Colonel  E.  G.,  187,  263, 
392 

Marston,  General,  205 
Martin,  brigade  of,  142,  148,  150 
(note),  151,  159,  190 
Martindale,  General,  division  of, 
175,  185  et  seq.,  206  et  seq., 
221,  223 

Maryland,  regiment  of  :  First,  113 
Massachusetts,  regiments  of : 
Fifth,  208  (note),  378;  Twen¬ 
tieth,  55,  272 ;  Twenty-eighth, 
183 ;  Fifty-ninth,  218 
Maynadier,  battery  of,  240 
Mayo,  Colonel,  103,  343  (note), 
349  (note),  350  et  seq. ,  353 
Meade,  Colonel,  187 
Meade,  General  George  G.,  recom¬ 
mends  consolidation  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  3  ;  in¬ 
structions  to,  5  et  seq. ;  move¬ 
ment  of,  12,  13  (note),  14,  23 
et  seq.,  31,  35,  39  et  seq.,  48 
(note),  50  et  seq.,  57  et  seq., 
65,  67,  69  et  seq.,  78,  81  ;  des¬ 
patch  from  Grant.  89  et  seq. , 
91  (note),  97,  104,  108,  111,  113, 
114  (note),  119  et  seq.,  127  et 
seq.,  132,  160,  169  et  seq.,  174, 
185  et  seq.,  196,  205,  216,218 
(note),  220  et  seq.,  227  et  seq., 
235  et  seq.,  239,  241,  247,  250 
et  seq.,  254  et  seq,,  257  et  seq., 
260  et  seq.,  273,  280,  290,  292, 
294,  296,  298  et  seq.,  302,  306, 
313  et  seq.,  320  et  seq.,  330, 
332,  336  et  seq.,  356  (note),  358, 
366  et  seq.,  373  et  seq.,  376 
et  seq.,  386,  389,  392,  394  et 
seq.,  399  (note) 

Meigs,  General,  245  (note) 

Mendell,  Major,  U.  S.  Engineers, 
90,  92,  202 

Merritt,  General,  division  of,  52, 
59  et  seq.,  63,  67  et  seq.,  134  et 


448 


INDEX. 


seq.,  165,  327  et  seq. ,  336,  343 
et  seq.,  346,  370,  374  et  seq., 
380,  382  et  seq.,  386,  395  et  seq. 
Metcalf,  Captain,  301  et  seq. 
Michigan,  regiments  of:  Second  In¬ 
fantry,  103 ;  Sixteenth  Infan¬ 
try,  291 

Miles,  General,  62,  65,  78  et  seq., 
88,  92,  94,  183,  271  et  seq., 
279  et  seq.,  295,  312  (note), 
313,  329,  331  et  seq.,  362,  367 
et  seq.,  378,  388  et  seq. 
Minnesota,  regiment  of :  First,  303 
(note) 

Mitchell,  Major,  301  et  seq. 
Montague,  Colonel,  288 
Moody,  brigade  of :  328,  384  (note) 
Morgan,  Colonel,  Hancock’s  Chief 
of  Staff,  31,  40,  205  (note) 
Morris,  Colonel,  183 
Morris,  General,  brigade  of,  30, 
50  ;  wounded,  72  (note) 

Mott,  General  G.,  division  of,  13 
(note),  31  et  seq.,  38,  40,  43,  47 
et  seq.,  71,  77  et  seq.,  81,  84, 
86  et  seq.,  90  et  seq  ,  94,  96  et 
seq.,  109,  223,  228  et  seq.,  249, 
253,  269  et  seq.,  271  et  seq  , 
274,  278  (note),  280,  282,  292, 
295  et  seq  ,  298  et  seq.,  301, 
303,  310,  312  et  seq.,  332  et 
seq.,  362,  367,  378,  381 
Munford,  General,  334  et  seq., 
340,  342,  344,  349,  353  et  seq., 
360  et  seq. ,  377,  385,  390  ' 
Murphy,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  265 
(note),  281,  315 

Napoleon,  Emperor  Louis,  7 
Neill,  General,  brigade  of,  24  et 
seq.,  28,  35,  83,  175  et  seq., 
178,  185,  221 

New  Jersey,  regiment  of :  Third, 
115  (note) 

New  York,  regiments  of  :  Forty- 
third,  85 ;  Sixty-first,  281 ; 
Sixty-sixth,  183 ;  Sixty-ninth, 
315;  Seventy-third,  33  (note)  ; 
Eighty-eigth.  217 ;  One  Hun¬ 
dred  and  Twelfth,  176;  One 
Hundred  and  Sixty-fourth, 
184.  Battery  of :  Eighth, 
184 

North  Anna  River,  movement  to, 
119  et  seq.,  230 
Nugent,  brigade  of,  368 


Ohio,  regiment  of :  Second,  115 
(note) 

Old,  General,  corps  of,  249,  252  et 
seq.,  257  et  seq.,  261,  274,  284 
et  seq.,  290,  369,  323  et  seq., 
329,  333  (note),  334,  362  et 
seq.,  369,  373,  378,  385,  387, 
391,  394,  396  et  seq.,  399 
(note) 

Osborn,  General  F.  A.,  214  et  seq., 

221 

Owen,  General,  brigade  of,  33,  38, 
41,  93  et  seq.,  97,  183  et  seq. 

Paine,  General  Charles  J.,  divi¬ 
sion  of,  285,  309 

Pamunkey  River,  passage  of,  160 
et  seq. 

Parke,  General,  223,  272,  290  et 
seq.,  294  et  seq.,  318  et  seq., 
329.  362,  366 
Parks,  General,  325 
Pearson,  General,  336 
Pease,  Lieutenant,  394,  399  (note) 
Peebles,  farm  of,  290  (note),  291 
Pegram,  farm  of,  290  (note),  291  et 
seq. 

Pegram,  General,  brigade  of,  27 ; 
wounded,  35,  96,  112,  168,  195 
(note),  275,  314,  344 
Pendleton,  General  William  N.,  15 
(note) 

Pennington,  brigade  of,  335.  351 
Pennsylvania, regiments  of:  Forty- 
eighth,  250  ;  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-eighth,  217 
Penrose,  brigade  of,  28,  35,  66 
Perkinson’s  mills,  381 
Perrin,  General,  brigade  of,  98  et 
seq.,  105 

Perry,  Colonel,  187 
Perry,  General  W.  F.,  wounded, 
46,  49 

Petersburg,  Va.,  198  et  seq.,  206  et 
seq.,  242,  251  et  seq.,  310  et 
seq.,  322,  324,  367  et  seq.,  372 
Pickett,  General,  division  of,  3,  15 
(note),  16  (note),  120,  122;  at 
Hanover  Junction,  124  et  seq., 
132,  140  et  seq.,  159,  169,  172, 
174  et  seq.,  214  et  seq.,  220  et 
seq.,  288,  305,  326,  328  et  seq., 
335  et  seq.,  341  et  seq.,  348, 
349  (note),  350  et  seq.,  354  et " 
seq.,  357,  362,  367,  370  et  seq., 
375,  380,  384 


INDEX. 


449 


Pierce,  General,  brigade  of,  130, 
223,  265  (note),  301  et  seq. 
Pleasants,  Colonel,  250 
Poague,  battery  of,  388,  390 
Pond,  Colonel,  294 
Porter,  Colonel,  184,  265  (note) 
Potter,  General  R.  B.,  division  of, 
14  (note),  21,  36,  46,  72,  102, 
111,  121,  131  et  seq.,  180,  188, 
217  et  seq.,  223,  250,  252,  254, 
257,  259  et  seq.,  274,  275,  291 
et  seq. ,  318,  366 
Preston,  Colonel,  189 

Ramseur,  General,  brigade  of,  37, 
96;  wounded,  97  et  seq.,  101, 
105,  112  et  seq  ,  180,  195  (note) 
Ramsey,  Colonel,  223,  265  (note), 
368 

Ransom,  General  Robert,  brigade 
of,  142,  144  et  seq.,  148,  159  et 
seq  ,  157,  159,  254,  256  et  seq., 
328,  344,  349  et  seq. ,  384  (note) 
Rapidan  River,  2,  18  et  seq. 
Rawlins,  General,  40,  173,  356 
(note) 

Read,  General  Theodore,  378,  3S5 
Reams’s  Station,  237  et  seq.,  279, 
312 

Rice,  General,  brigade  of,  82,  89 
Richmond,  Va.,  7,  137  et  seq.,  268 
et  seq.,  322,  372 

Ricketts,  General  James  B.,  13 
(note),  24,  28,  31,  91,  101,  160, 
175,  185,  243 

Roberts,  brigade  of,  328,  344 
Robinson,  General  J.  C. ,  division 
of,  13  (note),  23,  45,  60  et  seq.; 
wounded,  72  (note),  81  (note) 
Roder,  battery  of,  302 
Rodes,  General,  15  et  seq.  (notes), 
22  et  seq.,  25  et  seq.,  49,  64,  66, 
73  et  seq.,  83,  89,  94,  96,  105, 
168,  172,  179,  188  et  seq., 
244 

Rosser,  cavalry  brigade  of,  35, 126, 
128,  164  (note),  177,  231  et  seq., 
234,  239,  325,  328,  334,  342, 
344,  352,  377,  385,  390,  397 
Russell,  Colonel  Charles  S.,  260 
(note) 

Russell,  Colonel  H.  S.,  208  (note) 
Russell,  General,  brigade  of,  28; 
division  of.  83  et  seq. ,  91,  97, 
114,  160  et  seq.,  166, 175et  seq., 
185,  244 


Sailor’s  Creek,  379  et  seq.,  384 
Sanders,  brigade  of,  260,  277 
Sanford.  Colonel,  330 
Scales,  brigade  of,  34,  88,  102,  279 
(note),  281 ,  288,  326,  355,  367 
Schofield,  General,  309 
Seddon,  Hon.  J.  A.,  121  (note) 
Sedgwick,  Major-General  John,  13, 
21,  23,  25,  30,  36,  39,  42,  50,  51 
(note),  54,  57  et  seq.,  65 ;  killed, 
71,  72  (note) 

Seymour,  General,  24,  28,  35,  49, 
51  (note),  381  etseq. 

Shaler,  brigade  of,  49 
Sheridan,  Major-General  Philip 
H.,  appointed  to  Cavalry 
Corps,  13,  18,  21,  36,  39,  42, 
51  et  seq.,  58  et  seq.,  63,  66 
et  seq.;  instructions  to  Gregg, 
68,  70,  133  et  seq.,  149,  160 
et  seq.,  164  et  seq.,  169,  171  et 
seq.,  177,  194,  196,  201,  230  et 
seq.,  241  et  seq.,  247  et  seq., 
252  et  seq.,  261  (note),  267, 
273,  308,  323  et  seq.,  334  et 
seq.,  343  et  seq.,  353  et  seq., 
360  et  seq.,  367,  370,  373  et 
seq.,  376  et  seq.,  380  et  seq., 
383,  385  et  seq.,  391,  394,  396 
et  seq. 

Sherman,  General,  309,  316  etseq., 
322,  324 

Sickle,  General,  326 
Sigel,  General,  6,  124 
Sigfried,  Colonel,  260 
Smith,  General,  brigade  of,  334  et 
seq.,  377,  382,  396 
Smith,  General  M.  L.,  15  (note), 
43 

Smith,  General  Wm.  F.,  137,  139, 
145  et  seq.,  152  et  seq.,  157  et 
seq.,  170  et  seq.,  181  et  seq.; 
report  of,  185  et  seq.,  193,  200, 
206  et  seq.,  221 

Smyth,  General,  brigade  of,  33,  78 
et  seq.,  92,  388 

Smyth  (Gibbon’s  division!,  131, 
270,  298  et  seq.,  302,  312  et  seq. 
Snell’s  Bridge  over  the  Po  River, 
67  et  seq.,  75,  112,  123 
South  Carolina,  regiments  of : 
First,  100 ;  Fourth,  164  (note)  ; 
Fifth,  164  (note) ;  Sixth, 
164  (note),  234 ;  Eighteenth, 
256 ;  Twentieth,  173  ;  Twenty- 
third,  256 


450 


INDEX. 


Spear,  Colonel,  197,  273  (General) 
278,  352 

Spottsyl vania  Court  House,  Va.,  57 
et  seq. 

Stacey,  Lieutenant,  301 
Stagg,  brigade  of,  380,  383 
Stafford,  brigade  of,  25,  27  et  seq.; 

killed,  28,  74,  195  (note) 
Stannard,  General,  187,  285  et  seq., 
289 

Stannard’s  mills,  Va.,  120  et  seq. 
Staunton,  Va.,  6 
Steadman,  brigade  of,  278 
Stedman,  Colonel,  187 
Steuart,  Brigadier-General  George 
H.,  brigade  of,  25,  27,  42,  85 
(note);  captured,  93,  95,  1C6, 
328,  344,  350 
Stevensburg,  Va  ,  1 
Stevens,  Colonel,  286 
Stevenson.  General  Thomas  G.,  14 
(note),  20,  36,  39,  41  et  seq., 
72 ;  killed,  87,  89 
Stewart,  G.  H.,  195  (note) 

Stewart,  General  J.  E.  B.,  15,  22  ; 
cavalry  force  attacked,  52,  74, 
134  et  seq. 

Stone,  Colonel,  29,  43 
Sweitzer,  Colonel,  60  et  seq.,  179 

Tabb,  Colonel,  143 
Taylor,  Colonel  Walter  H.,  15 
(note),  16,  124  et  seq.,  132 
(note),  394 

Telegraph  Road,  120  et  seq.,  125 
et  seq. 

Terrill,  Colonel,  168 
Terry,  brigade  of,  74,  96,  142,  150 
(note),  152  et  seq.,  137,  147, 
154,  158,  214,  220,  271,  285, 
287,  304,  306,  309,  328,  343 
(note),  344,  349  (note),  350  et 
seq. 

Thomas,  Colonel,  263 
Thomas,  brigade  of,  34,  88,  102 
et  seq.,  114,  326,  363,  369 
Thompson,  Major,  385 
Tidbail,  General,  319 
Todd’s  Tavern,  20,  23,  36,  51  et 
seq.,  57  et  seq.,  59 
Torbert,  General  A.  T.  A.,  13 
(note);  division  of,  18,  21,  36, 
120,  163,  165  et  seq.,  169  et 
seq.,  177,  231,  233  et  seq.,  267 
Totopotomoy,  the,  161  et  seq. 
Trevylian  Station,  Va.,  230  et  seq. 


Tucker,  Commodore,  375 
Turner,  General,  137, 147,  154,  253, 
259  et  seq.,  323,  365,  369,  397 
Tyler  General  R.  O.,  division  of, 
109,  111  et  seq.,  115  (note), 
183,  265  (note) 

United  States,  regiment  of : 

Twenty-second,  208  (note) 
Upton,  Brigadier-General,  brigade 
of,  28,  35,  50,  83  et  seq. ;  made 
brigadier-general,  86,94  (note), 
108,  175 

Upton,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  28,  83, 
100 

Vaughn,  General,  cavalry  brigade 
of,  16  (note),  194  et  seq. 
Venable,  Colonel,  132  (note),  393 
Virginia,  regiments  of:  Thirteenth, 
168  ;  Fifty-second,  168;  Fifty- 
ninth,  143. 

Wadsworth,  General  James  S., 
13  (note),  23,  25  et  seq.,  34, 
38,  41  et  seq.;  mortally  wound¬ 
ed,  44 

Walker,  General  H.  H.,  brigade 
of,  29;  wounded,  80,  89,  103, 
189,  215  (note),  274  et  seq., 
391,  396 

Walker,  General  Lindsey,  375  et 
seq. 

Walker,  General  W.  S.,  23.  25,  27 
et  seq.,  74,  85,  93,  1C6,  142, 
158  et  seq. 

Walker,  J.  A.,  195  (note) 

Wallace,  Colon  el  William, 63  (note), 
325,  328,  344,  349  et  seq.,  384 
(note) 

Wallace,  General,  243  et  seq. 

Ward,  brigade  of,  47 
Warner,  Captain  E.  R.,  356 

(note) 

Warner,  Colonel,  regiment  of,  109 
Warren  Major-General  G.  K.,  ap¬ 
pointed  to  command  of  Fifth 
Corps,  13,  21,  23,  25,  29  et  seq., 
36  et  seq.,  39,  42  et  seq.,  51 
(note)  54,  57  et  seq.,  63  65,  78, 
81,  89,  91  (note),  100  et  seq., 
105  etseq.,  110,  113,  114  (note), 
120  et  seq.,  125,  127  et  seq., 
131, 132  (note),  166 etseq.,  174, 
176  et  seq.,  188,  193,  196,  200 
et  seq.,  213,  219  (note),  220, 


INDEX. 


451 


223,  227,  247,  253  et  seq.,  258, 
261,  272  et  seq.,  290  et  seq., 
295  et  seq.,  301  (note),  302  et 
seq.,  307,  310,  312  et  seq.,  320, 
324  et  seq.,  327,  329  et  seq., 
336  et  seq.,  355  et  seq.,  372 
Washburn,  Colonel,  378,  385 
Washington,  D.  C.,  243  et  seq. 
Watkins,  Colonel,  168 
Webb,  General  A.  S.,  brigade  of, 
39,  41,  42  (note),  81 ;  wounded, 
94,  97,  106,  265  (note),  320 
Weisiger,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  103, 
260,  263,  275 

Weitzel,  General,  137,  146  et  seq., 
152  et  seq.,  157,  202,  288  et 
seq. ,  304  et  seq. ,  309,  323,  372 
Welch,  Colonel,  291 
Welles,  Colonel,  374 
Werner,  artillery  of,  282 
West,  Colonel,  137,  139 
Wharton,  brigade  of,  16  (note) 
Wheaton,  General,  division  of,  31, 
91,  97,  314  efc  seq..  382  et  seq. 
Whitaker,  Captain,  239  et  seq. 
White,  division  of,  274  et  seq. 
White  Oak  Ridge,  Va.,  325  et  seq., 
336,  338,  340,  342,  345  et  seq., 
351  et  seq.,  354,  357  et  seq., 
360  et  seq. 

Whiting,  General,  148,  150  et  seq. , 
155  et  seq. 

Whittier,  Colonel,  392  et  seq.,  395, 
399  (note) 

Wickham,  brigade  of,  134,  234 
Wilcox,  General  C.  M.,  15  (note), 
22,  29,  31,  34  et  seq.,  46,  54 
(note),  88,  96,  99  et  seq.,  102, 
122,  131  et  seq.,  179,  198,  228 
et  seq.,  249,  25.2,  269,  271,  277, 
279  (note),  280  et  seq.,  288, 
292,  294,  300,  327,  333  (note), 
863,  398,  365,  369  et  seq.,  386 
Wilde,  General,  139 
Wilderness,  the,  10  et  seq.  ;  battle 
of,  23  et  seq.,  44  (note) 


Willcox,  General  O.  B.,  14  (note), 
21,  36,  46  et  seq.,  72,  102  et 
seq.,  180,  187,  218,  223,  252, 
254,  257,  262,  274  et  seq.,  280, 
282,  291  et  seq.,  318  et  seq., 
366,  372 

Willet,  brigade  of,  302 
Williams,  General  Seth,  391  et  seq. 
Willis,  Colonel,  168 
Wilson,  General  J.  H.,  13  (note), 
cavalry  of,  lSet  seq.,  21  et  seq., 
24,  35  et  seq. ,  56,  63,  67  et  seq. ; 
on  the  North  Anna,  133  et 
seq.,  160,  164,  170  et  seq.,  177 
etseq.,  180,  188  et  seq.,  200, 
202  et  seq. ,  214,  235  et  seq. , 
261  (note),  267,  279 
Winthrop,  General  Frederick,  330 
et  seq. ,  348,  354,  360 
Wisconsin,  regiment  of:  Thirty- 
sixth,  184 

Wise,  brigade  of,  142  et  seq.,  148, 
150  (note),  151,  159,197.207, 
210,  213  (note),  215  etseq.,  254 
et  seq.,  308  (note)  et  seq.,  325 
et  seq.,  328,  331  et  seq.,  354, 
374,  384  (note) 

Wofford,  General,  brigade  of,  43, 
46,  63,  175 

Wright,  brigade  of,  260 
Wright,  General  H.  G.,  13  (note), 
24,  26.  28,  37,  50,  51  (note),  61, 
66;  succeeds  to  command  of 
Sixth  Corps.  71,  78,  81,  83  et 
seq.,  86,  88  et  seq.,  97  et  seq., 
101,  106,  110,  120  et  seq.,  160, 
166  et  seq.,  172  et  seq.,  186, 
200  et  seq.,  203,  219,  227  et 
seq.,  244  et  seq.,  256,  320  et 
seq. ,  325,  329,  362  et  seq. ,  365 
et  seq.,  369,  382  et  seq.,  387, 
389 

York,  General,  brigade  of,  74,  93 
Young,  brigade  of,  164  (note),  171, 
177,  231 


WiitcTost. 


feldO  QTnwrf 


)i%imes\tUe 


Uddleburg 


Cedar  K/ 


.tfdsfonrn/ 


Gmfluon*- 


irTawrv , 


ropci'ide 


Woodstoc] 


Aiexa.ndri 


tm'i/le 


- marJu 


jrvwto 


timw 


Vcirrn  arket 


ftlors  M 


wBdttb 


)  Or  leans 


Jfcuvfo/iduf 


(r/r?. 


Occoquan 


irenlvi 


.UdeUsSt. 


Germantown 


Jefferson' 


QBristensbury 


Voodville 

A,  Jjclanon  Cfu 


gallon 


QJilkTon'n 


vaJutn/i 


firifflnaburg 


Sicilian 


Uornsdl/c 


'^.TUrheyhote ! 
M’.MiivCh.  1 


RoskUl  Ch- 


fivn  Works 

Vaverlie 


llatrisonburg- 


inn^v 


Madison  C.Hj 


ffe/npstdudj 


’•'almouli 


RED^ftKSBURi 


tftRepubUc 


Vuudieiflc 


^rdsvitle 


' OlOCl 


lan  St  cl. 


i  films  Zflo. 


tiitf/ind 


Verr tiers  i. 


iivrn 


TfortVomvcv,' 


Gordons  rh 


ffTiitehai 


Ssfierr. 


Mnllo^ 


?nsrt'Uc 


Whiten 
pi.  /j 


Mint  Spy  j>0\ 


G^trrK 
fylcrsviUe  Y 


(^aylrtftesviue! 


©  .  V 

Green  Springs 


ic£s  Tatvm 


ippaHanitort 


~nou± 


tetponj. 


uVen’Toien 


Bed's  fjtds. 


~rnionMr?ls 


•  VotPpaxx 
.furruLce 


Vlemii ^([1 


Gardners'. 


PrictS 5 


i  bcrlak. 


Beulah  Ch. 


Xanovci 


tnl/edi  Ctu 


4ound 


JYcgmtboG 


(aydenseiUe' 


fcbrcn  th  ■ 


(XOrmcinS  ,  . 

[igPpraylers) 


anover. 


Springs 


[ontirds  V- 


Lovini 


^er kins 


tries 


Colum 


StK\C-Quccn 

nc.n. 


Id  no  i 


Johnson* 


Warminster , 


Coalpits  © 


'fkinsoris/. 


artdimrbto 

oesCHUL 


'QJeftcnson. 


fH/oZF 

spatch  St. 


TlfarGlasfoi 


(aruzkinaiK'n 


ftn^tiallsSlu. 


imith  field 


Grcemva\ 


Jew  Kent  * 


.RSEHAL 


Amherstc£> 


Curn^Ql^ 


SerenPin^ 

[kite 


uacon 


luguids  XT 


iPOliivtCh . 


Toirud^ji- 


MtdeOur 


irdsyilie 


yBotlOl 


Ydsrille 


"Way  Ho. 


jeApLodensT. 


Chaste) 


ion  to  mi 


.inelia 


Appomallqe 


(itdnsiii 


ft /rn\loiu 


lUiers  CK. 


.Woods 


Slarket 


mpbcll 


tf’rinccSeora-e 
Jc.H.  \  ° 


o0The1. 


[ottawav 


UJifc  Hr. 


&  Whiter 


Hiinqryt*. 


VIRGINIA 

between 

WASHINGTON  &  RICHMOND 


ladcnsbuntf 

GTO  N 


Scale 

»f?S765432.i9 


ort  Tobacco 


la  tkerion  q  «/>  'J  (dr ket 


wmw. 

SIONimi  JO  ASfSH^AIMH 

Aavaan 


u4-7,sop 


'  tv  / 


/  /V  / 


*  ■  T- 


library 

IVLRS1TV  OF  ILLINOIS 

L’awi'un 


I  t- 


LIBRARY 

r.SITY  OF  ILLINOIS 


’Yellow  Tavern 


y.aclow  Br, 


iMechanicsville  Br. 


Bridge 


Dr.  Garnett 


oJU-A 
Hew  DridgeCli.' 


•ridged 

pevine 


'illiamsbutg  Turn. 


teadow  Sta. 


Q-  •  IMrs.Vauglian 

xxy  rx  w 


\ 

\  dVIra-HobsohJ 
White’s  Tavern.  ‘3Ir,s._Allen 
IrsfChfld  l'essv;  ^ V\ 


Bowers 


laptist 


illiams 


jf Bridge 


Kiddle 


Fussell’s  Hill 


FTffilLMER 


Jenni: 


Willis  Heth. 
A  Ch. 


A  M  Carter 


,  ^DRURY’S 
4  BLUFF 

;/gs7awai 


dt.A.Willi: 


Ponton 


lgslandt 


Dr.Woolridge 


Gregory 


‘Friend 


J.Wbolridge 


Howletts 


Gap  Canal' 


Despatch  Sta 


CWV 


MAH 


{Bottom's  Hr. 


isher's  Br 


’s  Br 


rner 


Watkins 


J  ]  MAL'VERN 
■'  /  H'LL 

/’w^XL.Femp 


SCALE 


RICHMOND. 


1  %  %  %  o  .1  Mile 

t United  States  'Worts 


Turkey  Bridge  Confederate  Works 


LIBRARY 

r.SITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
URBAN A 


